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Exhibit A 
Westlaw 
U.C.A. 1953 §73-3-3 Page 1 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 73. Water and Irrigation 
*i§ Chapter 3. Appropriation 
-t § 73-3-3. Permanent or temporary changes in point of diversion, place of use, or purpose of use 
(1) For purposes of this section: 
(a) "Permanent change" means a change for an indefinite period of time with an intent to relinquish the origin-
al point of diversion, place of use, or purpose of use. 
(b) "Temporary change" means a change for a fixed period of time not exceeding one year. 
(2)(a) Any person entitled to the use of water may make permanent or temporary changes in the: 
(i) point of diversion; 
(ii) place of use; or 
(iii) purpose of use for which the water was originally appropriated. 
(b) Except as provided by Section 73-3-30, a change may not be made if it impairs a vested water right 
without just compensation. 
(3) A person entitled to use water shall change a point of diversion, place of use, or purpose of water use, includ-
ing water involved in a general adjudication or other suit, in the manner provided in this section. 
(4)(a) A person entitled to use water may not make a change unless the state engineer approves the change ap-
plication. 
(b) A person entitled to use water shall submit a change application upon forms furnished by the state engineer 
and shall set forth: 
(i) the applicant's name; 
©2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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(ii) the water right description; 
(iii) the water quantity; 
(iv) the stream or water source; 
(v) if applicable, the point on the stream or water source where the water is diverted; 
(vi) if applicable, the point to which it is proposed to change the diversion of the water; 
(vii) the place, purpose, and extent of the present use; 
(viii) the place, purpose, and extent of the proposed use; and 
(ix) any other information that the state engineer requires. 
(5)(a) The state engineer shall follow the same procedures, and the rights and duties of the applicants with re-
spect to applications for permanent changes of point of diversion, place of use, or purpose of use shall be the 
same, as provided in this title for applications to appropriate water. 
(b) The state engineer may waive notice for a permanent change application involving only a change in point 
of diversion of 660 feet or less. 
(6)(a) The state engineer shall investigate all temporary change applications. 
(b) If the state engineer finds that the temporary change will not impair a vested water right, the state engineer 
shall issue an order authorizing the change. 
(c) If the state engineer finds that the change sought might impair a vested water right, before authorizing the 
change, the state engineer shall give notice of the application to any person whose right may be affected by 
the change. 
(d) Before making an investigation or giving notice, the state engineer may require the applicant to deposit a 
sum of money sufficient to pay the expenses of the investigation and publication of notice. 
(7)(a) Except as provided by Section 73-3-30, the state engineer may not reject a permanent or temporary 
change application for the sole reason that the change would impair a vested water right. 
©2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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(b) If otherwise proper, the state engineer may approve a permanent or temporary change application for part 
of the water involved or upon the condition that the applicant acquire the conflicting water right. 
(8)(a) A person holding an approved application for the appropriation of water may change the point of diver-
sion, place of use, or purpose of use. 
(b) A change of an approved application does not: 
(i) affect the priority of the original application; or 
(ii) extend the time period within which the construction of work is to begin or be completed. 
(9) Any person who changes or who attempts to change a point of diversion, place of use, or purpose of use, 
either permanently or temporarily, without first applying to the state engineer in the manner provided in this sec-
tion: 
(a) obtains no right; 
(b) is guilty of a crime punishable under Section 73-2-27 if the change or attempted change is made know-
ingly or intentionally; and 
(c) is guilty of a separately punishable offense for each day of the unlawful change. 
(10)(a) This section does not apply to the replacement of an existing well by a new well drilled within a radius 
of 150 feet from the point of diversion of the existing well. 
(b) Any replacement well must be drilled in accordance with the requirements of Section 73-3-28. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 1919, c. 67, § 8 ; Laws 1937, c. 130, § 1; Laws 1939, c. 111,§ l ;Laws 1949, c. 97, § 1; Laws 1959, c. 137, 
§ 1; Laws 1986, c. 40, § 1; Laws 1987, c. 161, § 289; Laws 1992, c. 208, § 1; Laws 2001, c. 136, § 3, eff. April 
30, 2001; Laws 2005, c. 215, § 5, eff. May 2, 2005; Laws 2008, c. 311, § 2, eff. May 5, 2008. 
Codifications R.S. 1933, § 100-3-3; C. 1943, § 100-3-3. 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Approval of applications by state engineer, criteria, see § 73-3a-108. 
©2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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Westlaw 
U.C.A. 1953 §73-3-3.5 Page 1 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 73. Water and Irrigation 
*i§ Chapter 3. Appropriation 
_• § 73-3-3.5. Application for a change of point of diversion, place of use, or purpose of use of water 
in a water company made by a shareholder 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Shareholder" means the owner of a share of stock, or other evidence of stock ownership, that entitles the 
person to a proportionate share of water in a water company. 
(b) "Water company" means any company, operating for profit or not for profit, in which a shareholder has 
the right to receive a proportionate share, based on that shareholder's ownership interest, of water delivered by 
the company. 
(2) A shareholder who seeks to change the point of diversion, place of use, or purpose of use of the shareholder's 
proportionate share of water in the water company shall submit a request for the change, in writing, to the water 
company. This request shall include the following information: 
(a) the details of the requested change, which may include the point of diversion, period of use, place, or 
nature of use; 
(b) the quantity of water sought to be changed; 
(c) the certificate number of the stock affected by the change; 
(d) a description of the land proposed to be retired from irrigation pursuant to Section 73-3-3, if the proposed 
change in place or nature of use of the water involves a situation where the water was previously used for ir-
rigation; 
(e) an agreement by the shareholder to continue to pay all applicable corporate assessments on the share af-
fected by the change; and 
(f) any other information that the water company may reasonably need to evaluate the requested change ap-
plication. 
©2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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(3)(a) A water company shall make a decision and provide written notice of that decision on a shareholder's re-
quest for a change application within 120 days from receipt of the request. 
(b) Based on the facts and circumstances of each proposed change, a water company may take the following 
action: 
(i) approve the change request; 
(ii) approve the change request with conditions; or 
(iii) deny the change request. 
(c) If the water company fails to respond to a shareholder's request for a change application, pursuant to Sub-
section (3)(a), the failure to respond shall be considered to be a denial of the request. 
(d) The water company may not withhold approval if any potential damage, liability, or impairment to the wa-
ter company, or its shareholders, can be reasonably mitigated without cost to the water company. 
(e) A water company may consider the following factors in evaluating change applications: 
(i) any increased cost to the water company or its shareholders; 
(ii) interference with the water company's ability to manage and distribute water for the benefit of all share-
holders; 
(iii) whether the proposed change represents more water than the shareholder's pro rata share of the water 
company's right; 
(iv) impairment of either the quantity or quality of water delivered to other shareholders under the existing 
water rights of the water company, including rights to carrier water; 
(v) whether the proposed change would cause a violation of any statute, ordinance, regulation, or order of a 
court or governmental agency; 
(vi) whether the shareholder has or can arrange for the beneficial use of water to be retired from irrigation 
within the water company's service under the proposed change; or 
(vii) the cumulative effects that the approval of the change application may have on other shareholders or 
©2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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water company operations. 
(4) The water company may require that all costs associated with the change application, including costs of sub-
mitting proof, be paid by the shareholder. 
(5)(a) The shareholder requesting the change must be current on all water company assessments and agree to 
continue to pay all applicable future assessments, except that the shareholder may choose to prepay any portion 
of the water company assessments attributable to an existing debt of the water company. 
(b) Other than prepaid assessments, the water company may require that the shareholder continue to pay all 
applicable assessments. 
(6) If the water company approves the requested change, with or without conditions, the change application may 
be filed with the state engineer, and must: 
(a) be signed on behalf of the water company; or 
(b) be accompanied by written authorization from the water company assenting to the change. 
(7)(a) The state engineer may evaluate a change application authorized by a water company under this section in 
the same manner and using the same criteria that he or she uses to evaluate any other change application. 
(b) Nothing in this section shall limit the authority of the state engineer in evaluating and processing any 
change application. 
(8) If an application authorized by a water company under this section is approved by the state engineer, the 
shareholder may file requests for extensions of time to submit proof of beneficial use under the change applica-
tion without further permission of the water company. 
(9)(a) Change applications approved under this section are subject to all conditions imposed by the water com-
pany and the state engineer. 
(b) If a shareholder fails to comply with all of the conditions imposed by the water company, the water com-
pany may, after written notice to the shareholder and after allowing reasonable time to remedy the failure, 
withdraw its approval of the application, and petition the state engineer for an order canceling the change ap-
plication. 
(c) The water company may not revoke its approval of the change application or seek an order canceling the 
application if the conditions are substantially satisfied. 
©2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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(10)(a) The shareholder requesting the change shall have a cause of action, including an award of actual dam-
ages incurred, against the water company if the water company: 
(i) unreasonably withholds approval of a requested change; 
(ii) imposes unreasonable conditions in its approval; or 
(iii) withdraws approval of a change application in a manner other than as provided in Subsection (9). 
(b) The action referred to in Subsection (10)(a) shall be referred to mediation by the court under Title 78B, 
Chapter 6, Part 2, Alternative Dispute Resolution Act, unless both parties decline mediation 
(c) If mediation is declined, the prevailing party to the action shall be entitled to costs and reasonable attorney 
fees. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 2002, c. 289, § 1, eff. May 6, 2002; Laws 2006, c. 85, § 1, eff. May 1, 2006; Laws 2008, c. 3, § 225, eff. 
Feb. 7, 2008. 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Alternative dispute resolution, court-annexed program in civil cases, see Jud. Admin., Rule 4-510. 
Arbitration and mediation, generally, see ADR, Rule 101 et seq. 
Costs awarded upon judgment, see Rules Civ. Proc, Rule 54. 
Execution against a mutual benefit corporation , see § 16-16a-119 
Uniform Arbitration Act, see § 78B-11-101. 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Waters and Water Courses €^> 145. 
Westlaw Key Number Search: 405k 145. 
C.J.S. Waters §§ 20, 380 to 382. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 73-3-3.5, UT ST § 73-3-3.5 
Current through 2009 General Session and 2009 First Special Session 
Copr (c) 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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9 LexisNexis* 
LEXSEE 278 P.2D 285 
COUNTY WATER SYSTEM, Inc., et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. SALT LAKE 
CITY et al., Defendants and Respondents 
No. 8206 
Supreme Court of Utah 
3 Utah 2d 46; 278 P.2d 285; 1954 Utah LEXIS 246 
December 17,1954 
DISPOSITION: [***1] Affirmed. 
COUNSEL: Elias Hansen, A. C. Melville, Salt Lake 
City, for appellants. 
Christenson, Holmgren & Christofferson, City Attys., 
Fisher Harris, Salt Lake City, E. R. Callister, Jr., Atty. 
Gen., Clyde & Mecham, Lothaire R. Rich, Salt Lake 
City, for respondents. 
JUDGES: Crockett, Justice. McDonough, C.J., and 
Henriod, Wade, and Worthen, JJ., concur. 
OPINION BY: CROCKETT 
OPINION 
[*47] [**286] The primary question here 
presented is whether the sale of surplus water by Salt 
Lake City to consumers beyond its city limits is subject 
to regulation by the Public Service Commission. 
The plaintiff, County Water System, is a public 
utility furnishing water in an area just south of the Salt 
Lake City limits; the individual plaintiffs are taxpayers 
having an interest in this controversy. Plaintiffs sought a 
declaratory judgment alleging: that plaintiff utility is 
qualified, willing, has ample water and is presently 
engaged in supplying water to the area; that the city is 
presently exercising or threatening to exercise certain 
functions in supplying water, arranging for the 
construction [*48] of pipelines and facilities, and 
contracting to sell water to residents of the area to the 
detriment [***2] of plaintiffs. They challenge the right 
of the city to so operate and contend that it should be 
subject to regulation by the Public Service Commission. 
The trial court rejected plaintiffs' [**287] contentions 
and entered an order dismissing the action, which order is 
here appealed from. 
The authority of a city to engage in the business of 
supplying water is found in Section 10-8-14, U.C.A. 1953, 
which provides: 
"They [cities] may construct, maintain and operate 
water works * * * [or] electric light works * * * or 
authorize the construction, maintenance and operation of 
the same by others, or purchase or lease such works from 
any person or corporation, and they may sell and deliver 
the surplus product or service * * * not required by the 
city or its inhabitants, to others beyond the limits of the 
city." (Emphasis added.) 
Plaintiffs' argument that the city is subject to 
jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission in the sale 
of surplus water is founded upon the provisions of our 
Public Utility Act, pertinent portions of which follow: 
Section 54-2-1. "Terms Defined ~ Utilities subject 
to jurisdiction and regulation * * * . - _ When used in this 
title: 
Page 2 
3 Utah 2d 46, *48; 278 P.2d 285, **287; 
1954 Utah LEXIS 246, ***2 
* * * * * [***3] * 1. 72 Utah 536, 271 P. 961, 973. 
"(3) The term 'corporation* includes * * * a 
municipal corporation * * *. 'Municipal corporation' 
includes all cities, counties or towns or other 
governmental units * * *. 
* * * * * * 
"(28) The term 'public utility' includes every * * * 
water corporation * * * where the service is performed 
for, or the commodity delivered to, the public generally. 
And whenever any * * * water corporation * * * 
performs a service for ** * the public for which any 
compensation or payment whatsoever is received, such * 
* * water corporation * * * is hereby declared to be a 
public utility, subject to the jurisdiction and regulation of 
the commission and to the provisions of this title. * * *" 
Section 54-4-1. "The commission is hereby vested 
with power and jurisdiction to supervise and regulate 
every public utility in this state, and to supervise all of the 
business of every such public utility * * * and to do all 
things, * * * which are necessary or convenient in the 
exercise of such power and jurisdiction." (Emphasis 
added.) 
A cursory reading of the foregoing language may 
seem to indicate the comprehension of municipalities 
operating water systems within the [***4] terms of the 
Act. In the [*49] case of Logan City v. Public Utilities 
Commission, ] this Court considered the question 
whether Logan City in operating a power plant and 
supplying electricity to its inhabitants within the city was 
a "public utility" and subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Public Service Commission (then Public Utilities 
Commission). The members of the Court were not in 
accord as to whether Logan City in so operating was a 
"Public Utility," but four judges were in agreement that it 
was not subject to regulation by the Public Utilities 
Commission. The rationale by which they reached that 
conclusion is grounded upon Article VI, § 29 of our State 
Constitution: 
"The legislature shall not delegate to any special 
commission, private corporation or association, any 
power to make, supervise or interfere with any municipal 
improvement, money, property or effects, whether held in 
trust or otherwise, to levy taxes, to select a capitol site, or 
to perform any municipal functions." 
[***5] The main opinion by Mr. Justice Straup 
commented: 
"It is hard to believe that by the Utilities Act it was 
intended that a municipality owning and operating its 
own waterworks or system * * * is required to submit to 
[the control of] the commission * * *. And still more 
difficult is it to understand that, if such a power by the 
Utilities Act is so delegated to the commission, why the 
act in such particular is not [**288] in direct conflict 
with the Constitution." 
This thought was made emphatic and clear in a 
separate concurring opinion by Justice Gideon: 
"The purpose of the constitutional provision quoted 
was to guarantee to the municipalities local 
self-government, and to deny to the Legislature any 
power to delegate to any body other than the local 
government the right of supervision over or interference 
with the property of the various municipalities within the 
state." 
This idea also met accord in the thinking of District 
Judge Woolley, who sat specially with the Court for that 
case: 
"That the people of Utah, when they adopted section 
29 of article 6 of the state Constitution, intended to limit 
the power of the legislative branch of government, so as 
to prevent the delegation [***6] of the power to * * * 
supervise or interfere with municipal property, to any 
commission outside the municipal fold, and that they 
thereby manifest an intention, which must be respected 
by the courts, that municipal property shall remain under 
the supervision and control of * * * municipal officials, 
who are amenable [*50] to the will of the inhabitants of 
the municipalities * * * are propositions about the 
soundness ofwhich I have no doubt." 
The opinion argues, inter alia, that to permit the 
Public Utilities Commission to regulate the city and fix 
rates to be charged for services authorized by law would 
indirectly have the effect of permitting the Commission 
to control the imposition of taxes upon city residents, and 
held that to permit the Commission to exercise 
jurisdiction of the city in connection with its lawful 
functions would be violative of the constitutional 
interdiction against delegation of such powers to a special 
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commission L 
2 Id pages 553 et seq of 72 Utah, pages 967 et 
seq of 271 P 
[***7] Plaintiffs urge upon us that the Logan City 
case should be limited to its own facts, where the 
operation is within the municipal limits, arguing that no 
such immunity from regulation exists where the city 
engages in furnishing utilities outside its corporate 
boundanes, especially where this is done in competition 
with other utilities Fear of dire consequences is 
expressed if cities are free to furnish utilities on any basis 
convenient or desirable to them and wholly uncontrolled 
by the Commission, whereas the utility which must 
compete is subject to regulation It is suggested that 
erratic rate schedules may be adopted, on the one hand so 
high as to be extortionate, or, on the other, so low as to be 
insufficient to meet the costs, thus imposing tax burdens 
on city residents, and that unfair and discriminatory 
distribution, bad for the people served and unfair 
competition to regulated utilities, will result 
In support of their contention that the city should be 
held subject to the jurisdiction of the commission, 
plaintiffs cite cases for the proposition that when a 
municipality engages in the sale of utilities to users 
beyond its boundaries it does so in a proprietary capacity, 
[***8] and is subject to the same conditions and 
supervision as private utilities furnishing the same 
services 3 Those decisions are not directly in point with 
the problem which confronts us because, insofar as we 
have discerned, none of them deal with the constitutional 
question which we deem to be controlling here, with one 
exception, presently to be noted 
3 City of Olive Hill v Public Service Comm , 
305 Ky 249, 203 S W 2d 68, Shirk v City of 
Lancaster, 313 Pa 158, 169 A 557, 90 A L R 
688, Valcourv Village of Morrisvdle, 110 Vt 93, 
2 A 2d 312, City of Wheeling v 
Benwood-McMechen Water Co, 115 W Va 353, 
176 SE 234, Yamhill Electric Co v City of 
McMmnville et a l , Or , P U R 1927E, 353, Rex 
Moore v Town of Evansville, Wyo , 95 P U R , 
N S , 357, Town of Milwaukee v City of 
Milwaukee, Wis, 87 P U R , N S , 254, In re 
Loveland Municipal Water Works, Colo, 83 
P U R , N S , 72 Also court opinions and 
commission decisions collected in 127 A L R 94, 
96 
[*51] The exception referred to [***9] is the case 
of City of Lamar v Town of Wiley, 4 upon [**289] 
which the plaintiffs place considerable reliance Therein 
the Colorado Supreme Court did refer to their 
constitutional provision substantially the same as our 
Article VI, Section 29, quoted above, and held that the 
municipality selling electricity beyond its limits was 
subject to the jurisdiction of the public utilities 
commission But it is important to note that the court did 
not actually deal with the precise problem as to what 
effect should be given the constitutional provision 
prohibiting the delegation of control of the city's property 
or functions to a special commission, but decided the case 
on another ground The conclusion of the court was 
based on the reasoning that inasmuch as nonresidents 
cannot vote for city officers and have no voice or control 
in the affairs of the city as do city dwellers, the 
nonresidents should have the protection of having the 
Public Service Commission fix reasonable rates and 
conditions of service, concluding 
"When a municipality, * * * furnishes public service 
to its own citizens, and in connection therewith supplies 
its products to consumers outside of its own territorial 
[***10] boundaries, * * * is and should be attended with 
the same conditions, and be subject to the same control 
and supervision, that apply to a private public utility 
owner who furnishes like service " 
4 80 Colo 18, 248 P 1009, 1010 
Although we think the City of Lamar case is of no 
value as precedent here because, as indicated, it was 
decided on another ground, there is yet a stronger reason 
why it cannot be regarded as persuasive on the point here 
involved In the case of City of Englewood v City and 
County of Denver, 5 the Colorado Court subsequently 
considered the question which confronts us here It did 
indicate some distinctions from the City of Lamar case on 
the ground that the question of whether the city was a 
public utility was not an issue in the Lamar case, and 
because it involved the furnishing of electricity, while the 
Englewood case was concerned with supplying water 
Reference was also made to a new statute which gave the 
city power to fix rates for sales of water beyond its limits 
We need [***11] not concern ourselves with whether 
there be merit in such distinctions because the conclusion 
reached clearly appears to be based on the constitutional 
provision above referred to The court said 
"We find, and so determine, that Denver holds such 
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water as is not needed by it for immediate use in its 
proprietary capacity, in which it has a well defined 
property right, and section 35 of Article V of the 
Colorado Constitution, supra, withholds from the 
legislature all power to dedicate [sic] to any commissions 
any supervision of this property right, thus precluding 
any jurisdiction [*52] of the Public Utilities 
Commission * * *" 
which is in accord with our holding herein 
5 123 Colo 290 229 P 2d 667 673 
From the point of view of the County Water System, 
as a competing utility, there may appear to be some merit 
in the apprehensions expressed as to the city being 
allowed to sell surplus water in its territory without 
regulation by the Public Service Commission On the 
other hand, there are numerous [***12] considerations 
which make it seem quite impractical for the city to be 
subjected to such regulation and control, including the 
fact that it would be an almost impossible task, both for 
the city and the Commission, to analyze the city's 
finances with respect to construction, maintenance and 
operation costs of its water department, and apportion 
them between services rendered within and without the 
city limits Furthermore, the fears expressed by plaintiffs 
that cities will engage in the utility business on a broad 
scale in competition with and destructive of regularly 
authorized pnvately owned utilities does not seem to be 
justified Such activities are neither contemplated nor 
authorized by law, they have no authority to sell water 
outside the city limits except as expressly permitted by 
statute, 6 which is to sell the "surplus product * * not 
required by the city or its inhabitants " 
6 Section 10-8-14, Utah Code Ann , 1953 
[**290] It must be recognized that because cities 
are creatures of constant [***13] growth, prudent civic 
planning requires the development and ownership of a 
water supply beyond present needs It would be a 
shameful waste indeed if they were not permitted to sell 
the surplus and residents in adjacent areas in need of 
water were compelled to go without because of a hiatus 
in the law The purpose of Section 10 8 14 permitting 
the sale of surplus water beyond the city limits was 
obviously to eliminate the existence of any such 
undesirable situation But such permissive sale of surplus 
water is clearly not calculated to permit the city to 
purchase water solely for resale, nor to construct, own or 
manage facilities and equipment for the distribution of 
water outside of its citv limits as a general business, the 
intent is obviously to permit it to dd those things only to 
the extent incidental to the development and use of watei 
for preseni requirements and those reasonably to be 
anticipated in connection with the expected growth of the 
city 
Another fact which would prevent cities from 
establishing and maintaining utility businesses on a 
competing basis is the temporary nature of such supply 
The water must of necessity be committed to the use of 
the city when need [***14] arises therein Therefore no 
long time assurance of continued supply to outside 
consumers can be given Because of the foregoing 
limitations we doubt that the effect of a holding that cities 
are not subject to regulation [*53] by the Public Service 
Commission will be as serious or harmful as plaintiffs 
predict 
Nevertheless, whatever the considerations as to the 
wisdom of the city's being subject to regulation by the 
Public Service Commission may be, it is, perhaps 
fortunately, not our responsibility to here evaluate these 
factors and determine what is more desirable as a matter 
of policy It is rather our duty to interpret what was 
intended by the framers of the constitution and the 
legislative enactments thereunder 7 
7 The limits of jurisdiction of the commission 
is solely a matter of constitutional and legislative 
intent 12 McQuillan, Municipal Corporations 
(3rd Ed) 427 
It is to be kept in mind that the authority of the city 
to sell its surplus water beyond the city limits is denved 
in the [***15] same manner and from the identical 
section of the statute which permits it to supply its own 
inhabitants 8 Such sale of surplus water, being 
authorized by law as a municipal function, is as much a 
municipal function as the supplying of water within the 
city limits, and disposing of the surplus outside its limits 
as permitted by statute does not change its character as a 
municipality, nor does the ownership and management of 
the necessary facilities beyond the city boundaries change 
such property to anything other than municipal property 
The same arguments presented here to the effect that the 
city is subject to the jurisdiction of the Public Service 
Commission were presented in the ca>e of Logan City v 
Public Utilities Commission, supra This court rejected 
them upon the reasoning that to allow the commission to 
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exercise jurisdiction over municipal property and the 
management thereof would be an unconstitutional 
delegation of power to a special commission forbidden by 
Article VI, Section 29, hereinabove discussed. The law 
as set out in that case has long been accepted and is 
firmly established as the law in this jurisdiction. We see 
no reason why the constitutional interdiction [***16] 
does not apply with equal force to the instant situation. 
8. Section 10-8-14, U.CAA953, quoted in Par. 
3 of this opinion. 
In summary, as to the issues presented for 
declaratory judgment we hold: 
control and manage such surplus water as is incident to 
the present and reasonably to be anticipated future needs 
of the city. 
2. That the city may sell and distribute such surplus 
beyond its corporate limits. 
[**291] 3. That the city may construct, own and 
operate such pipelines, equipment and facilities outside 
the city limits as are necessary for the above purpose. 
4. That in performing such functions, Salt Lake City 
is not subject to the jurisdiction [*54] or regulation of 
the Public Service Commission. 
1. That Salt Lake City may acquire, develop, own, Each party to bear its own costs. 
131QH7 
********** Print Completed ********** 
Time of Request: Saturday, February 06, 2010 12:10:38 EST 
Print Number: 2861:202845656 
Number of Lines: 227 
Number of Pages: 5 
Send To: ROBERTS, RICHARD 
HOWARD LEWIS & PETERSEN, PC 
120 E 300 N 
PROVO, UT 84606-2907 
Exhibit D 
Page 1 
LexisNexis' 
LEXSEE 2005 UT 73 
Summit Water Distribution Company, a Utah non-profit corporation; et al., 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Summit County; Summit County Commission; 
Mountain Regional Water Special Service District, a body politic of the State of 
Utah; Patrick D. Cone, Shauna L. Kerr, Eric D. Schifferli, County Commissioners; 
Douglas Evans, Employee and President of Mountain Regional Water Special 
Service District; Montgomery Watson Harza, a California corporation and its 
employee and agent, William Todd Jarvis, an individual; and John Does 1-10, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
No. 20040033 
SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
2005 UT 73; 123 P.3d 437; 538 Utah Adv. Rep. 38; 2005 Utah LEXIS 121; 2005-2 
Trade Cas. (CCH) P74,999 
November 4, 2005, Filed 
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: 
Publication December 8, 2005. 
[***!] Released for Mark K. Buchi, Greggory J. Savage, Richard D. Flint, 
Salt Lake City, for Intermountain Power Agency amicus. 
PRIOR HISTORY: Third District, Silver Summit. 
The Honorable Robert K. Hilder. No. 010500359. 
Summit Water Distrib. Co. v. Mt. Reg'l Water Special 
Serv. Dist, 108 P.3d 119, 2005 UT App 66, 2005 Utah 
App. LEXIS 69 (2005) 
DISPOSITION: Reversed. 
JUDGES: DURHAM, Chief Justice. Associate Chief 
Justice Wilkins, Justice Durrant, Justice Parrish, and 
Judge Willmore concur in Chief Justice Durham's 
opinion. Having recused himself, Justice Nehring does 
not participate herein; District Judge Thomas Willmore 
sat. 
OPINION BY: DURHAM 
COUNSEL: Robert S. Campbell, Scott M. Lilja, Clark 
K. Taylor, Jennifer Anderson, John F. Flynn, Salt Lake 
City, for appellants. 
Jody K. Burnett, George A. Hunt, Robert C. Keller, 
Michael D. Zimmerman, Kimberly Neville, Salt Lake 
City, David L. Thomas, Coalville, for appellees. 
Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., Annina M. Mitchell, R. 
Wayne Klein, Asst. Att'ys Gen., for Attorney General 
amicus. 
OPINION 
[**438] DURHAM, Chief Justice: 
[*P1] The appellants brought suit against Summit 
County, a county-created water service district, and 
related parties, [***2] alleging antitrust violations under 
section 76-10-914 of the Utah Antitrust Act and Article 
XII, Section 20 of the Utah Constitution. The district 
court dismissed these claims on the basis that the 
appellees were exempt from the Antitrust Act under Utah 
Code section 76-10-915(l)(f) and that the constitutional 
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antitrust provision is not self-executing. The appellants 
challenge the district court's analysis of both issues on 
appeal. Because we hold that the appellees' alleged 
anticompetitive activities do not qualify as acts of a 
"municipality" that are "authorized or directed by state 
law" under section 76-10-915(1)0), and that the appellees 
are therefore not entitled to the statutory exemption, we 
do not reach the issue concerning the interpretation of 
Article XII, Section 20. 
BACKGROUND 
[*P2] When reviewing a district court's grant of a 
motion to dismiss, "we accept the factual allegations in 
the complaint as true and interpret those facts and all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom" in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff as the nonmoving party. Russell 
Packard Dev., Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, P3, 108 P.3d 
741. We recite the facts of this case [***3] accordingly. 
[*P3] Appellant Summit Water Distribution 
Company (Summit Water) is a private nonprofit 
corporation that distributes culinary water for commercial 
and residential use to its shareholders within the 
unincorporated portion of the Snyderville Basin in 
Summit County. In January 2000, Summit Water was the 
leading competitor among eleven water companies that 
operated in the Snyderville [**439] Basin. In February 
2000, Summit County (the County) adopted an ordinance 
renaming an existing special service district as the 
Mountain Regional Water Special Service District 
(Mountain Regional), and naming the County's Board of 
County Commissioners as Mountain Regional's 
governing board. The goal of the resolution was to 
establish Mountain Regional as a Snyderville Basin-wide 
water service district. At that time, Mountain Regional 
had 5.7% of the market in Snyderville Basin while 
Summit Water had 34%. Shortly afterwards, Mountain 
Regional hired William Todd Jarvis—an employee of 
Montgomery Watson Harza, a California corporation—to 
provide water engineering services on an independent 
contractor basis. At around the same time, the County 
also hired Jarvis to perform water concurrency ratings 
£***4j
 0 f culinary water companies. These ratings 
purported to measure a water company's capacity to 
supply water to county residents. The County also passed 
new concurrency ordinances that required developers 
seeking building permits or planning and zoning 
approvals to prove they had obtained a commitment from 
a water company with a sufficient concurrency rating to 
provide water to their developments. ] According to 
Summit Water, the County used the arrangement with 
Jarvis, in conjunction with the new concurrency 
ordinances, to ensure that Mountain Regional would have 
a competitive advantage in seeking new water 
connections. 
1 A temporary concurrency ordinance, ordinance 
385, adopted on May 15, 2000, was soon replaced 
with a permanent ordinance, ordinance 400, 
which was then replaced with ordinance 415, 
which imposed similar requirements. 
Theoretically, a concurrency law is intended to 
require "a developer applying for a building 
permit [to] show the local governing body that the 
demands of the proposed development will not 
exceed the maximum capacity of public 
facilities." Adam Strachan, Note, Concurrency 
Laws: Water as a Land-Use Regulation, 21 J. 
Land Res. & Envtl. L. 435, 435 (2001). 
[***5] [*P4] Summit Water also faced a tax 
assessment increase, from $ 5000 to nearly $ 60,000, and 
the County Commission denied its appeal from that 
assessment. Summit Water was also forced to engage in 
an extended dispute with Jarvis over its concurrency 
rating while Mountain Regional faced no such 
difficulties. Meanwhile, Mountain Regional also sought, 
ultimately unsuccessfully, to acquire Summit Water's 
water infrastructure through eminent domain 
proceedings. As of September 2001, Mountain Regional 
had acquired all but three of the water companies 
operating in the Snyderville Basin. 
[*P5] In September 2001, Summit Water and a 
number of its shareholders (collectively, Summit Water 
appellants) brought suit against the County, the County 
Commission, Mountain Regional, Montgomery Watson 
Harza, and a number of their officers and employees 
(collectively, County appellees), alleging that these 
entities and individuals had conspired in restraint of trade 
and in an attempt "to monopolize the culinary water 
product market in the Snyderville Basin geographic 
market." As subsequently amended in March 2002, the 
complaint specifically alleged that the County appellees 
had "conspired, agreed, [***6] and combined to 
unlawfully tie the sale, distribution and delivery of 
[Mountain Regional] water to [the grant of] building 
permits and planning approvals, fix prices, [engage in] 
other restraints of trade and impair competition," and had 
2005 UT 73, *P5, 123 P 3d 437, **439, 
538 Utah Adv Rep 38, 2005 Utah LEXIS 121, ***6 
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engaged in "illegal conspiracies, combinations and 
arrangements by anti-competitive conduct" in order to 
gain a monopoly over culinary water distribution in the 
Snyderville Basin, all in violation of both the Utah 
Antitrust Act, Utah Code Ann §§ 76-10-911 to -926 
(2003), and Article XII, Section 20 of the Utah 
Constitution 2 For these alleged antitrust violations, 
[**440] the Summit Water appellants sought injunctive 
relief against all County appellees and compensatory and 
treble damages against Montgomery Watson and Jarvis 
2 The complaint also alleged violations of 
Article I, Sections 7 and 24 of the Utah 
Constitution and the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses of the United States 
Constitution The district court granted the 
Summit Water appellants' motion for partial 
summary judgment on their due process claims in 
May 2002 In so doing, the court declared 
unconstitutional county ordinances 400 and 415, 
which had imposed requirements on developers to 
form agreements with water companies having 
sufficient water concurrency ratings The court 
reasoned that an appearance of unfairness arose 
from the facts that the ordinances designated the 
Board of County Commissioners—also Mountain 
Regional's governing board—as the body hearing 
appeals of water concurrency ratings, and that 
Jarvis was the County's concurrency officer as 
well as a Mountain Regional employee The 
district court's May 2002 order is not before us on 
appeal According to the County appellees, the 
County has since revised its ordinance to 
designate a state district engineer as the 
concurrency officer and to remove the county 
commission from the appeal process Summit 
Water's challenge to its concurrency rating under 
the new ordinance is on appeal in a separate 
action, Summit Water Distrib Co v Mountain 
Regional Water Special Serv Dist, 2005 UT App 
66, 108 P 3d 119 
[***7] [*P6] The County appellees filed a rule 12 
motion to dismiss The district court denied this motion 
in relevant part in an order issued March 4, 2002, and this 
court denied the appellees' petition for interlocutory 
appeal The district court based its denial on its 
conclusions that Article 1, Section 26 of the Utah 
Constitution was a self-executing provision, that the state 
action immunity doctrine enunciated in Parker v Brown, 
317 US 341, 63 S Ct 307, 87 L Ed 315 (1943), did not 
apply to actions under state antitrust laws, and that Utah 
Code section 76-10-915(1)0), which exempts 
"municipalities" from the state antitrust act, did not apply 
here because "neither a county nor its special service 
districts are municipalities " 
[*P7] After discovery was underway, the County 
appellees, in January 2003, filed a motion to reconsider 
and to dismiss, which the district court construed as a 
motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure The district court issued an order on 
May 27, 2002, in which it reevaluated its prior legal 
conclusions in light of the constitutional and legislative 
historical evidence newly submitted by the County 
appellees [***8] Based on its review of those materials, 
the district court concluded that Article XII, Section 20 
was not, in fact, self-executing but was meant rather as a 
"strong policy statement to guide future legislative 
action" so as to "guard against dilution or elimination 
[of] the Antitrust Act in a changed political climate " The 
court therefore dismissed the Summit Water appellants' 
claims based on Article XII, Section 20 
[*P8] The court then reconsidered its conclusion 
that counties and special service districts were not 
included within the "municipality" exemption contained 
in Utah Code section 76-10-915 While confirming that 
by its plain meaning the term "municipality" referred 
only to a city, the court determined that the legislative 
intent behind the municipality exemption could not be 
discerned based on plain meaning alone when the 
legislative history submitted by the County appellees cast 
'"doubt or uncertainty' [on] the scope of the otherwise 
unambiguous term 'municipality "' Reviewing the debate 
on the floor of the Utah Senate regarding the insertion of 
the municipality exemption into the Antitrust Act, the 
court considered significant the statement of [***9] 
Senator Thorpe Waddmgham, who supported his floor 
amendment introducing the exemption by referring 
explicitly to the then-recently-decided United States 
Supreme Court case, City of Lafayette v Louisiana 
Power & Light Co, 435 U S 389, 98 S Ct 1123, 55 L 
Ed 2d 364 (1978) 3 
3 As quoted by the district court, Senator 
Waddmgham stated that 
one of the reasons is the 
legislation we passed two years 
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ago dealing with [the 
Intermountain Power Project]. And 
a recent federal case, that I have 
not read, but which has been called 
to my attention, that in some cases 
makes municipalities comply with 
certain sections of the federal 
antitrust legislation. This~one of 
the purposes, which I hope that this 
particular amendment would 
accomplish was to remove any 
question as to whether or not its' 
[sic] at variance with the Interlocal 
Cooperation Act that we passed 
two years ago. 
Floor Debate, 43rd Utah Leg., Gen. Sess., Feb. 5, 
1979 (statement of Sen. Waddingham). 
[*P9] Based on this history, [***10] the court 
concluded that the term "municipality," as used in the 
Act, "must include all units of local government within 
its rubric." The court then gave the Summit Water 
appellants twenty days to further amend their complaint 
by "in good faith identifying anti-competitive activities 
on the part of any one of the foregoing defendants that 
were not 'authorized or directed by state law,'" which 
under Utah Code section 76-10-915(l)(f) would exclude 
the County appellees from the scope of the municipality 
exemption. The court directed that, failing such 
amendment, the Summit Water appellants' statutory 
[**441] claims under the Antitrust Act be dismissed as 
well. 
[*P10] The Summit Water appellants then filed a 
motion for reconsideration, arguing that the district court 
erred in its legal analysis of the foregoing issues and in 
placing on the appellants the burden of pleading that the 
County appellees' actions were not authorized or directed 
by state law. In a January 5, 2004 order, the district court 
denied this motion, clarifying its conclusion that "for an 
activity to satisfy the 'authorized or directed' requirement 
in section 76-10-915(1)0) of the Utah Code it is 
necessary only that [***H] a political subdivision act 
pursuant to general state statutes." The court determined 
that because the Summit Water appellants had failed to 
"allege conduct that is not described in section 
76-10-915(l)(f)" they had failed to state a claim under 
the Antitrust Act. The court then dismissed all remaining 
claims of the Summit Water appellants. 
[*P11] The Summit Water appellants appealed the 
district court's final ruling, and the appeal was transferred 
to this court pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 43. This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 
Utah Code section 78-2-2(3)(b) (2002). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[*P12] The district court's determination that a 
plaintiffs complaint "failed to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted," leading the court to grant the 
defendant's motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(6) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is a legal conclusion that 
we review for correctness. Foutz v. City of S. Jordan, 
2004 UT 75, P8, 100 P.3d 1171. Here, specifically, we 
review for correctness the district court's interpretation of 
Utah Code section 76-10-915, id. 
ANALYSIS 
[*P13] The Summit Water appellants argue that 
[***12] (1) the district court erred in dismissing their 
claims under the Utah Antitrust Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 
76-10-911 to -926 (2003), because the "municipality" 
exemption in Utah Code section 76-10-915(1 )(f) exempts 
only cities from the provisions of the Act and therefore 
would not exempt any of the County appellees, and 
because the further requirement under that section that 
the appellees' activities be "authorized or directed by state 
law" also does not apply; (2) the district court erred in 
requiring the Summit Water appellants to plead specific 
conduct by the County appellees that was not "authorized 
or directed by state law" because the municipality 
exemption is an affirmative defense to an Antitrust Act 
claim; and (3) the district court erred in dismissing their 
constitutional claims because Article XII, Section 20 is an 
enforceable, self-executing provision. The Summit Water 
appellants concede that if we decide in their favor on 
their statutory claims, we need not address their 
constitutional arguments. The County appellees disagree, 
suggesting that we must in any case resolve the Summit 
Water appellants' "contention that Article XII, Section 20 
trumps [***13] all the liability and damage limitations in 
the 1979 Act." We first examine the statutory issues. 
I. THE "MUNICIPALITY" EXEMPTION TO THE 
UTAH ANTITRUST ACT 
[*P14] Utah Code section 76-10-914 defines illegal 
anticompetitive activities for purposes of the Utah 
Antitrust Act: 
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(1) Every contract, combination in the 
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in 
restraint of trade or commerce is declared 
to be illegal. 
(2) It shall be unlawful for any person 
to monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, 
or combine or conspire with any other 
person or persons to monopolize, any part 
of trade or commerce. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-914 (2003). Section 76-10-915 
exempts from this definition "the activities of a 
municipality to the extent authorized or directed by state 
law." Id. § 76-10-915(1)0). Thus, in order for a party's 
activities to be exempt under section 76-10-915(1)0) 
from an antitrust claim, the party must be a 
"municipality" and its activities must have been 
"authorized or directed by state law." Id. As described 
above, the district court held that both of these 
requirements [**442] were met in the case of the 
County appellees. The Summit [***14] Water appellants 
challenge its conclusion on both counts. We address each 
of the exemption's two requirements in turn. 
A. Whether the County Appellees Are 
"Municipalities" Under Utah Code Section 
76-10-915(1)0) 
[*P15] The Summit Water appellants argue that the 
district court's interpretation of the word "municipality" 
in section 76-10-915(1)0) to include a county, a special 
service district, and a private California corporation is 
contrary to settled principles of statutory construction, 
which require reliance on a word's plain meaning unless 
there is ambiguity. They contend that the term plainly 
refers to municipal corporations only—in other words, 
cities and towns—and that such an interpretation is in 
accord with a general mandate to interpret exemptions 
from antitrust laws narrowly. 
[*P16] The County appellees respond that the term 
"municipality" is ambiguous on its face when considered 
in light of conflicting definitions of the term in other 
statutory enactments. Furthermore, in their view, the 
context in which the municipality exemption was added 
to the Antitrust Act, together with the Antitrust Act's 
direction in section 76-10-926 to refer to federal law 
[***15] when interpreting the Act, indicates an intent by 
the legislature to include all units of local government 
within the exemption. They further contend that a narrow 
interpretation of the term would lead to conflict between 
the Antitrust Act and the Interlocal Cooperation Act, 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 11-13-101 to - 314 (2003 & Supp. 
2004), insofar as the latter authorizes the creation and 
continuing existence of the Intermountain Power Agency 
(IPA), an entity formed through the cooperation of 
twenty-three Utah cities and towns for the purpose of 
constructing and operating the Intermountain Power 
Project (IPP). 
[*P17] It is well settled in this court that our goal 
when interpreting a statute "is to give effect to the 
legislative intent, as evidenced by the [statute's] plain 
language, in light of the purpose the statute was meant to 
achieve." Foutz v. City of S. Jordan, 2004 UT 75, Pll, 
100 P.3d 1171 (internal quotation omitted). When 
evaluating the plain language of a particular statutory 
provision, we interpret it "in harmony with other statutes 
in the same chapter and related chapters." Mountain 
Ranch Estates v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2004 UT 86, 
Pll, 100 P.3d 1206 [*** 16] (internal quotation omitted). 
However, "if we find ambiguity in the statute's language, 
we look to legislative history and other policy 
considerations for guidance." ExxonMobil Corp. v. Utah 
State Tax Comm'n, 2003 UT53, PI4, 86 P.3d 706. 
[*P18] Here, the parties' dispute over the 
interpretation of the term "municipality" in section 
76-10-915(1)0) implicates the broader question of how 
ambiguity in a statute's language is to be identified. As 
indicated above, the district court originally determined 
that the word "municipality" unambiguously referred 
only to cities and towns. In its May 27, 2002 order, the 
court repeated that, in the absence of the legislative 
history materials submitted by the County appellees, it 
would continue to adhere to that conclusion. Its ultimate 
decision to the contrary was entirely based on the 
additional materials submitted that, in the district court's 
view, indicated a legislative intent that was not apparent 
on the face of the statute itself. 
[*P19] We first consider whether we agree with the 
district court that the term "municipality," on its face, 
unambiguously refers only to cities and towns. The 
district court concluded [***n] that "nowhere has this 
court been able to find a definition or use of the term 
'municipality' in Utah statute or constitution that, from its 
plain meaning, one could read as anything other than a 
city. Or, conversely, that one could stretch to embrace a 
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county or its special service district." Based on our 
examination of the Utah Code and Constitution, there is 
no question that the word "municipality" is used almost 
exclusively to refer to municipal corporations—cities and 
towns. It is true, as the County appellees point out, that 
the former Utah Municipal Bond Act explicitly defined 
"municipality" to "include[] cities, towns, counties, 
school districts, public transit districts, and improvement 
districts . . ., special service districts . . ., metropolitan 
water districts [**443] . . ., irrigation districts . . ., water 
conservancy districts . . ., and regional service areas." 
Utah Code Ann. § 11-14-1(1) (2003) (repealed 2005). 
The provision clarified that that definition applied only 
"for the purpose of the [Municipal Bond Act]." Id. The 
County appellees urge us to consider this definition as 
sufficient indication that the word "municipality" is 
ambiguous [***18] on its face. However, the fact that 
the legislature in 2005 saw fit, when amending the Act, to 
replace the term "municipality" with the term "local 
political subdivision," see ch. 105, 2005 Utah Laws § 9 
(codified at Utah Code Ann. § 11-14-102(3)), may 
suggest the legislature's own acknowledgment that the 
former broad definition of "municipality" was not in 
accord with the term's generally accepted meaning. 
[*P20] The only other instance in which a Utah 
Code provision defines the term "municipality" to include 
"any county . . . or political subdivision of this state" is in 
section 72-10-301(4) of the Aeronautics Act, Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 72-10-101 to -504 (2001 & Supp. 2004). A 
review of the Aeronautics Act in its entirety suggests that 
this definition was inserted only to simplify the later 
definition of "public agency" in the same provision, see 
id. § 72-10-301(6) (including "municipalities" in the 
definition of "public agency"), for, despite the inclusion 
of counties in that definition of municipality, other 
provisions in the same part of the chapter list both 
counties and municipalities in a manner that suggests 
[***19] they are separate entities, see id. §§ 72-10-303, 
-304. 
[*P21] If our review were restricted to the 
occurrences of the word "municipality" in the Utah Code 
and Constitution, we would be inclined to agree with the 
district court that the term on its face unambiguously 
refers only to municipal corporations. We do not end our 
analysis here, however, because, as the County appellees 
point out, the Antitrust Act expressly provides that "the 
Legislature intends that the courts, in construing this act, 
will be guided by interpretations given by the federal 
courts to comparable federal antitrust statutes and by 
other state courts to comparable state antitrust statutes." 
Id. § 76-10-926. Based on this direction, we must 
examine antitrust law as a whole in order to determine 
whether the term "municipality" means something other 
than a municipal corporation when used in the antitrust 
context. 
[*P22] The federal antitrust law, the Sherman Act, 
exempts "local governments" from damage and attorney's 
fee penalties for federal antitrust violations. 15 U.S.C. § 
35(a). The Act defines "local government" as including 
"a city, county, parish, town, township, [***20] village, 
or any other general function governmental unit 
established by State law," id. § 34(1)(A), as well as "a 
school district, sanitary district, or any other special 
function governmental unit established by State law in 
one or more States," id. § 34(1)(B). The Sherman Act 
thus uses the term "local government" to mean what the 
County appellees argue the term "municipality" means in 
the Utah statute. These provisions therefore do not 
support the County appellees argument. Congress, 
however, added these provisions to the Sherman Act in 
1984, Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984, Pub. L. 
No. 98-544, 98 Stat. 2750 (1984) (codified at 75 U.S.C 
§§ 34-36), and the County appellees argue that Congress 
made this amendment in response to the United States 
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Sherman Act in a 
line of cases that served to limit the immunity of local 
governments from federal antitrust liability. We therefore 
examine these cases in order to determine whether they 
support the County appellees' proposed interpretation of 
the word "municipality." 
[*P23] We agree that the United States Supreme 
Court has interpreted the Sherman Act, prior [***21] to 
its 1984 amendment, as applying on its face to all local 
governmental entities. City of Lafayette v. La. Power & 
Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 396-98, 98 S. Ct. 1123, 55 L. Ed. 
2d 364 (1978) (recognizing that the term "person" in the 
Sherman Act included all entities, whether public or 
private, that "engaged in business whose activities might 
restrain or monopolize commercial intercourse among the 
states" and thus included both states and cities (internal 
quotation omitted)). In reaching this interpretation, the 
Court emphasized the strong federal policy in favor of a 
"regime of competition," such that "the antitrust laws will 
not be displaced [**444] unless [they] . . . are plainly 
repugnant" to a "regulatory regime over an area of 
commercial activity." Id. at 398. The Court then indicated 
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that implied exclusions from the Act were disfavored. Id. 
at 399. Reasoning that local governments serve parochial 
rather than national interests, the Court then concluded 
that when these bodies act as owners and 
providers of services, they are fully 
capable of aggrandizing other economic 
units with which they interrelate, with the 
potential of serious distortion [***22] of 
the rational and efficient allocation of 
resources, and the efficiency of free 
markets which the regime of competition 
embodied in the antitrust laws is thought 
to engender. 
Id. at 408. 
[*P24] Unlike local governments, however, states 
themselves are coequal sovereigns with the federal 
government. Id. at 411-13. On that basis, the Court has 
interpreted the Sherman Act as implicitly excluding states 
from its application. Id. at 400 (citing Parker v. Brown, 
317 U.S. 341 351, 63 S. Ct. 307, 87 L. Ed. 315 (1943)). 
In City of Lafayette, a plurality of the Court further 
recognized that a local government falls within the 
Parker exemption when it acts as an agent of the state, 
"pursuant to state policy to displace competition with 
regulation or monopoly public service." Id. at 413 
(plurality). The standard set forth by the City of Lafayette 
plurality was subsequently adopted by the Court. Cmty. 
Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 51, 
102 S. Ct. 835, 70 L. Ed. 2d 810 (1982). Later cases have 
adhered to this general principle. See Fed. Trade Comm'n 
v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 US. 621, 636-37, 112 S Ct. 
2169, 119 L. Ed 2d 410 (1992); [***23] City of 
Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 
372-73, HIS. Ct. 1344, 113 L. Ed. 2d 382 (1991); Town 
ofHallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 45, 105 S. 
Ct. 1713, 85 L. Ed. 2d 24 (1985). 
[*P25] We agree with the County appellees that this 
line of cases provides interpretative guidance in this 
context, but we disagree concerning its import. We are 
unpersuaded that the United States Supreme Court's use 
of the specific term "municipality" in some instances 
where the enunciated principles applied equally to other 
units of local government indicates that the term is 
ambiguous or has a different meaning in the antitrust 
context, particularly where the entities at issue in the 
cases reviewed by the Court were in fact cities, as 
indicated in the case names above. Far from establishing 
that antitrust law in general uses the word "municipality" 
broadly, the County appellees have failed to point to a 
single instance where a court referred to a specific unit of 
local government as a "municipality" unless it was in fact 
a city or a town. 
[*P26] Moreover, we believe that the mandate in 
our Antitrust Act that we be guided by other courts' 
interpretations requires [***24] us to rely on the 
principles underlying those interpretations, rather than on 
the courts' particular word choice. When we examine the 
issue before us in that light, it becomes clear that the 
County appellees are asking us to engage in rather 
curious logic. They propose that, because the Court in the 
City of Lafayette line of cases held that the Sherman Act 
applies to all local governmental entities, unless they are 
acting as agents of the state, our Legislature must have 
intended to exempt all local governmental entities when 
they added the municipality exemption to Utah's Antitrust 
Act. Further, the County appellees repeat the argument, 
made before the district court, that the municipality 
exemption's purpose was to avoid incorporating the 
Court's decision in City of Lafayette into Utah antitrust 
law. Thus, according to the County appellees, we must 
follow the mandate that we rely on federal caselaw when 
interpreting the term "municipality" even as we recognize 
that the Legislature intended to circumvent the very 
federal caselaw that we are urged to follow. We decline 
to engage in such a tortured analysis. 
[*P27] The only remaining factor militating against 
the [***25] conclusion that the term "municipality" 
unambiguously refers only to municipal corporations is 
Senator Waddingham's statement in the floor debates, 
indicating his concern, when proposing the municipality 
exemption, about the impact of the City of Lafayette 
decision on the IPP. The extent to [**445] which an 
individual statement by a legislator is a reliable indicator 
of legislative intent has frequently been questioned. E.g., 
Woodv. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 2002 UT 134, PI9, 67 
P.3d 436 ("Legislators may decide that a statute should 
be passed for myriad, often even different, reasons . . . 
."). Moreover, it is far from clear to us that legislative 
history should be relevant when making the initial 
determination of whether a statutory provision is 
ambiguous on its face. See Berube v. Fashion Ctr., 771 
P.2d 1033, 1038 (Utah 1989) (agreeing that the statute at 
issue "is clear on its face and should be applied 
accordingly, regardless of any specific intent formed by a 
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particular legislator"). At the same time, because our 
primary goal is to interpret statutes in accord with 
legislative intent, we might hesitate to disregard entirely 
such an indication [***26] of intent where it was clear, 
even if a provision appears to be unambiguous. 4 We do 
not believe Senator Waddingham's statement qualifies as 
such a clear indication of intent, however. The statement 
indicates that Senator Waddingham had not read City of 
Lafayette, and though the Senator specifically mentions 
the IPP, he does not indicate that he considers the IPP 
itself, or its owner, the IPA, to be a "municipality" that 
would be subject to antitrust legislation in the absence of 
the proposed exemption. Rather, Senator Waddingham, 
in stating that the exemption's purpose is "to cause 
actions taken by municipalities . . . to be on the same card 
as activities conducted by utilities," uses the term 
"municipalities" himself, making it difficult to conclude 
that he accorded the word a meaning other than the 
generally accepted definition of "municipal corporation." 
4 In one treatise author's opinion, "because 
issues concerning what a statute means or what a 
legislature intended are essentially issues of fact, 
even though they are decided by the judge and not 
by a jury, a court should never exclude relevant 
and probative evidence from consideration." 2A 
Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory 
Construction § 45:02, at 14-15 (6th ed. 2000). 
[***27] [*P28] Thus, as the Summit Water 
appellants suggest, Senator Waddingham's language is 
simply too vague to draw specific conclusions on these 
matters from his statements alone. It seems that, in order 
to accord Senator Waddingham's statement the 
significance that the County appellees suggest it deserves, 
we would have to engage in a full analysis of whether the 
IPA and IPP are otherwise subject to Utah's Antitrust Act 
and, if so, whether the legislature intended these entities 
to be free to engage in anticompetitive activities. 
Although the IPA, in its role as amicus in the present 
case, argues that both of these questions must be 
answered in the affirmative, and indeed that the 
municipality exemption was constructed with it 
specifically in mind, we are unwilling to undertake such a 
review when the IPA's status and activities are not 
actually at issue in the case before us. 
[*P29] Moreover, we believe the district court erred 
in according Senator Waddingham's statement such 
weight without considering the proper import of other 
interpretative principles in the antitrust context. We 
adhere to the fundamental principle underlying the 
Court's decision in City of Lafayette [***28] —that 
antitrust laws must be interpreted in light of the strong 
public policy disfavoring anticompetitive practices. City 
of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 398. Indeed, our deference to 
this policy must be particularly strong in light of Article 
XII, Section 20 of our state constitution as well as the 
Legislature's explicit finding, set forth in the Antitrust 
Act itself, that 
competition is fundamental to the free 
market system and that the unrestrained 
interaction of competitive forces will yield 
the best allocation of our economic 
resources, the lowest prices, the highest 
quality and the greatest material progress, 
while at the same time providing an 
environment conducive to the preservation 
of our democratic, political and social 
institutions. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-912. Based on this policy, 5 we 
have previously indicated that provisions of our Antitrust 
Act must be strictly construed in favor of competition and 
that, therefore, "exemptions [from the Act] [**446] 
should be construed narrowly." Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 
177, 185 (Utah 1998); see also Group Life & Health Ins. 
Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 231, 99 S. Ct. 1067, 
59 L. Ed. 2d 261 (1979) [***29] ("It is well settled that 
exemptions from the antitrust laws are to be narrowly 
construed. This doctrine . . . applies with equal force to 
express statutory exemptions."). Thus, even if we were to 
conclude that the term "municipality" in section 
76-10-915(l)(f) is ambiguous, this interpretive principle 
suggests that we adopt the narrowest possible meaning of 
the term, limiting it to municipal corporations. See Evans, 
963 P. 2d at 185. 
5 By referring to such a "policy," we express no 
opinion on the question of whether Article XII, 
Section 20 is self-executing. 
[*P30] For the reasons set forth above, we cannot 
conclude that the term "municipality" in section 
76-10-915(l)(f) is ambiguous, nor, if it were ambiguous, 
would we be likely to interpret the term broadly. 
However, we acknowledge that we are unable to perceive 
any logical reason for including cities and towns in the 
municipality exemption but excluding other units of local 
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government In the interest of judicial caution, therefore, 
[***30] we reserve an ultimate decision on the meaning 
of "municipality" for another day and proceed to analyze 
whether, assuming the County appellees would qualify as 
municipalities, their activities at issue here are exempt 
because they were "authorized or directed by state law" 
for purposes of Utah Code section 76-10-915(!)(/) 
B Whether the County Appellees' Activities Are 
Authorized or Directed by State Law 
[*P31] Section 76-10 915(1)0) exempts 
municipalities from operation of the Antitrust Act only 
insofar as their activities are "authorized or directed by 
state law" Utah Code Ann § 76-10-915(l)(J) As 
described above, the district court concluded that a 
municipality satisfies this condition as long as it acts 
"pursuant to general state statutes " The Summit Water 
appellants argue that this broad interpretation of the 
"authorized or directed" language is contrary to the City 
of Lafayette line of cases and that the requirement is not 
satisfied here by general laws that give no indication that 
the state authorizes counties to "monopolize a private 
water market" The County appellees, in turn, 
maintaining their position regarding the purpose [***31] 
of the municipality exemption, argue that to interpret 
section 76-10-915(1)0) in accord with City of Lafayette is 
to "incorporate^ into the Utah Antitrust Act precisely 
what the legislative history indicates that section was 
intended to keep out of the Act—the narrow City of 
Lafayette reading of local government immunity from 
antitrust [claims] " They further argue that their activities 
would be exempt under current federal law, as it has 
developed in the twenty-seven years since City of 
Lafayette 
[*P32] In accord with Utah Code section 
76-10-926, we first examine federal law on this issue 
Again, the principle first set forth by the City of Lafayette 
plurality and subsequently adopted by a majority of the 
United States Supreme Court is that a unit of local 
government is exempt from federal antitrust laws only if 
its "anticompetitive conduct [is] engaged in as an act of 
government by the State as sovereign, pursuant to 
state policy to displace competition with regulation or 
monopoly public service " City of Lafayette, 435 U S at 
413 (plurality) The basis for this holding was the 
doctnne of dual sovereignty, under which, [***32] 
according to the plurality, "state action" is exempt from 
federal antitrust laws Id at 412 The plurality stated that, 
in order for a state's subdivision to enjoy the "state 
action" exemption, there must be an indication that its 
action is "authorized or directed" by the state, so that the 
subdivision is in fact acting on behalf of the state rather 
than its own parochial interests Id at 414-15 The 
plurality then concluded that "an adequate state mandate 
for anticompetitive activities of subordinate 
governmental units exists when it is found from the 
authority given a governmental entity to operate in a 
particular area, that the legislature contemplated the kind 
of action complained of" Id at 415 (internal quotation 
omitted) 
[*P33] As an initial matter, we point out that, were 
we facing the same question considered by the Court in 
City of Lafayette and its successor—namely, whether to 
read an implicit exemption into antitrust law—we might 
well conclude that the Court's analysis in [**447] those 
cases was inapplicable because the dual sovereignty 
considerations that motivated the Court's reasoning in 
those cases are [***33] entirely absent when a state court 
is considenng state antitrust laws See Fine Airport 
Parking, Inc v City of Tulsa, 2003 OK 27, PI9, 71 P 3d 
5, Town ofHalhe v City of Chippewa Falls, 105 Wis 2d 
533, 314 NW2d 321, 324 (Wis 1982) The latter 
situation involves a potential conflict "'between the state 
laws dealing with municipalities and the state antitrust 
law,"' Fine Airport Parking, Inc, 2003 OK 27 at PI9 
(quoting Town of Hal lie, 314 N W 2d at 324), in other 
words, the laws at issue in our case are those of a single 
sovereign—the state 
[*P34] Unlike the state antitrust statutes involved m 
these Oklahoma and Wisconsin cases, section 76-10-915 
of the Utah Antitrust Act includes an explicit statutory 
exemption for municipalities Utah Code Ann § 
76-10-915(1)0) A number of other state antitrust laws 
also contain statutory exemptions, leading courts in those 
states simply to apply the plain language of these 
exemptions See, eg, Miller's Pond Co v City of New 
London, 273 Conn 786, 873 A 2d 965, 979-80 (Conn 
2005) (reaffirming that its statutory [***34] antitrust 
exemption for actions "specifically directed or required" 
by a state statute was intended to be more stringent than 
the federal "authorized or directed" standard and 
therefore holding that the federal standard was 
inapplicable), Alarm Detection Sys, Inc v Village of 
Hinsdale, 326 III App 3d 372, 761 N E 2d 782, 793, 260 
III Dec 599 (III App Ct 2001) (relying on the "plain 
language of [the statutory exemption in] the [Illinois] 
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Antitrust Act in determining whether the Village was 
immune from liability"). 
[*P35] Here, Utah's statutory exemption is, as far as 
we are aware, unique in that it is defined using 
language—"authorized or directed"—identical to that used 
by the City of Lafayette plurality. Utah Code Ann. § 
76-10-915(l)(f) (exempting a municipality "to the extent 
authorized or directed by state law"); City of Lafayette, 
435 U.S. at 414 (concluding that a municipality engages 
in state action when "the State authorized or directed [it] 
to act as it did"). This identical language, together with 
the mandate set forth in section 76-10-926 that our 
interpretations be guided by federal [***35] caselaw, 
indicate to us that the Legislature intended the 
"authorized or directed" standard in section 
76-10-915(l)(f) to coincide with federal courts' 
interpretation of "authorized or directed" when 
delineating the municipality exemption to federal 
antitrust laws. 6 The conclusion indicated by the plain 
language of these provisions is further supported by the 
fact that the Court's observations in City of Lafayette, in 
regard to the tendency of local governments to act in their 
own parochial interests rather than in the interest of the 
state as a whole, see 435 U.S. at 408, would appear of 
equal concern to the state itself. See Evans, 963 P. 2d at 
185 (recognizing the legislative intent that "those 
anticompetitive activities that have been approved by the 
state or federal government should not be punished by the 
[Utah Antitrust] Act"); see also Reppond v. City of 
Denham Springs, 572 So. 2d 224, 228 (La. Ct. App. 
1990) ("Because municipalities perform many functions 
in both a private and a public sense, it would be 
imprudent to categorically reject the applicability of the 
anti-trust statutes to every act of such governmental 
[***36] entities."). It is thus not unreasonable for the 
legislature to have intended us to follow federal antitrust 
law on this issue even though the federal analysis 
originates in inapplicable notions of dual sovereignty. 7 
[**448] Consequently, while we would hesitate to infer a 
"state action" exemption from our state antitrust law 
where no such exemption is expressly provided, here we 
conclude that the legislature has in fact expressly 
included such an exemption in the state antitrust laws, 
and we therefore analyze the exemption's applicability 
relying on federal caselaw for guidance. 
6 Our conclusion here is not inconsistent with 
our refusal above to interpret the term 
"municipality" to include all units of local 
government in accord with the federal state action 
exemption. As we explained above, federal 
antitrust law does not ascribe a unique meaning to 
the word "municipality." In contrast, City of 
Lafayette used the phrase, "authorized or 
directed," in the course of setting forth a distinct 
legal standard. The latter phrase, therefore, does 
have a unique meaning in federal antitrust law. 
Moreover, the implication of our holding is that 
the Utah Legislature simply imported the 
exemption recognized in City of Lafayette into the 
Utah Antitrust Act rather than trying to avoid the 
federal law, as the County appellees have argued. 
r***37-j 
7 The County appellees bolster their argument 
that the Utah Legislature was "actively hostile" to 
the Court's rulings in City of Lafayette and City of 
Boulder by reference to its enactment of section 
76-10-919(4) and (5), which prohibits damage 
awards against political subdivisions that violate 
the Antitrust Act. Utah Code Ann. § 
76-10-919(4), (5). As the County appellees note, 
this provision mirrors the federal statute enacted 
by Congress in 1984, which similarly bars 
damage awards against local governments. Local 
Government Antitrust Act of 1984, 75 U.S.C. §§ 
35-36. In our view, the Legislature's passage of 
section 76-10-919 is simply another example of 
its close adherence to federal antitrust law. This 
strengthens our conclusion that the "authorized or 
directed" language in section 76-10-915(1)(f) was 
similarly intended to parallel federal law. 
Moreover, while the County appellees maintain 
that the Supreme Court's decisions caused 
"considerable consternation" in Congress and that 
it was this "aversion" to the Supreme Court's 
decisions that led to the passage of the Local 
Government Antitrust Act and to section 
76-10-919, it seems significant that neither 
Congress nor the Utah Legislature simply 
declared all local governmental entities exempt 
from antitrust laws in these provisions. Their 
actions in limiting monetary damages while 
failing to grant a complete exemption appears to 
signal acquiescence in, and possibly even 
approval of, the idea that local governments may 
have to comply with orders of injunctive relief if 
their anticompetitive actions violate antitrust 
provisions. 
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[***38] [*P36] Following City of Lafayette, the 
United States Supreme Court in Town of Hallie 
reaffirmed that, in order to be eligible for the state action 
exemption, a municipality must "show that it acted 
pursuant to a 'clearly articulated and affirmatively 
expressed state policy'" to displace competition 471 
US at 39 (quoting City of Lafayette, 435 US at 410) 
The standard is satisfied when the anticompetitive 
conduct alleged by the plaintiff "is a foreseeable result" 
of a state's grant of authority in a particular area Id at 
42 Thus, in Town of Hallie, the Court held that state 
statutes authorizing a city to provide sewage services 
outside the city limits and to determine which areas it 
would serve sufficiently articulated a state policy that 
would allow the city to refuse sewage service in a 
particular area unless the landowners in that area voted in 
favor of annexation to the city Id at 37, 42-43 The 
Court in City of Columbia later held that state zoning 
laws that "authorized municipalities to regulate the use of 
land and the construction of buildings and other 
structures within their boundaries," including [***39] 
their size, location, and spacing, were sufficient to 
immunize a city's ordinances limiting billboard 
placement 499 U S at 370-73 & n 3 Adhering to the 
"foreseeable result" standard, the Court reasoned that "[a] 
municipal ordinance restricting the size, location, and 
spacing of billboards necessarily protects existing 
billboards against some competition from newcomers," 
and that the anticompetitive conduct complained of by a 
newcomer billboard company was thus foreseeable Id at 
373 
[*P37] The County appellees make much of the 
idea that City of Columbia substantially broadened the 
scope of federal antitrust immunity for municipalities, 
reversing the "aggressive narrowing" of such immunity 
that, in their view, was imposed by City of Lafayette 
They thus argue that we should follow the same broad 
interpretation that, they maintain, the Court has now 
adopted The Summit Water appellants disagree with the 
County appellees in regard to whether municipalities 
were altogether exempt from federal antitrust laws before 
the Court's ruling in City of Lafayette They further 
contend that City of Columbia adhered to the same 
standard [***40] for construing the municipality 
exemption that was originated in City of Lafayette and 
followed in Town of Hallie 
[*P38] Having reviewed the line of federal 
Supreme Court cases from City of Lafayette to City of 
Columbia and the opinions of lower courts construing 
them, we see no clear indication that the Court in City of 
Columbia intended to broaden its previously-adopted 
standard The Court's primary concern in its discussion of 
the municipality exemption standard in that case was to 
clarify that a federal court applying the exemption need 
not determine whether a municipal act is "substantively 
and procedurally correct" under state law in order to 
conclude that the act was taken pursuant to a state policy 
to [**449] displace competition City of Columbia, 499 
US at 371-72 (internal quotation omitted) To require 
federal courts to engage in such scrutiny of state law 
would, the Court explained, "undermine the very interests 
of federalism [the state action immunity doctrine] is 
designed to protect " Id at 372 
[*P39] This clarification thus did nothing to alter 
the range of state authorization that suffices to immunize 
[***41] anticompetitive municipal actions from antitrust 
laws The outer boundaries of that range are found in two 
basic principles that the Court has consistently 
acknowledged First, "the requirement of 'clear 
articulation and affirmative expression' is not satisfied 
when the State's position is one of mere neutrality 
respecting the municipal actions challenged as 
anticompetitive A state that allows its municipalities to 
do as they please can hardly be said to have 
'contemplated' the specific anticompetitive actions for 
which municipal liability is sought " City of Boulder, 455 
US at 55 (holding that a neutral grant of home rule 
authority to municipalities could not constitute a state 
"policy" to displace competition m the provision of cable 
television services), see also Town of Hallie, 471 U S at 
43 (concluding that specific statutory authorization to 
municipalities to provide sewage services outside city 
boundaries was not "neutral on state policy") Second, 
however, the municipality need not show "a specific, 
detailed legislative authorization" to engage in the 
particular anticompetitive conduct at issue City of 
Lafayette, 435 US at 415 [***42] (plurality), see also 
City of Columbia, 499 U S at 372 ("We have rejected the 
contention that the ["clear articulation"] requirement can 
be met only if the delegating statute explicitly permits the 
displacement of competition "), Town of Hallie, 471 US 
at 43-44 (rejecting the idea that "a legislature must 
expressly state in a statute or its legislative history that 
the legislature intends for the delegated action to have 
anticompetitive effects"), id at 45 (rejecting the idea that 
the municipality must "show that the State 'compelled' it 
to act") 
2005 UT 73, *P39 123 P 3d 437, **449, 
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[*P40] The "foreseeabihty" inquiry that the Court 
settled on in Town of Halhe, 471 US at 42, and in City 
of Columbia, 499 U S at 373, ensures that the required 
state authorization falls somewhere between these two 
poles Subsequent decisions of lower federal courts have 
thus focused on whether the anticompetitive action 
alleged is a "foreseeable result" of state statutes See Elec 
Inspectors, Inc v Vill of E Hills, 320 F 3d 110, 121 (2d 
Cir 2002) (concluding that "the plaintiffs complete 
exclusion from the market for [***43] required electrical 
inspection services is a foreseeable result of a statute 
that requires municipalities to enforce a uniform fire code 
and administrative regulations that condition the issuance 
of certificates of occupancy upon inspections by 
town-designated agents"), Mich Paytel Joint Venture v 
City of Detroit, 287 F 3d 527, 536 (6th Cir 2002) 
(concluding that a city's facilitation of a private telephone 
company's monopoly by accepting its bid to install and 
service pay telephones in city prisons was "the logical 
and foreseeable result of the City's broad authority under 
state law and the Michigan Constitution to bid out public 
contracts for the maintenance of City prisons"), Surgical 
Care Ctr v Hosp Serv Dist No 1, 171 F 3d 231, 235 
(5th Cir 1999) (en banc) (concluding that a hospital 
service district's alleged exclusivity and tying agreements 
that aimed to exclude a private hospital from the market 
for outpatient surgical care were "not the foreseeable 
result of allowing a hospital service district to form joint 
ventures") 
[*P41] We therefore hold that the district court 
erred in concluding that "for an activity to satisfy [***44] 
the 'authorized or directed' requirement m section 
76-10-915 (!)(/) of the Utah Code it is necessary only that 
a political subdivision act pursuant to general state 
statutes " Rather, a court must examine the particular 
statutes at issue and then engage in the foreseeabihty 
analysis set forth above Here, the question is thus 
whether the alleged price-fixing, agreements tying 
Mountain Regional water distribution to the grant of 
building permits and planning approvals, and other 
anticompetitive activities are the "foreseeable result" of 
the authority granted the County appellees under state 
law 
[*P42] [**450] We first set forth the provisions 
that, according to the County appellees, grant the 
necessary authority The County appellees cite provisions 
in the County Land Use, Development, and Management 
Act (CLUDMA) 8 and the Utah Special Service District 
Act, Utah Code Ann §§ 17A-2-1301 to -1332 (2004), as 
providing the County appellees with authority to act and 
articulating a state policy to displace competition in the 
area of culinary water distribution The CLUDMA 
provisions that, according to the County appellees, are 
comparable to those found sufficient [***45] in City of 
Columbia are as follows Section 17-27a-102 provides 
that 
counties may enact all ordinances, 
resolutions, and rules and may enter into 
other forms of land use controls and 
development agreements that they 
consider necessary or appropriate for the 
use and development of land within the 
unincorporated area of the county, 
including ordinances, resolutions, rules, 
restrictive covenants, easements, and 
development agreements governing uses, 
density, open spaces, structures, buildings, 
energy-efficiency, light and air, air quality, 
transportation and public or alternative 
transportation, infrastructure, street and 
building orientation and width 
requirements, public facilities, and height 
and location of vegetation, trees, and 
landscaping, unless expressly prohibited 
by law 
Utah Code Ann § 17-27a-102(l)(b) (Supp 2005) 
Section 17-27a-301 requires that every county "enact an 
ordinance establishing a countywide planning 
commission " Id § 17-27a-301(l)(a) Section 17-27a-401 
requires that every county "prepare and adopt a 
comprehensive, long-range general plan" that "may 
provide for the efficient and economical use, 
conservation, [***46] and production of the supply of 
water " Id § 17-27a-401(l), (2)(c)(i) 
8 The parties cite to the version of CLUDMA in 
effect at the time they submitted their briefs See 
Utah Code Ann §§ 17-27-101 to -1003 (2001 & 
Supp 2004) (repealed 2005) In the 2005 
legislative session, the Act was renumbered and 
revised See Utah Code Ann §§ 17-27a-101 to 
-803 (Supp 2005) While generally we consider 
the law in effect at the time a claim arises or is 
brought in court, see State v One Lot of Pers 
Prop, 2004 UT 36, PP13-17, 90 P3d 639, 
current law is relevant when injunctive relief is 
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requested, see Nat'l Coalition to Save Our Mall v. 
Norton, 348 U.S. App. D.C 92, 269 F.3d 1092, 
1096-97 (D.C Cir. 2001) (citing Miller v. French, 
530 U.S. 327, 120 S. Ct. 2246, 147 L. Ed. 2d 326 
(2000)). Because injunctive relief is requested 
here, we consider the current version of the 
CLUDMA in our analysis. 
[*P43] [***47] The provisions of the Special 
Service District Act that the County appellees assert are 
relevant authorize a county to "establish a special service 
district for the purpose of providing [water] within the 
area of the special service district." Id. § 
17A-2-l304(l)(a)(i) (2004). "The area within any special 
service district may include all or any part of the county . 
. . that established it except that . . . a special service 
district may not include any area not directly benefitted 
by the services provided under this section without the 
consent of the nonbenefitted landowner." Id. § 
17A-2-1304(2)(a)(iii). The scope of the service district's 
authority then includes, among other things, "the power 
to exercise all powers of eminent domain possessed by 
the county . . . which established" it, "the power to enter 
into contracts . . . to carry out [its] functions," and "the 
power to acquire or construct facilities." Id. § 
17A-2-1314(l)(b),(c),(d). 
[*P44] Although these provisions clearly 
contemplate a county's establishment of a water service 
district, such as Mountain Regional, and grant both 
counties and special service districts certain powers, 
lacking from the [***48] statutes is any suggestion that a 
county might use its planning or zoning authority to 
facilitate the operation or growth of special service 
districts once they are created. In particular, the general 
grant of authority to counties contained in section 
17-27a-102 allows counties to enter into "development 
agreements" in a number of areas but does not mention 
the provision of water or other utility services. Id. § 
17-27a-102(l)(b) (Supp. 2005). Unlike in Town of 
Hallie, where a town's requirement that unincorporated 
areas annex themselves to the town was a prerequisite to 
supplying sewage services, 471 U.S. at 43, the allegation 
here is that developers are precluded from proceeding 
with their development unless they accept Mountain 
Regional [**451] water services; in Town of Hallie, 
desired services were tied to acceptance of incorporation 
within the governmental entity that provided those 
services while in our case, developers are allegedly 
forced to accept services they may or may not desire. The 
Special Service District Act itself appears to prohibit a 
service district from incorporating a nonbenefitted 
landowner's property without the landowner's consent. 
Utah Code Ann. § 17A-2-1304(2)(a)(in) [***49] (2004). 
[*P45] We can find no other statute within either of 
these Acts that contemplates any connection between a 
county's development activities and its favoring of special 
service districts that it has established. The statutory 
scheme does not reveal a state policy of allowing 
counties to displace competition with a special service 
district unless the special service district is successful 
through its own competitive efforts in acquiring an 
exclusive market share within its area. Other courts have 
similarly noted that a state's grant of authority to a 
government entity or utility to provide a natural resource 
does not necessarily indicate an intent to immunize the 
entity or utility from antitrust laws. See Cantor v. Detroit 
Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 595-96, 96 S. Ct. 3110, 49 L. 
Ed. 2d 1141 (1976) ("There is no logical inconsistency 
between requiring [a private utility] to meet regulatory 
criteria insofar as it is exercising its natural monopoly 
powers and also to comply with antitrust standards to the 
extent that it engages in business activity in competitive 
areas of the economy."); Parks v. Watson, 716 F.2d 646, 
663 (9th Cir. 1983) ("Merely because [***50] the state 
may authorize a city to be the sole supplier of a natural 
resource and to set prices for that resource, it does not 
necessarily follow that the city is immunized from 
antitrust liability when it attempts to tie the purchase of a 
non-monopolized product or service to the sale of that 
natural resource."). We therefore conclude that the 
anticompetitive activities alleged by the Summit Water 
appellants, including the act of tying building permit and 
planning approvals for developers and others to 
acceptance of Mountain Regional as the development's 
water provider, are not a foreseeable result of the 
statutory scheme. 9 
9 We note, however, that anticompetitive effects 
resulting from activities that any of the County 
appellees undertake in the ordinary course of 
performing their authorized duties, where there 
are no uncontemplated ties between county and 
special service district functions, might be 
considered foreseeable. Moreover, we recognize 
that the Court in City of Columbia rejected a 
"conspiracy" exception to the municipality 
exemption. 499 U.S. at 379 (refusing to "allow 
plaintiffs to look behind the actions of state 
2005 UT 73, *P45, 123 P 3d 437, **451, 
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sovereigns to base their claims on 'perceived 
conspiracies to restrain trade"' and reaffirming 
that, "with the possible market participant 
exception, any action that qualifies as state 
action" under the foreseeabihty test is "exempt 
from the operation of the antitrust laws") 
[***51] [*P46] Accordingly, even assuming 
without deciding that the County appellees qualify as 
"municipalities" under Utah Code section 
76-10-915(l)(f), they would not be entitled to the 
municipality exemption contained in that subsection 
because their alleged anticompetitive conduct is not 
"authorized or directed by state law" We therefore 
reverse the district court's dismissal of the Summit Water 
appellants' complaint on that basis 10 
10 Because we conclude that the actions alleged 
by the Summit Water appellants are not 
"authorized or directed by state law" under 
section 76-10-915(1)0, we need not address the 
Summit Water appellants' additional argument 
that the municipality exemption does not apply to 
the County appellees because they are acting as 
market participants As noted above, City of 
Columbia left open the question of whether the 
municipality exemption would apply when the 
municipality is acting as a market participant 499 
US at 379 Further, the Summit Water 
appellants' claim that Senator Waddingham's 
affidavit was inappropriately excluded is moot 
under our conclusion here 
[***52] II WHETHER THE EXEMPTIONS IN 
SECTION 76-10-915 ARE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
[*P47] We further reverse the distnct court in 
regard to its requirement that the Summit Water 
appellants amend their pleadings to assert specifically 
that the anticompetitive activities alleged were not 
authorized or directed by state law The structure of the 
Utah Antitrust Act, together with federal antitrust 
caselaw, make clear that the exemptions in Utah Code 
section 76-10-915(1)(f) are to be pleaded by a defendant 
as an affirmative defense See Utah R Civ P 8(c) 
[**452] ("In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party 
shall set forth affirmatively any matter 
constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense") 
Section 76-10-915 states that other provisions of the 
Antitrust Act must not "be construed to prohibit" the 
activities that it lists, including "the activities of a 
municipality to the extent authorized or directed by state 
law " Utah Code Ann § 76-10-915(1)0) The County 
appellees argue that this language distinguishes the 
antitrust exemptions from a proper affirmative defense 
because in the case of the exemptions, "the cause of 
action never arises [***53] in the First instance " We do 
not agree that there is a meaningful distinction in that 
regard between the exemptions listed in section 
76-10 915 and other affirmative defenses There is no 
legitimate cause of action against an individual who kills 
another in self-defense, for example, but a murder 
defendant is nevertheless required to assert self-defense 
as an affirmative defense See Utah Code Ann § 
76-2-402 (2003), State v Starks, 627 P 2d 88, 92 (Utah 
1981) 
[*P48] The line of federal Supreme Court cases 
since City of Lafayette indicates that the municipality 
exemption is regarded as an affirmative defense See, 
eg, City of Columbia, 499 U S al 369 (indicating that 
the municipality exemption was asserted by the 
defendants in a motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict), id at 372 (referring to the doctrine at issue as 
"the Parker [v Brown, 317 US 341, 63 S Ct 307, 87L 
Ed 315 (1943)J defense") Moreover, as the County 
appellees concede, the burden is on the municipality to 
"demonstrate that it is engaging in the challenged activity 
pursuant to a clearly expressed [***54] state policy" to 
displace competition Town of Halhe, 471 US at 40 It 
would make little logical sense to require plaintiffs to 
specifically plead a matter in the negative that the 
defendants would then be required to prove to the 
contrary in order to prevail against the plaintiffs on that 
ground 
III CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER UTAH 
CONSTITUTION ARTICLE XII, SECTION 20 
[*P49] As indicated above, the parties disagree as 
to whether we need determine whether Article XII, 
Section 20 is self-executing when we have already 
determined that the Summit Water appellants may 
proceed with their statutory claim under the Utah 
Antitrust Act While the Summit Water appellants 
suggest that we need not reach the constitutional issue, 
the County appellees allege that we must resolve the 
issue of whether the constitutional provision "trumps all 
the liability and damage limitations in the 1979 Act " We 
accept the concession of the Summit Water appellants for 
the following reasons First, the County appellees have 
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not provided any specific citation to the record where we 
might find the assertion that they ascribe to the Summit 
Water appellants. The amended complaint submitted by 
[***55] the Summit Water appellants does list Article 
XII, Section 20 as a parallel basis, together with the Utah 
Antitrust Act, for awarding injunctive relief against the 
County appellees and damages against Montgomery 
Watson and Jarvis. The complaint does not suggest, 
however, that the constitutional provision "trumps" the 
statute in this regard. 
[*P50] Second, the Summit Water appellants lost 
on the issue of the proper interpretation of Article XII, 
Section 20 below. Their concession on that point, if we 
decide in their favor on the statutory issue, suggests that 
they do not consider a constitutional right of action 
essential to their complaint as long as their statutory 
claim is intact. Our settled policy is to avoid giving 
advisory opinions in regard to issues unnecessary to the 
resolution of the claims before us. Savage v. Utah Youth 
Vill, 2004 UT 102, P25, 104 P.3d 1242. We therefore 
decline to analyze whether Article XII, Section 20 is 
self-executing. 
CONCLUSION 
[*P51] We reverse the district court's dismissal of 
the Summit Water appellants' claims under section 
76-10-914 of the Utah Antitrust Act. We hold that, even 
assuming the defendants qualify [***56] as 
"municipalities" for purposes of section 76-10-915(l)(f), 
the activities at issue here were not "authorized or 
[**453] directed by state law," and defendants are 
therefore not exempt from the requirements of the Utah 
Antitrust Act. We further reverse the district court's order 
requiring the Summit Water appellants to specifically 
plead that the activities they allege are not authorized or 
directed by state law because we hold that the exemptions 
in section 76-10-915 constitute affirmative defenses, 
which must be pleaded by a defendant. Finally, because 
we decide in favor of the Summit Water appellants on 
their statutory claim, we do not consider whether Article 
XII, Section 20 of the Utah Constitution is self-executing. 
[*P52] Associate Chief Justice Wilkins, Justice 
Durrant, Justice Parrish, and Judge Willmore concur in 
Chief Justice Durham's opinion. 
[*P53] Having recused himself, Justice Nehring 
does not participate herein; District Judge Thomas 
Willmore sat. 
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HEADNOTES 
1. FRAUDS, STATUTE OF. Where complaint or 
answer sets up contract or modification required by 
statute of frauds to be in writing, and is silent as to 
whether contract is in writing, contract will be assumed to 
be in writing until contrary appears (Rev. St. 1933, 
33-5-3). * 
2. CONTRACTS. Parties may orally modify an 
agreement in writing, not required by statute of frauds to 
be in writing, where there is consideration for such 
modification (Rev. St. 1933, 33-5-3). 
3. FRAUDS, STATUTE OF. Oral modification of 
contract required by statute of frauds to be in writing will 
not ordinarily be permitted (Rev. St. 1933, 33-5-3). 
4. FRAUDS, STATUTE OF. Where party has 
changed his position by performing oral modification of 
contract required to be in writing, so that it would be 
inequitable to permit other party who has induced or 
consented to such change of position to enforce contract 
according to its original terms, modified agreement 
should be upheld (Rev. St. 1933, 33-5-3). 2 
5. PLEADING. In action on written lease, parts of 
defendant's answer which were stricken by court upon 
ground that they attempted to vary terms of written 
instrument should not have been stricken if they had any 
office as valid defense. 
6. APPEAL AND ERROR. In action on written lease 
where parts of defendant's answer had been stricken by 
trial court, every intendment, inference, and implication 
must be given stricken matter which would support it as 
valid defense. 
7. EVIDENCE. Ambiguity in written contract for 
lease of premises resulting from application of contract to 
subject-matter could be resolved by evidence of what 
meaning parties intended to give such terms. 
8. PLEADING. In action by lessor on written lease 
providing for making of certain alterations of premises by 
lessee, striking lessee's answer, which set up subsequent 
oral agreement in defense, on ground that such answer 
sought to vary terms of written instrument, held error, 
since use of term "contemplated alterations" in answer 
implied that evidence might be introduced showing that 
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oral evidence would be required to render intelligible 
language of lease providing for alterations, and that 
lessee pursuant to oral modifications had undergone 
change of position to its detriment (Rev. St. 1933, 
33-5-3). 
9. PLEADING. In action involving lease providing 
for cancellation if lessee was unable to procure theatre 
permit from city, action of trial court in striking answer 
stating that building, with contemplated alterations, could 
not be used for picture show business held error, even 
though wording might have been ground for motion to 
make more definite. 
10. PLEADING. In action on lease requiring lessee 
to furnish bond to protect lessor from liens which might 
be filed on property, action of trial court in striking 
lessee's answer, on ground that it sought to modify terms 
of written instrument, where answer stated that bond was 
given to protect lessor and contractor, and that time of 
filing liens under bond was extended at request of lessor 
and with its assurance that provisions of lease would be 
waived, held error, since answer inferred that lessee so 
changed its position as to make it inequitable for lessor to 
take advantage of fact that modification was oral (Rev. 
St. 1933, 33-5-3; Comp. Laws 1917, §§ 3759-3763). 
1 Case v. Ralph, 56 Utah 243, 188 P. 640. 
2 Kerr v. Hillyard, 51 Utah 364, 170 P. 981. 
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OPINION BY: WOLFE 
OPINION 
[**490] [*196] WOLFE, Justice. 
On October 18, 1932, the plaintiffs and the assignor 
of the Certified Productions, Inc., entered into a written 
lease for the letting of certain premises on Main street in 
Salt Lake City for a period of ten years, the rent to begin 
on January 1, 1933. Plaintiffs now sue the defendant 
corporation [*197] as lessee and the personal defendants 
as sublessees for restitution of the premises, setting out 
four causes of action. [***2] The fourth cause of action 
was dismissed, and on the third cause of action a 
judgment of no cause of action was entered, leaving the 
first and second causes only to be dealt with in this 
appeal. The ground set out in the first cause of action for 
restitution of the premises was an alleged default in the 
payment of a net rent of $ 5,297.09. Restitution of the 
premises was asked in the second cause of action on the 
ground that the defendant company had failed and 
neglected to keep and preserve said leased premises at all 
times free of liens or other encumbrances and have 
permitted mechanics' liens to be placed thereon, allegedly 
contrary to the conditions and covenants of the lease. 
The defendant corporation set up as an answer to 
both causes of action that there were supplemental 
agreements which modified the original lease, and that 
such supplemental agreements in reference to the 
covenants and conditions which plaintiffs claim were 
broken were acted upon by the corporate defendant, and 
that it materially changed its position in reliance upon 
them. Nothing is said in either defense as to the 
supplemental agreements or modifications being in 
writing. The lease, being for a period of [***3] ten years, 
was governed by the statute of frauds (Rev. [**491] St. 
1933, 33-5-3). Where a complaint or answer, which sets 
up a contract or modification required by the statute of 
frauds to be in writing, is silent as to whether it was in 
writing, it will be assumed to be nn writing until the 
contrary appears. Case v. Ralph, 56 Utah 243, 188 P. 
640. But in this case, while the answer was silent as to the 
character of the modification, both sides treated it as 
being oral and a motion to strike as hereunder set forth 
was argued as if it had been pleaded as oral. 
Plaintiffs moved to strike the first three paragraphs 
of the corporate defendant's answer to the first cause of 
action, and also moved to strike the first paragraph of the 
said defendant's answer to the second cause of action. 
Such parts [*198] of each answer as are material will 
later appear in this opinion. The motion to strike was 
upon the ground that the allegations of such paragraphs 
attempted to modify and vary the terms of a written 
instrument, further claiming that the said modifications as 
alleged were oral and not in writing. At the trial the court 
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struck all of the paragraphs covered by the motion, 
[***4] which practically left the corporate defendant 
without a defense While the motion to strike did not 
specifically assign as a ground for the motion that there 
was an attempt to vary a contract required to be within 
the statute of frauds by an oral modification, yet, the 
argument proceeded upon that basis 
It is important to note that if the stricken paragraphs 
can avail the corporate defendant as a defense on any 
theory, the court was in error in striking them Evidently 
the theory upon which the court struck the matters of 
defense was that the said matters alleged an oral 
modification of a written lease required by the statute of 
frauds to be in writing and that such could not be done 
The arguments of counsel before this court on the 
assignments of error practically all turn about the 
question as to whether or not the court was in error in this 
theory The parties first divide on the question as to 
whether an oral modification of an agreement required to 
be in writing by the statute of frauds can be set up as a 
defense, granted it is shown in addition that the defendant 
had acted on said oral modification and had performed in 
accordance therewith and materially changed its position 
[***5] by reason thereof Many cases have been cited to 
the effect that such oral modification may be enforced 
where the modification or new agreement has been 
executed, or where the particular part of the original 
agreement changed or modified is not one required to be 
by the statute of frauds in writing, or where the party 
seeking to avoid the oral agreement has received material 
benefit therefrom, or where the situation is such as to 
work an estoppel of the party seeking to avoid the [* 199] 
effect of the agreement, or where such modification 
constitutes a waiver of the original terms of the contract 
At the outbet, it may be said that theie is no question 
but that parties may orally modify an agreement in 
writing where the original contract is not required by the 
statute of frauds to be in writing, at least where there is 
consideration for such modification We make no 
statement concerning the case where the original contract 
is not required to be in writing, but the matter covered by 
the modification is in reference to a subject covered by 
the statute of frauds A different question presents itself 
when the original contract is required by the statute of 
frauds to be in writing [***6] As a broad general 
doctrine, it may be announced that a contract required by 
the statute of frauds to be in writing cannot be modified 
by a subsequent oral agreement At the moment the 
principle is thus announced, it is immediately subject to 
many and varied exceptions The first great division 
comes between executory and executed modifications 
Even where the contract is still executory and specific 
performance is asked, or where an action is brought, on 
the contract as originally written, for failure to perform 
and the modification is set up as a defense to the alleged 
failure, or where the action is brought upon the original 
contract with its oral modifications as the basis of the suit 
and defense to the action is made on the ground that such 
contract was not wholly in writing, the courts have 
recognized the validity of the oral modifications in 
certain cases The rule that there can be no oral 
modification of a contract required by the statute of 
frauds to be in writing has been most rigidly enforced in 
England where, as a general rule, even an oral 
modification permitting an extension of time in which to 
perform has been held invalid Most of the courts of this 
country hold, as [***7] a general rule, that an oral 
modification of a contract required by the statute [**492] 
of frauds to be in writing will not be permitted 
Exceptions have been made by some courts where the 
matter in the original contract which has been modified 
was not such [*200] matter as was required to be in 
writing Other courts have made a supposed distinction 
between matters relating to performance, permitting such 
matters to be modified This would appear to be a 
difficult line to draw because most of the provisions of 
the contract are to be performed As stated in the case of 
Rucker v Harrington, 52 Mo App 481 
"But a contract is only burdensome because of the 
consequence of performance flowing from it Per se the 
contract is harmless It is the performance that does the 
hurt It is, therefore, at least, equally proper to say that the 
principal design of the statute was to protect parties from 
the performance of burdensome contracts which they 
never made Therefore, if you may enforce an oral 
agreement for a substituted performance of a written 
agreement, you apply the statute to the shadow and 
withhold it from the substance Such application of the 
statute only makes [***8] it necessary that parties have a 
contract in writing, then, under the guise of performance, 
the contract enforced is shown by parol " 
In the instant case, as will be noted when we come to 
consider the alleged modifications, it is claimed there was 
an agreement to forego rent for a certain period pending 
the making of required alterations Payment of rent deals 
with performance If oral substituted matter relating to 
Page 4 
88 Utah 194, *200; 48 P.2d 489, **492; 
1935 Utah LEXIS 11,***8 
performance is valid, then it may orally be shown in an 
executed contract that the lessor agreed to take a different 
rent. What the cases usually mean when they speak of 
substituted performance relates to matters incidental to 
performance, such as an extension of the time in which 
performance may be made, or the manner or method of 
performing, such as payment in commodities instead of 
money, or payment to the creditor of the person entitled 
under the contract to the money instead of to such person 
himself. The distinction there sought to be made is that 
the subject-matter of the contract has not been changed, 
but only the method of performing it. 
For a comprehensive discussion of the exceptions 
and variations of the general rule heretofore announced, 
reference is made [***9] to a 50-page not in 17 A. L. R. 
10, where numerous cases are discussed and analyzed. 
[*201] It is claimed by the corporate defendant in 
this case that the modified part of the contract was by it 
performed. Consequently we may proceed immediately 
to a consideration as to whether an oral modification 
which has been acted upon is valid. Here again, there is a 
division of authority. The note in A. L. R. cites in the 
United States, California, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, 
Mississippi, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Washington, and Wisconsin, as 
states in which it has been held that where an agreement 
as modified has been acted upon the rights of the parties 
are to be determined by the modified agreement. As 
stated by Mr. Justice Cardozo, then justice of the Court of 
Appeals of New York, in Imperator Realty Co. v. Tull, 
228N.Y. 447, 127N.E. 263, 266: 
"Sometimes the resulting disability has been 
characterized as an estoppel, sometimes as a waiver. * * * 
We need not go into the question of the accuracy of the 
description. * * * The truth is that we are facing a 
principal more nearly ultimate than either waiver or 
estoppel, one with roots in [***10] the yet larger 
principal that no one shall be permitted to found any 
claim upon his own inequity or take advantage of his own 
wrong. * * * The statute of frauds was not intended to 
offer an asylum of escape from that fundamental 
principle of justice." 
We accept this principle. If a party has changed his 
position by performing an oral modification so that it 
would be inequitable to permit the other party to found a 
claim upon the original agreement as unmodified or 
defeat the former's claim by setting up a defense that 
performance was not according to the written contract, 
after he has induced or consented to the former going 
forward, the modified agreement should be held valid. 
We have held in Kerr v. Hillyard, 51 Utah 364, 170 P. 
981, that a contract required to be in writing when fully 
executed is not within the statute of frauds, although 
originally oral. Logically, an oral modification of a 
contract required to be in writing when such modification 
is fully executed is taken out of the statute. 
[*202] The plaintiffs claim that the matter stricken 
did not show a change of position, but that it only showed 
the performance of obligations which the corporate 
defendant [***l 1] was under the original lease required 
to perform. That is to say, said defendant [**493] did 
not do anything which it was not required under the 
original contract to do; consequently it has not changed 
its position and there would be no inequity or fraud upon 
the defendant if it was not permitted to set up such 
alleged modifications. Another way of stating plaintiffs' 
claim is to say that the modifications alleged by the 
defendant have been modifications in the nature of 
recession by the plaintiffs of their rights under the 
original agreement whilst no new obligations are required 
of or are to be performed by the defendant. Nor has it 
suffered any detriment by such modifications which it 
would not have suffered by performing under the terms 
of the original agreement. 
This brings us to a point where we are required to 
make a careful analysis of certain provisions of the lease 
and the paragraphs of the answer heretofore referred to. 
The material parts of the lease which must be considered 
in this analysis under the first cause of action are as 
follows: 
"Third: * * * 
"(4) The Lessee shall not make any alterations in, 
additions or improvements to the leased premises without 
the [***12] prior written consent of the Lessors, except 
that the Lessee shall have the right and he hereby agrees 
to alter and remodel, at his own expense, the interior and 
front of the building in said demised premises into a 
theatre suitable for the purposes for which the said 
premises are hereby leased, the plans and specifications, 
however, for said alterations and remodeling to be first 
approved by the Lessors and further approved by the duly 
authorized officers of and made in accordance with the 
ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah, and the laws of the 
State of Utah, and for the purpose of making said 
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alterations and remodeling the said premises the Lessee 
shall have the right to enter into the possession and 
occupancy of the demised premises on the 21st day of 
November, 1932 
"(5) The Lessee agrees to furnish, or cause to be 
furnished, to the Lessors, a bond in the sum of $ 
5,000 00, as required by chapter 3, title 62, Compiled 
Laws of Utah, 1917, for the protection of said [*203] 
Lessors against any liability or hen arising by reason of 
materials furnished or labor performed in the alteration 
and remodeling of the demised premises for the purposes 
hereinabove mentioned, and when [***13] the Lessee 
shall start alterations on said building the Lessee shall 
furnish a performance bond or securities acceptable to the 
Lessors sufficiently large enough to insure the 
completion for any and all alterations made in said 
building 
"(6) The Lessee hereby agrees that he will, at his 
own expense during the entire term of this Lease, well 
and sufficiently repair, maintain and keep in repair the 
demised premises and all parts thereof, and all plumbing 
and other fixtures therein, and that he will on or before 
February 1, 1933, at his own expense, expend in 
remodeling, altering and reconstructing the interior of the 
demised premises including the installation of suitable 
equipment and furnishings for theatre purposes, not less 
than the sum of $ 10,000 00 The Lessors agree to paint, 
prior to the opening of said theatre, building above the 
first floor " 
The paragraphs of the defense to the first cause of 
action which were stricken read as follows 
"1 That at the time the said lease was entered into, 
the said plaintiffs warranted that the building was fit and 
proper for the uses that this defendant intended to use the 
same for, namely, a picture show business, after certain 
remodelling [***14] contemplated by the defendant was 
made 
"2 That on the signing of the lease, the defendant 
company immediately commenced the work of 
remodelling of the building and shortly thereafter were 
notified by the building inspector for Salt Lake City and 
the fire department of Salt Lake City that the building 
with the contemplated alterations could not be used for a 
picture show business, with the result that the defendant 
company was compelled to abandon the project or else 
seek another building in which to carry on its business 
That another building, namely the building known as the 
Callaway, Hoock & Francis Building at about 72 South 
Main Street was found by these defendants and 
arrangements were made to rent the same 
"3 That immediately on the plaintiffs herein learning 
of this, they went to the defendant company and entered 
into a new agreement under which it was agreed that the 
defendants herein should make further alterations to the 
Bamberger Building than had been contemplated so as to 
meet the requirements of the building inspector and fire 
department, and in consideration of the defendant 
company making such changes and alterations, these 
plaintiffs agreed that [*204] [***15] no payment 
should be required during any of the time used in the 
alterations [**494] of the building, and further agreed 
that when the building was completed and ready for 
occupancy that the lental which otherwise would have 
been due and owing at that time under the terms of the 
agreement set out should either be waived in total or if 
not in total then a proper adjustment would be made 
depending on the extra expense defendants were put to 
and the due date of the payments should be spread over a 
period of several years, and had such an agreement not 
have been made, the defendant company would not have 
continued to occupy the said premises or made the 
alterations in the building which it was compelled to 
make " 
The two principles which must govern in the analysis 
are as follows (1) If the parts of the answer stricken have 
any office as a valid defense, the order striking them 
would be erroneous, and (2) in construing the matter 
stricken to so determine whether it has any office every 
intendment, inference and implication which would 
support it as a valid defense must be given to it The 
answer is remarkable for what it fails to state Paragraph 
2 alleges that the corporate defendant [***16] 
immediately commenced the work of remodeling the 
building It does not state whether the defendant 
complied with the provision in sub-paragraph 4 of the 
lease in drawing plans and specifications and having 
them approved by the lessors or approved by the duly 
authorized officers of Salt Lake City It then goes on to 
allege that it was notified by the building inspector and 
the fire department that the building with the 
"contemplated alterations" could not be used for a picture 
show business It does not state whether the building 
inspector or the fire department had authority to pass 
upon such a building It does not state whether the 
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ordinance of Salt Lake City permitted such officer or 
department to pass upon contemplated alterations. It does 
not set up that the ordinances of Salt Lake City had been 
complied with. We are left in the dark as to whether there 
were ordinances specifically setting forth the 
requirements of a theater construction or whether the 
ordinance left such decisions up to some officer, and, if 
so, which officer. As far as the answer is [*205] 
concerned, it may be that the officers of Salt Lake City 
were mere volunteers, and that the defendant would not 
have [***17] had to consult them or obey their warnings 
or instructions. When we come to the words 
"contemplated alterations" used in the second paragraph 
and the phrase "further alterations to the Bamberger 
Building than had been contemplated" used in the third 
paragraph, we immediately get the impression that there 
were some definite alterations contemplated between the 
parties. The next question which presents itself is: (1) Do 
such phrases refer to contemplated alterations which were 
definite and certain by the terms of the contract, or (2) to 
some reservations or understanding which the parties had 
in their minds not contained in the contract, or (3) is the 
contract, while certain and definite on its face, yet when 
its language is applied to the subject-matter, found to be 
ambiguous so that evidence might be introduced to show 
what was in the minds of the parties when they used 
certain terms or which might be material to invest such 
terms with a meaning which the parties themselves had 
given them or understood by them - that is to say, a 
latent ambiguity? Thus, in the case of Klueter v. Joseph 
Schlitz Brewing Co., 143 Wis. 347, 128 N.W. 43, 32 L. R. 
A. (N. S.) 383, it is stated: [***18] 
"Ambiguity in a written contract calling for 
construction may arise as well from words plain in 
themselves but uncertain when applied to the 
subject-matter of the contract, as from words which are 
uncertain in their literal sense." 
As stated before, we must give the defendant the 
benefit of every implication or inference which may arise 
out of the language of the parts stricken. Certainly, if the 
contract itself states definitely, so that there is no latent or 
patent ambiguity as to what alterations are required, then 
there would be no room for any evidence as to what the 
parties contemplated as comprising the necessary 
alterations. If, on the other hand, the contract, while on its 
face appearing to be certain, would open up an ambiguity 
[*206] when attempts were made to apply it to the 
subject-matter, then such ambiguity could be resolved by 
evidence of what meaning the parties themselves 
intended to invest such terms. In looking at the contract, 
subparagraph 4, we find that the lessee is restrained from 
making "any alterations in, additions or improvements to 
the leased premises without the prior written consent of 
the Lessors." There is one important and necessary 
exception. [***19] That is that the lessee shall have not 
only the right, but is required to alter and remodel the 
interior and front of the building. These alterations are 
limited as follows: First, so as [**495] to make a 
"theatre suitable for the purposes for which the said 
premises are hereby leased." The kind of a theater for 
which the premises are leased is set out in subsection (1) 
of paragraph third of the lease, being stated to be for 
"motion pictures, talkies and all lawful screen 
representations and reproductions and all other lawful 
reproductions and public exhibitions usual and customary 
in the operation of a theatre." This measure of the kind of 
theater is itself somewhat indefinite. Second, the 
alterations which the defendant may make are further 
limited by requiring the plans and specifications thereof 
to be approved by the lessors and other duly authorized 
officers; and, third, limited in that they must be in 
accordance with the ordinances of Salt Lake City and the 
laws of the state of Utah. 
It would appear from these provisions that there 
might easily be a latent ambiguity when it comes to 
applying these provisions to the actual performance of the 
contract. We cannot tell, and [***20] only the evidence 
could show it. The question as to whether there was a 
definite ordinance of Salt Lake City which would itself 
be equivalent to plans and specifications is not revealed. 
Whether the plans and specifications were to meet certain 
conversations which the parties had would only be 
revealed by the evidence. What alterations which the 
defendant could make to the interior and front of the 
building and still meet the rather uncertain requirements 
as to a suitable [*207] theater as meant by the lease 
without running counter to the requirement that no 
alterations should be made without the written consent of 
the lessor except those required to make such suitable 
theater might turn out to be ambiguous when it actually 
came to applying the provision. It is not certain, however, 
that we need go to the extent of even analyzing the above 
provisions of the lease in order to conjecture whether 
there would or could be such a latent ambiguity. We 
believe that we must, for the purpose of testing whether 
the motion to strike was correct, hold that the term 
"contemplated alterations" used in the answer implies 
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that there was room for the introduction of evidence 
which would tend to [***21] prove that alterations were 
contemplated by the language of the lease which required 
oral evidence to make that language intelligible when it 
actually was attempted to apply it to the performance, 
although on the face of the lease it may have had the 
appearance of being definite. It might appear otherwise at 
the trial, but giving the defendant the benefit of every 
implication, we must conclude that its answer alleged 
such a situation. Had the plaintiffs demurred to the 
answer on the ground that it was ambiguous and 
uncertain, the demurrer should have been sustained. The 
court, before doing the drastic thing of striking, could, 
with propriety, have inquired whether the defendant 
could make more definite and certain by amendments, his 
theory. Had the defendant asked for permission to amend, 
undoubtedly the court would have permitted it. The 
defendant might still have asked permission to amend 
when he discovered that the court intended to grant the 
motion to strike. But we are not prepared to say that 
failure to make such motion, in view of the court's 
decision to strike, would be a waiver of defendant's right 
to object to the erroneous order of the court striking the 
paragraphs. The [***22] record does not reveal that the 
motion to strike was brought up on any law and motion 
day. It evidently was presented for the first time during 
the progress of the trial, so that when stricken the 
defendant had the right to proceed [*208] with the trial 
without the aid of such matter and assign the ruling as 
error. 
If we assume, which we must for the purpose of 
testing the correctness of the motion to strike, that the 
answer set up sufficient, in the absence of a special 
demurrer, to introduce evidence on the question of 
whether the terms of the lease were invested by the 
understanding of the parties with a certain meaning as to 
contemplated alterations, we must further assume that 
such evidence would have revealed that the contemplated 
alterations were less than those required by the 
modification. It may be that the evidence would not have 
so revealed. It may be that the evidence would have 
revealed that there were no contemplated alterations 
except those as shown by the lease, however latently 
uncertain that might be. It may be that such contemplated 
alterations, if evidence had been taken, would be shown 
to be the same as those which the defendant actually 
made. But that is [***23] all in the realm of speculation. 
The point is that the answer sets out sufficient matter 
from which it can be implied, giving the defendant, every 
benefit of the doubt, that it could have shown that there 
was a certain quantum of alterations which were 
contemplated [**496] by the parties as meeting the 
requirements of the terms of the lease if they themselves 
were latently uncertain (a matter as to which the evidence 
would reveal), and that by striking such parts the 
defendant was denied the right to tender evidence to that 
effect. If such evidence had been introduced, which 
would have tended to establish that there was an 
understanding as to what would be approximately 
required in the way of alterations, and that by an oral 
modification the defendant had agreed to do more and 
spend considerable more money, then there certainly 
would have been consideration for the foregoing of rental 
over a certain period, and the defendant would have 
materially changed its position as compared to that which 
it had to assume under the terms of the contract. It 
follows, therefore, that in such case the defendant would 
have performed an oral modification different and more 
onerous [*209] from [***24] that which it would have 
been compelled to have performed under the written 
agreement. The performance of such oral modification 
could be used as a basis of a cause of action or as a 
defense in accordance with the principle earlier set out in 
this opinion. It may be urged that the defendant should 
have asked the court to withhold its order striking the 
parts and asked for permission to amend, but the motion 
to strike was based upon the ground that it was an 
unpermissible modification of a written contract, and the 
court evidently came to the same conclusion. 
Consequently, the defendant might have reasonably 
concluded that a request to make the answer more 
definite and certain would have availed it nothing 
because of a reasonable belief that the court took the 
position that any oral modification of a contract required 
to be in writing was no defense, regardless of whether 
executed or regardless of whether the performance by the 
defendant of such oral modifications required additional 
acts to be done over those required by the original 
contract. 
Proceeding with the analysis of paragraph 2 of the 
answer to the first cause of action, we find that it states 
that the 
"building with the [***25] contemplated alterations 
could not be used for the picture show business with the 
result that the defendant company was compelled to 
abandon the project or seek another building in which to 
carry on its business." (Italics supplied.) 
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Giving the defendant the benefit of the doubt, this 
may have been a poor way of alleging that the defendant 
would be compelled to abandon the lease as provided by 
paragraph 5, which reads as follows: 
"Fifth: This lease is to become effective only if a 
permit to equip and operate a theatre therein is granted by 
Salt Lake City; provided, however, that if at the end of 
thirty days from date hereof he is unable to get permit or 
the performance bond mentioned in Paragraph No. 5 
hereof, then lease is cancelled and the One Hundred 
Dollars ($ 100.00) becomes the property of the Lessor." 
[*210] The defendant, if the conditions were right, 
could abandon the lease, forfeiting the $ 100. This 
conclusion could be reached if paragraph 5 of the lease 
was interpreted to mean that the lease was to become 
effective only if a permit to equip and operate a theater 
according to the "contemplated alterations" would be 
granted by Salt Lake City, and that if Salt [***26] Lake 
City would not grant a permit to operate a theater altered 
as contemplated by the parties (such contemplated 
alterations susceptible of being made definite only by 
evidence), that then the lease could be considered as 
canceled. The time provided for the obtaining of the 
permit was thirty days from the date of the signing of the 
lease, but since the defendant alleges that it immediately 
commenced the work of remodeling the building and was 
notified by the building inspector that it could not be used 
as a picture showhouse with the contemplated alterations, 
it is a fair inference that it was discovered that the city 
would not grant the permit within the thirty-day period 
allowed. The fact that such theory was poorly reflected 
by the wording of the answer might have been ground for 
a motion to make more definite and certain, but not a 
ground for striking the matters in the answer. 
From what has been said above, we must conclude 
that the order striking subparagraphs 1, 2, and 3 of 
paragraph third of the defense to the first cause of action 
was error. 
It remains to see if the plaintiff is entitled to 
restitution under its second cause of action. Here again 
we must analyze the answer [***27] to see if, after 
giving the defendant every benefit of the doubt, it sets up 
a situation which involved a change of position which the 
plaintiff could not take advantage of if it agreed to it, and 
if the defendant acted upon the oral modification. 
[**497] The paragraph of the defense to the second 
cause of action which was stricken reads as follows: 
" 1. That after the said written lease was entered into 
a supplemental agreement was made between the 
plaintiffs and defendant [*211] herein under which the 
plaintiffs agreed that should the defendant furnish a 
surety bond to the contractor for the faithful performance 
of his duty, said bond to provide that the bonding 
company would in turn pay any liens that might be placed 
on the building, that the terms of the lease set out in 
paragraph two of said amended complaint would be 
waived. That relying upon the same and on February 15, 
1933, the defendant herein furnished a bond of the Pacific 
Indemnity Company in the sum of $ 8,000.00 to protect 
the contractor and the defendant from any liens filed 
against the building, this bond being a continuous one for 
a period of one year. The said bond, although running for 
a period of one [***28] year, required that liens should 
be filed within a certain time but this defendant at the 
request of the plaintiffs herein, on August 16th, 
September 13th, October 12 and November 15th of 1933, 
and January 16th of 1934, had the time for the filing of 
liens under this bond extended from time to time, all of 
which was done at the request of plaintiffs and on the 
plaintiffs' assurance that the provisions of the lease as 
herein referred to would be waived." 
Under the written lease, the lessee was required to 
furnish a bond of $ 5,000 as provided by chapter 3, title 
62, Comp. Laws Utah 1917 (section 3759-3763). The 
bond was to provide for the protection of the lessors 
against any liability of any lien arising by reason of any 
materials or labor furnished in the alterations by the 
lessee. It further provided that the lessee should provide a 
performance bond to insure the completion of any and all 
alterations to the building. Here again it is difficult to 
glean from the answer any allegations which definitely 
set up a change of position acted upon. The answer states 
that there was a supplemental agreement "that the 
defendant should furnish a surety bond to the contractor 
for the faithful [***29] performance of his duty." It is 
difficult to see why the defendant should furnish a bond 
to the contractor rather than to the lessor, or rather than to 
take a bond from the contractor. Sub-paragraph 5 of 
paragraph third of the lease provided that the bond should 
be for the protection of the lessor. The answer to the 
second cause of action proceeds to allege that the 
defendant furnished an $ 8,000 bond to protect the 
contractor and the defendant from any liens filed against 
the [*212] building. The bond provided for in chapter 3, 
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title 62, supra, appears to be for the purpose of protecting 
the materialmen and those furnishing labor against 
nonpayment of their accounts by the contractor. The 
answer further alleges that at the request of the plaintiffs 
the time for filing liens under the bond was extended 
from time to time, and that the liens would not have been 
filed had the extension of time not been arranged for, 
which was at the request of plaintiffs. While it may be 
difficult to get a satisfactory picture out of this answer, it 
appears to set up a situation wherein the plaintiffs 
requested the defendant to extend the time for filing liens 
so that liens might be filed. If this [***30] is true, the 
plaintiffs could not take advantage of the fact that the 
liens had been filed, because it is tantamount to stating 
that the plaintiffs and defendant agreed that liens might 
be filed to be taken care of by the bondsmen. Here again 
we have a case in which it may be inferred from the 
answer that the defendant, by the representations and 
promise of the plaintiffs, so changed its position that it 
would be inequitable for the plaintiffs to take advantage 
of the fact that such modification was oral. Whatever 
might ultimately result from the evidence in support of 
the allegations in the answer, opportunity should have 
been permitted to show whether the situation set out in 
the answer to the second cause of action was as there 
alleged. It was therefore error to strike the above-quoted 
paragraph 1 of the answer to the second cause of action. 
From what has been said above, it is clear that 
assignments of error Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6 are well taken. 
It is unnecessary to consider assignment No. 3, as the 
judgment must be reversed. Such is the order. Costs to 
appellant. 
ELIAS HANSEN, C. J., and FOLLAND, EPHRAIM 
HANSON, and MOFFAT, JJ., concur. 
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1. WATERS AND WATER 
COURSES-CONTRACTS--CONSTRUCTION. A city, 
to obtain a supply of potable water which had already 
been appropriated, entered into a contract whereby the 
appropriators agreed to exchange the waters which they 
had appropriated for an equivalent quantity of water from 
a canal of which the city was the owner. The contract 
fixed the quantity of water which plaintiff, one of the 
appropriators, was entitled to receive from the city's 
canal, and obligated the city to maintain the canal in 
repair. The limits of the city were extended, and the land 
on which plaintiff formerly used the water for irrigation 
purposes became urban property, and she asserted the 
right to divert the water at another point on the canal and 
apply it to other lands. The diversion would in no way 
injure the city, but merely relieve it of the burden of 
transporting the water some distance. Held that, as the 
right of an appropriator of water to change the place of 
diversion is well recognized, plaintiff was, in view of the 
fact that waste of water is prohibited in arid countries, 
entitled to demand that the city allow her to take the 
water from a new location, where she could use it, 
notwithstanding she had, for many years after the 
contract was entered into, received the water at a different 
location. (Page 361.) 
2. WATERS AND WATER 
COURSES--APPROPRIATORS--CHANGE OF POINT 
OF DIVERSION. An appropriator of water, who was 
entitled to a given amount, may, for the purpose of 
increasing the benefit from his use, change the point of 
diversion. * (Page 361.) 
1 Hague v. Nephi Irrigation Co., 16 Utah 421, 
52 P. 765, 41 L.R.A. 311, 67 Am. St. Rep. 634. 
COUNSEL: H. J. Dininy, W. H. Folland, and M. C. 
Davis for appellant. 
James H. Moyle, H. D. Moyle, and A. T. Sanford for 
respondent. 
JUDGES: FRICK, C. J. McCARTY, CORFMAN, and 
GIDEON, JJ., concur. THURMAN, J., being disqualified, 
did not sit in this case. 
OPINION BY: FRICK 
OPINION 
[*358] [**661] FRICK, C.J. 
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The plaintiff commenced this action to require Salt 
Lake City to deliver to her certain water, to which, it is 
conceded, she is entitled under the contract hereinafter 
referred to, at a point other than where said water has 
been delivered by Salt Lake City since the year 1888, 
when the contract was entered into. The facts are not 
disputed. Those that are material, in substance, are: 
That in June, 1888, Salt Lake City and certain 
farmers, who were the owners of primary water rights in 
what is known and called Parley's Canyon creek, a stream 
having its source in the Wasatch Mountains lying east of 
Salt Lake City and flowing westerly through Salt Lake 
valley into the Jordan river, entered into an agreement 
[***2] in which the owners of said water agreed to 
exchange the water obtained by them from said Parley's 
Canyon creek for water owned by Salt Lake City which it 
obtained from Utah Lake through the Jordan river, and 
through what is designated the Jordan & Salt Lake City 
Canal, which is owned by Salt Lake City. The exchange 
of the waters was made for the benefit of the inhabitants 
of Salt Lake City, in that the water from Parley's Canyon 
creek is potable mountain water, while the water obtained 
by the city from Utah Lake is nonportable, but is suitable 
to irrigate the lands and crops of the farmers with whom 
the exchange was made. 
The court found, and the findings are not questioned, 
that the plaintiff in this action is the owner of 
"144.5/2027" of the waters exchanged as aforesaid, 
which is the equivalent of "144.79 acre shares of the 
water of Parley's Canyon creek." The water used by the 
plaintiff was, for many years, used by [*359] her within 
what is called the basin of Parley's Canyon creek and on 
lands lying immediately southeast of Salt Lake City, 
which lands, in the last few years, have, however, 
become a part of Salt Lake City, and have thus ceased to 
be used for farming purposes, [***3] but are being used 
for residential purposes by some of the inhabitants of Salt 
Lake City. In view of the changed conditions, the 
plaintiff no longer uses, or can use, said water on lands 
lying within the basin of Parley's Canyon creek. She, 
however, owns lands lying about five miles south of the 
lands on which she formerly used the water, and about 
five miles south of where the water has always been 
delivered to her, on which she can use all the water she is 
entitled to under said exchange agreement with Salt Lake 
City. Upon that subject the court found (which finding, to 
avoid repetition, we make a part of this statement) as 
follows: 
"That plaintiff has no lands upon which said water 
can be beneficially used in or near the vicinity in which 
said water has been heretofore used, but the said water, of 
which said plaintiff is the owner, can be beneficially used 
upon her above described lands, which are situate about 
five miles south of said point of diversion, and which lie 
adjacent to and immediately below said canal, as 
aforesaid. That the said quantity of water, of which 
plaintiff is the owner and thus entitled to use, can be 
diverted upon plaintiffs said lands out of said Salt [***4] 
Lake & Jordan Canal, through the weir aforesaid, without 
any damage whatsoever to said defendant city or to any 
person whomsoever, and does not impair any vested right 
of any person whomsoever, and said city will be saved 
the cost of conveying said water a distance of about five 
miles." 
For the same reason we also insert here the material 
portions of the agreement entered into between the parties 
aforesaid: 
"It is hereby agreed as follows: The parties of the 
first part, whose names are signed hereto, agree to 
exchange the waters of the Parley's Canyon creek to 
which they are entitled for an equivalent quantity of 
water from the Jordan & Salt Lake City Canal, * * * and 
to permit, allow, and authorize said party of the second 
part to take said waters of [*360] the Parley's Canyon 
creek at any point it may choose, and devote the same to 
the use and benefit of the inhabitants of Salt Lake City. * 
* * The second party agrees to maintain all existing rights 
of the parties of the first part to the waters of the said 
Parley's Canyon creek, and to keep in repair the said 
Jordan & Salt Lake City Canal, and by its agent, jointly 
with the agent of the parties of the first part, and at the 
[***5] expense of the former, turn out from the said 
canal the proper portion of the water due to the parties of 
the first part on the exchange as aforesaid, and also to 
construct the necessary ditch or ditches, headgates, and 
dams to take out the said waters of the said canal and 
Parley's Canyon creek, and provide for rights of way for 
the same, all at its own cost and expense, and without 
cost or expense to the parties of the first part. * * * This 
agreement shall be perpetual, if the covenants and 
conditions herein expressed are kept and complied with." 
While nothing is contained in the agreement 
respecting the precise place where Salt Lake City was to 
deliver the plaintiff her share of the water, yet, as before 
stated, the water was delivered to her, ever since 1888, 
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within the basin of Parley's Canyon creek, and at a point 
about five miles north of where she now seeks to have the 
same delivered 
The only defense interposed by Salt Lake City is that 
the plaintiff is not entitled to have the water delivered at 
any other point or place than the one where she first 
elected to receive it from the city, and that permitting her 
to take the water at some other place or point is violative 
of [***6] the provisions of the contract, and amounts to 
an impairment, or, at least, a change, of the obligation 
assumed by the city in entering into the contract 
Upon substantially the foregoing facts the court 
found all the issues in favor of the plaintiff, and entered 
conclusions of law and [**662] a judgment or decree 
requiring the city to deliver plaintiff the amount of water 
she is entitled to under the contract from the said canal at 
the point selected and through the weir prepared by her, 
but without additional cost or expense to the city 
[*361] The city appeals, and the only propositions 
argued are the two we have stated above True, counsel 
assign various reasons in their argument why plaintiff 
should fail, but the real reasons are those we have stated 
We fail to see how the judgment or decree in any 
way contravenes any of the stipulations contained m the 
city's contract There is nothing in the contract specifying 
any particular place where plaintiffs share of the water 
shall be delivered to her True, by receiving the water at a 
particular place for many years past the plaintiff could 
not now successfully urge that the city had not fulfilled 
its part of the agreement [***7] Apart from the fact, 
however, that the water has been delivered as before 
stated, there is absolutely nothing m the contract that 
binds the plaintiff to receive the water at any particular 
place or point Nor is there anything in the contract that 
prevents her from having the water delivered to her at any 
other point, provided always that in doing that she in no 
way inconveniences the city, or increases its cost or 
expense of delivering the amount of water to her to which 
she is entitled under the agreement It no doubt is true, as 
contended by the city's counsel, that ordinarily, in case a 
place of delivery is fixed in the contract, the party 
agreeing to deliver cannot be required to deliver at any 
other place or point without disregarding the terms of the 
contract As we have pointed out, however, there is no 
specific place of delivery fixed in the contract in 
question, and the only contention made by counsel in that 
regard is that the water had actually always been 
delivered to and received by the plaintiff at a certain 
place during the past That, however, merely goes to 
show that she was willing to receive it, and that the city 
was also willing to deliver it, at that particular [***8] 
place In case, however, no specific place of delivery is 
mentioned in the contract, but the party to whom a 
particular thing is to be delivered, nevertheless, receives 
it at a particular place, why may not such party ask to 
have the thing delivered at some other place, if to make 
the delivery at such other place is as convenient and no 
more expensive to the party required to make the 
delivery? In doing that, [*362] how are the obligations 
of the contract either disregarded or impaired? If it were 
conceded, however, that the place of delivery could not 
be changed in case of a contract in which one party 
agreed to deliver specific articles of goods or 
merchandise to another for a term of years, it does not at 
all follow that it may not be done under a contract like the 
one in question here 
In arriving at a just conclusion in this case, it is 
important to keep in mind the subject-matter of the 
contract and the object or purpose of the parties In 
connection with those, the law, as it affects the 
subject-matter of the contract, must also be kept in mind 
The law upon the subject-matter of the contract in 
question is as much a part of it as though it were 
incorporated into the writing [***9] itself What is the 
law regarding the use of water in this and region? The 
law will not permit any owner to waste water, nor will it 
permit him to claim more than will supply his needs If 
conditions change, the law, nevertheless, applies to the 
changed conditions In this case the district court found 
that the plaintiff no longer can use the water where it was 
first received by her under the contract, but in that 
connection also finds that she can make a beneficial use 
of it at some other place under the city's canal, at which 
place it is just as convenient and no more expensive for 
the city to deliver the water to the plaintiff than at the 
point where it was first received, but where it can no 
longer be used, and, if delivered there, it will result in 
wasting the water What, then, is the law applicable to 
such a condition? As a question of law does it not merely 
amount to this, that the plaintiff is seeking to change the 
point of diversion? Assuming the city's canal to be a 
natural stream, and that the plaintiff had appropriated and 
was entitled to divert the quantity of water found by the 
court from such stream, no one would doubt her nght to 
change the place of diversion to [***10] some other 
point on the stream, so long as she, in making the change, 
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did not interfere with the rights of any one else. The city 
concedes that the plaintiff is entitled to a certain quantity 
of water flowing in its canal, and that she has received it 
and it has been delivered to her at a particular [*363] 
place. Now, why may she not change the point or place 
of delivery precisely upon the same conditions and upon 
the same theory that she may change the point or place of 
diversion on the stream, provided she does so without 
increasing or adding to the expense of the city in 
delivering the water to her? Is not the right to change the 
place of diversion under the law based upon the fact that 
conditions change, and that it may be that the original 
point of diversion selected by the appropriator no longer 
responds to his needs, and that to continue the old place 
of diversion may result in waste? 
True, there are no contractual obligations involved 
where a change of diversion on a stream is made; but is it 
not pertinent to ask in what way are contractual 
obligations involved in this case? As we have seen, the 
law is a part of the contract, and it is conclusively 
presumed that the parties [***11] to the contract entered 
into every stipulation in view of the existing law. Indeed, 
they were bound to do so, and, if they had entered into 
stipulations that were contrary to law, those [**663] 
stipulations would be void. We must assume, therefore, 
IfiiiFi^^ffiies to the contract in question had in mind the 
fact that the conditions not only might, but that they in all 
probability would, change, and that it might be that the 
plaintiff or some other of the parties to the contract might 
require the place of delivery changed, which, as we have 
seen, amounts to a change of the place of diversion, and 
that, when it became necessary to do that, the change 
could be made upon the same conditions that any other 
change of the place of diversion could be made, namely, 
at the expense of the party making the change and 
without interfering with the rights of others. The law 
respecting the right of another appropriator to change the 
place of diversion is well settled in this jurisdiction, and, 
so far as we are aware, in all other jurisdictions where the 
right to appropriate water is recognized. Hague v. Nephi 
Irr. Co., 16 Utah 421, 52 P. 765, 41 L.R.A. 311, 67 Am. 
St. Rep. 634; Union [***\2] Mill & Mining Co. v. 
Dangberg (C. C) 81 F. 73; 2 Kinney, Irr., etc. (2d Ed.), 
sections 857, 858; 1 Weil, Water Rights (3d Ed.), section 
504. 
[*364] We are of the opinion, therefore, that the 
district court has in no way invaded any contractual rights 
of the city, nor has it in any way disregarded any of its 
legal rights in entering the judgment appealed from. We 
desire to add, in conclusion, however, that we do not 
want to be understood as holding that, although a person 
or corporation has agreed to deliver a certain quantity of 
water to another at a particular place, the place of 
delivery may not be changed in case the owner of the 
water can no longer use it at the original place of 
delivery, the same as the original place of diversion may 
be changed by the appropriator under the law. It is not 
necessary to decide that question now, and therefore we 
express no opinion upon it. 
For the reasons stated, the judgment is affirmed, with 
costs to respondent. 
McCARTY, CORFMAN, and GIDEON, JJ., concur. 
THURMAN, J., being disqualified, did not sit in this 
case. 
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Bruce Badger, Salt Lake City, for East Jordan Irrigation 
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Joseph Novak, Marc T. Wangsgard, Salt Lake City, for 
Provo River Water Users' Association. 
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JUDGES: HALL, Howe, Zimmerman, Stewart, 
DURHAM 
OPINION BY: HALL 
OPINION 
[*310] HALL, Chief Justice: 
Plaintiff East Jordan Irrigation Company ("East 
Jordan") appeals from a grant of summary judgment 
upholding the state engineer's decision allowing 
defendant Payson City Corporation ("Payson"), a 
shareholder in East Jordan, to change the point of 
diversion of a portion of East Jordan's water without the 
company's consent. We reverse. 
East Jordan is a nonprofit mutual water corporation 1 
owning legal title to certain [*311] water rights in Utah 
Lake and the Jordan River. The corporation diverts water 
from the river and the lake into a [**2] canal and 
delivers it to its 650 shareholders to be used primarily for 
irrigation in Salt Lake County. Each of the 10,000 shares 
entitles the shareholder to receive a pro rata share of the 
company's water through the canal. 
1 A mutual water corporation is a nonprofit 
corporation formed to supply water only to its 
shareholders. 3 Clesson S. Kinney, Kinney on the 
Law of Irrigation and Water Rights, § 1480, at 
2659 (2d ed. 1912) [hereinafter Kinney]. Water is 
delivered to shareholders in proportion to the 
amount of stock owned by each. Id. § 1483, at 
2665. Water shortages are shared proportionally 
by the shareholders, and operating costs are paid 
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by assessment on the stock. See generally 
Jacobucci v. District Court, 189 Colo. 380, 541 
P.2d 667, 670-72 (Colo. 1975); Kinney, §§ 
1464-89. Such a corporation is distinct from a 
"carrier ditch company," which exists to furnish 
water for profit or hire to persons who may or 
may not be shareholders. We use the terms 
"mutual water corporation" and "mutual water 
company" interchangeably. 
[**3] Payson bought 38.5 shares of East Jordan's 
stock (representing 186.34 acre-feet of water) in 1987. 
Soon after, it filed an application with the state engineer 
to change the point of diversion of the water to a 
city-owned well that draws water from a basin flowing 
into Utah Lake. Payson sought to use this water for 
year-round municipal purposes. 
East Jordan, Salt Lake City Corporation, and the 
Provo River Water Users' Association protested the 
proposed change. 2 They argued, inter alia, that (1) the 
change application should have been filed by East Jordan 
as owner of the water right, and (2) the proposed change 
would impair their vested rights to water in Utah Lake. 
The state engineer held two informal hearings and 
approved the change. 3 He concluded that Payson had a 
vested water right by virtue of its ownership of East 
Jordan stock and therefore could file a change application 
in its own name. The engineer considered a number of 
factors, including the amount of water consumed by 
irrigation, the amount of water that would be returned to 
Utah Lake from municipal use, and the seasonal variation 
in water use. He then ordered that Payson be allowed to 
divert 144 acre-feet between April [**4] 15 and October 
31 and 38 acre-feet the rest of the year and that East 
Jordan reduce the diversion into its canal by 186.34 
acre-feet per year. Finally, the order required that Payson 
install a meter on its diversion well to be available for 
inspection by East Jordan and that Payson remain liable 
for assessments and "any other obligations it may incur as 
a shareholder in the Company." 
2 Salt Lake City Corporation owns 2,067 shares 
of stock in East Jordan (20.67%). The Provo 
River Water Users' Association apparently does 
not own any stock, but it alleges that it owns 
rights in the Provo River that depend in part on an 
exchange for waters stored in Utah Lake. See 
generally Provo River Water Users' Ass'n v. 
Morgan, 218 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 857 P.2d'927, slip 
op. at 3-4 (1993). These protestants are also 
plaintiffs and appellants in this action, but for 
simplicity we refer only to East Jordan. 
3 The engineer issued a decision after the first 
hearing, in which he approved a diversion of 
89.82 acre-feet. Both sides petitioned for 
reconsideration, and the engineer held another 
hearing, resulting in the final order discussed in 
the text. 
[**5] East Jordan brought this action in the fourth 
district court, seeking to overturn the engineer's decision. 
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on 
a stipulated statement of facts on the issues of (1) whether 
Payson as a shareholder in the corporation had the legal 
right to file a change application in its own name without 
consent of East Jordan, and (2) whether the state engineer 
had jurisdiction to consider such an application. The trial 
court denied East Jordan's motion, granted Payson's 
cross-motion, and subsequently entered judgment in 
favor of Payson. 4 East Jordan appeals from that 
judgment. 
4 East Jordan's complainl also alleged that the 
proposed change would impair the vested water 
rights of the company., Salt Lake City 
Corporation, and the Provo River Water Users' 
Association. But after the trial court granted 
Payson's cross-motion, plaintiffs amended the 
complaint and deleted those allegations so that the 
court's ruling disposed of all issues in the case. 
On appeal, East Jordan argues that [**6] the trial 
court erred in concluding (1) that in the absence of a 
specific restriction in the articles of incorporation or 
bylaws, a shareholder in a mutual water corporation has 
the legal right to file a change application in its own 
name even where the company opposes the change, and 
(2) that the state engineer has jurisdiction to approve the 
application. Its primary argument is that since the 
corporation is the legal owner of the water rights, only 
the corporation may [*312] change the point of 
diversion. Allowing shareholders to file change 
applications in their own names ignores the corporate 
structure and would render these corporations 
unmanageable. 
East Jordan also argues that its articles of 
incorporation and company policies constitute a "specific 
restriction" preventing a shareholder from filing a change 
application without its consent. Moreover, it asserts that 
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the change in fact impairs the vested rights of the 
company and its other shareholders, and that the state 
engineer's ruling in effect wrongfully partitions the 
company's title to its water rights. Finally, East Jordan 
contends that the state engineer lacks jurisdiction to 
approve a change application in such a situation [**7] 
because he fulfills an administrative function and lacks 
the authority and training to adjudicate the legal rights of 
the parties. 
Payson responds that mutual water companies are 
fundamentally different from other types of corporations, 
that shareholders in such corporations have direct 
interests in the water rights held by the corporation, and 
that among these rights is the right to change the place of 
diversion. Payson contends that while East Jordan may 
have legal title to the water rights, the shareholders have 
equitable title. Payson also disputes East Jordan's other 
claims. 
We first state the standard of review. This matter 
arose in the district court under Utah Code Ann. §§ 
73-3-14 (1989) and 63-46b-15 (1989) as a de novo 
review of the state engineer's decisions approving 
Payson's change application. In determining whether the 
district court properly granted summary judgment as a 
matter of law, this court gives no deference to the trial 
court's legal conclusions and reviews those conclusions 
for correctness. 5 
5 Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 499 (Utah 
1989) (per curiam). 
[**8] We first address the issue of whether Payson 
has the legal right to file a change application in its own 
name without the consent of East Jordan. We conclude 
that Payson, as a shareholder in a mutual water 
corporation, has no such right. We base this decision on 
the statutory scheme governing the appropriation of 
public waters, the principles of corporate law bearing on 
the function and power of boards of directors to manage 
corporate affairs in the interest of shareholders as a 
whole, and the dictates of sound public policy. 
The right to change a point of diversion, place, or 
purpose of water is governed by Utah Code Ann. § 
73-3-3(2) (1989), which provides: 
(a) Any person entitled to the use of 
water may make: 
(i) permanent or 
temporary changes in the 
place of diversion; 
(ii) permanent or 
temporary changes in the 
place of use; and 
(iii) permanent or 
temporary changes in the 
purpose of use for which 
the water was originally 
appropriated. 
(b) No change may be made if it 
impairs any vested right without just 
compensation. 
This case ultimately turns on whether a shareholder 
in a mutual water corporation is "a person entitled to the 
use of water" under the statute. Payson narrowly [**9] 
focuses on the language of this section to support its 
position that it has the right to change its point of 
diversion over East Jordan's objection. However, section 
73-3-3(2)(a) must be read in light of the entire statutory 
scheme. Payson fails to consider whether it is "entitled to 
the use of water" in the same manner proposed by a 
change application. 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-1 directs how one becomes 
legally "entitled" to the use of water: 
Rights to the use of unappropriated 
waters of this state may be acquired only 
as provided in this title. No appropriation 
of water may be made and no rights to the 
use thereof initiated and no notice of intent 
to appropriate shall be recognized except 
application for such appropriation first be 
made to the state [*313] engineer in the 
manner hereinafter provided, and not 
otherwise. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Rights to the use of water may be obtained by two 
methods under Utah's appropriation scheme. The first is 
commonly known as a diligence claim. Prior to 1903, the 
law allowed a person to appropriate public water by 
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merely turning or diverting water from its natural channel 
and putting it to beneficial use 6 This method of 
appropriation has been [**10] preserved by statute Utah 
Code Ann § 73-5-13 recognizes diligence rights to the 
use of water not represented by a certificate of 
appropriation issued by the state engineer 
6 Bishop v Duck Creek Irr Co, 121 Utah 290, 
293, 241 P 2d 162, 164 (1952) 
As of March 12, 1903, 7 the waters of this state were 
recognized to be the property of the public, and a 
procedure was formalized for the acquisition of rights to 
the use thereof in Utah Code Ann § 73-3-1 Under this 
method of appropriation, Utah Code Ann § 73-3-2 
requires any person seeking to appropriate water to do so 
by written application to the state engineer The 
application must set forth the name of the person, 
corporation, or association making the application, the 
nature of the proposed use, the quantity thereof, and the 
source from which the water is to be diverted, together 
with all other pertinent information Additionally, Utah 
Code Ann § 73-3-3(5)(a) provides that a change in point 
of diversion, place, [**11] or use can be accomplished 
only upon application and approval of the state engineer 
following the same procedures governing applications to 
appropriate water 
7 See 1903 Utah Laws ch 100, § 47 
Payson has not filed an application to become an 
appropnator of public waters To the contrary, title to 
company water rights was judicially confirmed in East 
Jordan under the Morse and Booth Decrees 8 Payson's 
ownership of shares m East Jordan does not afford it a 
nght conferred by the state to "the use of water" as 
contemplated by section 73-3-3(2) It necessarily follows 
that any change in point of diversion can be initiated only 
by East Jordan itself since it alone owns the right as an 
appropnator to the use of public waters 9 Therefore, 
Payson does not have standing before the state engineer 
to seek a change in the point of diversion 
8 See Salt Lake City v James A Gardner, 
Fourth District Court, Utah County, June 5, 1909 
("Booth Decree"), Salt Lake City v Salt Lake City 
Water & Elec Power Co, Third District Court, 
Salt Lake County, Civil Nos 2861, 3449, 3459, 
July 15, 1901 ("Morse Decree") 
[**12] 
9 We also note that water rights are transferred 
by deed in substantially the same manner as real 
estate In contrast, a shareholder's interest in a 
water company is personal property and is 
transferred as such Utah Code Ann § 73-1-10 
(1989) 
Payson claims to be an "equitable owner" of its 
shares of East Jordan's water rights However, its 
equitable ownership remains subject to the general rule 
governing corporations that directors, rather than 
shareholders, control the affairs of the corporation East 
Jordan was organized under the territorial laws in 1878 
and currently is governed by the Utah Nonprofit 
Corporation and Co-operative Association Act 10 Section 
16-6-34 provides that "the affairs of a nonprofit 
corporation shall be managed by a governing board " 11 
Article VII of East Jordan's articles of incorporation 12 
provides, "The Board of Directors shall have the general 
supervision, management, direction & control of all the 
business and affairs of the company, of whatever [*314] 
kind " A change in point of diversion certainly implicates 
management of the water supply as a whole It 
necessanly [**13] follows that any change in the point 
of diversion of water from a source other than East 
Jordan's canal can be initiated only by East Jordan itself 
since it alone is empowered with the right to manage and 
control the affairs of the company 
10 Utah Code Ann §§ 16-6-18 to-122 Section 
16-6-20(l)(c) provides that the act applies to 
"mutual irrigation, canal, ditch, reservoir and 
water companies and water users' associations 
organized and existing under the laws of this state 
on the effective date of this act " 
11 See Anderson v Grantsville N Willow Irr 
Co, 51 Utah 137, 141-42, 169P 168, 169 (1917) 
(noting that where stockholders directed president 
of mutual water corporation to issue certain stock 
but directors refused to approve it, issuance of 
stock was void) 
12 Although we refer to the "articles of 
incorporation," we note that the documents 
submitted by the parties bear the label "Articles of 
Association " Because the documents are indeed 
articles of incorporation, we refer to them as such 
[**I4] What Payson did gain by its purchase of 
East Jordan shares is the right to receive a proportionate 
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share of the water distributed by East Jordan out of its 
system in the same manner as all other shareholders. 13 
East Jordan's articles of incorporation, as amended, set 
forth the objective, powers, and purposes of the water 
company. Article III thereof reads in pertinent part: 
The pursuit or business of this 
association is, and shall be the 
construction, operation and maintenance 
of a canal—said canal to extend from a 
point in the Jordan River . . . to . . . Salt 
Lake City, . . . the purpose of said canal 
being to direct a portion of the waters of 
the said Jordan River, to be appropriated, 
used, and disposed of, sold and distributed 
by said association, for agricultural, 
manufacturing, domestic or ornamental 
purposes . . . and to do and perform such 
work and acts, and use such mechanical or 
other means and appliances as may he 
necessary to maintain or increase the flow 
of water in the said Jordan River. 
13 See Park v. Aha Ditch & Canal Co., 23 Utah 
2d 86, 90, 458 P.2d 625, 627 (1969). 
[**15] Payson's rights as a shareholder and its 
relationship with East Jordan are dependent on and 
limited by the scope of East Jordan's articles of 
incorporation, which Payson agreed to by virtue of its 
purchase of shares. Here, Payson is seeking a point of 
diversion, place of use, and nature of use that are 
substantially different from those of the other 
shareholders and those anticipated in East Jordan's 
articles of incorporation. Payson purports to divert its 
share of the water before it enters East Jordan's delivery 
system, to transport the water outside of East Jordan's 
service, and to use it for municipal purposes. 
The agreement between East Jordan and its 
shareholders imposes the duty on the association to 
manage its affairs in the interest of its shareholders as a 
whole. 14 That duty is not to be infringed upon by the 
state engineer. Rather, any dispute that should arise out of 
the agreement is to be resolved by a court of competent 
jurisdiction. Under these circumstances, East Jordan 
clearly has an interest in reviewing the application to 
determine whether it is in the best interests of the 
company and its shareholders. 
14 See Summit Range & Livestock Co. v. Rees, 
1 Utah 2d 195, 197, 265 P.2d 381, 382 (1953). 
[**16] Three other states have addressed this issue. 
Payson argues that we should follow the Colorado rule 
set forth in Wadsworth Ditch Co. v. Brown. 15 The court 
in Wadsworth essentially held that a shareholder has the 
right to change a point of diversion over the objection of 
the company. Wadsworth involved a shareholder who 
could no longer beneficially use his water at the original 
diversion point and therefore petitioned the water court to 
change the diversion point. The trial court approved the 
change provided that Brown's stock remained liable for 
assessment to maintain the company ditch. The Colorado 
Supreme Court concluded that the right to change the 
diversion point was a property right belonging to the 
stockholder in a mutual ditch company. 16 
15 39 Colo. 57, 88 P. 1060 (Colo. 1907). 
16 Id. at 1061. We note that Idaho followed 
Colorado for some time but changed its position 
by statute in 1943 to provide explicitly what the 
Utah statute provides for implicitly, namely, that a 
shareholder may not change its point of diversion 
without the consent of the corporation. 
[**17] Unlike Utah law, under the Colorado 
appropriation scheme, the change process is commenced 
in a court of competent jurisdiction rather than with an 
application to an administrative agency. 17 A court is 
better suited to construe a company's articles of 
incorporation and bylaws than the state [*315] engineer, 
who merely performs an administrative function. 
Therefore, the Wadsworth case is inapposite. 
17 See Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 37-92-201 to -307. 
Further, we are more persuaded by California 
authority that has established through case law what Utah 
has established by statute. In Consolidated People's Ditch 
Co. v. Foothill Ditch Co., 18 the California court held that 
a shareholder does not have the right to change its point 
of diversion over the objection of the company. In 
Consolidated People's Ditch Co., the defendant bought 
stock in a number of different mutual water corporations 
along a river and started to enlarge a canal upstream to 
divert the water represented by this stock. The trial court 
enjoined [**18] construction of the canal, and the 
supreme court affirmed. The court noted that 
shareholders in mutual water corporations are entitled to 
proportionate distribution of the water of the corporation, 
860 P.2d 310, *315; 218 Utah Adv. Rep. 62; 
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but no more: 
Such stockholders are in that sense and 
to that extent, but to none other, owners of 
the water and water rights which the 
corporation possesses, and over the 
distribution of which it exercises under 
general laws and under its particular 
by-laws full and exclusive control. 19 
18 125 Cal App.2d 34, 269 P. 915 (Cal. 1928). 
19 Id. at 920 (emphasis added). 
The court also noted that the term "mutual water 
company" had no legal meaning that would differentiate 
such companies from other corporations administering 
property for the benefit of their stockholders. 2 0 The court 
stated that "it would seem to be too clear for argument 
that neither one nor any number of such stockholders 
would or could possess the legal right to take or to 
receive the amount of water [**19] to which [they] may 
be entitled by another manner or means than those 
supplied by the corporation itself." 21 To recognize such a 
right 
would necessarily be to admit the 
possession of similar rights in each and 
every stockholder in each of said 
corporations to go and do likewise, and it 
is too plain for argument that such an 
admission would result in a state of 
inextricable discord and confusion among 
the owners of water rights of various sorts 
[all over California]. The creation or 
threatened danger of such a consequence 
would of itself supply a sufficient reason 
for the use of the injunctive processes of 
the court in the way of its prevention. 22 
20 
21 
22 
Id. 
Id. 
Id. at 921. 
Payson argues that California water law is a "mixed 
bag" of appropriative and riparian concepts and that Utah 
has always followed the "Colorado doctrine" of 
appropriation. Both of these arguments may be correct, 
but they are irrelevant. The cases supporting both the 
Colorado and [**20] the California positions are 
completely unrelated to whether the underlying water 
rights were appropriative or riparian. 
More important, we are persuaded by the reasoning 
of the California court in Consolidated People's Ditch 
Co. that allowing the shareholder this right would 
ultimately lead to "a state of inextricable discord and 
confusion among the owners of water rights" 23 This 
would certainly apply in this situation, where East Jordan 
has 650 shareholders. We fear the havoc that would 
invariably ensue if every shareholder in the corporation 
were to attempt to govern the corporate affairs as they 
relate to the appropriation of waters. Indeed, water 
companies could well be destroyed by complete changes 
of use of water. In addition, some rivers in Utah, for 
example, the Sevier River, are extremely long. It would 
be impossible to manage the appropriation if each 
individual water user were allowed to take water from 
anywhere along the river. 
23 Id. 
It should be observed that our ruling today does not 
leave [**21] the shareholder without a remedy. The 
rights that Payson or any other shareholder has to the use 
of water and the points of service within East Jordan's 
system can be readily determined [*316] by seeking 
appropriate relief in the court system. Pay son's proper 
course of action in this matter was to bring its request for 
change application to the East Jordan board of directors. 
In the event that its request for change was unreasonably 
refused after consideration by the board, the shareholder 
could have sought judicial relief wherein Payson's 
arguments concerning the appropriateness of board policy 
regarding change applications and the regulation of the 
shareholder's rights could have been fully explored. 24 
24 See Syrett v. Tropic & E. Fork Irr. Co., 97 
Utah 56, 89 P.2d 474 (1939); Baird v. Upper 
Canal Irr. Co., 70 Utah 57, 257 P. 1060 (1927) 
We need not reach East Jordan's contention that the 
state engineer lacked jurisdiction to [**22] approve a 
shareholder's change application because we hold that the 
shareholder in a mutual water corporation does not have 
standing to change its point of diversion absent the 
consent of the corporation. We reverse. 
860 P.2d 310, *316; 218 Utah Adv. Rep. 62; 
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WE CONCUR: 
Richard C. Howe, Associate Chief Justice 
Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice 
Stewart, Justice, concurs in the result. 
DISSENT BY: DURHAM 
DISSENT 
DURHAM, Justice, dissenting: 
I respectfully dissent. The majority holds that a 
shareholder in a mutual water corporation does not have 
the right to change his or her point of diversion because 
the water rights are owned by the company rather than 
the shareholder. In so holding, the majority makes a 
number of crucial errors. First, the majority improperly 
treats water like an ordinary corporate asset and assumes 
that mutual water companies are the same as other 
corporations. The majority further ignores 
long-established Utah case law holding that mutual water 
corporations may not interfere with a shareholder's use of 
his or her share of water unless the shareholder's use 
harms the corporation or other shareholders. Finally, the 
holding is bad policy; it assumes without adequate 
analysis that allowing shareholders to change their points 
[**23] of diversion would destroy water corporations, 
and it ignores the need for flexibility and transferability 
of water rights. 
The main opinion reasons that East Jordan, as the 
true "owner" of the water rights, has the sole right to 
change the point of diversion. This position ignores the 
fact that we have previously established that shareholders 
in mutual water companies do in fact have ownership 
interests in the water rights. 
For example, in Genola Town v. Santaquin City, 96 
Utah 88, 80 P.2d 930 (Utah 1938), two municipalities 
entered into a complex exchange agreement wherein 
Santaquin agreed to deliver culinary water to Genola in 
exchange for cash and shares of stock in a mutual water 
corporation, which stock entitled the holder to delivery of 
irrigation-quality water. The citizens of Santaquin 
protested, and the city refused to perform. Genola sued 
for specific performance, and the trial court found for the 
plaintiff. 
This court affirmed. Santaquin raised a number of 
objections, but the only "serious question" ] presented 
was whether exchanging water in kind for shares in a 
mutual water company violated article XI, section 6 of 
the Utah Constitution, which forbids [**24] a 
municipality from alienating its water rights unless it 
receives in exchange water rights "of equal value." Utah 
Const, art. XI, § 6. 2 We held that water company stock 
could be of equal value to direct water rights, because 
stock in a mutual [*317] water company is essentially 
the same as ownership of water rights themselves: 
Water rights are pooled in a mutual 
company for convenience of operation and 
more efficient distribution, and perhaps for 
more convenient transfer. But the stock 
certificate is not like the stock certificate 
in a company operated for profit. It is 
really a certificate showing an undivided 
part ownership in a certain water supply. 
80 P.2d at 936 (emphasis added); 3 see also Smithfield 
West Bench Irr. Co. v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 105 
Utah 468, 142 P.2d 866, 869 (Utah 1943) ("The 
shareholders are in effect owners in common of the 
waters with certain limitations as between one another 
governing the use thereof." (emphasis added)). 
1 80P.2dat935. 
2 This section provides in full: 
No municipal corporation, shall 
directly or indirectly, lease, sell, 
alien or dispose of any waterworks, 
water rights, or sources of water 
supply now, or hereafter to be 
owned or controlled by it; but all 
such waterworks, water rights and 
sources of water supply now 
owned or hereafter to be acquired 
by any municipal corporation, shall 
be preserved, maintained and 
operated by it for supplying its 
inhabitants with water at 
reasonable charges: Provided, That 
nothing herein contained shall be 
construed to prevent any such 
municipal corporation from 
exchanging water-rights, or 
sources of water supply, for other 
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water-rights or sources of water 
supply of equal value, and to be 
devoted in like manner to the 
public supply of its inhabitants. 
[**25] 
3 This passage is repeated verbatim in St. 
George City v. Kirkland, 17 Utah 2d 292, 409 
P.2d 970, 972 (Utah 1966), and Swasey v. Rocky 
Point Ditch Co., 617 P.2d 375, 379 (Utah 1980). 
We reiterated the principle that shareholders in a 
mutual water corporation actually own water rights in St. 
George City v. Kirkland, 17 Utah 2d 292, 409 P.2d 970 
(Utah 1966). In Kirkland, a mutual water company's 
charter lapsed in 1953 after fifty years of existence, and 
the company did not reincorporate until four years later. 
After reincorporation, a number of people filed claims to 
the company's water, arguing that the corporation 
forfeited its water rights when it ceased to exist. This 
court rejected these claims, holding that the shareholders 
continued to own the water rights "although the agency 
charged to administer and deliver the water to those 
entitled, was as dead as a mackerel." Id. at 971. The court 
held that the corporation was not the owner of the water 
rights-it simply provided a method for the shareholders 
[**26] to distribute the water among themselves. We 
upheld the trial court's conclusion that the corporation 
"merely provided another vehicle for 
such ownership (stockholders') and use of 
such water" consequently that such 
ownership continued after 1953, and could 
not be attacked if the same beneficial use 
continued, whether by individual 
shareholder, whether by agreement of 
shareholders among themselves, whether 
administered by an agent, partnership or 
anything else. 
Id. at 971 (emphasis added). 
The majority concludes that East Jordan is the sole 
owner of the water rights because it is named in the 
decree. However, ownership of water is far more 
complex than ownership of other forms of property, and 
the mere existence of legal title does not determine all the 
rights of ownership. Indeed, even the term "ownership" is 
an oversimplification. A number of different rights are 
subsumed under this concept, but here we are concerned 
with only one: the right to control the point at which the 
water is taken. Due to the unique nature of both water and 
the mutual water corporation, a shareholder has at least 
some ownership interest in the water rights held [**27] 
in the corporation's name, and based on Utah case law 
dealing with similar issues, part of this interest includes 
the right to change the point of diversion. 
Water is a unique commodity in a desert state such 
as Utah; society could not survive here on a large scale if 
people did not capture, divert, and use the small amount 
of water that is present. Thus, while a water right is 
considered a "property right," certain legal principles 
regarding water have developed in the West that differ 
significantly from the rules regarding other forms of 
property. First, the law does not allow a private person to 
really "own" water. All waters in the state belong to the 
public, Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-1, and one may obtain 
only the right to use water. Melville v. Salt Lake County, 
570 P.2d 687, 688 (Utah 1977); see Provo River Water 
Users' Ass'n v. Morgan, 218 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 857 P.2d 
927, slip op. at 8-9 n.8 (July 27, 1993). Second, as 
opposed to any other form of private property, one has 
the right to use water only to the extent that he or she puts 
it to "beneficial use." Melville, 570 P.2d at 688; Utah 
Code Ann. § 73-1-3 ("Beneficial use shall be [**28] the 
basis, the measure and the limit of all rights to the use of 
water in this state."). Third, in accordance with the 
beneficial use principle, one forfeits his or her [*318] 
rights to water after failing to use it for five years. Utah 
Code Ann. §73-1-4. 
These differences between water and other forms of 
property are crucial in determining the respective rights 
of shareholders and mutual water corporations. For 
example, while the water rights may be held in the 
corporation's name, only the shareholder has the right to 
use the water. The shareholder, not the corporation, 
decides whether to use his or her water on certain crops, 
for domestic use, or for some other purpose. Further, the 
shareholder decides where he or she will use this water. 
The mutual water corporation is under a perpetual duty to 
deliver water to the shareholder, 3 Clesson S. Kinney, 
Kinney on Irrigation and Water Rights § 1486 (2d ed. 
1912) [hereinafter Kinney] (citing Miller v. Imperial 
Water Co., 156 Cal. 27, 103 P. 227, 229 (Cal. 1909)); it 
may not decide that it would rather deliver the water to 
someone else or for some other purpose. If it fails to 
deliver the proper share of water to [**29] the 
shareholder, the shareholder has a remedy in mandamus, 
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Baird v Upper Canal Irr Co, 70 Utah 57, 257 P 1060 
1064-65 (Utah 1927), Miller, 103 P at 229, or in 
damages, Swasey v Rocky Point Ditch Co, 617 P2d 
375, 379 (Utah 1980) Moreover, a mutual water 
company cannot maintain its water rights unless its 
shareholders use the water Since one does not have a 
legal right to the use of water unless and until someone 
puts it to beneficial use, "it therefore follows that, where 
the company is not itself the consumer, but simply 
furnishes and distributes the water to others, in order to 
perfect the appropriation, it takes the joint action of both 
the corporation and the consumers " Kinney, § 1475, at 
2650 Thus, in Kirkland, the shareholders ov/ned the 
water rights "The question is whether [the shareholders] 
beneficially used the water during the 50 year period 
" 409 P 2d at 971 
Ownership of water rights is thus not as 
straightforward as the majority opinion implies The 
shareholder is an essential part of the ownership equation, 
for he or she [**30] is the one who actually puts the 
water to beneficial use Indeed, as East Jordan concedes, 
if the shareholder fails to use his or her share of water, 
the corporation may lose its rights Contrary to the 
majority's conclusion, the name on the decree therefore 
does not necessarily determine who "owns" the water 
rights 
In holding that water rights are company property 
and that only the board of directors has control over the 
point or points of diversion, the majority also ignores 
critical differences between mutual water companies and 
other corporations The most striking difference is that 
mutual water corporations exist solely to serve their 
shareholders While it may be technically true that the 
typical business corporation also exists for the benefit of 
its shareholders, it is more accurate to say that the 
business corporation operates to make a profit for itself 
that the shareholders then receive as dividends A mutual 
water company, on the other hand, exists to serve its 
shareholders directly The shareholders do not benefit 
from the company's balance sheet, rather, they benefit 
because they receive water 
This court historically has recognized the unique 
nature of [**31] mutual water corporations when 
considenng the rights of their shareholders The cases 
discussed above treat the mutual water corporation as 
merely a device to manage delivery and distribution of 
water rather than as the owner of water It has often been 
said that even where a mutual water corporation owns 
legal title to water rights, the shareholders own "equitable 
title" See, eg, Kinney, §§ 1475, 1481 This court has 
stated that a mutual water company "is simply a trustee 
for the stockholders, and not the owner of the water " 
Center Creek Water & Irr Co v Lindsay, 21 Utah 192, 
60 P 559, 560 (Utah 1900) (emphasis added), see also 
Smithfield West Bench Irr Co, 142 P2d at 869 ("The 
waters of a mutual irrigation company belong to the 
users, the company being merely a distributing and 
apportioning trustee " (emphasis added)) Water is 
therefore not simply a corporate asset over which the 
board of directors automatically has exclusive control 
[*319] The majority opinion also fails to 
acknowledge case law that has developed regarding the 
relative rights of mutual water companies and their 
shareholders While this court has never [**32] faced the 
precise issue of whether a shareholder may change his or 
her point of diversion without company consent, we have 
considered the relationship in a number of other contexts 
These cases establish that a shareholder in a mutual water 
corporation has a right to do whatever he or she wants 
with his or her share of the water, and the company may 
not interfere with this right Further, the shareholder has 
the exclusive right to determine where and how the water 
will be used 
In Baird v Upper Canal Irrigation Co , 70 Utah 57, 
257 P 1060 (Utah 1927), the plaintiff shareholder 
brought an action in mandamus to compel the defendant 
mutual water corporation to connect her pipeline to the 
company's main line at a certain point The plaintiff was 
already receiving her share of company water through 
three other connections, but she sought a new connection 
so that she could supply twelve or thirteen other houses 
with water The trial court found for the plaintiff and 
ordered the company to make the connection as long as 
the plaintiff paid the expenses of doing so 
This court affirmed On appeal, the company argued, 
among other things, that it could not [**33] be 
compelled to connect the shareholder's pipe because 
doing so would violate a company regulation that 
prohibited any future connections that would divert 
culinary water outside the company's service area The 
court rejected this argument 
Nor do we see upon what theory the 
stockholders of the defendant company 
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claim the right to limit the use of the 
culinary and domestic water to the homes 
and premises within the area irrigated by 
water controlled and regulated by the 
defendant company. When a stockholder 
has the water to which he is entitled 
delivered into his private pipe line, it 
becomes his personal property. One of the 
incidents of the ownership of property is 
the right to use, lease, or otherwise 
dispose of the same as the owner may 
desire so long as the rights of others are 
not interfered with. In this case it is 
difficult to see how the rights of the other 
stockholders would be affected by the 
mere fact that the water flows out of a 
private pipe line beyond the limits of the 
land irrigated by water controlled by the 
defendant company rather than within 
such boundary lines. A regulation made 
solely upon such a basis is an 
unwarranted interference with the rights 
[**34] of stockholders not consenting 
thereto. 
Id. at 1065 (emphasis added). 
Baird established that water becomes the 
shareholder's property once it is delivered to him or her 
and that the shareholder has the right to use it as he or she 
wishes as long as it does not interfere with the rights of 
others. But Baird is compelling for three additional 
reasons. First, East Jordan complains that Payson's 
proposed change would result in the removal of water 
from East Jordan's service area and would change from 
irrigation to municipal use. As Baird demonstrates, these 
are not valid concerns of the corporate. 4 Second, Baird 
implies that a shareholder would not need the company's 
permission to file an application for a change in place or 
purpose of use, and these changes are governed by the 
same statute that covers changes in points of diversion. 
Utah Code Ann. § 7 3-3-3 (2) (a) (ii), (Hi). In other words, 
the phrase "person entitled to the use of water" probably 
would include a shareholder for purposes of 
subparagraphs (ii) and (iii). This interpretation should 
also apply to changes in the point of diversion governed 
by subparagraph (i). Id. § 73-3-3(2)(a)(i). 
4 Further, East Jordan's articles of incorporation 
expressly allow the company to appropriate, use, 
or distribute 
manufacturing, 
purposes." 
water for 
domestic 
"agricultural^] 
or ornamental 
[**35] Third, and most important, Baird suggests a 
practical reason to allow a shareholder to change his or 
her point of diversion [*320] over the company's 
objection. Under its reasoning, East Jordan could not 
object if Pay son took its share of water through the 
company's canal and then somehow delivered it up to the 
city through its own facilities (e.g., by pumping the water 
through an aqueduct). 5 And since Payson has the right to 
take its water wherever it wants after the water enters its 
own pipes and ditches, it should also be allowed to take 
the water from further up the natural watercourse. Given 
that Payson can use its water for municipal purposes 
anyway, it is illogical to force Payson to pump the water 
at great expense when it could just as easily take the same 
amount of water from a point upstream. 
5 This will be discussed in greater detail below. 
This court has also established that a shareholder 
may take his or her water from anywhere along the 
company canal he or she chooses, as long as he or she 
does not [**36] increase costs or otherwise negatively 
affect the corporation. This principle was not made 
explicit in Baird, but it is a necessary predicate for the 
court's holding that the corporation had to connect the 
shareholder to the pipeline at a point of her choosing. A 
similar mandamus case is Syrett v. Tropic & East Fork 
Irrigation Co., 101 Utah 568, 125 P.2d 955 (Utah 1942). 
In Syrett, the plaintiff shareholder owned land on the 
plateau above Tropic Valley near Bryce Canyon. He 
sought an order compelling the corporation to deliver 
water to these lands, and the trial court found for the 
plaintiff. This court affirmed, rejecting the corporation's 
argument that its articles of incorporation did not 
authorize it to deliver water on the plateau. The court also 
noted that "since under [the articles] the water is to be 
divided to each person, without specifying where he is to 
receive it, it would appear that a stockholder should be 
entitled to receive his proportionate amount of water at 
any reasonable point along the canal system." Id. at 957. 
Another similar case is Moyle v. Salt Lake City, 50 
Utah 357, 167 P. 660 (Utah 1917). [**37] In Moyle, the 
plaintiff entered into a contract with Salt Lake City in 
which she exchanged her rights to culinary water from 
Parley's Canyon Creek for nonpotable water from Utah 
Lake to be delivered through a canal from the Jordan 
860 P.2d 310, *320; 218 Utah Adv. Rep. 62; 
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River for irrigation. The agreement was silent as to the 
place of delivery, but for over twenty-five years, the city 
delivered the plaintiffs water to her land just below 
Parley's Canyon. The city annexed these lands, and they 
ceased to be used for farming. The plaintiff had other 
land below the city's canal about five miles south of her 
Parley's Canyon land (closer to the head of the canal), 
and she sought to have the water delivered to that land. 
The trial court ordered the change, finding that the city's 
costs of delivering the water would not increase. 
We affirmed, noting that while the water had always 
been delivered to the plaintiffs Parley's Canyon lands, 
nothing in the contract required that the water be 
delivered there. In making this determination, the court 
discussed the unique nature and importance of water in a 
desert state such as Utah. Id. at 662. The court also noted 
that a contract purchaser of water [**38] should have 
the same right to change his or her point of delivery as a 
direct appropriator: 
Assuming the city's canal to be a natural 
stream, and that the plaintiff had 
appropriated and was entitled to divert the 
quantity of water found by the court from 
such stream, no one would doubt her right 
to change the place of diversion to some 
other point on the stream, so long as she, 
in making the change, did not interfere 
with the rights of any one else. The city 
concedes that the plaintiff is entitled to a 
certain quantity of water flowing in its 
canal, and that she has received it and it 
has been delivered to her at a particular 
place. Now, why may she not change the 
point or place of delivery precisely upon 
the same conditions and upon the same 
theory that she may change the point or 
place of diversion on the stream, provided 
she does so without increasing or adding 
to the expense of the city in delivering the 
water [*321] to her? Is not the right to 
change the place of diversion under the 
law based upon the fact that conditions 
change, and that it may be that the original 
point of diversion selected by the 
appropriator no longer responds to his 
needs, and that to continue the old place 
[**39] of diversion may result in waste? 
Id. The court stressed, however, that it was not deciding 
what the result would be if the contract had in fact 
specified a place of delivery. Id. at 663. 
Moyle dealt with an exchange contract rather than 
with a shareholder in a mutual water corporation, but its 
reasoning applies to this dispute as well. As noted above, 
a corporation has a duty to deliver water to its 
shareholders, a duty contractual in nature. Similarly, 
while East Jordan points out that shareholders have 
always taken their water through the company's dam and 
canal, it has not cited any provision in its articles of 
incorporation, bylaws, or other regulations that requires SL 
shareholder to do so. Further, Moyle recognizes that 
water has special status in this arid region, that conditions 
and needs change, and that a water user should be able to 
change his or her use to reflect changed conditions. 167 
P. at 662-63. 
These cases establish that a shareholder's interest in 
the water of a mutual company includes the right to 
decide where he or she will receive the water and where 
and how the water will be used, [**40] as long as a 
proposed change does not increase the company's costs or 
otherwise interfere with its ability to manage the water 
supply for the benefit of all shareholders. 6 The point at 
which a shareholder receives company water is thus not 
simply a corporate affair. Baird, Syrett, and Moyle each 
involved a change of diversion points within a company 
canal, but a change from a canal to a natural watercourse 
should be subject to the same rule. A shareholder in a 
mutual water corporation, like any other water user, 
should be able to adapt his or her use of water in response 
to changing economic and social conditions, since 
otherwise he or she will lose the water right. 
6 East Jordan's articles of incorporation do not 
expressly prevent a shareholder from making such 
a change without company consent. I do not 
address whether or by what means a mutual water 
company may restrict a shareholder's right to 
change his or her point of diversion, though I note 
that Colorado allows a corporation to do this in 
the articles of incorporation, bylaws, or other 
written restriction. See, e.g., Fort Lyon Canal Co. 
v. Catlin Canal Co., 642 P.2d 501, 506-09 (Colo. 
1982) (upholding bylaw imposing "reasonable 
limitations" upon shareholder's right to change 
point of diversion). 
[**41] A shareholder's rights are not unlimited, of 
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course This court has decided several 
shareholder-company disputes in favor of the 
corporations, but only where the shareholder's claim 
would have increased the company's costs or interfered 
with the management and distribution of the water 
supply For example, we have held that a mutual water 
corporation is not required to extend a company ditch to 
reach a shareholder's lands Swasey v Rocky Point Ditch 
Co 617 P 2d 375 (Utah 1980) Similarly, a shareholder 
may not compel the corporation to install devices to 
measure the amount of water each shareholder receives, 
at least where the shareholder fails to demonstrate that he 
or she has been receiving less than his or her fair share of 
water Id at 379, Yardley v Long Canal Co, 111 Utah 
247, 177 P 2d 530 (Utah 1947) However, should the 
company decide to install such devices, it may compel all 
shareholders to pay the cost Big Cottonwood Tanner 
Ditch Co v Kay, 108 Utah 110, 157 P 2d 795, 799 (Utah 
1945) 
East Jordan relies on Park v Alta Ditch & Canal 
Co, 23 Utah 2d 86, 458 P2d 625 (Utah 1969), [**42] 
for the proposition that the company's duty is to protect 
all shareholders from the whims of an individual 
shareholder Under its reasoning, the company must give 
its approval to any change However, Park is easily 
distinguishable In Park, the company had entered into an 
agreement in which it traded its rights to water from Alta 
Spring for a greater quantity of water from Deer Creek 
Reservoir plus cash A shareholder sued to stop the deal, 
arguing that he had an absolute right to the particular 
water of Alta Spring and that the corporation had no 
authority to [*322] divest him of that right The court 
disagreed, finding that the contracts at issue did not 
amount to a conveyance of the plaintiffs water "The 
agreements in question here are not in essence a 
conveying away of water, nor do they deprive plaintiff of 
his water " 458 P 2d at 627 
The issue in Park was whether the exchange of water 
divested the plaintiff of his rights The court held that it 
did not, since the Alta Spring water would he replaced by 
water from Deer Creek Reservoir Under the agreement 
in Park, the plaintiff apparently would have received the 
same amount [**43] and quality of water at the same 
place as he had previously received it—the only difference 
would be the source Id If the court had found for the 
plaintiff, it would effectively have given each shareholder 
veto power over any exchange agreement, even where the 
exchange would not harm the shareholder in any way 
This would have interfered with the corporation's ability 
to manage the water supply as a whole 
Park and these other cases do not preclude a 
shareholder from changing his or her point of diversion, 
because such a change does not interfere with the 
company's ability to manage its water supply The 
majority asserts that mutual water corporations cannot 
manage their affairs if shareholder > are allowed to make 
these changes but fails to specify how this is so Instead, 
like the California Supreme Court sixty-five years ago, 
the majonty simply assumes that affirming the engineer's 
order would be the downfall of such corporations See 
Consolidated Peoples Ditch Co v Foothill Ditch Co, 
205 Cal 54, 269 P 915, 921 (Cal 1928) (asserting 
without analysis that "it is too plain for argument" that 
allowing shareholder changes would lead to "inextricable 
[**44] discord and confusion") As the majority 
acknowledges, however, shareholders in Colorado have 
been able to make changes in their points of diversion 
since at least 1907, Wadsworth Ditch Co v Brown, 39 
Colo 57, 88 P 1060 (Colo 1907), and nothing suggests 
that disaster has resulted Indeed, a recent study reveals 
that mutual water companies still "dominate the water 
market in Colorado " Timothy D Tregarthen, Water in 
Colorado Fear and Loathing of the Marketplace, in 
Water Rights Scarce Resource Allocation, Bureaucracy, 
and the Environment 119, 131 (Terry L Anderson ed, 
1983), see also Barton H Thompson, J r , Institutional 
Perspectives on Water Policy and Markets, 81 Cal L 
Rev 671, 688 table 2 (1993) [heieinafter Thompson] 
Further, the Colorado Supreme Court has reaffirmed its 
rule as recently as 1984 See Great Western Sugar v 
Jackson Lake Reservoir 681 P 2d 484 (Colo 1984) If 
"inextricable discord and confusion" were such an 
obvious result of allowing shareholders to make changes 
in their own points of diversion, certainly there would 
have been some sort of legislative response [**45] or 
judicial retrenchment in Colorado m the last eighty-five 
years 7 
7 I find it relevant that the state engineer was 
not persuaded by the concerns expressed by East 
Jordan and the majonty While the engineer's 
decision is not entitled to any deference on de 
novo review, it is worth noting that he is an expert 
in water distribution and deals often with mutual 
water corporations 
The engineer's order does not interfere with East 
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Jordan's ability to "manage" the company water supply 8 
The order provides that both East Jordan and the Utah 
Lake and Jordan River commissioner have the right to 
inspect Payson's meter to ensure that the city does not 
take more than its share of water It also provides that 
Payson's stock will remain liable for assessment to 
maintain East Jordan's canal and other company assets 
East Jordan would still be able to sue in the name of its 
shareholders, object to claims that may impair its vested 
rights, and enter into exchange agreements it feels are m 
the best interests of the company [**46] If there is a 
water shortage, East Jordan may limit the [*323] 
amount of water Payson takes through its well in the 
same proportion as the other shareholders If Payson does 
not use its allotment, the water would be available to 
other shareholders, just as it would be if Payson were 
taking its water from the company canal Payson would 
still be a shareholder in East Jordan, and East Jordan 
would still be the legal owner of the water rights The 
only difference is that Payson would take water from its 
own well rather than from the company canal 9 
8 The majority also asserts, "Change in point of 
diversion certainly implicates management of 
water supply as a whole " Again, the majority 
does not provide any supporting analysis for this 
argument, nor can I see how this is so The 
engineer's order provides that enough water will 
be diverted into East Jordan's canal to supply the 
remaining shareholders 
9 I do have one concern about the engineer's 
order, however The order provides, "Any 
additional costs incurred by the Utah Lake and 
Jordan River Commissioner in the administration 
of the change application shall be borne by the 
applicant " I do not have any quarrel with this, 
however, Payson should be liable for any costs 
incurred by East Jordan as well For example, if 
East Jordan has to spend more time and money 
monitoring Payson's well than it would to monitor 
withdrawals made from the company canal, it 
should be reimbursed for these additional costs I 
therefore would direct that the engineer's order be 
modified to include this provision As long as a 
shareholder is responsible for any additional costs 
incurred by a mutual water company due to 
changes in the shareholder's point of diversion, 
however, the shareholder has the right to make 
such a change without the consent of the 
corporation 
[**47] Not only is the majority's holding contrary 
to Utah case law, but it is also bad policy First, it will not 
actually increase East Jordan's control over its water 
supply Payson will still be free to use its share of 
company water for municipal purposes As discussed 
above, under Baird and Syrett the corporation must 
connect the shareholder to the company canal at any 
point the shareholder chooses, as long as it does not 
injure the corporation or the other shareholders Baird 
also established that a shareholder may do whatever he or 
she wants with water once it is delivered Thus, there is 
nothing East Jordan can do to prevent Payson from taking 
its water from the East Jordan canal and pumping it to the 
city In my view, the majority's approach will increase the 
costs for everyone involved without providing any 
benefits 
Further, preventing shareholders from changing their 
points of diversion interferes with the ability of water 
users to respond to new needs for water Utah's 
population has been and is expected to continue growing 
at a substantial rate, 10 and there is not enough water 
available to meet the increasing demands in many parts 
of the state 1J While in [**48] the past these concerns 
have been addressed by the construction of dams and 
large-scale water diversions, such projects are no longer 
as economically or politically feasible as they once were 
12 As the demand for water approaches the supply, the 
natural solution will be to seek transfers of water rights 
Commentators agree that agricultural users are the most 
likely sources of water rights for transfer 13 
10 Utah's population is projected to increase to 
over 2 4 million by the year 2010 This would 
reflect a growth rate of 1 7 percent per year, more 
than double the national average Utah 
Department of Natural Resources, State Water 
Plan § 4, at 4-2 to 4-6 (January 1990) 
11 See Ray Jay Davis, Utah Water Rights 
Transfer Law, 31 Ariz L Rev 841, 841-42 
(1989) [hereinafter Davis] 
12 A number of factors contribute to the decline 
of large-scale water projects the optimal reservoir 
sites have been used, political pressure has made 
the federal government reluctant to grant huge 
subsidies for such projects, and public opposition 
to dams on environmental grounds has increased 
Bonnie G Colby, Economic Impacts of Water 
Law—State Law and Water Market Development 
in the Southwest, 28 Nat Res J 721, 725 (Fall 
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1988) [hereinafter Colby]. 
[**49] 
13 See, e.g., Steven J. Shupe et al., Western 
Water Rights: The Era of Reallocation, 29 Nat. 
Res. J. 413, 414 (Spring 1989); Colby at 724; 
Davis at 841-43; Thompson at 702. In Utah, 
agriculture accounts for over 90 percent of the 
consumptive use of water. U.S. Geological 
Survey, National Water Summary 1987 — Water 
Supply and Use: Utah 491, 496 fig. 4 (U.S.G.S. 
Water-Supply Paper 2350). 
This case presents a classic example. The person 
who sold the stock to Payson apparently decided that he 
or she could receive a higher return by selling the water 
rights than by using them for farming. Presumably, 
Payson likewise concluded that the returns from the new 
water exceeded the purchase and transfer costs and that 
purchase of East Jordan stock was [*324] more 
economically attractive than any other option. But by 
refusing to allow shareholders to change their points of 
diversion, the majority increases the cost of these 
transactions, perhaps to the point of making them 
prohibitive. 
I do not mean to imply that economic efficiency is 
the sole consideration in water law or that transfers must 
be allowed [**50] without restrictions. One commentator 
has noted: 
It must be emphasized that policies 
which restrict market activities and make 
transactions more costly are not 
necessarily wasteful or inefficient. They 
are an expression of the concerns that 
members of society and policy makers 
have about reallocating water through 
market processes and they provide 
protection for third-parties who may be 
impacted by water transfers. 
Bonnie G. Colby, Economic Impacts of Water Law—State 
Law and Water Market Development in the Southwest, 28 
Nat. Res. J. 721, 722 (Fall 1988). There can be little 
doubt that social and environmental concerns should 
override economic efficiency in some situations. I 4 I also 
believe that some protection should be provided for third 
parties affected by large-scale water transfers. However, 
the only interest served by the holding in this case is East 
Jordan's desire to have the water flow through its canal. 
Further, area-of-origin protections and other concerns 
implicated by large-scale water transfers should be 
handled by some sort of governmental entity rather than 
by a private corporation pursuing its own goals. 15 
14 I note that Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-8(1) 
provides that the state engineer shall reject an 
application for appropriation if the proposed plan 
"will prove detrimental to the public welfare." 
These same considerations apply to applications 
for permanent changes under Utah Code Ann. § 
73-3-3. Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-3(5)(a); Bonham 
v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 502 (Utah 1988) (per 
curiam). 
[**51] 
15 The record reveals that East Jordan has 
allowed the Salt Lake County Water Conservancy 
District, which owns 2000 shares (20 percent) of 
company stock, to change the diversion of its 
10,000 acre-feet of company water for delivery 
outside of East Jordan's service area. 
The majority, driven by the unfounded and 
unsubstantiated fear that allowing shareholders to change 
their points of diversion will destroy Utah's water 
delivery systems, has overlooked crucial differences 
between the control of water in mutual water companies 
and the management of other forms of property in 
ordinary corporations. In its desire to prevent East 
Jordan's hypothetical "parade of horribles," it has also 
ignored years of Utah case law establishing that a 
shareholder in a mutual water corporation has a direct 
ownership interest in the water held in the corporation's 
name and the right to use such water however he or she 
sees fit, as long as the use does not harm the corporation. 
Finally, the majority assumes without adequate analysis 
that a change in a shareholder's point of diversion 
necessarily interferes with the [**52] corporation's 
ability to protect the interests of the shareholders as a 
whole. I therefore dissent. 
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OPINION BY: McIFF 
OPINION 
[**412] AMENDED OPINION 
McIFF, District Judge: 
INTRODUCTION 
[*P1] This appeal probes whether jurisdiction 
should lie in the federal district court or in the courts of 
the State of Utah. The dispute centers around competitive 
[***2] applications filed by the Strawberry Water Users 
l and the United States with respect to water imported 
from the upper reaches of the Duchesne River, a 
Colorado River tributary, into the Great Basin. The water 
is collected in the Strawberry Reservoir as part of the 
Strawberry Valley Project 2 and delivered through a 
transbasin diversion tunnel for use primarily in the 
southern end of Utah County. The parties before the court 
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are the Strawberry Water Users, the United States, and 
the Utah State Engineer. 
1 "Strawberry Water Users" includes the 
Strawberry Water Users Association and the 
Strawberry Highline Canal Company. Occasional 
reference may also be made to "Strawberry" or to 
the "Association." These are intended to include 
the water companies and/or all shareholders. 
2 "Strawberry Valley Project" may be referred to 
as "SVP" or simply as the "Project." Reference is 
also made to "Project water." 
[*P2] The Strawberry Water Users argue that the 
water rights in question are the product of following 
[***3] the application and beneficial use requirements of 
Utah law and that Utah courts have exclusive jurisdiction 
to adjudicate claims relating thereto. "The United States 
disagrees and contends that Strawberry's rights to use 
water derive solely from its contracts with the United 
States." It asserts "the proper forum for resolution of 
Strawberry's contract-based claims is federal district 
court." The State Engineer has submitted memoranda in 
partial support of the position of the United States. 
[*P3] The parties have not always been so certain 
about jurisdiction. This litigation began on April 24, 
2001, when the Strawberry Water Users filed a petition 
for an interlocutory decree in the general adjudication of 
water rights pending since 1936 in Utah's Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt [**413] Lake County. 3 
Strawberry named the United States Bureau of 
Reclamation as respondent. One day later, Strawberry 
filed an identical petition in the general adjudication of 
water rights pending since 1956 in Utah's Eighth Judicial 
District Court in and for Duchesne County. 4 One day 
after that, it filed an action seeking essentially the same 
relief in the United States District Court for [***4] the 
District of Utah. 5 
3 Case No. 360057298. The action began as a 
private suit, but was converted to a general 
adjudication by this court in 1944. Salt Lake City 
v. Anderson, 106 Utah 350, 148 P.2d 346, 349 
(Utah 1944). 
4 Case No. 560800056. 
5 Case No. 2:01CV00295 J. On September 21, 
2001, the Strawberry Water Users filed an 
additional action in the District Court in Duchesne 
County, joining the United States as a defendant 
(Case No. 010800071 AA, styled Strawberry 
Water Users Association v Robert L. Morgan). 
This latter action was removed to the federal court 
(Case No. 2:02CV0034 J.), where it was 
subsequently consolidated with the other federal 
court action because it probed several of the same 
basic legal issues. 
[*P4] Strawberry's uncertainty has been matched if 
not exceeded by that of the United States. In support of 
its motion to dismiss the consolidated case in the federal 
district court, the United States asserted, "Neither the 
state engineer nor the court in [***5] this action has 
jurisdiction to adjudicate title to water rights under Utah 
law." Further evidence of the uncertainty of the United 
States is found in its protest of Strawberry's change 
application filed with the State Engineer: 
An adjudication of the [ownership of] 
water rights is required before a change of 
use application can be processed by the 
state engineer for this applicant. However, 
the authority to adjudicate water rights is 
vested by the Utah Constitution in the 
[Utah] courts and not given to the state 
engineer. . . . Thus, the applications must 
be dismissed pending the necessary 
adjudication. 
[*P5] After Strawberry filed its petitions in the state 
courts seeking adjudication, the United States made a 
complete reversal and urged dismissal for failure to 
exhaust administrative remedies. It later withdrew this 
argument when the State Engineer granted conditional 
approval of change applications for both Strawberry and 
the United States. The condition was that the parties 
obtain a judicial determination establishing who has the 
right to file such applications. We think it fair to conclude 
that the parties have struggled with how best to proceed 
and that [***6] the State Engineer, in particular, both 
needs and seeks direction. We note that it is not possible 
to flesh out the jurisdictional issue and provide 
appropriate guidance without a more extensive discussion 
of the substance of the dispute than would normally be 
required at this stage of the proceedings. 
THE DECISIONS BELOW 
[*P6] Both the Third and Eighth District Courts 
dismissed Strawberry's petitions for an interlocutory 
decree under Utah's general adjudications statute, Utah 
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Code Ann. §§ 73-4-1 to -24 (2004). The dismissal orders 
are abbreviated and do not contain any legal analysis. The 
Third District Court stated that it "is not satisfied that 
petitioners' claims are properly a general adjudication 
proceeding," and that "petitioners seek to adjudicate 
ownership of water rights based upon federal contract, 
which should properly be before the Federal Court." The 
Eighth District Court essentially agreed but also 
determined that the United States had not been properly 
joined in the general adjudication in the Uintah Basin and 
that suits for interlocutory orders brought under Utah 
Code section 73-4-24 do not qualify for [***7] waiver of 
federal sovereign immunity under 43 U.S.C. § 666 
(2005). Because the petitions sought essentially the same 
relief in each district court and were dismissed for similar 
reasons, the appeals of those dismissals have been 
consolidated. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[*P7] We review the district courts' dismissals for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction for correctness and 
accord no deference to their legal conclusions. Beaver 
County v. Qwest, Inc., 2001 UT 81, P18, 31 P.3d 1147; 
[**414] see also Petersen v. Bd. ofEduc, 855 P.2d241, 
242 (Utah 1993) (applying the correctness standard of 
review to denial of a motion to dismiss based on 
governmental immunity). 
ANALYSIS 
I. REVERSAL WITH GUIDANCE 
[*P8] After thoughtful review we have determined 
that the dismissals should not stand, but we have also 
determined that the jurisdictional question does not lend 
itself to an either/or response. Depending upon how the 
parties proceed in light of our ruling, there could be 
issues suitable for either or both state and federal courts. 
It is our design herein to delineate as best possible 
between water law issues over which Utah [***8] courts 
have exclusive jurisdiction and contract issues arising 
under the federal reclamation contracts over which the 
federal district court has jurisdiction. Moreover, there 
may be issues as to whether contractual arrangements, 
even if clear, would run afoul of Utah water law, which 
the United States Congress has recognized as controlling. 
To the extent possible at this juncture, we have attempted 
to provide guidance to the parties. We note particularly 
our responsibility to correct erroneous interpretations or 
assumptions of the State Engineer, who ultimately looks 
to this court for direction regarding application of Utah 
water law. Before examining the specific legal issues, we 
think it imperative to briefly outline the history of federal 
water reclamation projects followed by the particular 
history of the Strawberry Valley Project and the origin of 
the dispute between these parties. We also address the 
matter of the United States' waiver of sovereign 
immunity regarding disputes arising from reclamation 
projects. 
II. FEDERAL WATER RECLAMATION PROJECTS 
A. History 
6 
6 With minor adjustments, we here embrace a 
narrative set forth in Strawberry's opening brief. It 
tells the story in an understandable and useful 
manner with appropriate reliance upon historical 
facts extracted from various federal decisions at 
all levels, including the United States Supreme 
Court. 
[***9] [*P9] "The final westward migration of the 
late 1800s resulted in an enormous demand by settlers for 
irrigation systems." Peterson v. United States Dep't of 
Interior, 899 F.2d 799, 802 (9th Cir. 1990). "As early as 
1891, settlers in the western states organized annual 
irrigation congresses to discuss their water needs and to 
urge Congress to fund irrigation projects." Id. at 802 n.6. 
"Western states themselves lacked the means to finance 
the enormous systems of dams, reservoirs, and canals 
needed to regulate and distribute water from the western 
rivers and snow melt." Id.; see also California v. United 
States, 438 U.S. 645, 663, 98 S. Ct. 2985, 57 L. Ed. 2d 
1018 (1978). 
[*P10] "By the turn of the century, most of the land 
that could be profitably irrigated by small-scale private 
reclamation efforts had been put to use. Pressure mounted 
on the Federal Government to provide the funding for 
massive projects that would be needed to complete the 
reclamation." California, 438 U.S. at 649; see also 
Peterson, 899 F.2d at 802; United States v. Alpine Land 
& Reservoir Co., 887 F.2d 207, 209 (9th Cir. 1989). 
[***10] Responding to the pressing demand for financial 
assistance in funding reclamation projects, Congress 
enacted the Reclamation Act of 1902. Pub. L. No. 
57-161, 32 Stat. 388 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C § 
371 (2005)). 
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With the Reclamation Act of 1902, 
Congress committed itself to the task of 
constructing and operating dams, 
reservoirs, and canals for the reclamation 
of the arid lands in 17 western states. The 
projects were to be built on federal land 
and the actual construction and operation 
were to be in the hands of the Secretary of 
the Interior. 
Peterson, 899 F.2d at 802 (citing California, 438 U.S. at 
650, 664). 
[*P11] When Congress enacted the Reclamation 
Act of 1902, it had far greater expectations for the 
program than to simply increase agricultural production. 
With the Reclamation Act, Congress created a blueprint 
for the orderly development of the West, and [**415] 
water was the instrument by which that plan was to be 
carried out. See Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 
357 U.S. 275, 292, 78 S. Ct. 1174, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1313 
(1958). Congress's plan included purposeful and 
continued deference to state [***H] water law, which 
was to govern the ownership of all water rights absent a 
clear Congressional directive to the contrary. See 
California, 438 U.S. at 653-70, 678-89; United States v. 
New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 702, & n.5, 98 S. Ct. 3012, 57 
L. Ed. 2d 1052 (1978). Section 8 of the Reclamation Act 
left little room for doubt. 
Nothing in this Act shall be construed as 
affecting or intending to affect or in any 
way interfere with the laws of any state . . 
. relating to the control, appropriation, 
use, or distribution of water . . . and the 
Secretary of the Interior, in carrying out 
the provisions of this Act, shall proceed in 
conformity with such laws . . . . 
43 U.S.C. § 383 (emphasis added). 
[*P12] The monies initially provided by Congress 
under the 1902 Reclamation Act were placed in a 
separate "Reclamation Fund" to be used by the Secretary 
of the Interior to fund construction of reservoirs and 
irrigation works. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 391; Twin Falls 
Canal Co. v. Foote, 192 F. 583, 585 (D. Idaho 1911). 
Using this fund, the Bureau of Reclamation was able to 
construct large dam and [***12] reservoir projects 
similar to the Strawberry Valley Project. See, e.g., id.; 
Burley Irrigation Dist. v. Ickes, 73 App. D.C 23, 116 
F.2d529, 530 (D.C. Cir. 1940). 
[*P13] After construction of a particular 
reclamation project was completed, the water users or 
irrigation district, as the contracting party, was required 
to repay all the construction costs of the project. See 43 
U.S.C. §§ 419, 461. In this manner, the Reclamation 
Fund was to be replenished and used in turn to fund new 
projects. All monies received thereafter from the sale and 
disposal of public lands were also to be paid into the fund 
to the credit of the project on which such lands were 
located. See 43 U.S.C §§ 374-375, 391-392. 
B. The Strawberry Valley Project 
7 
7 The factual narrative relating to the Strawberry 
Valley Project is taken essentially from the 
allegations of petitioners' complaint, which was 
dismissed by both the Third and Eighth District 
Courts. These allegations must be deemed true, 
and this court must consider all reasonable 
inferences to be drawn therefrom in a light most 
favorable to Strawberry. Peterson v. Delta 
Airlines, Inc., 2002 UT App 56, P2, 42 P.3d 1253; 
Prows v. State, 822 P.2d 764, 766 (Utah 1991). 
Where noted, we also rely to a limited extent on 
factual allegations set forth by the United States in 
its answer and counterclaim filed in the federal 
court and attached as an addendum to its brief. 
We have found the latter necessary in order to 
flesh out what appears to be at stake in this 
litigation and the proper forum for adjudication. 
[***13] [*P14] On December 15, 1905, the 
Secretary of the Interior, acting under authority of the 
Reclamation Act, authorized construction of the 
Strawberry Valley Project. The Project was to include a 
large complex of many different water works, including a 
series of diversion dams and feeder canals in the upper 
Duchesne River drainage. These included the Strawberry 
Dam, the Strawberry Tunnel driven through the Wasatch 
Mountains from the Strawberry Reservoir on the east side 
of the said mountains into Sixth Water Creek on the west 
side, allowing the water to flow dov/n Diamond Fork to 
its confluence with the Spanish Fork River and farther on 
down that river to a point of rediversion into delivery 
canals for beneficial use on lands being acquired 
Page 5 
2006 UT 19, *P14; 133 P.3d 410, **415; 
548 Utah Adv. Rep. 22; 2006 Utah LEXIS 26, ***13 
principally by homesteaders in southern Utah County. 
[*P15] In anticipation of the Project, one Frank C. 
Kelsey had filed with the State Engineer Application No. 
79 for the appropriation of 100,000 acre-feet of water 
from the Strawberry River, Trail Hollow Creek, Indian 
Creek, and Horse Creek—all located in the Duchesne 
River drainage. The application, filed January 27, 1904, 
provided that the water would be stored in the 
then-proposed [***14] Strawberry Reservoir for release 
and transbasin diversion for beneficial use in southern 
Utah County. The application was assigned to the 
Strawberry Irrigation and Reservoir Committee, a 
Strawberry predecessor, on May 16, 1905, and was 
reassigned to the Bureau of Reclamation on August 11, 
1905. The Utah State Engineer approved Application No. 
79 on January 23, 1906, subject to proof of actual 
appropriation and beneficial [**416] use, which would 
take many more years to achieve. 
[*P16] The Bureau of Reclamation constructed the 
Strawberry Valley Project between 1906 and 1915, thus 
opening the door for homesteaders to make application to 
beneficially use Project water. Once accepted and 
approved by the United States, the water rights 
applications constituted binding contracts between the 
applicants and the United States. Each applicant became 
obligated to put the water to beneficial use and to repay a 
proportionate share of construction costs and annual 
operation and maintenance costs of the Project. Upon full 
performance, the applicant became entitled to a certain 
quantity of Project water annually in perpetuity. A typical 
patent for the homesteaded lands described the tract 
"together [***15] with the right to the use of water 
from the Strawberry Valley Reclamation Project as an 
appurtenance to the irrigable lands in said tract TO 
HA VE AND TO HOLD . . . unto the said [patentee] and 
to his heirs and assigns forever " 
[*P17] In 1924, Congress adopted the Fact Finders 
Act, Pub. L. No. 68-292, 43 Stat. 702 (codified as 
amended at 43 U.S.C. § 500 (2005)). This Act mandated 
that operation and maintenance of reclamation projects be 
turned over to a water users association or an irrigation 
district. Thereafter, the United States was obliged to deal 
with associations or districts rather than thousands of 
different individual water users. The Strawberry Water 
Users Association had actually been formed in 1922 for 
the very purposes contemplated by the Fact Finders Act, 
which was adopted two years later. Virtually all of the 
individuals and entities that had entered into contracts 
with the United States for Project water became 
Strawberry Water Users Association shareholders. Their 
water rights were transferred to the Association in 
exchange for shares of stock. In turn, the Association 
entered into contracts with the United States to repay the 
then-unpaid [***16] construction costs of the Project, 
operate and maintain the Project, and deliver water to the 
Project water users who were now shareholders. The 
contracts between the Association and the United States, 
which have governed the relationship of these parties 
until recent years, are dated September 28, 1926 ("1926 
Contract"), November 20, 1928 ("1928 Contract"), and 
October 9, 1940 ("1940 Contract"). 
[*P18] By the early 1930s, the appropriation efforts 
were complete and proofs of appropriation were filed 
with the State Engineer. On March 13, 1933, the 
Engineer issued Certificate of Appropriation No. 2115 
(later designated as water right 43-3001) for the 100,000 
acre-feet covered by Application No. 79, which had 
originally been filed in 1904. The certificate was based 
exclusively upon the beneficial use of Project water by 
the individual Strawberry users whose contractual 
interests had been assigned to the Association in 
exchange for shares of stock. The certificate provided for 
capture and storage in Strawberry Reservoir, delivery 
down Diamond Fork into the Spanish Fork River for 
rediversion into the Highline Canal for irrigation of 
53,522.24 acres of land, specifically describing [***17] 
such land, all of which is located in southern Utah 
County. The certificate was issued in the name of the 
United States and remains in the name of the United 
States at present. 8 
8 Between 1910 and 1934, the United States 
filed five additional applications to appropriate 
water and eventually obtained certificates of 
appropriation. As to each one, the proof of 
appropriation filed with the State Engineer was 
based upon beneficial use by Strawberry Water 
Users and/or other Project water users. As to these 
five applications, the certificates of appropriation 
were also issued in the name of the United States 
for the use in perpetuity by Strawberry or other 
Project water users. Some of these are for 
irrigation, some for electrical generation. Only 
one, Certificate of Appropriation No. 2116 (later 
designated as water right No. 43-3102), involves 
major acre-footage. The certificate is for 60,000 
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acre-feet for use on the same 53,522.24 acres 
located in southern Utah County that is the 
subject of Application No. 79. 
[***18] [*P19] On December 23, 1974, the 
Strawberry Water Users paid the United States the final 
installment due on construction of the Strawberry Valley 
Project. This satisfied the combined obligation of all the 
individual parties who conveyed their rights to the 
Association in exchange for shares of stock. All costs 
incurred by the United States in appropriating and 
perfecting the Strawberry water rights were fully repaid, 
and the United [**417] States no longer held any type of 
lien on the patented land or the right to use the Project 
water appurtenant to such land even though the 
certificates of appropriation remained in the name of the 
United States. 
[*P20] Were the story to end here, the issues would 
be easier to frame and to resolve. However, in mid-1985, 
a decade or more after full performance of the contracts 
by which Strawberry obtained rights to use Project water 
in perpetuity, the Strawberry Dam was replaced by the 
Soldier Creek Dam, a Central Utah Project facility also 
constructed by the Bureau of Reclamation. The new dam 
increased the capacity of Strawberry Reservoir from 
roughly 270,000 acre-feet to more than 1,100,000 
acre-feet. 9 After the enlarged reservoir was in place, 
[***19] the parties entered into what they refer to as the 
1991 Operating Agreement. Under the terms of this 
agreement, Strawberry is guaranteed annual delivery of 
61,000 acre-feet from the enlarged reservoir. Strawberry's 
petition alleged that it had historically received some 
70,000 acre-feet. The United States in the federal action 
claims the historical average was 61,500 acre-feet. 
Whatever the figure, it appears that it no longer varies 
with the ebbs and flows of wet and dry years, but is fixed 
at 61,000 acre-feet annually. It also appears that the 
United States relies heavily upon the 1991 Operating 
Agreement to advance its arguments in this dispute. 
9 These facts and those which follow have been 
gleaned from the Strawberry petitions filed in the 
Third and Eighth District Courts and the 
counterclaim filed by the United States in the 
federal district court. There does not appear to be 
a dispute about these facts, only about the legal 
consequences flowing therefrom. It is not possible 
to understand the dispute of these parties and what 
is really at stake in this litigation or to properly 
analyze the jurisdictional issues without inclusion 
of these facts. 
[***20] C. Origin of the Current Dispute 
[*P21] The current dispute first arose in August 
1997, when Strawberry filed three change applications 
seeking to update and correctly reflect current points of 
diversion and place of use of Project water and to provide 
for municipal and industrial use. More specifically, 
Strawberry sought the right to use Project water for the 
irrigation of small lots, including lawns and gardens, as 
opposed to larger agricultural tracts. In its protest before 
the State Engineer, the United States claimed that it was 
the owner of the water and urged the State Engineer to 
dismiss the Strawberry applications until the ownership 
issue could be resolved, presumably in Utah courts. After 
the lawsuits were filed, the United States advanced the 
further claim that Strawberry is contractually prohibited 
from changing use without consent of the Secretary of the 
Interior. In due course, the United States sought to have 
all matters adjudicated in the federal district court. 
[*P22] Separate and apart from these initial change 
applications filed by Strawberry are competing 
applications filed by each of the parties in December 
1997 seeking to recapture Project water [***21] after it 
has been fully utilized and passed beyond the control of 
either party. These applications are extremely ambitious 
and far-reaching. The application of the United States, 
filed December 4, 1997, seeks to appropriate 49,200 
acre-feet of return flow of Project water for storage in 
Utah Lake and delivery in Salt Lake County. Strawberry's 
"exchange application," filed eight days later, seeks to 
recover the return flow from 64,400 acre-feet by pumping 
or diverting from existing wells, springs, and streams in 
southern Utah County. These competitive applications 
raise fundamental Utah water law issues of first 
impression that potentially impact appropriators 
throughout the Jordan River drainage and beyond. 
D. Waiver of Sovereign Immunity—the McCarran 
Amendment 
[*P23] We now consider whether and for what 
purposes the United States is subject to joinder in either 
the federal or the state court suits that have been filed. 
We begin with the proposition that the United States is 
immune from suit unless Congress has waived that 
immunity. Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 160, 101 
S. Ct. 2698, 69 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1981); In re Bear River 
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Drainage Area, 2 Utah 2d 208, 271 P.2d 846, 848-49 
(Utah 1954). [***22] 
[**418] [*P24] Congress has waived the United 
States' sovereign immunity for joinder in both federal and 
state court actions arising out of federal water 
reclamation projects. It has consented to joinder in 
federal district court "to adjudicate, confirm, validate, or 
decree the contractual rights of a contracting entity and 
the United States regarding any contract executed 
pursuant to federal reclamation law." 43 U.S.C. § 390uu 
(2005) (emphasis added). It has consented to joinder in 
state court 
(1) for the adjudication of rights to the 
use of water of a river system or other 
source, or (2) for the administration of 
such rights, where it appears that the 
United States is the owner of or is in the 
process of acquiring water rights by 
appropriation under state law . . . and the 
United States is a necessary party to such 
suit. 
43 U.S.C. § 666 (emphasis added). 
[*P25] The consent to joinder in state court came in 
the McCarran Amendment to the 1902 Reclamation Act. 
Section 8 of the Act had decreed noninterference with 
state law "relating to the control, appropriation, use, or 
distribution of water" and further, [***23] that "the 
Secretary of the Interior, in carrying out the provisions of 
this Act, shall proceed in conformity with [state] laws." 
43 U.S.C. § 383 (emphasis added). These mandates had 
limited meaning unless the United States could be 
compelled to join in state court proceedings. The 82nd 
Congress came to grips with this problem in 1952 with 
the adoption of the McCarran Amendment. The 
Amendment had been preceded by the efforts of most 
western states to develop orderly and comprehensive 
procedures for the general adjudication of water rights. 
By the time the McCarran Amendment 
was passed, most Western states had 
adopted some statutory procedure for the 
mass adjudication of water rights. While 
these statutory adjudications seemed to 
promise an end to the confusing and 
conflicting adjudication of water rights in 
multiple cases, the system was impaired by 
the refusal of the federal government to 
participate. Since the United States had 
large landholdings and extensive reserved 
water rights in the West, its claims of 
sovereign immunity significantly 
diminished the value of the comprehensive 
state adjudications. Congress sought to 
remedy this problem [***24] by 
enacting the McCarran Amendment in 
1952. See S. Rep. No. 755, 82d Cong., 1st 
Sess. 4-6 (1951). 
United States v. Oregon, 44 F.3d 758, 765 (9th Cir. 
1994) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
[*P26] The purposes of the McCarran Amendment 
are clear, and its language is broad. After providing for 
joinder, it goes on to state: 
The United States when a party to any 
such suit, shall (1) be deemed to have 
waived any right to plead that the state 
laws are inapplicable or that the United 
States is not amenable thereto by reason 
of its sovereignty, and (2) shall be subject 
to the judgments, orders, and decrees of 
the court having jurisdiction, and may 
obtain a review thereof, in the same 
manner and to the same extent as a private 
individual under like circumstances . . . . 
43 U.S.C. § 666 (2005) (emphasis added). The United 
States Supreme Court has characterized the Amendment 
as "an all-inclusive statute concerning the adjudication of 
rights to the use of water of a river system which in § 
666(a)(1) has no exceptions and which, as we read it, 
includes appropriative rights, riparian rights and reserved 
rights." United States v. Dist. Court in and for the County 
of Eagle, 401 U.S. 520, 524, 91 S Ct. 998, 28 L. Ed. 2d 
278 (1971) [***25] (internal quotations omitted). Here 
the courts are dealing with "appropriative rights" and 
competing claims of ownership, the right to file change 
applications, and the competitive claims seeking to 
capture and use return flow water. In the language of the 
Supreme Court, and the Amendment, these issues relate 
to "the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river 
system." Id. (emphasis added). While there are contract 
issues that need to be addressed by the federal district 
court, there are also important water law issues that will 
ultimately need to be addressed by Utah courts. 
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[**419] III. STRAWBERRY'S PETITIONS AND 
THE UNITED STATES' RESPONSE 
[*P27] Strawberry advanced three claims for relief 
in the petitions filed in the general adjudications in the 
Third and Eighth District Courts. First, it sought a 
declaration that Strawberry, for the use and benefit of its 
shareholders, holds equitable title to Project water which 
the shareholders have applied to beneficial use over 
approximately the last ninety years. It claims this 
ownership extends to the right to recapture return flows. 
Second, Strawberry sought a declaration that the 
Association and the individual water users [***26] have 
the right to use the water for purposes of irrigation 
regardless of the size of the tract. Finally, Strawberry 
sought a declaration that it has the right to file change 
applications with the State Engineer without the consent 
or approval of the United States. 
[*P28] Strawberry bases its petition before us on 
Utah water law. The State Engineer also addresses the 
issues from the standpoint of Utah water law but 
misapplies both statutory provisions and certain decisions 
from this court. The United States makes no attempt to 
discuss Utah water law, nor does it undertake to identify 
any contractual provisions which it claims to be relevant 
or to have been violated. The depth of its legal analysis in 
the briefing before this court is to point to the fact that in 
its petitions in state courts, Strawberry recounted the 
history of the Strawberry Valley Project and the 
contractual relationship of these parties. From this the 
United States concludes: "Thus the Petitions themselves 
assert that the water rights at issue derive from contracts 
entered into pursuant to federal reclamation law," and 
further, "Strawberry's rights to use water derived solely 
from its contracts with the United [***27] States." While 
this assertion is repeated more than once, it is wholly 
conclusory and without analytical support. 
[*P29] The fact that two parties contract with each 
other to cooperatively pursue a certificated right to the 
use of water belonging to the people of the State of Utah 
does not lead to the conclusion that the water rights 
"derive from contracts" or that the rights of one derive 
from its contract with the other. That is a simplistic 
surface analysis that disregards the source of the water 
rights. The rights of both parties derive from the State of 
Utah through their joint effort in following the 
appropriation procedure outlined by statute. Simply 
stated, the foundation of these water rights is an approved 
application to appropriate followed by actual beneficial 
use on the ground. As stated in Robinson v. Schoenfeld, 
62 Utah 233, 218 P. 1041, 1043 (Utah 1923), "The sine 
qua non of making a valid appropriation is and was to 
apply the water attempted to be appropriated to some 
beneficial use." The contracts between these parties were 
designed to facilitate this process, but they are not the 
source of the right to use the water. 
[*P30] In an [***28] effort to understand the 
substantive legal position of the United States in this 
dispute, we have been compelled to examine not only its 
limited response here, but the more extensive disclosures 
in its counterclaim in the federal district court, attached as 
an addendum to its brief. As set forth in its counterclaim, 
the United States asserts that it "is the owner in fee of the 
Strawberry Valley Project facilities and the record title 
owner of the Strawberry Valley Project water rights" and 
that "it was . . . the intent of congress that these project 
water rights remain permanently in federal control." In 
support of this claim, the United States cites 43 U.S.C. §§ 
383, 498. Neither of these sections supports the claim 
with respect to water rights as opposed to Project 
facilities, nor does applicable case law. See Nevada, 463 
US. at 125-27 (citing Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82, 94-95, 
57 S. Ct. 412, 81 L. Ed. 525 (1937)). These decisions 
stand for the proposition that "the water-rights became 
the property of the land owners, wholly distinct from the 
property of the government in the irrigation works." 
Nevada at 125; Ickes at 95. [***29] 
[*P31] The United States proceeds to repeat its 
claims that "the Association's right to the use of the 
project facilities and water from the federally owned SVP 
water rights were solely and totally contractual from their 
inception." There is nothing new in this, but there is in 
that which follows. The United [**420] States then 
asserts that when the Association entered into the 1991 
Operating Agreement, it "did not retain their [sic] 
contractual interests in Strawberry Valley Project water 
rights as provided under the 1926, 1928 and 1940 
contracts, but instead gave them up in return for a 
contractual interest in a guaranteed water supply." 
Perhaps most revealing and germane to the jurisdiction 
inquiry is the allegation with respect to return flows. The 
United States asserts: 
The right to use return flows within the 
SVP service area was given to the 
Highline Canal Company through a 
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contract with the United States. The 
Association has not used them in the 
nearly 100 years of the SVP's existence 
and still cannot recapture them within the 
boundaries of the SVP. Under state law, 
since the return flows result from a 
transbasin diversion the United States may 
track and reuse the [***30] return flows 
. . . . The Association gave up its right to 
the Strawberry Valley Project water rights 
in the 1991 Agreement and therefore has 
no claim to return flows, which derive 
from the initial water rights. 
(Emphasis added.) 
[*P32] The foregoing reveals why the underlying 
facts of this case do not lend themselves to a 
determination that jurisdiction rests in but one place, state 
or federal. The 1991 Operating Agreement is not before 
us, nor are the earlier agreements of 1926, 1928, and 
1940. Under 43 US.C § 390uu (2005), it is the 
prerogative of the federal district court to examine the 
contractual relationship and "to adjudicate, confirm, 
validate, or decree the contractual rights . . . regarding 
any contract executed pursuant to Federal reclamation 
law." (Emphasis added.) Separate and apart from this 
prerogative is the prerogative of Utah courts to determine 
how the contractual relationship plays out under Utah 
water law. That law cannot be changed by contract. We 
reiterate that the Secretary of the Interior in carrying out 
the provisions of the Reclamation Act is obliged to 
"proceed in conformity with [state] laws . . . relating 
[***31] to the control, appropriation, use, or 
distribution of water." 43 US.C. § 383 (emphasis added). 
Further, we note and underscore that the United States 
presumes more than it should when it undertakes to 
articulate Utah law regarding return flows from a 
transbasin diversion. 
[*P33] We cannot here resolve all the competing 
claims, including the ultimate issues regarding return 
flow, which we envision will come to us at a future time. 
Accordingly, we tailor our discussion to correction of 
misstatements of Utah water law advanced in the briefs 
and to identification and examination of the underlying 
substantive issues sufficient to determine whether and to 
what extent jurisdiction rests in state or federal court. The 
difficulty of the task and the demonstrated uncertainty of 
the parties has compelled us to move beyond a surface 
analysis. We look first at the so-called "ownership" issue 
and the certificate of appropriation. 
IV. WATER OWNERSHIP IN UTAH 
A. A Use-Based Concept 
[*P34] In navigating a course through Utah water 
law, it is easy to be misled by the word "ownership." In 
some respects it is a misnomer. It is only the right to use 
water [***32] that is subject to ownership. The first and 
over-arching principle of Utah water law is this: "All 
waters in this state, whether above or under the ground, 
are hereby declared to be the property of the public, 
subject to all existing rights to the use thereof." Utah 
Code Ann. § 73-1-1 (2004) (emphasis added). Of equal 
importance is the second fundamental principle: 
"Beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure and the 
limit of all rights to the use of the water in this state." Id. 
§ 73-1-3 (emphasis added). Throughout its history, this 
court has uniformly recognized that title to "public water 
is not subject to private acquisition . . . even by the 
federal government or the state itself." See, e.g., Adams v. 
Portage Irrigation, Reservoir & Power Co., 95 Utah 1, 
72 P.2d 648, 652-53 (Utah 1937). The State, acting as 
trustee rather than owner, has assumed the responsibility 
of allocating the use of the water for the benefit and 
welfare of all the people. J.J.N.P. Co. v. State, 655 P.2d 
1133, 1136 (Utah 1982). 
[**421] [*P35] Notwithstanding these clear and 
controlling directives, the "ownership" label continues 
[***33] to be part of the vernacular of Utah water law. 
However, the word has varying meanings and 
applications that lack the breadth and finality that 
"ownership" suggests in other contexts. As held in United 
States v. District Court of Fourth Judicial District in and 
for Utah County, 121 Utah 1, 238 P.2d 1132, 1134 (Utah 
1951): 
The right to the use of water, although a 
property right, is very different from the 
ownership of specific property which is 
subject to possession, control and use as 
the property owner sees fit. Such right 
does not involve the ownership of a 
specific body of water but is only a right 
to use a given amount of the transitory 
waters of a stream or water source for a 
specific time, place and purpose . . . . 
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(Emphasis added.) Accordingly, it is not sufficient to ask 
only who has title to water or in whose name a certificate 
of appropriation has been issued. The governing statute, 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-17, affords the certificate of 
appropriation only the status of "prima facie evidence of 
the owner's right to the use of the water." (Emphasis 
added.) Here it is undisputed that the right of use rests 
[***34] with Strawberry. 
B. Ownership as a Protective Role 
[*P36] The State Engineer draws this court's 
attention to two decisions where entitlement to file 
change applications was tied to the holder of the 
certificate of appropriation. The two decisions are East 
Jordan Irrigation Co. v. Morgan, 860 P. 2d 310 (Utah 
1993), and Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 922 P.2d 745 
(Utah 1996). Each case illustrates the importance of 
asking not only the "title" or "ownership" question, but 
also the second question, which probes roots, purposes, 
and entitlements. East Jordan and Brooklyn Canal 
support the concept that a mutual water company as the 
owner of record of the collective rights of its shareholders 
is alone empowered to file change applications. But 
ownership for this purpose is not in derogation of the 
rights and entitlements of the shareholders who are the 
ultimate users, it is rather for their benefit. "The 
agreement between East Jordan and its shareholders 
imposes the duty on the association to manage its affairs 
in the interest of its shareholders as a whole" 860 P.2d 
at 314 (emphasis added). It is a form of ownership akin 
[***35] to that of a trustee. The court offered a succinct 
justification for the result reached: 
We base this decision on the statutory 
scheme governing the appropriation of 
public waters, the principles of corporate 
law bearing on the function and power of 
boards of directors to manage corporate 
affairs in the interest of shareholders as a 
whole, and the dictates of sound public 
policy. 
Id. at 312 (emphasis added); see also Syrett v. Tropic & 
East Fork Irrigation Co., 97 Utah 56, 89 P.2d 474 (Utah 
1939) (holding that an irrigation company stands as a 
single appropriator with a duty to protect the rights of its 
stockholders). 
[*P37] Our holdings in East Jordan and Brooklyn 
Canal cannot be read as empowering the United States to 
emasculate rather than protect the rights of the ultimate 
beneficial users. Nothing in either decision will support 
an ownership status other than a protective role on behalf 
of the rank-and-file persons who have applied the water 
to beneficial use. In the final analysis, the principal thrust 
of East Jordan and Brooklyn Canal is not to undermine 
the importance of beneficial use, but rather to [***36] 
shift the protective focus from the individual shareholder 
to the shareholders as a collective whole. 10 The effort to 
use these decisions as a sword against, rather than as a 
shield in protection of, the collective whole of the 
individual users is completely untenable. The only way 
the [**422] United States (or the State Engineer in 
behalf of the United States) could rely upon these cases 
would be to acknowledge that the United States stands in 
the same shoes worn by the mutual irrigation companies 
and that it holds title for the benefit of the ultimate users, 
and for no other purpose, a rob it must share witbrlh® 
Strawberry Water Companies. 
10 East Jordan prompted a strong dissent in 
favor of individual users. The majority adopted a 
pragmatic approach that places the administrative 
and management burden on the water company 
while mandating protection of all users. 
Specifically, East Jordan recognizes the right of 
an individual shareholder to judicially challenge 
the "appropriateness of board policy regarding 
change applications and the regulation of the 
shareholder's rights." 860 P.2d at 316. Brooklyn 
Canal and Syrett are in accord. Moreover, the 
legislature has now adopted a statutory procedure 
governing change applications sought by 
individual shareholders. See Utah Code Ann. § 
73-3-3.5. 
[***37] [*P38] Casting the United States in a 
protective role for the benefit of the ultimate users is the 
approach embraced by the United States Supreme Court 
in Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 103 S. Ct. 
2906, 77 L. Ed. 2d 509 (1983). In that case, the Bureau of 
Reclamation sought to reduce the enlitlement of irrigators 
to project water in order to provide additional water to an 
Indian tribe to whom the Department of the Interior owed 
a fiduciary duty. The Bureau claimed that as the title 
holder of the water rights it could alter the allocation of 
project water. In rejecting this position, the Supreme 
Court stated: 
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The Government is completely mistaken 
if it believes the water rights confirmed to 
i t . . . were like so many bushels of wheat, 
to be bartered, sold, or shifted about as the 
Government might see fit. Once . . . lands 
were acquired by settlers in the Project, 
the Government's "ownership" of the 
water rights was at most nominal; the 
beneficial interest in the rights confirmed 
to the Government resided in the owners 
of the land . . . to which these rights 
became appurtenant upon application of 
the Project water to the land. 
463 U.S. at 126 [***38] (emphasis added). The Court 
chided the government for wholly ignoring "the 
[protective] obligations that necessarily devolve upon it 
from having mere title to water rights . . . when the 
beneficial ownership of these water rights resides 
elsewhere." Id. at 127 (emphasis added). 
C. Terminable Vis-a-Vis Permanent Right of Use 
[*P39] In his effort to support the position of the 
United States, the State Engineer also relies on this 
court's decision in Prisbrey v. Bloomington Water Co., 
2003 UT 56, 82 P. 3d 1119. Prisbrey involves a set of 
facts so completely foreign to the facts in this case that its 
only value is by way of contrast. In Prisbrey, the 
owner/lessor of a water right filed a change application at 
the request of its lessee. After the change application was 
duly noticed and granted by the State Engineer, a 
neighboring landowner (one Prisbrey) who had not filed a 
protest or participated in the administrative proceedings, 
filed a petition for judicial review. Among other rejected 
arguments, Prisbrey claimed that the published notice of 
the change application was invalid because it listed the 
owner/lessor of the water right [***39] rather than the 
lessee. Prisbrey argued that the lessee was the proper 
party to advance the change application under section 
73-3-3(2)(a) because it was then using the water. The 
argument was rejected, first, for the reason that the lessee 
was not an appropriator under the law and, second, on the 
solid foundation that a lessee "owns only a terminable 
possessory interest in the water rights" and that "it would 
be illogical to permit [the lessee] to make a permanent 
change in the point of diversion, place of use, or purpose 
for use." Id. at 1124. 
[*P40] Prisbrey is not helpful to the position of the 
United States. To the contrary, we find it helpful to the 
position advanced by the Strawberry Water Users, who 
are not lessees with "terminable possessory interests." 
Rather, they were joint participants in the appropriation 
process and are the owners of the exclusive right to use 
the subject Project water in perpetuity Though not 
clearly spelled out in Prisbrey, use and ownership were 
merged in that case. The owner/lessor filed the change 
application at the behest of the lessee. Use by the lessee 
would be deemed use by the lessor in thai context. This 
[***40] court takes the opportunity to clarify that 
Prisbrey should not be read as undermining the 
importance of use as a basis for filing a change 
application under Utah's statutory scheme. 
D. Authorization for Filing Change Applications 
[*P41] Permanent or temporary changes in the 
point of diversion or purpose [**423] of use is governed 
by Utah law. Utah Code section 73-3-3 outlines a careful 
procedure for the filing and approval process. The 
qualification for filing relevant to our inquiry is stated as 
follows: 
(2)(a) any person entitled to the use of 
water may make permanent or temporary 
changes in the: 
(i) place of diversion; 
(ii) place of use; or 
(iii) purpose of use for 
which the water was 
originally appropriated. 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-3(2)(a)(i)-(iii) (1989 & Supp. 
2005) (emphasis added). 
[*P42] As heretofore noted, East Jordan and 
Brooklyn Canal have construed this statutory provision in 
favor of a mutual irrigation company as opposed to an 
individual shareholder. Here the relationship is 
three-layered: the United States, the Strawberry 
companies, and the shareholders. [***41] The 
Strawberry companies represent the collective use of all 
their shareholders. They owe these shareholders a 
fiduciary duty and have a responsibility to manage for the 
common good. The concern in East Jordan and Brooklyn 
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Canal that one shareholder would pursue a course at 
variance with the interests of the other shareholders is 
nonexistent in this case. The risk here is that the United 
States as holder of the certificate would seek to pursue a 
course at variance with the Strawberry companies and 
their shareholders, whose interests are aligned. Such a 
course would be contrary to the cited decisions and to the 
protective role recognized in Nevada, 463 U.S. at 126-27. 
[*P43] The considerations in East Jordan and 
Brooklyn Canal which led to the decisions favoring the 
mutual irrigation companies do not favor the United 
States. These same considerations favor continued 
recognition of the right of the mutual irrigation 
companies to make change application decisions for the 
benefit of the collective whole of the shareholders whom 
they represent and who, through their votes, control the 
boards of directors. The United States, on the other hand, 
is a [***42] stranger to the day-by-day beneficial use 
and lacks a direct equation with the actual users. 
Moreover, even if the United States were entitled to file 
the applications, it could not do so in derogation of ihe 
rights and entitlements of the ultimate users in whose 
>jgg$erest it is obliged to act. Failure to protect this interest 
would violate the principles established in Nevada. 11 
11 We do not foreclose the possibility that in the 
proper circumstance the United States should be 
allowed to file the change application. In addition 
to "entitlement to the use of water" as a qualifying 
basis, Utah's statute empowers the holder of an 
"approved application for the appropriation of 
water" to file. Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-3(8)(a). 
Here the "approved application" matured into a 
"certificate of appropriation," but the right of use 
became separated from the holder of the 
certificate. The statute does not have a separate 
provision for the holder of the certificate. We 
need not determine how these provisions should 
be applied to the United States in its role in this 
case since it is only the right to file belonging to 
the actual users (Strawberry) that has been 
challenged. 
[***43] [*P44] Having corrected the misreading 
of our statutory and case law regarding "ownership" and 
the filing of change applications, we turn now to the 
claim that provisions in the contract(s) between these 
parties require the Secretary of the Interior's approval of 
any change in place or purpose of use. 
V. DEFERRAL TO FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT 
[*P45] In its federal court counterclaim, the United 
States advances the position that "the federal government 
retains the ultimate approval authority with respect to 
both the distribution of project water and any change of 
place or purpose of use that might be contemplated." It 
claims that this is mandated both by the contract between 
the parties and by federal statutes. It further claims that as 
the "title owner of record" it alone has the authority to 
file a change application with the State Engineer. 
[*P46] We have addressed the latter argument, but 
must now defer to the federal court for construction of the 
federal statutes as well as the contracts between the 
parties. We note, however, that the position advanced by 
the United States seriously calls into question the 
primacy of state water law guaranteed by Section 8 of the 
[***44] Reclamation Act. [**424] Notwithstanding the 
over-arching importance of this issue, any further 
response by Utah courts must await the federal court 
review. 
[*P47] We also take note of the claim by the United 
States that if Strawberry is allowed to change the place or 
purpose of use of Project water without Secretary 
approval, it will threaten the "integrity" and "viability" of 
the entire Project as well as the Central Utah Project. 
Such a claim, if adequately supported, would be 
extremely compelling in either federal or state court or 
before the Utah State Engineer, whose responsibility it is 
to evaluate change applications. The threat posed by 
irrigating lawns and gardens and other small tracts whose 
combined consumptive use does not exceed that of the 
larger tract of which they are a part is not apparent to us, 
but could be readily evaluated by the State Engineer. The 
right to file change applications neither ends the inquiry 
nor guarantees approval. Each change application must 
stand on its own merit. Quite clearly, any real 
compromise of the ability of the Project to survive or 
properly function would give great pause to any 
responsible official or tribunal. 
VI. THE CLAIMS TO RETURN [***45] FLOW 
FROM IMPORTED WATER 
[*P48] We come at last to the competing claims to 
return flow water. This does not appear to be a change 
application issue, but a dispute about which party, if 
either, can extend control beyond the initial use made by 
Strawberry. It ventures into uncharted territory. The 
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ambitious applications to, in essence, reappropriate 
Project water give rise to three interrelated questions that 
we discuss not for the purpose of resolution, but for the 
purpose of examining the jurisdiction in which they 
ultimately should be decided. The three questions may be 
stated as follows: First, can either party follow Project 
water beyond the current user's (Strawberry's) reach and 
then subsequently recapture it? Second, can the United 
States, enjoying no right of use to the Project water in 
Utah Valley, gain a superior right to the use of that water 
once it becomes return flow? And third, does the inquiry 
necessarily move beyond these parties, thereby 
implicating matters suitable for a general adjudication? 
[*P49] These questions are complicated by the fact 
that they arise in the context of water imported to the 
Great Basin from the Colorado River drainage. This 
[***46] importation augments the supply of water 
available for beneficial use in both Utah Valley and the 
Salt Lake Valley. In the absence of reliance on this fact 
and the apparent cooperation of the State Engineer, 12 it 
is difficult to understand how these parties could seek to 
recapture virtually the entire quantity, in acre-feet, of the 
imported water. 
12 Without any discussion or analysis, and in a 
rather obscure manner, the State Engineer seems 
to accept the notion that imported water can never 
be subject to appropriation by others in the import 
basin, citing Tanner v. Bacon, 103 Utah 494, 136 
P.2d 957 (Utah 1943). The Tanner decision is 
briefly discussed hereafter. See infra P58. 
A. Recapturing Return Flow 
[*P50] Under ordinary circumstances, the original 
appropriator can use and reuse the water so long as it is 
within the appropriator's control. Estate of Steed v. New 
Escalante Irrigation Co., 846 P.2d 1223, 1225 (Utah 
1992). But once the water has passed [***47] to the land 
of another and out of the control of the user, it is subject 
to recapture and appropriation by others. Smithfield W. 
Bench Irrigation Co. v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 105 
Utah 468, 142 P.2d 866, 868 (Utah 1943). The law 
"makes no distinction between previously appropriated 
waste waters which are beyond the control of the original 
appropriator and the flow of natural streams, and under 
[the statutory provisions] all . . . are subject to 
appropriation." McNaughton v. Eaton, 121 Utah 394, 242 
P.2d 510, 574 (Utah 1952). Further: 
Water permitted to escape after it has 
been appropriated by one, and which finds 
its way into the natural channel of a stream 
from which it was taken or into the 
channel of another stream cannot be 
reclaimed by the original appropriator 
against subsequent appropriators (users) 
who have made use of it. 
[**425] Wrathall v. Johnson, 86 Utah 50, 40 P.2d 755, 
766 (Utah 1935) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
These principles were specifically applied to return flow 
water in the underground basin in the case of Stubbs v. 
Ercanbrack, 13 Utah 2d 45, 368 P.2d 461, 464 (Utah 
1962), [***48] to wit: 
But after the irrigation water is used and 
becomes commingled with the waters in 
the natural water table it has lost its 
identity as irrigation water and is no 
longer owned by the [irrigators] as such. 
Such waters in the natural water table are 
and always have been subject to 
appropriation. 
(Emphasis added.) It seems elementary that Utah courts 
must determine how these well-established principles 
should be applied to imported water. 
B. Right to Recapture Without Prior Right of Use 
[*P51] The United States has not applied the water 
to the land covered by the certificates of appropriation. 
The general rule in the western states that beneficial use 
is the basis, the measure, and the limit of the right to use 
water for irrigation is given expression in the 
Reclamation Act. Imperial Water Co. No. 5 v. Holabird, 
197 F. 4, 12 (9th Cir. 1912). The language of the Act 
provides: "The right to the use of water acquired under 
the provisions of this Act shall be appurtenant to the land 
irrigated, and beneficial use shall be the basis, the 
measure, and the limit of the right." 43 U.S.C. § 372 
(2005). The certificates [***49] of appropriation stand in 
the name of the United States; however, in the absence of 
beneficial use by the Strawberry Water Users, these 
would be nothing more than empty vessels. Moreover, 
under the terms of the Act as well as the patents issued, 
the water rights are appurtenant to the lands described in 
the certificates. These lands have been owned and 
occupied by the Strawberry Water Users at all relevant 
times. 
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[*P52] By some yet unarticulated theory, the 
United States seeks to recapture the return flow from 
water beneficially used by the Strawberry Water Users on 
their lands, the United States being a complete stranger to 
both the lands and the water since delivery of the latter to 
these users at a far distant point high in the watershed. 
Presumably, the United States places complete reliance 
upon the assumption that imported water should be 
afforded special treatment unlike all other water 
belonging to the public and that it, as opposed to the 
Strawberry Water Users, should be the beneficiary of that 
special treatment. Quite clearly, this involves major 
policy issues "relating to the control, appropriation, use 
or distribution of water" and is therefore governed by 
state [***50] water law under the express language of 
Section 8 of the Reclamation Act. 43 U.S.C § 383 (2005) 
(emphasis added). Utah courts will have to grapple with 
these issues. 
C. Addressing the Issues in a General Adjudication 
[*P53] Under the McCarran Amendment, the 
United States is subject to Utah's general adjudication 
statute. It is codified at Utah Code Ann. §§ 73-4-1 
through -24 (2004). The Act provides for the general 
adjudication of the rights of various claimants to the 
waters of a particular stream or water source. The final 
section of the Act, § 73-4-24 (hereafter "Section 24"), 
provides in relevant part as follows: 
If, during the pendency of a general 
adjudication suit, there shall be a dispute 
involving the water rights of less than all 
of the parties to such suit, any interested 
party may petition the district court in 
which the general adjudication suit is 
pending to hear and determine said dispute 
. . . . Thereafter the court may hear and 
determine the dispute and may enter an 
interlocutory order to control the rights of 
the parties . . . until the final decree in the 
general adjudication suit is entered. 
[***51] [*P54] The United States argues that this is 
purely a "private dispute" and therefore not properly part 
of a general adjudication to which the United States has 
waived sovereign immunity. It relies on Dugan v. Rank, 
372 U.S. 609, 83 S Ct. 999, 10 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1963), for 
the proposition that the only actions that can be 
considered as seeking an "adjudication of rights to the use 
of water of a river system or other source" under the 
McCarran Amendment are those "involving a general 
adjudication of all of the rights of [**426] various 
owners on a given stream." Id. at 618 (internal quotations 
omitted). 
[*P55] We find no violation of the principles stated 
in Dugan, which arose in a much different context than is 
present here. 13 Section 24 authorizes this court to "hear 
and determine" the dispute of these parties as part of the 
"general adjudication suit." Section 24 represents a 
simple and common-sense recognition that there may be 
some disputes involving the water rights of fewer than all 
of the parties in a water basin, thereby justifying an early 
hearing and entry of an interlocutory decree short of the 
final decree in the general adjudication. This serves 
[***52] the "objective of providing . . . a reasonably 
prompt resolution of the issues raised in [the] section 24 
petition." Murdoch v. Springyille Mun. Corp., 878 P.2d 
1147, 1150 (Utah 1994). This objective is a key factor 
favoring exercise of discretion to allow the action to 
proceed. Id. 
13 Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 83 S. Ct. 999, 
10 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1963), involved an action for 
injunctive relief to prevent the United States from 
impoundment of water that allegedly interfered 
with the rights of downstream users. The court 
determined that it was a private dispute 
potentially involving a partial taking of water 
rights giving rise to claims for compensation. 
[*P56] The United States Supreme Court has 
approved an adjudication process somewhat similar to 
that contemplated by Section 24. See United States v. 
Dist. Court in and for Water Dist. No 5, 401 U.S. 527, 91 
S. Ct. 1003, 28 L. Ed. 2d 284 (1971); United States v. 
Dist. Court in and for the County of Eagle, 401 U.S. 520, 
91 S. Ct. 998, 28 L. Ed. 2d 278 (1971). [***53] In these 
decisions, the Supreme Court upheld the McCarran 
Amendment waiver of immunity even though the 
adjudication process proceeded step by step and, at times, 
focused only on the water rights of particular claimants. 
Such a process, which eventually involves the entire 
community of claims, is quite essential for such a 
massive undertaking. 
[*P57] The State Engineer also points out that a 
general adjudication should not be employed to resolve a 
purely "private dispute" even if water rights are involved. 
The concept is sound, but the examples given and the 
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cases cited are not akin to the facts and circumstances of 
this case. To suggest that this is a private dispute whose 
impact begins and ends with these parties is to turn a 
blind eye to the obvious. It potentially reverberates all the 
way from southern Utah Valley north to where the Jordan 
River enters the Great Salt Lake. I 4 If the imported water 
is protected from appropriation by others even after its 
identity has been lost and it is commingled with other 
waters in the underground basin or in natural water 
courses or bodies, then what is to prevent the present 
effort from being repeated until the water is either lost to 
[***54] evaporation or moves beyond the possibility of 
recapture? The competitive applications filed by these 
parties are very ambitious. Of the 61,000 acre-feet which 
it guarantees to deliver annually to the Strawberry Water 
Companies, the United States proposes to recapture 
49,200 acre-feet for storage in Utah Lake and use in Salt 
Lake County. 15 The Strawberry Water Companies 
propose to recapture all return flow from 64,400 acre-feet 
for use in southern Utah Valley. 
14 There may be some motivation for these 
parties to characterize this as a "private dispute," 
thereby eliminating all outside competition for 
return flow from imported water. The issues and 
impacts are simply too expansive to allow this. 
15 This acknowledges a loss of some 19.4% of 
the acre-footage. If the pattern persisted, the next 
round would begin at approximately 39,680 
acre-feet. The Strawberry Water Companies do 
not address the issue of loss. 
[*P58] It is universally understood that the public 
waters of this state are appropriated [***55] and used 
high in the various watersheds only to become return 
flow for appropriations anew over and over again until 
the residue finally passes beyond any possible diversion 
for beneficial use. It is all the same water. In the absence 
of special treatment for imported water, the claims of 
these parties seem difficult to defend. Whether or to what 
extent imported water is entitled to different treatment 
does not appear to have been squarely addressed by this 
court. It surfaced in an oblique manner in Tanner v. 
Bacon, 103 Utah 494, 136 P.2d 957 (Utah 1943), to 
[**427] which the State Engineer has softly drawn our 
attention. As here, Tanner dealt, at least in part, with 
water developed pursuant to a reclamation project (Deer 
Creek Project); but the United States and the Provo River 
Water Users' Association (who stood in the same position 
as the Strawberry Water Users stand here) were on the 
same side. Both opposed the application of the plaintiff to 
appropriate waters of the Provo River for power 
generation purposes. In this context, the plaintiff made a 
concession in relation to the imported water: 
[The plaintiff) concedes that he can 
acquire no rights under his [***56] 
application to the use of the waters which 
may be brought from the Weber and 
Duchesne river systems. Such waters 
having been appropriated and reduced to 
possession and ceased to be public waters 
and are not subject to appropriation. 
136P.2dat960. 
[*P59] Neither the district court nor this court 
reinforced the distinction drawn or the concession made 
by the plaintiff. Rather they held that the plaintiffs 
approved application was subordinate and inferior to the 
"prior rights" of the United States and the Provo River 
Water Users' Association in "the waters of the Provo 
River and its tributaries, and the waters of the Weber and 
Duchesne rivers and their tributaries in connection with 
the Deer Creek reclamation project." Id. at 961. In the 
sixty-plus years since it was decided, there are no 
subsequent cases which cite Tanner for the proposition 
that imported water is entitled to special treatment. That 
is a subject that will deserve full briefing and careful 
consideration at the appropriate time, which is not now. 
The sole purpose in citing and briefly discussing Tanner 
is to reveal that an effort to afford different treatment for 
imported water [***57] is not entirely novel, that it 
potentially involves rights and interests on a much 
broader scale than the interests of these litigants, and that 
it necessarily implicates fundamental issues of Utah 
water law properly addressed to Utah courts in the 
context of a general adjudication. 
VII. EIGHTH DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDING 
[*P60] It is clear that the United States is a party to 
the general adjudication action in the Third District Court 
pending since 1936. There is a dispute as to whether it is 
a party in the Eighth District. This may be of limited 
consequence since there is no dispute between these 
parties about the diversion and use of water within the 
Uintah Basin drainage. They are in agreement that the 
waters in question have been properly diverted and 
captured in the Strawberry Reservoir and properly 
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delivered through the diversion tunnel into the Utah 
Lake-Jordan River drainage for beneficial use by the 
Strawberry Water Companies and their shareholders. The 
basic diversion decision was made some 100 years ago 
and will remain entirely unchanged by the outcome of the 
current dispute. All impacts and implications of this 
dispute appear to be limited to the Utah Lake-Jordan 
[***58] River drainage. The State Engineer has issued a 
memorandum decision giving conditional approval of 
applications for both parties subject to a judicial 
determination establishing who has the right to proceed 
with such applications. There is no apparent reason to 
suppose that the resolution of this dispute in the Third 
District action will have any impact on the general 
adjudication in the Uintah Basin. 
CONCLUSION 
[*P61] Jurisdiction rests in the federal district court 
to "adjudicate, confirm, validate or decree . . . 
contractual rights." 43 U.S.C. § 390uu . Jurisdiction rests 
in state district court as to issues dealing with the 
"control, appropriation, use or distribution of water," 43 
U.S.C. § 383 (emphasis added), and "adjudication of the 
right to use of water of a river system" 43 U.S.C. § 666 
(emphasis added). The United States has consented to 
joinder in both courts. In Utah, "ownership" of water 
rights is equated with "right of use," and title can be held 
in a protective capacity for those who have that right. The 
water rights dispute of these parties is appropriate for 
resolution [***59] under Utah's general adjudication 
statute of which Section 24 is an integral part. It has been 
properly invoked by the Strawberry Water Users. This is 
not just a "private dispute," but potentially impacts 
[**428] many downstream appropriators and involves 
important water law issues of first impression. The 
dispute centers in the Utah Lake-Jordan River drainage. 
[*P62] We remand to Eighth District Court, 
directing that it stay further proceedings pending the 
outcome in Third District Court and in federal district 
court. We remand to Third District Court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. The parties need 
to evaluate what questions they want answered in light of 
our ruling and to press those issues in the proper 
jurisdiction. If the parties dispute the manner in which the 
contracts between them should be construed, and their 
rights thereunder, then Third District Court is directed to 
defer to federal district court. Once the contractual 
provisions are made clear, Third District Court should 
determine the manner in which they should be 
recognized, treated, or applied under Utah water law. We 
further direct Third District Court to work in a 
cooperative manner with federal [***60] district court so 
as to facilitate each court hearing and resolving the 
matters which are peculiarly within its jurisdictional 
province. 
[*P63] Chief Justice Durham and Justice Nehring 
concur in Judge Mclff s opinion. 
[*P64] Having disqualified herself, Justice Parrish 
does not participate herein; District Judge K. L. Mclff sat. 
CONCUR BY: DURRANT 
DISSENT BY: DURRANT 
DISSENT 
DURRANT, Justice, concurring and dissenting: 
[*P65] I fully concur in all aspects of the majority 
opinion, except for the section entitled "The Claims to 
Return Flow from Imported Water." As to that section, I 
concur in part and dissent in part. 
[*P66] I agree with the majority that the return flow 
issue is governed by state law and is appropriately 
resolved by state courts. See supra PP50, 52, 59. I am 
unwilling, however, to join with the majority in 
anticipating how the issue will ultimately be resolved by 
this court. 
[*P67] I recognize that the majority does not 
purport to resolve the parties' return flow claims, but 
rather, provides analytical guidance. That guidance is, 
however, at a minimum, suggestive of what this court's 
ultimate resolution of the claims would be. This is a step 
[***61] I am unwilling to take at this juncture. 
[*P68] My unwillingness is founded not upon any 
disagreement with the substance of the guidance provided 
by the majority, but upon the fact that the parties' return 
flow claims are not now before us, and we have therefore 
not had the benefit of full briefing on the issues raised by 
these claims. I would wait until the return flow issue is 
squarely before this court and has been appropriately 
briefed before attempting to determine how it should be 
resolved. 
[*P69] Associate Chief Justice Wilkins concurs in 
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Justice Durrant's concurring and dissenting opinion. 
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Where a contract between a city and certain farmers 
entitled to water for irrigation, for an exchange of 
water, provided that, in case the city made default 
in furnishing the farmers the exchange water from 
its canal, they reserved the right to use the water 
they agreed to exchange only during the time the 
city's default continued, unless the failure of the 
city continued for a period of six months, when it 
should be optional with the farmers to terminate the 
contract, and the city's ability to perpetually furnish 
the farmers the required amount of water in ex-
change was conceded, such contract provision was 
a condition subsequent, and did not prevent the city 
from acquiring an absolute right to the farmer's wa-
ter, within Const, art. 14, § 4, authorizing a city to 
incur indebtedness for waterworks owned and con-
trolled by the municipality, and article 11, § 6, au-
thorizing a city to exchange water rights for rights 
which shall be acquired and owned by the city, and 
be preserved to supply its inhabitants. 
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PER CURIAM. 
This is an application to obtain from this court a 
writ of prohibition restraining Salt Lake City and its 
mayor, recorder, and treasurer from issuing, negoti-
ating, or selling the municipal bonds hereinafter re-
ferred to. 
The material facts, as presented by the petition of 
the relator and the answer of defendants, are as fol-
lows: On the 21st day of November, 1904, the city 
council of Salt Lake City duly passed an ordinance 
which was approved by the mayor of the city, 
which ordinance provided for and ordered a special 
election for the purpose of submitting to the quali-
fied electors of said city the question of incurring a 
bonded indebtedness to the amount of $1,000,000 
for the purpose of making necessary extensions in 
its sewer system, and of procuring a permanent and 
adequate increase in the water supply of the city. 
The present supply during the minimum flow, 
which is approximately 10,000,000 gallons per day, 
is estimated to be about one-half enough to prop-
erly supply the present population of the city. No-
tice of such special election was given, to be held 
upon the 3rd day of January, 1905; and thereafter 
the returns of said special election were duly can-
vassed by the city council of said city, and it was 
declared by the said city counsel that sufficient 
votes had been cast by qualified electors to author-
ize the issuance of the bonds. Previous to said elec-
tion, for the purpose of presenting to the qualified 
voters of Salt Lake City the object and purpose of 
the issuances of said bonds, and a plan to be pur-
sued for the acquisition of an additional water sup-
ply and an extension of the sewer system, an ad-
dress, under the authority of the mayor and city 
council of Salt Lake City, was issued to the taxpay-
ers of Salt Lake City, a copy of which is attached to 
and made a part of the petition herein, and in which 
address it is pointed out and shown that the present 
water supply of the city is derived from four separ-
ate sources. These sources, and the quantity of wa-
ter that each supplies daily during the minimum 
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flow, are as follows: City creek, 4,802,134 gallons; 
Emigration creek, 1,000,000 gallons; Parley's 
creek, 4,202,740 gallons; Utah Lake Reservoir, 
43,560,000 gallons. Of this total daily quantity, 
only the creek (canon) water (10,004,874 gallons) 
is suitable for drinking and culinary purposes. The 
remainder (43,560,000 gallons), which comes from 
Utah Lake Reservoir, is impure, and not fit for 
drinking or household purposes, and can only be 
used for irrigation and kindred uses. The only 
sources from which the city can obtain an addition-
al supply of pure water for drinking and household 
purposes are Mill creek, Big Cottonwood, and 
Little Cottonwood, three mountain streams which 
flow into the valley from near-by mountains on the 
east. The daily supply of these creeks during the 
low-water season is as follows: Mill creek, 
6,631,211 gallons; Big Cottonwood, 17,883,588 
gallons; Little Cottonwood, 7,827,867 gallons. The 
water of these streams has already been appropri-
ated and is used by a large number of individuals to 
irrigate a considerable area of high-priced land that 
lies adjacent to the city. Two thirds of the land 
upon which this water is now being used lies below 
the city's canal, through which its Utah Lake Reser-
voir water is conducted, and there are no physical 
difficulties in the way of irrigating the lands with 
water from the canal. The owners of this land are 
willing to exchange their present supply of water 
from the mountains for water from the mountains 
for water from the canal referred to, and the city 
has taken options from the farmers for the exchange 
in this manner of one-half the water of Big Cotton-
wood creek. Negotiations are pending by which it is 
expected that practically all of the waters of Big 
Cottonwood, Mill creek, and Little Cottonwood 
creek will be acquired by exchange or lease as soon 
as the necessities of the city shall require. The 
terms of exchange are as follows: The city is to pay 
a bonus of $10 per acre to the farmers, and give 
them during the irrigation season an additional 
quantity of 25 per cent, more canal water than it re-
ceives of mountain water. It is proposed in the op-
tions to "grant, bargain, and sell" to the city all the 
farmers' rights to the perpetual use of the mountain 
water; but, in case default is made by the city in 
furnishing them the exchange water from the canal, 
in that event they reserve the right to use the moun-
tain water, but only during the time the default con-
tinues, unless the failure of the *274 city to furnish 
the exchange water continues for a period of six 
months, and then it is optional with the farmers 
whether the city's right to the use of the water under 
the sale shall be terminated or not. The ability of 
the city to perpetually furnish the farmers the re-
quired amount of Utah Lake water in exchange for 
the mountain water in conceded. The money which 
will be obtained from the sale of the bonds in ques-
tion, with the exception of about $70,000 to be used 
in repairing the city's canal from the Utah Lake 
Reservoir, and in payment of the bonus to the farm-
ers as a consideration for the exchange of water, is 
to be used by the city in the construction of the ne-
cessary conduits for conveying and turning into the 
city's present waterworks system the water received 
in exchange from the farmers, and for extending the 
city's sewer system. 
The most serious objection urged by relator to the 
proposed issue and sale of the bonds in question is 
that the water rights which will be finally obtained 
by the city under the option contracts, when com-
pleted and effected by sale and exchange, are not 
absolute rights, but that such sale and exchange are 
subject to forfeiture in the event of certain contin-
gencies, and that the interest which the city will fi-
nally acquire from sale and exchange of the waters 
by virtue of the option contracts is not such an own-
ership and control as is contemplated by section 4, 
art. 14, of the Constitution of the state of Utah, 
which, so far as material here, provides as follows: 
"That any city or town, when authorized as 
provided in section three of this article, may be al-
lowed to incur a larger indebtedness, not exceeding 
four per centum additional for supplying such city 
or town with water, artificial lights or sewers, when 
the works for supplying such water, light and sew-
ers, shall be owned and controlled by the municip-
ality." 
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In determining the question presented by relator's 
petition, we must construe the foregoing provision 
of the state Constitution in connection with section 
6, art. 11, of the same instrument, which is as fol-
lows. "No municipal corporation shall directly, or 
indirectly, lease, sell, alien or dispose of any water-
works, water rights, or sources of water supply 
now, or hereafter to be owned or controlled by it; 
but all such waterworks, water rights and sources of 
water supply now owned or hereafter to be acquired 
by any municipal corporation, shall be preserved, 
maintained and operated by it for supplying its in-
habitants with water at reasonable charges: 
provided, that nothing herein contained shall be 
construed to prevent any such municipal corpora-
tion from exchanging water rights, or sources of 
water supply, for other water rights or sources of 
water supply of equal value, and to be devoted in 
like manner to the public supply of its inhabitants." 
It is conceded that the mountain water which the 
city will receive by the exchange is much more 
valuable for municipal purposes than the Utah Lake 
Reservoir water, and that the superior quality of the 
mountain water for culinary purposes will fully 
compensate the city for the excess in amount which 
it will be obligated to furnish the farmers from Utah 
Lake. The power and authority of the city to thus 
contract for and exchange its Utah Lake water, 
which is an inferior quality and wholly unfit for 
household purposes, for a superior quality of moun-
tain water, is expressly conferred by section 6 of 
the Constitution, unless it can be said that the trans-
fer and exchange of water as contemplated would 
fail to vest the city with ownership and control of 
the water received by it in exchange, as is contem-
plated by section 4, art. 2, of the Constitution. The 
compliance or noncompliance with the conditions 
of the sale and transfer of the water in question will 
be exclusively within the control of the city, and so 
long as the city does that which it will be its legal 
duty to do, and which the farmers, in case of de-
fault, could by judicial proceedings compel it to do 
if there were no forfeiture clause in the contract of 
exchange, there can be no forfeiture of the water 
thus acquired by the city, and its title to the same 
will be as clear and indefeasible as though the ex-
change were absolute and unconditional. 
We are of the opinion that, when sales and ex-
changes of the rights of the respective parties are 
made in and to the use of the waters, the forfeiture 
clause, being but a condition subsequent, is not ob-
noxious to the vesting of title and ownership in the 
city to the mountain water which it has received in 
exchange for lake water; and it is settled by the 
great weight of authority that when real estate is 
sold upon a condition subsequent, as the farmers 
propose to do in this case, the fee is transferred to 
and remains in the grantee until a breach of the con-
dition and a re-entry by the grantor; that is, such a 
sale carries with it all the attributes and incidents of 
absolute ownership until the condition is broken. 
Towle v. Remsen, 70 N.Y. 303; Vail v. Long Island 
R. Co., 106 N.Y. 283, 12 N. E. 607, 60 Am. Rep. 
449; Bouvier v. Baltimore & N.Y.R. Co., 60 L.R.A. 
750, and cases cited in note; 13 Cyc. 690; 1 Jones, 
Real Prop, in Conv. § 620. In Shattuck v. Hastings, 
99 Mass. 23, the rule is tersely, and, as we think, 
correctly, stated as follows: "A deed of land upon 
conditions subsequent conveys the fee with all its 
qualities of transmission. The condition has no ef-
fect to limit the title until it becomes operative to 
defeat it. Subject to this contingency, the estate will 
pass by deed or mortgage in the same manner and 
to the same extent as if no such incident were at-
tached to it." 
Applying the foregoing principles of law to the ad-
mitted facts in this case, we have no hesitancy in 
saying that the right and title of the city to the water 
it will receive from *275 the farmers by the ex-
change, when made as contemplated, will constitute 
ownership, and will come clearly within the forego-
ing provisions of the state Constitution. 
There are other objections made to the issue and 
sale of the bonds by the relator, but as the questions 
raised by such objections are without merit, and in 
no way affect the validity of the bonds, we deem it 
unnecessary to discuss them. 
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As heretofore stated in an oral opinion in which our 
conclusions were announced in this case, we are of 
the opinion that the provisions of the Constitution 
and the statutes authorizing the issue of this charac-
ter of bonds have been substantially complied with, 
and that the bonds in question are valid. The peti-
tion of relator will therefore be denied. 
It is so ordered. 
Utah 1905. 
State v. Salt Lake City 
29 Utah 361, 81 P. 273 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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The affidavit upon which the alternative writ was is-
sued is as follows: 
(Title of Court and Cause.) 
A0FEDAVIT, FR>R WRIT* Off BEtOKDSITrON. 
State of Utah, ) 
County of SaliffE&kfe'. J f*' 
George E. Ellerbeck .^of JSaltLake City, in the County 
of Salt Lake, State of Utah, being first dyly sworn on oath 
deposes and says: Tfiht'he.is the relator.above named; 
that he is aacitizen of the United States and of ithe. State of 
Utah, and a. resident and taxpayer:within Salt Lake City, 
Utah; that the defendant Salt Lake Ciirf, is a municipal 
corporation^ and thhtikja^Btiidl^d&fendint Eichferd P/Mor-
risj is the Mayor ofi said f City f;thafc the>said defendant, 
John S. Critchlow/ lVfhbOity BScorder'of >said' municipal 
corporation and the said 'defendant, Fisher S. Harris, is 
the City Treasurer of thetsai&mflnicipal corporation; that * 
your Eelator makfes this affidavit 'f&r the purpose of pro-
curing a Writ of Brohibiiion joufc*of this Court to the. said 
defendants to prohibit and restrain them and each of tHem 
from executing, issuing, negotiating and selling certain 
municipal bbiidd of ibfe'said municipal 'corporation herein-
after TefGrad^ O', and'your;d^poiient'frirther says that hi? 
hhs not api^ in;* speeds-aid 'adequate redied^ in thfe ordi-
nary course of 'lawvand 'as grounds iVJr iAsabg said writ 
this deponent shows unto this Court: 
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V 
Tliat on the 21st day of November, 1904, the City 
Council of Salt* Lake City duly passed an ordinance 
which was approved by the Mayor of said City on the 
22nd day of November, 1904, which said ordinance pro-
vided fdr and ordered a special election f6r the purpose of 
submitting to the qualified electors of Salt Lake City, the 
question of incurring a bonded indebtedness to the amount 
of one million dollars for certain purposes therein spe-
cified, a true copy of which said ordinance is hereto at-
tached and'marked exhibit " A " and made a part hereof. 
That thereafter a notice of such* special etectfon was giv-
en, to be held upon the 3rd day of January, 1905, and 
said election was held upon said day, and that thereafter 
the returns of said election were canvassed- by the City 
Council of.said City, and it was declared* by said City 
Council that sufficient votes had been cast by qualified 
electors to authorize the issuance of said boiids; that there-
after an advertisement was published for bids upon said 
bonds, and 'said defendants are about to sell and dispose 
of said bondtf, unless .prohibited by this court; that pre-
vious to said election, for the purpose of presenting to the 
qualified voters of Salt Lake City thfe object and purpose 
of the iss^anoe of spid hbnds and a plan to be pursued for 
the acquisition of an additional water supply and an addi-
tion to the sewer system, AD address, under the authority 
of the Mdyor and City Council of Salt Lake City was is-
sued to the taxpayers of Salt Lake City, a true copy of 
which" said address is hereto attached and marked exhibit 
"B'r and made a part hereof as fully as if the same were 
set out herein'; that said city was and is the owner of a 
waterworks system and obtains its waters from Parley's 
Creek, Emigration Creek and City Creek, and .is also the 
owner of the Salt Lake and Jordan Canal flowing from 
Utah Lake to said City, the waters however carried by 
said canal not being fit or used for domestic purposes in 
said City; that the present waterworks system of said City, 
which is owned and controlled by it, embraces several 
large and substantial reservoirs; a masonry conduit about 
5 miles long, about 160 miles of pipe,. 1500 valves, 1150 hy 
drants, and its present estimated value is over four nv 
lion dollars, the paters from Parley's Creek being 
ducted from that, canyon to the city through said mas< 
conduit and distributed through its water mains, the 
ject and purpose of said bond issue being to constru 
conduit from Parley's Creek to Big Cottonwood Ca;, 
for the purpose of conducting the water of Big Coti 
wood Creek through said conduit to Parley's Canyon am 
delivering the same at the intake of the present condun 
at Parley's Canyon, through which it will be conducted 
into the water mains of the existing water system of Salt 
Lake City. 
Your Eelator further alleges and shows, that-besides 
the waters of Big Cottonwood Creek the City intends, with 
the proceeds of said bonds, to acquire when needed ami 
convey through the conduit aforesaid, the waters of Mill 
Creek and Little Cottonwood Creek, in which waters or 
the use thereof however the City has no right, title or in-
terest whatsoever,, except by virtue of certain option con-
Irads whereby a part of the prior appropriators of the 
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waters of Big Cottonwood Creek have agreed to exchange 
the use of the waters of said creek for the use of an equal 
amount and twenty-five percent in addition of the waters 
of the Salt Lake and Jordan Canal, owned absolutely by 
ihe said city, which said right to use said waters of Big 
Cottonwood Creek is to be perpetual to said city, unless 
default is made by said city in furnishing them the said 
amount of the waters of said canal, and in that event the 
said several owners of said waters in said creek reserve 
the right to use to the exclusion of said city, the waters of 
said creek during the time that said default continues, but 
that said option contracts ho.wever further provide, that 
should the said city fail to furnish said amount of the water 
from said canal to said individuals for a period of six 
months, then the said individuals should have the option of 
terminating said contract absolutely, and the ability of the 
city to carry out the terms of said contract and prevent 
a default and forfeiture thereof, depends entirely and 
solely upon its ability to furnish to said individuals from 
the Salt Lake and Jordan Canal one and a fourth times 
the amount contracted* for in said option contracts, and 
your Relator further alleges and shows unto the court, that 
besides the furnishing of'the Salt Lake and Jordan Canal 
water one and a fourth times the amount received from 
said individuals,* Salt Lake City must as a further con-
sideration for such exchange, pay to each of said indn 
viduals a bonus of $10.00 per acre for each and every acre 
watered by said individuals from said creek, which said 
bonus would be wholly lost and forfeited in case of the 
forfeiture of the said water rights. ^Your Helator further 
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alleges and shows, that a part, to-wit, about $40,000-00, of 
the money which it is expected to be realized from said 
bond issues is to.be expended in acquiring said alleged 
water rights and the use thereof, under said existing con-
tracts above set forth, and that said alleged rights are not 
absolute, but are subject to forfeiture in certain contin-
gencies, the said contingency being as set forth above, and 
that the interest that the said city will acquire by virtue of 
said option contracts is not such an ownership and con-
trol as is contemplated by Section 4, Article XIV of the 
Constitution of the State* of Utah, and that the issuance 
of bonds for the purpose of acquiring such contingent and 
defeasible interest is contrary to the provisions of said 
Section 4 of Article XIV of the Constitution of the State 
of Utah. 
IL 
Your Relator further alleges and shows unto the 
court, that a part of the water rights of Big Cottonwood 
Canyon, for power purposes, have been heretofore used 
for private manufacturing purposes, but that the Utah 
Light and Railway Company, a corporation organized un-
der the laws of the State of Utah, and engaged in the 
business of operating a street railway system in Salt Lake 
City and County, and furnishing electric light and power 
to the inhabitants of Salt Lake City and County, claims to 
have succeeded to the ownership of said right heretofore 
used only for private manufacturing purposes, and claims 
the right, if it finds it convenient and expedient in the fu-
ture so to do, to use the same in the generation of power 
for the purposes aforesaid; that a part of the water rights 
intended to be acquired by said city with the proceeds of 
said bond issue, is the power right aforesaid, claimed to 
be owned by the said Utah Light and Railway Company. 
That no agreement between said city and said railway 
company has been concluded, and said railway company 
refuses to convey said water rights to said city, except 
upon terms not acceptable to the said city. That said city 
claims that it can acquire said interest of said railway 
company in and to said water rights, if valid, by virtue of 
the statutes of Utah in reference to eminent domain, but 
that your Relator is informed and believes, and therefore 
alleges the fact to be, that said water rights of said rail-
way company, if valid, are not subject to the law of emi-
nent domain in favor of said city, and that said railway 
company claims that its right to hold said water rights and 
property for a public use is superior, or, at least, equal to 
the right of said city to acquire the same by eminent do-
main, for the purposes set forth in said ordinance and the 
jrroposition submitted to said taxpayers, and that if said 
city is unable to acquire the rights of said railway com-
pany by contract or eminent domain, one of the purposes 
for which said bonds are to be issued, cannot be accom-
plished, and that said bond issue would be therefore 
unauthorized, unlawful and void. 
in. 
Your Relator further alleges and shows that Section 
4 of Article XIV of the Constitution of the State of Utah 
provides: 
"That any city or town, wheu authorized as provided 
in Section 3 of this Article, may be allowed to in-
cur a larger indebtedness not exceeding four per 
centum additional for supplying such city or 
town with water, artificial lights or sewers, when 
the works for supplying such water, lights and 
sewers shall be owned and controlled by the 
municipality." 
That said city has no present ownership or control of 
the water rights and other property in Mill Creek, Big 
Cottonwood or Little Cottonwood Creeks and their tribu-
taries, and that the city has not acquired an absolute own-
erfhip and control of Said water rights, except subject to 
the conditions and contingencies above set forth, and that 
said City is dependent upon the authority of law to ac-
quire, by eminent domain, ownership and control of that 
part of said water rights claimed to be owned by the said 
Utah Light and Railway Company, and that by reason of 
not having as yet acquired the ownership and control of 
said rights, as contemplated by said Section of said Con-
stitution, that said bonds issued for such purpose and un-
der such circumstances are invalid, for the reason thab 
•said bonds would create an indebtedness in excess of that 
allowed by Sections 3 and 4 of Article XIV of the Con-
stitution of the State of Utah, notwithstanding the ag-
gregate amount thereof does not exceed the four per cent 
additional indebtedness allowed by ssid Section, for the 
special purpose therein named. 
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IV 
Your Relator further alleges and shows, that it was 
contemplated by said ordinance and said address to said 
taxpayers, that the City should acquire by exchange with 
the primary owners of the waters of Big Cottonwood, 
Little Cottonwood and Mill Creek, sufficient waters for 
its present and immediate future needs; your Relator, 
however, alleges that at the time of the passage of said 
ordinance and at the present time the said City has not 
any right, title or interest to any of the water rights in 
said Canyon Creeks, except certain option contracts, as 
above set forth, for exchange for a portion of the waters 
of Big Cottonwood Creek, and should said City be unable 
to acquire by similar contracts the use of the waters of 
Little Cottonwood, Mill Creek, and the remainder of Big 
Cottonwood Creeks, it would be compelled to partially 
abandon the plan submited to the taxpayers, qualified 
electors of Salt Lake City, and the said plan could not be 
fully carried out in the manner and form as submitted to 
said voters, and the issuance of bonds for a partial 
carrying outof a plan submitted to and ratified by the 
voters as provided in* Section 3 of Article XIV of the 
Constitution of the State of Utah, would be unlawful and 
void, and your Relator further alleges and shows, that 
as shown by the address submitted to the taxpayers of 
Salt Lake City, it is only possible to carry out the plan 
contemplated by means of exchange with the primary 
owners of the waters of said Big Cottonwood, Little Cot-
tonwood and Mill Creek streams; that as shown by said 
address the sum of $850,000.00 to be provided, for the 
purpose of extending the water supply of Salt Lake City, 
is only sufficient for such extension in the event that such 
exchange can be made, and is wholly insufficient for the 
purpose stated, if the plan of exchange has to be aban-
doned and the right of the eminent domain is exercised 
against the individual owner of said waters, and that 
contracts having been made with only a portion of said 
individual owners and all other owners having yet the 
right to refuse to contract with said City for such ex-
change, the carrying out of said plan in its entirety is 
wholly contingent and uncertain, and the proposition to 
incur such indebtedness and issue bonds therefor, is not 
such a proposition to create a debt as is contemplated by 
Section 3 of Article XIV of the Constitution of the State 
of Utah. 
V. 
Yoiy Relator further alleges and shows, that the 
bond issue contemplated by the ordinance hereinbefore 
set forth, provides Jfor the sum of $850,000.00 to be used 
for ail increased water supply, and $150,000.00 for addi-
tion to the sewer system of said City. That the use of 
said additional sewerage' facilitates is wholly contingent 
upon the acquisition of the increased water supply to be 
procured with that portion-of the bond issue for such 
purpose, and the issuance of bonds for increased water 
supply being void and unauthorized for the reasons Here-
inbefore stated, the issuance of said bonds for addition to 
the sewer system of Salt Lake City is likewise null and 
void, for the reason that the construction of the addition 
to the sewer system would be a useless and wasteful ex-
—11— 
penditure of money, as it could not be used without the 
additional water supply. 
Wherefore, your Relator prays, that an alternative 
writ of prohibition be issued, returnable at an early day, 
and that upon a hearing had that a permanent writ be is-
sued prohibiting and enjoining said defendants and each 
of them from issuing, negotiating or selling any of said 
bonds of said City, and for such other and further relief 
as your Relator may be entitled to, and for his costs. 
GEORGE E. ELLERBECK, 
Relator. 
STEPHENS & SMITH, 
Attorneys for Relator. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me by George E. 
Ellerbeck, this 7th day of June, A. D. 1905. 
(Notary Seal.) BENNER X. SMITH, 
Notary Public. 
EXHIBIT " A/ ' 
An Ordinance. 
An ordinance providing for and ordering a special 
election for the* purpose sf submitting to the qualified 
electors of Salt Lake City, Utah, the question of incur-
ring a bonded indebtedness to the amount-of eight hun-, 
dred and fifty thousand ($850,000.00) dollars for the pur-
pose of supplying said city with water, and improving 
the present system of water distribution of said city; and 
also the question of incurring a bonded indebtedness to 
the amount.of one hundred apd fifty thousand ($150,-
—12— 
000.00) dollars for the purpose of laying and establishing 
sewer mains and sewer system in the southern and west-
ern portions of said city. 
Be it ordained by the city council of Salt Lake City 
Utah: 
Section 1. That there is an immediate and pressing 
necessity for increasing the water supply of Salt Lake 
City, Utah, and.also for the improvement and extension 
of the present system of .waterworks whereby the water 
of said city is now distributed throughout said cityj and 
also that there is an immediate and pressing necessity 
for sewer mains and a system of sewerage in the south-
ern and western portions of said city, in which no sewer-
age system now exists. 
Sec: 2. That to increase said water supply and im-
prove and extend the present system of water distribu-
tion of said city in the manner required calls for and re-
quires an expenditure of eight hundred and fifty ($850,-
000.00) dollars. 
That to establish and provide sewer mains and a 
sewerage system for, the part of said city above specified, 
calls for and requires an expenditure of one hundred and 
fifty thousand ($150,000.00) dollars. 
Sec. 3. That there are not sufficient funds in the city 
treasury to defray said expenses or any part thereof and 
that in order to defray the expenses of making said pro-
posed improvements it is.necessary for Salt Lake City to 
incur a bonded indebtedness to raise funds therefor in 
the following amounts: 
For increasing water supply $850,000.00 
—18— 
For establishing sewer mains and sewerage 
system $150,000.00 
Sec. 4. That in pursuance of Sections 308, 309 and 
310 of the Revised Statutes of Utah of 1898, it is hereby 
ordered that a special election be held in Salt Lake City> 
Utah, on the 3d day of January, 1905, for the purpose of 
submitting to such qualified electors as shall have paid 
a property tax in said city in the year 1904, the question 
of incurring a bonded indebtedness in the sum of eight 
hundred arid fifty thousand ($850,000.00) dollars for the 
purpose of defraying the expenses of increasing the 
water supply of said city by laying pipes and establish-
ing a water system to conduct water from Big Cottou-
wood creek and Mill creek and their tributaries to Salt 
Lake City, and acquiring water and water rights in said 
streams and in Utah lake, and by improving and extend-
ing the present system of .water distribution by which 
water is now distributed throughout said city; sxiso the 
question of incurring bonded indebtedness in the sum of 
one hundred and fifty thousand ($150,000.00) dollars for 
the purpose of defraying the expenses of establishing 
se^er mains and a sewerage system in the southern and 
western portions, of Salt Lake City, where no sewerage 
system now exists. 
Said water system and said sewerage system shall 
be owned by Salt Lake City. 
Said bonds shall bear interest at a rate not to exceed 
4 per cent per annum, which interest shall be payable 
semi-annually; and said bonds shall become due- and 
payable at the end of twenty (20) years from the date of 
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issue, with the option reserved to the city to pay or re-
fund the same at any time after the expiration of tea 
(10) years after the date of issue, and shallr.be of such 
denomination or denominations as the city council may 
hereafter determine, and the net revenues from said 
water system shall be set apart for and shall be a sinking 
fund for the payment of said bonds and interest thereon. 
Said election shall be conducted according to the 
statutes and laws of Utah, and shall be held in manner 
and form provided thereby. 
Sec. 5. The mayor and city recorder of Salt Lake 
City are hereby directed and required to make proclama-
tion of said special election by publication of a notice 
thereof in three (3) daily newspapers, published and cir-
culated in said city, for four (4) successive weeks prior 
to the date of said election. 
Sec. 6. Tliis ordinance shall take effect upon ap-
proval. 
Passed by the city council of Salt Lake City, Utah, 
Nov. 21, 1904, and referred to the mayor for his ap-
proval. 
JOHN S. CEITCHLOW, City Recorder. 
Approved this 22d dajr of November, 1904. 
RICHARD P. MORRIS, Mayor. 
The,defendants have filed herein the following An-
swer, in which none of the facts set up by the plaintiff are 
denied, but additional facts are stated by the defendants 
which are admitted by the plaintiff'to be true. 
(Title of Court and Cause.) 
DEFENDANT'S ANSWER. 
And now comes tiie above named defendants, and for 
answer to the affidavit of the Relator herein, these de-
fendants admit all the allegations, matters and things 
therein contained. 
And further answering, the defendants allege that 
the water rights claimed by the Utah Light & Railway 
Company, referred to in the Relator's affidavit, consist of 
water rights for power purposes only; that one of said 
rights was used prior to the first day of April, 1893, for 
the purpose of furnishing power for operating a paper 
mill; that the said mill was destroyed on that day and has 
never been rebuilt, and the power right'has never been 
used for any purpose whatever; that several years ago a 
small sawmill was operated by power furnished from the 
waters of said creek, and the said Utah Light and Rail-
way Company has since acquired the ownership of said 
water right and mill and has continued, from time to 
time, to operate the same in a very limited way; that both 
of these alleged water rights claimed by .the Utah Light 
& Railway Company are situated below the power plants 
which have heretofore been and are now being operated 
by said Company for the purpose mentioned in the Rela-
tor's affidavit; that the only interference with these al-
leged rights which could possibly occur in carrying out 
the proposed plan for increasing the City's water supply 
would be in changing the point of diversion of the waters 
secured under the contracts for exchange, and would not 
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in any way interfere with the operation of any of the ex-
isting power plants of said Company; that the waters of 
Big Cottonwood Creek, which the City proposes to.ac-
quire by exchange, are now diverted from the natural 
channel of said stream at a point below the site of the old 
paper mil/, and it is desired by the City to divert the 
waters of said Creek from the natural channel at a point 
above said saw mill and paper mill site, and below the 
lower power plant of said Company, 
The defendants further allege that the plan which 
was submitted to the voters, as appears from the City or-
dinance, Relator's Exhibit "A," was for "increasing the 
water supply of the City by laying pipes and establishing 
a water system to conduct water from Big Cottonwood 
Creek and Mill Creek .and their tributaries to Salt Lake 
City, and acquiring water and water rights 
in said streams and in Utah Lake, and by 
improving and attending the present system 
of water distribution by which water is now dis-
tributed throughout said City"; that the carrying out of 
this plan is not dependent upon diverting the waters of 
Big Cottonwood Creek at any point which would inter-
fere with any of the water rights claimed by the Utah 
.Light & Railway Company, because said waters can be 
diverted from their natural channel below the old paper 
mill site, which is the lowest right claimed by the Com-
pany, and said waters can be conducted by gravity into 
Salt Lake City at a point above the Thirteenth East 
Street Reservoir, so that they can be utilized from said 
reservoir and distributed through.the present* water-
works system of the City; that it would be more beneficial 
to the City to divert the water at a point immediately be-
low the Utah Light & Railway Company's lower power 
plant, and above the said saw mill and paper mill site, 
because it could then be conducted by gravity through a 
conduit from Big Cottonwood Creek to Parley's Creek, 
where it would have a fall of about one hundred and 
eighty (180) feet, before entering the Parley's conduit, 
and this fall could be utilized by the City for power pur-
poses; that a portion of the water could also be conduct-
ed across Parley's Canyon and brought out on the bench 
east of the City, at about the same elevation as Fort 
Douglas, which would render practicable the utilization 
of the Cottonwood water on the East and North benches 
of the City, at an elevation over 200 feet above the Thir-
teenth East Street Reservoir^ thus greatly increasing the 
area of the City that would be supplied with water, and 
providing a much higher and necessary pressure for fire 
purposes. 
The defendants further allege that the present pota-
ble water supply of the City, which, is derived from City 
Creek, Emigration Creek/and Parley's Creek, during the 
season of minimum flow, which is approximately ten 
million* .(10,000,000) gallons per day, which \k estimated 
to be about one-half enough to properly supply the pres-
ent population'of the City; that the waters of Mill Creek, 
Big Cottonwood, and Little Cottonwood Creek are equal 
in quality to the water now used by the City; that the op-
tional contracts which the City now has with the owners 
of water rights in Big Cottonwood Creek cover approxi-
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mately one-half of that stream, which, during the season 
of minimum flow, supplies about eighteen million (18,-
000,000) gallons per day, so that, if the City should, ac-
quire this additional nine million (9,000,000) gallons, its 
present supply would be nearly doubled, and, as appears 
from the Re'ator's Exhibit " B , " "negotiations are pend-
ing by which it is expected that practically all of the wat-
ers of Big Cottonwood Creek and Mill Creek will be ac-
quired by exchange and lease, as well as the waters of 
Little Cottonwood, as- soon as the necessities of the City 
shall require/' 
The defendants <further allege that in addition to 
the City's daily supply of forty-three million five nuncwrect 
and sixty thourfana (43,560,000) gallons of Utah Lake 
reservoir water, as shown by said Exhibit " B , " it has, 
since the address was issued, increased its daily supply 
twelve million nine hundred and twenty-six thousand 
(12,926,000) gallons by the installation of an additional 
pump at Utah Lake, so that it now has an available daily 
supply of Utah Lake water of fifty-six million four hun-
dred* and eighty-six thousand (56,486,000) gallons, which 
is nearly twelve million (12,000,000) gallons more than 
would be required in exchange for all the waters of Par-
ley's Creek, Mill Creek, Big Cottonwood Creek and Little 
Cottonwood Creek, including the twenty-five per cent 
(25 per cent) bonus, which the City ha& to furnish in con-
sideration of the exchange, and said available supply is 
only about one-fourth of the City's share of stored water 
in Utah Lake, 
C. C. DEY, 
Attorney for DefenQants. 
F. S. RICHARDS, 
Of Counsel. 
—M*-*" 
As will be seen from the foregoing affidavit the ques-
tions to be considered by the court in this proceeding, are 
five in number and we will discuss them in their order: 
I. 
IS THE INTEREST WHICH THE CITY PRO-
POSES TO ACQUIRE BY VIRTUE OF OPTION CON-
TRACTS WITH THE OWNERS OF THE WATERS 
FROM MOUNTAIN STREAMS SUCH AN OWNER-
SHIP AS IS CONTEMPLATED BY SECTION 4 OF 
ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH? 
This Section is as follows: 
" (Limit of indebtedness of counties, cities, etc.) 
When authorized to create indebtedness as pro-
vided in Section three of this Article, no county 
shall become indebted to an amount, including 
existing indebtedness, exceeding two per centum. 
No city, town, school district or other municipal 
corporation, shall become indebted to an amount, 
including existing indebtedness, exceeding four 
per centum of the value of the taxable property 
therein, the value to be ascertained by the last 
assessment for State and county purposes, pre-
vious to the incurring of such indebtedness; ex-
cept that in incorporated cities the assessment 
shall be taken from the last assessment for city 
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purposes: Provided, That no part of the indebt-
edness allowed in this section, shall be incurred 
for other than strictly county, city, town or school 
district purposes: Provided, further, That any 
city, or town, when authorized as provided in 
Section three of this Article, may be allowed to 
incur a larger indebtedness, not exceeding four 
per centum additional, for supplying such city 
or town with water, artificial lights or sewera, 
when the works for supplying such water, light 
and sewers, shall be owned and controlled by the 
municipality." 
Note the clear and unequivocal language of the sec-
tion. 
" When the works for supplying such water, light and 
sewers shall be OWNED and controlled by the 
municipality." 
"Not owned OB controlled, but owned AND con-
trolled." 
By referring to page 9 of the Address, described as 
Exhibit "B," it will be seen that under these option con-
tracts the city merely makes an exchange of the use of the 
water under conditions whereby the city, as a pre-requisite 
to instituting such exchange, in the beginning pays a bonus 
of $10.00 per acre to the owners of the mountain water, 
for each acre of land irrigated by such mountain water in 
which the exchange is to be made, and there is also to be 
given to the farmer an additional 25 per cent more canal 
water than the city receives of mountain water. It is pro-
posed in the options to grant, bargain and sell to the city 
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all of the farmers' rights to the perpetual use of the moun-
tain water, unless default is made by the city in furnish-
ing them the exchange water, and in that event they re-
serve the right to use the mountain water during the time 
that the default continues, and if the failure of the city to 
furnish the exchange water continues for a period of six 
months, then it is optional with the farmers to terminate 
the contractabsolutely and deprive the city of any interest 
whatever in the mountain water; the interest which the city 
acquires is therefore not absolute but contingent and sub-
ject to forfeiture, and such a contingent and forfeitable 
interest we claim is not an ownership such as is contem-
plated by the section of the Constitution quoted above. 
WHAT IS OWNERSHIP! 
"Owner. He who has dominion of a thing, real or 
personal, corporeal or incorporeal, which he has a 
right to enjoy and do with as he pleases,—even to 
spoil or destroy it, as far as the law permits, \m-
less he be prevented by some agreement or cove-
nant which restrains his right." 
"Ownership. The right by which a thing belongs to 
someone in particular, to the exclusion of all 
others." 
Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Vol. 2, page 343. 
28 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 234. 
Webster defines "Own." "To hold as property; to 
have a legal or rightful title to; to be the pro-
prietor or possessor of; as, to own .a house.'' 
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In Fallbrook Irrigation Dist- Vs. Abila, 39 Pac., 794, 
the Supreme Court of Calif., discussing the meaning of 
owner, says: 
"Words used in a statute are to be given their gen-
eral and unrestricted meaning, unless the con-
text or the apparent scope and purpose of the 
statute indicate a limited meaning. 'Owner' in 
its general sense means one who has full proprie-
torship in and dominion over property. In Bou-
vier's Law Dictionary it is said, that "the word 
'owner,' when used alone, imports an absolute 
owner." 
Johnson vs* Crookshanks, 28 Pac. 78. 
Smith vs. Race, 76 111. 490. 
Certainly the interest the city proposes to acquire by 
virtue of these option contracts is not ownership as de-
fined above. 
Section 26 of Article 1, provides : 
"The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory 
and prohibitory, unless by express words they 
are declared to be otherwise." 
Section 6 of Article XI of the Constitution prohibits 
nunicipal corporations from directly or indirectly leasing, 
telling or disposing of any of its waterworks or water 
ights or sources of water supply, with the proviso, how-
ver, that they may exchange water rights or sources of 
rater supply, or other water rights or sources of water 
upply of equal value. It is quite apparent from, these 
revisions of the Constitution that what the city proposes 
y do in the present case, is directly within the prohibi-
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tion of the Constitution against leasing its water right* 
and sources of water supply. It is not such an exchange 
of .water rights or sources of water supply as is contained 
in the proviso, for an exchange necessarily implies a part-
ing with the title and possession of the thing exchanged 
and the acquisition of the title and possession to the tiling 
acquired; 
No such absolute title to the thing acquired will be 
acquired by the city, but merely a defeasible interest which 
may be entirely lost in the event of the contingency hap-
pening that tihe city is unable or does not furnish the 
water from Utah Lake. 
Exchange of property, 11 Am. & Eng. Ency. of 
Law, 569. 
But still more serious considerations are involved in 
this failure to acquire the absolute ownership as con-
templated by the Constitution. 
By referring to page 12 of Exhibit " B " it will be seen 
that it is proposed to expend this $850,000.00 in the follow-
ing manner: 
Conduit from Cottonwood to Parley's $350,000.00 
Power plant at niouth of Parley's 40,000.00 
Development at Utah Lake 200,000.00 
Repairs on City Canal 20,000.00 
Improvement of distribution system 100.000.00 
Money consideration in exchange of water . . . . 50,000.00 
Extinguishment of power rights and incidentals 50,000.00 
Engineering preliminaries and supervision . . . 40,000.00 
Total estimated cost $850,000.00 
Not only Xvill the city lose any interest it 1ms in the 
—Si-
water obtained from the farmers, should there be a de-
fault by the city in furnishing the Utah Lake water, but, 
as will be noted from the foregoing statement of expend!-' 
tures, practically the entire proceeds of the sale of the 
bonds will, in the event of the extinguishment of the city's 
right to the mountain water, be likewise lost: 
First, the $10.00 per acre paid to the farmers, aggre-
gating on present contracts $40,000. (See first aJlegation 
in the affidavit.) 
• Second, conduit from Cottonwood to Parley % $350,-
000f which will be worthless if there is no water, to con-
duct through it 
Third, power plant at mouth of Parley's, $40,000, 
.which will be wortBless if there is no water to run it with. 
Fourth, development at Utah Lake, $200,000, which 
is not needed if we have more water from Utah Lake now 
than we know what to do with at present. 
Fifth, the extinguishment of power rights and inci-
dentals, $50,000, which will be wholly wasted if the water 
obtained by such extinguishment is lost 
Sixth, engineering preliminaries and supervision $40,000.00. 
Seventh, a large part of improvements of distribu-
tion system, $100,000. 
So that with the loss of the water obtained by option 
3ontracts, there will follow an additional enormous loss 
n a useless system for conducting said waters with which 
he amount actually forfeited as a bonus paid, is small in 
omparison. 
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n. 
CAN THE INTEREST OF THE UTAH LIGHT 
AND RAILWAY COMPANY BE ACQUIRED BY 
THE CITY IN ORDER TO CARRY OUT ITS PLAN, 
AS SUBMITTED TO THE TAXPAYERS, BY EX-
ERCISE OF THE RIGHT OF'EMINENT DOMAIN? 
It appears that the Utah Light and Railway Company 
claims to be the owner of a right, heretofore used for pri-
vate manufacturing purposes, in the waters of Big Cot-
tonwood Canyon, and claims the right, if it finds it expe-
dient or convenient in the future so to do, to use this water 
for generation of power, for the purpose of furnishing 
light, power and transportation of passengers to the cit-
izens of Salt Lake City and County. It appears that no 
agreement between the city and the Railway Compan^jas 
been concluded, and that said Railway Company refuses 
to convey said water rights to the city, except upon terms 
which are not acceptable to the city. 
Are the water rights of the Railway Company, if 
valid, subject to the law of eminent domain, in favor of the 
city, and can it not be successfully maintained by the Rail-
way Company, that a water right, contemplated to be used 
for a public use in the furnishing of light and power and 
in the transportation of passenger ,^ is a public use equal 
if not superior to the right of the city to acquire the same 
for the purpose set forth in Exhibit "A,M and the propo-
sition submitted to the taxpayers? 
It is apparent that, if the city is not able to acquire 
such fights by a contract or eminent domain, one of the 
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purposes for which said bonds are to be issued cannot be 
accomplished. 
Sec. '3588 of the Revised Statutes of Utah, 1898, as 
amended in 1901, provides that right of eminent domain 
may be exercised for certain public uses, and sub-division 
3 of Sec. 3590 provides in substance: 
That the property already appropriated to a public 
use shall not be taken unless for a more neces-
sary public use than that to which it has already 
been appropriated. 
Can it not be said with reason that the use of water 
rights for the public use of generating power, furnishing 
liglits and transportation to the citizens of Salt Lake City, 
is at least equal to the rights of the city to the use of said 
water for domestic and city purposes, and can it be said 
that the right of the city to take the Railway Company's 
rights by eminent domain for domestic municipal pur-
poses, is a superior and more necessary pub-
lic use than the right of the Railway Company to 
use its water for the furnishing of power, light and trans-
portation to the citizens, not only within the city, but to 
citizens of the county without the city ? 
The defendants in their answer allege, that condem-
nation of the Utah Light and Railway Company 's riglits, 
is not necessary, for the reason that another plan can be 
pursued; namely: the taking of the waters of Big Cotton-
wood at a point below the old paper mill, without interfe^ 
ing with the rights of the Utah Light and Railway Com-
pany, and delivering the same in the city at Thirteenth 
East Street reservoir. For the purpose of this proceed-
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ing we are willing to admit the truth of this allegation, but 
it is perfectly apparent that if such a course were pursued 
that it would be a radical abandonment of the plans sub-
mitted to and ratified by the voters. 
On page 12 of Exhibit " B " is the following state-
ment: 
"The proposed conduit will be constructed of cement 
concrete and be of such dimensions as will carry 
the acquired water. It will discharge the Mill 
Creek and Cottonwood waters into Parley 's 
Creek at an elevation of 180 feet above the in-
take of the Parley's Canyon Conduit, through 
which the water will be carried to the city. The 
180 feet of fall between the discharge end of the 
proposed conduit and the intake of Parley's Can-
yon conduit will be utilized through the construc-
tion of the proposed power plant, in the produc-
tion of power for pumping sewage from the 
proposed west side intercepting sewer up into the 
present gravity sewer." 
This statement read in connection with the defend-
ants' answer, shows conclusively, that the plan submit-
ted to and r&tified by the voters, contemplated the acquisi-
tion of the Power Company's rights and the taking out of 
the Cottonwood waters at a point of the stream above the 
paper mill and saw mill, for the purpose of obtaining the 
fall at the intake in Parley's Canyon, to be utilized for 
power purposes, and which would also bring the water to 
the city at a point high enough to be used in any part of 
the municipality; while the alleged modification of this 
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>lan suggested in defendants' answer, abandons altogethe 
he power scheme submitted to and ratified by the taxpaj 
rs, and also deprives that portion of the city, highe 
han the Thirteenth East Street reservoir, of any benef 
rom the Cottonwood and Mill Creek waters. 
Did the voters at the special bond election vote t 
ring water in as outlined in the modified plan suggests 
i defendants' answer; or did they not vote these bonds fo 
lie purpose of carrying out the plans submitted in exhibi 
B?" 
Again it appears that the plan submitted to the voter* 
Mitemplated the acquiring of the Railway Company's 
ghts in Big Cottonwood < Canyon. It is conceded thai 
lese rights cannot be obtained by contract and must be 
btained by condemnation, if at all, and it appears from 
le defendants' answer, that it is not necessary for the city 
> take the water at the higher point, which was the plan 
ibmitted to the voters, but that it may, without interfer-
g with the Railway Company's rights, take the waters 
the lower point; it would seem to follow, without.any 
lestion, that since the city's right to condemn property 
ready appropriated for a public use, must depend upon 
showing that it is to be taken for a more' necessary pub-
i use (Sub-division 3, Revised Statutes, 3590), and it 
pearing from the city's answer that it can avail itself of 
is water by taking it at the lower point, it would there-
re seem to follow, that, if it can obtain the^ benefit by so 
ing, it should not be permitted under the statute of emi-
nt domain to take it at the higher point and thereby de-
prive the Railway Company of its rights in the use of this 
water, 
m. 
CAN THE CITY LEQALLY ISSUE BONDS NOT 
EXCEEDING A FOUR. PER CENT ADDITIONAL 
INDEBTEDNESS, WHEN THE WORKS FOR SUP-
PLYING THE WATER ARE NOT OWNED AND 
CONTROLLED BY IT AT THE TIME OF THE IS-
SUANCE OF SUCH BONDS? 
Section 4 of Article XIV of the Constitution, auth-
orizes the issuance of bonds for certain purposes, and pro-
vides further, that: 
"Any city or town, when authorized as provided in 
Section 3 of this Article, may be allowed to incur 
a larger indebtedness not exceeding .four per 
cent additional for supplying such city or town 
with water, artificial lights or sewers, when the 
works for supplying such water, light and sewer 
shall be owned and controlled by the munici-
pality." 
These words of the Constitution, imply plainly a pres-
ent ownership, and it seems to us that the proposed in-
debtedness is to be incurred on behalf of Salt Lake City, 
when it has no right, title or interest in the works for sup-
plying said waters, as is contemplated by this proviso of 
Section 4. 
From the statement above it will be seen that fully 
one-half of the proceeds of these bonds is to be used in 
the construction of the conduit and other w6rks, when at 
the time of the issuing the bonds, the city has no interest, 
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ght or title in any of the waters in these mountain 
reams, except a contingent and defeasible interest by 
ay of option contracts for about one-half of the waters 
f one of the streams, to-wit, Big Cottonwood. 
- Suppose these bonds are issued and the city does not 
ucceed in carrying out their proposed plan in regard to 
be acquiring of these rights by exchange, the city then 
as outstanding one million dollars in bonds, constituting 
n indebtedness, with its promise to pay interest, and with 
10 ownership or control of any water rights within the 
neaning of the Constitution, but owning a conduit and 
>ther works built for the carrying of water not owned by 
;He city, and consequently useless. 
If the Constitution and Laws of this State contem-
plate the issuance of bonds and the use of the proceeds 
when and .where the city might determine, this bond issue,. 
BO far as the ground now argued, might be valid, but un-
fortunately the Constitution and Laws of the State of 
Utah, Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Article XIV of the Constitu-
tion, and Section 309, Chapter 18, of the Revised Statutes 
of Utah, 1898, provide, in substance: 
That the City Council must specify the particular 
purpose for which the indebtedness is to be 
created. 
And Section 5, Article XIV, of the Constitution above 
quoted, provides, that: 
" All moneys borrowed by or on behalf of the State or 
any legal subdivision thereof, shall be used solely 
for the purpose specified in the law authorizing 
the loan/' 
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The proposed bond issue is therefore void on account 
of the non-ownership and control of the " works.'' 
IV. 
IF THE PLAiT OF EXCHANGE AND ACQUISI-
TION OF POWER RIGHTS SUBMITTED TO THE 
VOTERS, IS ABANDONED OR ONLY PARTIALLY 
CARRIED OUT, CAN BONDS BE VALID, THE PRO-
CEEDS OF WHICH MUST BE USED IN A PLAN-
OTHER THAN THAT SUBMITTED TO THE VOT-
ERS AND AUTHORIZED BY THEM1 
The plan submitted to the voters is to obtain water 
by exchange with farmers owning potable waters from the 
mountain streams. At present option contracts have 
been taken upon about one-half of the waters of Big Cot-
tonwood Canyon alone. 
See pages 8 and 9 of Exhibit "B." ' 
The owners of the remaining one-half of Big Cot-
tonwood, and all of the owners of Mill Creek and Little 
Cottonwood have yet the right to refuse to make any con-
tract whatever with the City for the exchange of water. 
If the remaining owners or any considerable number of 
them refuse to exchange, the plan submitted to the voters 
will have to be abandoned in its entirety, and largely or 
partially carried out, if possible, by the exercise of the 
right of eminent domain, which the city in its address 
(page 13 of Exhibit 4<B") admits its inability to do, con-
sequently the carrying out of the plan submitted tx) the 
voters is contingent upon the unknown volition of a mul-
titude of water owners; they may agree and they may 
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notr or tlieir terms may be such as to be prohibitive. We 
are, therefore, confronted with a bond issue for the pur-
pose of carrying out a plan, the execution of which de-
pends wholly upon the whim, caprice and wiJJ of parties 
hostile to the City, or at least in a position to demand 
prohibitive prices or refuse to contract at all. An essen-
tial part of the carrying out of the Cottonwood plan, as 
voted upon, was the acquiring of rights to exchange with 
the individual owners of the water; it is conceded that 
only one-half of the waters of Cottonwood have been ob-
tained in this way, and that it would be impossible to 
condemn the remaining waters on account of the expense 
(see pages 6 and 7 of Exhibit "B"), and it therefore fol-
lows that should the City be unable to acquire the re-
m&ining waters of these streams, as contemplated in the 
Address, by means of exchange, that the plan submitted 
to the voters w&uld have to be abandoned, and that not 
only would the original plan fail and the bonds be invalid 
by reason of not being issued and used for the purpose 
ratified by the voters, but the whole scheme of obtaining 
water would fail. 
We think it will be conceded by the Attorneys for 
defendants, that Sections 3 and 4 of Article XIV of the 
Constitution and Section 309 of the Revised Statutes of 
1898, absolutely require that a definite plan be submitted 
to the voters for the carrying out of which the proceeds 
of the bonds to be voted, are to be used, and we think that 
the Attorneys will also concede that Section 5 of Article 
XIV of the Constitution, namely: 
"TKat all the moneys borrowed by or on behalf of 
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the State or any legal subdivision thereof, shall 
be used solely Yor the purpose specified in the*' 
law authorizing the loan," 
must be construed to mean, that the plan submitted by 
the voters shall be carried out as submitted. Can a bond 
issue be valid where the carrying out of a plan is depend-
ent upon the will of parties owning water, which the City 
has no claim upon and must obtain by getting the consent 
of owners who have always the right to refuse? There is 
certainly no presumption that a man will sell to the city 
something which he owns absolutely. Water rights are 
not a commodity which owners must sell like wheat or 
corn; there is no open market in which water rights can 
be bought; there is no certainly that they can-be bought. 
Defendants have set up in their answer that since the 
Address, marked Exhibit "B,M was presented to the vot-
ers, in addition to the City's daily supply of 43,560,000 
gallons of Utah Lake reservoir water, it has increased its 
daily supply 12,926,000 gallons by the installation of an 
additional pump at Utah Lake, so that it now hAs an 
available daily supply of Utah Lake water of 56,486,000 
gallons. 
We presume this statement is made in connection 
with the statements upon pages 10 and 11 of Exhibit 
"B,M in which the fact is presented to voters, that if nec-
essary the City might increase its possible daily flow to 
203,280,000 gallons by completely exhausting in any one 
season the total amount of water stored in Utah Lake so 
far as the city's right to the same is concerned. 
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We submit that these allegations do not make it any 
more certain that the exchange can be made with those 
who have not yet agreed to exchange. Certainly, grave 
questions will arise as to what extent the City would be 
permitted to lower Utah Lake reservoir, and we think we 
are justified in saying that it would be to the necessary 
injury of riparian owners, and should such owners be 
able to establish their rights as against the City, they 
would be in the same position as the owners of mountain 
streams, who have.not yet contracted to exchange ana 
need not do so, except upon terms agreeable to them-
selves, which might be prohibitive so far as the City is 
concerned. 
It is apparent from the answer and the address, that 
the exchange, if effected, must be substantially upon the 
terms already made with other owners. If a larger bonus 
per acre is exacted, or if a very much larger additional 
amount of water is exacted, the exchange will be impos-
sible. 
As a matter of fact only $50,000.00 of bond issue is 
set apart as a money consideration for the exchange of 
water (see page 12 of Exhibit " B " ) , and it is conceded 
that about $40,000.00 of this sum has already been 
pledged as the ten dollar an acre consideration for. the 
acquisition of one-half of the waters of Big Cottonwood 
Canyon alone. 
"Where is the money coming from with which to ef-
fect the exchange for the waters of Mill Creek*and the re-
maining half of Big Cottonwood? 
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We submit that, upon the facts stated and admitted, 
the carrying out of the plan proposed is not only uncer-
tain, but impossible of realization. 
V. 
THE WATER BONDS BEING VOID, THE 
SEWER BONDS MUST FALL WITH THEM. 
It appears from the pleadings that $150,000.00 of the 
proposed bond issue is for the purpose of extending the 
sewer system of this City, and that the use and practic-
ability of the extension of the sewer system is wholly con-
tingent upon the increase in the water supply to be ob-
tained through, this bond issue, and it therefore follows, 
that, the water bonds being invalid, the City is without 
means to construct the water system upon which depends 
the use of the sewer system, the latter system being de-
pendent for its operation upon an increase of the water 
supply to be obtained by the invalid bonds, the failure of 
the former would necessarily mean the failure of. the lat-
ter; the two questions are so closely linked together that 
when one fails both must fail. 
I t would be a useless and wasteful expenditure of 
money to build a sewer system which could not be used 
without the increased water supply and power contem-
plated by the proposed issue of water bonds. 
The Relator respectfully submits that a permanent 
writ should issue. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STEPHENS & SMITH, 
Attorneys for Relator. 
THE COUNCIL RESOLUTION. 
WHEREAS, the Committee of Citizens, appoint-
ed by the Mayor, in conjunction with the Special Com-
mittee on Water Supply of this Council, have formu-
lated an address to the taxpayers of this city for their 
consideration, prior to the Special election to be held 
on January 3rd, prox., therefore be it 
RESOLVED, That the said address to the tax-
payers be made a part of this resolution and adopted 
by this council as the plan ©r the proposed water in-
crease; and be it further, 
RESOLVED, That the Mayor be authorized to 
have the said address, together with this resolution, 
published in the press of this city and that the Mayor 
be further authorized to have the said address and 
resolution printed in pamphlet form and a copy there-
of be placed in every home and business house in this 
city. 
THE ADDRESS. 
TO THE PROPERTY TAXPAYERS OP SALT 
LAKE CITY: 
The City Council having ordered a special elec-
tion to be held January 3,19p5, for the purpose of sub-
mitting to the qualified voters, the proposition of the 
issuance of $1,000,000, four per cent bonds, with 
which to obtain money to secure a permanent and 
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adequate water supply, and to make necessary sewer 
extensions, it is deemed advisable that this address 
be given the widest possible publicity among the peo-
ple to be affected. The advantages that will accrue 
to Salt Lake City and county by favorable action upon 
the momentous question involved, are so manifold and 
so manifest, and the objections so few and so ground-
less, that there can be no doubt as to the outcome of 
the issue when the taxpayers shall have passed upon 
the same at the polls. 
The success of the plan means a Greater Salt 
Lake, a larger and richer city—the permanent solu-
tion of a problem that has impeded the growth and 
.progress of our city for many years; one that now 
threatens to halt its expansion altogether unless it 
shall be satisfactorily disposed of. The means of 
solution are finally ,at hand. It remains only for the 
taxpayers to ratify them. That done,'the future of 
Salt Lake City wall be assured. Naturally, every 
citizen will want to know just what is proposed, what 
the city's abilities are, and what the cost will be. On 
all of these points he will be given only accurate in-
formation based upon official' records and obtained 
from the most conservative sources. 
Under the law the city has the right to borrow for 
water, artificial light arid sewer improvements, thef 
sum of $1,250,000.00. The proposition that the city 
council has ordered to be voted upon, is for the is-
suance of $1,000,000.00, in bonds, of which sum $850,-
000.00 is to be utilized in securing a permanent water 
supply, several times the volume of what we now have, 
and $150,000 for sewering the southern and western 
part of tile city, an improvement that would be worse 
than useless unless more water is secured to jnake it 
effectual. 
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INTEREST AND TAXATION. 
By way of information the taxpayer will prob-
ably ask specifically how the interest is to be raised on 
this issue of bonds, and whether it means an increase 
in taxation. The answer will doubtless be more 
pleasing than he imagined. It may be stated first of 
all, that no increase of taxation is contemplated. An 
examination of the records of the waterworks depart-
ment, covering a long period of years, proves conclu-
sively that the revenues in that branch of the munici-
pality alone are more than ample to pay the annual 
interest of the proposed water bond issue. Besides, 
these revenues are constantly increasing at a rate ex-
ceeding five per cent each year; and that, too, in the 
face of an inadequate water supply and retarded 
growth in population. The figures which follow, en-
tirely justify the conclusion that with a numerical 
augmentation of people, an increase in wealth and 
property improvement, and consequently a greater 
tax-paying capacity, that there will be a still greater 
revenue from this deaprtment. 
For several years past there has been applied a 
sum averaging over $55,000 annually for water ser-
vice betterments, redemption of scrip, increase of 
waterworks stores and reserve fund, every cent of 
which has deen derived from the'department itself, 
which, at the same ratio, after paying the $34,000 in-
terest on the proposed bonds, will leave a margin of 
$21,000, The water revenues beginning with the year 
1900, are as follows: 
1900 $ 97,808.65 
1901 102,810.92 
1902 108,262.79 
1903 112,883.79 
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And the records of 1904 disclose the interesting 
fact that there will be a proportionate increase in the 
same department this year. Surely, such a showing 
as this should inspire the taxpayer with full confi-
dence in the ability of the waterworks system of the 
city to support itself, including the payment of the 
interest on the proposed bond issue, and leave a hand-
some annual margin in addition, that must grow 
larger with the years, and which should be applied to 
the redemption of the bonds themselves. 
Another important fact to remember is that, at 
the very outset the annual drain that has been made 
upon the waterworks fond for betterments will cease. 
This highly desirable condition will be made possible 
by the provision that requires a prompt expenditure 
of $100,000 to make all necessary improvements here-
tofore undertaken and carried out in piece-meal 
fashion. 
CITY WATER SUPPLY. 
Providing water for a city that is situated in the 
very heart of this rainless region is a work fraught 
with difficulties unknown to other places. Many 
problems must be solved for which there is no prece-
dent for a guide. Originality, therefore, becomes a 
necessity in dealing with many matters that are in-
separable from the question of providing an increase 
in the water supply of this city. Due allowance 
should be made for this by the taxpayers who are 
called upon to decide this important question, a ques-
tion which involves the growth and greatness of the 
city. 
The present water supply of the City is derived 
from four separate sources. These sources and the 
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quantity of water that each supplies daily, during the 
season of minimum flow, are as follows: 
City Creek 4,802,134 gallons 
Emigration Creek 1,000,000 gallons 
Parleys Creek 4,202,740 gallons 
Utah Lake Beservoir 43,560,000 gallons 
Total daily supply . .53,564,874 gallons 
Of this total daily quantity only the creek water, 
(10,004,874 gallops), is suitable for drinking. The re-
mainder, (43,560,000 gallons), which comes from the 
Utah Lake Beservoir, is suited only for irrigation and 
kindred uses. The creek water comes into the city 
from the mountains through three separate and sub-
stantial conduits. 
The distribution system comprises four districts 
or zones, known as the lower, the upper, the Thir-
teenth Street and the Capitol Hill districts, respec-
tively. The lower and the upper districts are each 
supplied with the commingled waters of Parleys % 
Emigration and City Creeks. The Thirteenth Street 
and the Capitol Hill districts, are both supplied from 
City Creek exclusively. 
The Utah Lake Beservoir water is brought into 
the city through an open channel known as the Jordan 
and Salt Lake City Canal. The water from this 
source is used for irrigation partly by the fanners 
in exchange for Parley's Creek and partly through 
the system of irigation ditches which ramify the city. 
All the Creek watef comes from the canyons and 
is distributed by gravity, thus insuring the least pos-
sible cost for carirage and distribution. 
The reservoir water originally ran out of the 
Lake into Jordan Biver and through the canal to the 
city by gravity, but during the last three seasons it has 
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been necessary to pump the water from the Lake into 
the river channel on account of the water in the reser-
voir having receded to a point below the level of the 
river outlet 
So far &s quantity is considered, the City's pres-
ent water supply is sufficient for many years to come. 
The greater portion of (he water, however, is not of 
the quality required for general use and the need is 
therefore of more water of the required quality. 
On acount of the dryness of the climate and the 
consequent need for a libera] use of water in lawn and 
street sprinkling, it has been estimated that a daily 
supply of 300 gallons per capita is not an excessive 
requirement and should be made the basis for deter-
mining the city's needs. 
On this basis it is clear that the city's present 
supply of potable water, (10,004,874 gallons), is only 
about half enough to properly supply the present pop-
ulation. Such a condition points out, more plainly 
than words can possibly do, the need for early and 
united effort to supply this deficiency and at the same 
time provide in a reasonable degree for the future 
growth and needs of the city. 
PLANNING FOR BELIEF. 
In considering any plan for relief from the condi-
tions that confront us, the taxpayers should keep in 
mind the facts that, wherever we go the water sup-
ply has already been appropriated by others and can-
not be taken by the city without just compensation; 
that the sum of money which it is proposed to expend 
for increasing the water supply is only $850,000, and 
that there is no practical way by which' this sum can 
be materially increased. 
If water is purchased the price of the water must 
include the value of the land, and a# appurtenances, 
1 
upon which the water is norw being used. To take the 
water from the land implies its degradation and the 
practical destruction of all improvements that are up-
on it 
In case of condemnation the obligation to pro-
vide the price of the water taken, would not be re-
moved nor could the loss of time and increased cost 
due to such procedure be avoided. 
In addition to the price of water that might be 
procured through either purchase or condemnation 
there must be provided a sum sufficient for the con-
struction of a conduit in which to carry the acquired 
water from its source into the city, and it is absolutely 
impossible to acocraplish both the purchase and the 
carriage of the needed water with the sum of $850,000. 
Coming into the valley from the nearby moun-
tains on the East are the several streams known as 
Mill Creek, Big Cottonwood and Little Cottonwood, 
respectively. The water from each of these streams 
is of well known purity and is so situated that it can 
be brought into the city by gravity through works 
which wil cost infinitely less*than those needed to 
bring in an equivalent supply from any other possible 
source. But the water'from these streams has al-
ready been appropriated and is used by a large num-
ber of individuals toMrrigate a considerable ai^a of 
high-priced land that lies adjacent to the city. This 
water must therefore be acquired before its use by the 
city can be made possible. 
From careful and repeated measurements it has 
been ascertained thai the daily supply of water which 
these sources afford, in seasons of lowest flow, is as 
follows: 
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Mil Creek , . , 6,631,211 gallons 
Big Cottonwood 17,383,588 gallons 
Little Cottonwood .... 7,827,867 gallons 
Total ^ aily supply . . .32,342,666 gallons 
It is proposed to acquire the water from these 
sources and so make available for city use during 
times of lowest flow, the following daily supply of 
potable water: 
Present supply 10,004,874 gallons 
Increased supply 32,342,666 gallons 
Total daily supply.. .42,347,540 gallons 
At the estimated rate of 300 gallons daily per 
capita this would provide amply for the needs of at 
least double our present population, and so relieve 
the present unfortunate condition as well as provide 
in a reasonable measure for the future. That it is 
practicable for the city to acquire this additional 
quantity of potable water and construct a conduit for 
bringing it into the city at a cost, in money, not to ex-
ceed the.$850,000, available for water supply«pur-
poses, is shown by the following statement of facts: 
LOCATION OF NEEDS. 
Two-thirds of the land upon which this water is 
now used lies below the City's canal, and there are no 
physical difficulties in the way of irrigating these 
land£ with water from the canal. The owners of this 
land have expressed a wililngness to use water from 
the canal in lieu of their present supply from the 
mountains, and the City has taken options' for the ex-
change, in this manner, of one-half the water of Big 
Cottonwood Creek. Negotiations are pending by 
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which it is expected that practically all the waters of 
Big Cottonwood and Mill Creek will be acquired by 
exchange and lease, as well as the waters of Little 
Cottonwood, as soon as the necessities of the City 
shall require. 
The terms of exchange are practically the same 
as those relating to Parley's Creek, except that, in 
this instance, the City is to pay a bonus of ten dollars 
per acre to the farmers, and give them during the ir-
rigation season, an additional quantity of twenty-five 
per cent more canal water than it receives of moun-
tain water. These are the best terms that can now be 
made, and they do not seem unjust when the difference 
in value between the mountain waters and the waters 
from Utah Lake is considered. 
It is proposed to acquire such portions o? the 
waters of these mountain streams as are used on lands 
above the city by canal by lease, for a long term of 
years, and assurances have been given that such leases 
can be obtained at a very low rental. 
It is proposed in the options to "grant, bargain 
and sell" to the City all of the farmers7 rights to the 
perpetual use of the mountain water, unless default 
is made by the city in furnishing them the exchange 
water, and, in that event, they reserve the right to use 
the mountain water only during the time that the de-
fault continues, but there can be no forfeiture of the 
contract, unless the failure of the city to furnish the 
exchange water continues for a period of six months, 
and tlien it is optional with the fanners whether the 
contract shall be terminated or not While an abso-
lute and unconditional exchange of the waters of the 
mountain streams for the Lake water would be more 
desirable, still, the "City runs no risk of forfeiting the 
right to use the mountain water, because, by carrying 
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out the contemplated plan and making the available 
supply of water at Utah Lake absolutely certain, it 
would render any forfeiture or even default or jpter-
ruption in the use of the water practically impossible. 
The essence of the proposed exdfeange agreement lies 
in the City's ability toi&irnish a sufficient and certain 
substrfcgte for the mountain water. 
WBEAOMS BEQBIBED. 
The quantity of water that will be ultimately re-
quired, daily, for the exchange of mountain water 
will, under the plan proposed, be as follows, for a 
period of 180 days : 
For Parleys Creek 4,202,740 gallons 
For Mill Creek 6,631*211 gallons 
For Big Cottonwood 17,883,588 gallons 
For Little Cottonwood-... 7,827,867gallons 
For the 25 per cent. Bonus 8,085,666 gallons 
Total daily requirement 
for 180 days, or dur-
ing exchange period. .44,631,072 gallons 
At the lowest known stage of water which oc-
curred last year there was, at the end of the irrigation 
season, in the Utah Lake Reservoir, 143,748,000,000 
gallons of unused water. One-fifth of this quantity, 
or 28,749,600,000 gallons, the City's share of this 
stored water, is the equivalent of a daily flow of 159,-
720,000 gallons for a period of 180 days. • This, with 
the quantity which the city drew from this source the 
same season, would make the City's total daily supply 
from the Lake, in seasons of lowest flow, for a period 
of 180 days, as follpws: 
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Daily available flow - 43,560,000 gallons 
Baily unused flow 159,720,000 gallons 
Total possible daily flow.203,280,000 gallons 
or four and one-half times the ultimate daily require-
ment for exchange according to the proposed plan. 
There is no doubt that all the water necessary 
for exchange purposes can be made available from 
Utah Lake Reservoir through the installation of ad-
ditional pumps, or the rectification of the river chan-
nel, and that its certain delivery to the farmers can 
be effected by a reasonable expenditure .for repairs on 
the City Canal. 
AS TO SPRING CREEK. 
IN ADDITION TO THE PROSPECTIVE 
BIGHTS, THE CITY HAS TAKEN AN OPTION 
ON SPRING CREEK, WHICH CAN BE EXER-
CISED IF IT SHALL BE THOUGHT PRUDENT 
TO DO SO. BUT THE SPRING CREEK PROPO-
SITION IS NOT INCLUDED IN ANY OF THE 
RECOMMENDATIONS OR ESTIMATES OF 
THIS ADDRESS. 
There is nothing experimental in the plan of pro-
curing a supply of potable water for an equivalent of 
irrigation water. The City has had the use of Par-
ley's Creek water or the past fifteen years, under a 
similar plan and during that time there has not'been 
to .exceed two days of interrupted flow—no longer 
than it is often necessary to shut off the water from 
some street main to effect a needed repair. 
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The works by which it is proposed to consum-
mate the plan and the cost of such works as estimated 
by the City Engineer, are as follows: 
Conduit from Cottonwood to Parleys $.350,000.00 
Power plant at mouth of Parley's 40,000.00 
Development at Utah Lake 200,000.00 
Repairs on City Canal 20,000.00 
Improvement of distribution system 100,000.00 
Money consideration in exchange of water 50,000.00 
Extinguishment of power rights and inci-
dentals 50,000.00 
Engineering preliminaries and supervision 40,000.00 
Total estimated cost $850,000.00 
The proposed conduit will be constructed of ce-
ment concrete and be of such dimensions as will carrv 
the acquired water. It will discharge the Mill Creek 
and Cottonwood waters into Parley's Creek at an ele-
vation of 180 feet above' the intake of the Parley's 
Canyon Conduit, through which the water will be car-
ried to the city. The 180 feet of fall between the dis-
charge end of the proposed conduit and the intake of 
Parley's Canyon conduit will be utilized through the 
construction of the proposed power plant, in the pro-
duction of power for pumping sewage from the pro-
posed west side intercepting sewer up into the present 
gravity sewer. 
AT UTAH LAKE. 
The development work at Utah Lake will be of 
such character as will make certain and sufficient for 
exchange and other purposes, the supply of water 
from that source. This work may be done in con-
nection with that for which plans are now being pre-
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pared by the U.S. Reclamation Service, or independ-
ently as may be found most advantageous to the city. 
The repairs on the City oanal will, consist of such 
work as will put that channel in proper condition to 
deliver with certainty the water which will be' de-
veloped at the Lake. 
The improvement of the distribution system will 
comprise such enlargements and extensions in the 
present pipe system as will enable the proper distribu-
tion of the added water supply. The irfany considera-
tions in effecting the proposed .exchange of water will 
require 'the sum shown in the above statement. 
The cost of extinguishing the several power 
rights situated below the point of proposed diversion 
on Big Cottonwood, and for miscellaneous inciden-
tals it is estimated will require the amount placed in 
the schedule for these purposes. 
The cost of the preliminary and'supervising work 
for engineering has been estimated at five per cent 
of the cost for the entire work, which it is thought will 
be ample. 
BIGHTS AND USE. 
The City is not in a condition financially to ob-
tain an absolute title to the mountain water, because 
it is not able to purchase the water rights: If the 
City were bonded to the constitutional limit, it would 
not have sufficient money,* after constructing the con-
duit and making provision for the distribution of wa-
ter in the City, to purchase sufficient mountain water 
to materially increase the present supply. But, even 
if the City could raise the money to purchase the wa-
ter, inasmuch as it already owns a canal and valuable 
water right from the Jordan River and Utah Lake, 
would it not be a better business proposition to utilize 
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that water, for which the City has no other use, in ac-
quiring the mountain water, than to procure the same 
by purchase? There is no such thing known to the 
law as an absolute title to the water itself, but only 
to the use thereof, and, as the City will have the per-
petual right to use the water, subject only to such con-
ditions as it can control, there is but little difference 
in effect between the proposed arrangement and an 
absolute transfer to the Ciiy of the mountain water 
rights. It is believed that, when these plans are car-
ried out and the development of Utah Lake and the 
establishment of permanent irrigation works for the 
distribution of the water are completed, farmers will 
see that their supply is just as secure and satisfactory 
from the Lake as from the mountains, and then a 
mutually satisfactory arrangement «can be made by 
which the City will become the absolute owner of the 
mountain water rights. 
All questions of a legal nature which relate to the 
contracts for exchange or lease of the water, the in-
crease of an- available supply from the lake, or that 
may arise from any cause connected with the proposed 
work will be cared for by the City Attorney and able 
associate counsel who can be depended upon to pro-
tect and safeguard the interests of the City. 
CAEEPULLT PLANNED. 
The engineering work will be carefully designed 
and executed under the immediate direction*of th£ 
City Engineer who will have the aid and aiflvice of a 
competent consulting engineer. 
The making of all contracts for construction and 
the approval of all bills, estimates and other matters 
requiring the rayment of money and also the final ac-
ceptance of the work are matters which the law places 
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in the hands of the Board of Public Works, whose ac-
tions must be approved by the City Council and 
Mayor. 
These are assurances that the work will be prop-
erly designated and well constructed; that the money 
will be prudently expended and that the City's inter-
ests will be properly and full}* protected. 
THE SEWER. 
In addition to the work above described it is pro-
posed to construct an intercepting sewer for the south-
ern and western portions of the City where it is im-
perative from a sanitary view, that an effective system 
be provided for disposing of the sewage from that 
section. To accomplish this will, according to the esti-
mates of the City Engineer, require the expenditure 
of $150,000 for which provision has been made in 
the proposed bond issue. 
ADVANTAGES AMPLE. 
The advantages to be derived from a thorough and 
satisfactory solution of the water problem, the seri-
ousness of which has been increasing each year, are 
so numerous and apparent as to require no particular 
citation. Nevertheless, it may be briefly stated that 
these mean better health for the people, a lower death 
rate, more sprinkled streets, more trees, lawns and 
flowers. In short, a more beautiful city with better 
facilities to extinguish fires, a reduction in fire insur-
ance rates that will amount to many thousands of dol-
lars annually and- a restriction of water meters to 
the business and manufacturing districts. More than 
that, it means, too, that we will have more new busi-
ness blocks; and more people will come hero to invest 
their capital and start industries that will give em-
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ployment to many wage-earners, while those who are 
now residents will further improve their property. 
Manufacturing: establishments are much needed in our 
city at the present time. There will be still greater 
necessity for them in the future. If we ever have 
them we must increase our water supply and in 
achieving that result it must be known that the in-
crease is permanent, the source pure and the solution 
of the problem certain. It is highly gratifying to this 
committee to be able to state to the entire people of 
Salt Lake that the solution is certain, the source pure 
and the increase permanent. 
RICHARD P. MORRIS, Mayor. 
F. J. HEWLETT, 
F. S. FERNSTROM, 
GEO. D. DEAN, 
RULON S. WELLS, 
Special Council Committee. 
0. J. SALISBURY, 
JOHN CLARK, 
W.. MONT FERRY, 
NEPHIL. MORRIS, 
GEO. A. WH3TAKER, 
Citizens Commi.ttee. 
Passed by the City Council of Salt Lake City, 
Utah, December 12,1904, and approved by the Mayor, 
December 14,1904, as appears of record in my office. 
IN. WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set 
my hand and.affixed the corporate seal of said City, 
this 14th day of December, 1904. 
J. S. CRITCHLOW, 
City Recorder. 
In the SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH. 
ELIZABETH BRERETON, SUBSTITUTED BY 
MARY ELLEN BRERETON, EXECUTED OF 
THE ESTATE OF RICHARD BRERETON, DE-
CEASED, 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
vs. 
JAMES K. PIERPONT AND EMMA 
WATERMAN, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Appellant's Abstract 
Appeal from the Fourth District, Utah County, Utah. 
THURMAN & EVANS, 
Attorneys for Appellants. 
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Landlord and Tenant 
III. Tenancies: Creation, Characteristics, and Termination 
C. Termination of Tenancy 
5. Forfeiture of Lease 
d. Waiver of or Estoppel to Assert Forfeiture 
(1) In General 
49 Am Jur 2d Landlord and Tenant § 259 
§ 259 Application of waiver to subsequent causes of forfeiture 
As a general rule, waiver of a right of forfeiture for breach of a covenant in a lease does not operate as a waiver with 
respect to a continuance of the breach, where the breach is a continuing one, and it does not operate as a waiver of the 
right of forfeiture for a subsequent breach of the covenant, nl A lessor may demand strict compliance with the lease 
terms even though it has not done so in the past, and in demanding strict compliance with a lease the lessor may advise 
the lessee that further noncompliance will result in termination. n2 Thus, the receipt of rent by a landlord with 
knowledge of the tenant's breach of conditions in the lease does not preclude the landlord from declaring a forfeiture for 
a continuance of the cause of forfeiture after the acceptance of the rent n3 or for subsequent breaches of the covenant. 
n4 However, the landlord must give sufficient notice to the lessee of the landlord's intent to insist upon strict 
compliance with the lease terms, where such compliance has not been required in the past. n5 
On the other hand, where a covenant or condition for forfeiture is not a continuing one or is not capable of a continuing 
or a subsequent breach, a waiver of forfeiture for breach of the covenant or the happening of the condition will operate 
to prevent any future claim of forfeiture on that ground. n6 The waiver of a forfeiture by acceptance of rent applies to 
past breaches, which are single and complete when the rent is accepted, and, having been once waived, the landlord's 
rights are lost, n7 even as to known breaches occurring before the landlord acquired title. n8 
Even though a lessor has waived his or her right to forfeit the lease, the lessor is not thereby deprived of all his or her 
contractual rights under the instrument and may recover damages for the lessee's breach of covenant. n9 
FOOTNOTES: 
nl Lane v. Hognason, 13 Ariz. App. 120, 474 P.2d839 (Div. 2 1970); Knoop v. Penn Eaton Motor Oil Co., 
331 Mich. 693, 50 N. W.2d 329 (1951); Plassmeyer v. Brenta, 24 N.J. Super. 322, 94 A.2d 508 (App. Div. 1953). 
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n2 RubloffCB Machesney, LLC v. World Novelties, Inc., 363 III. App. 3d 558, 300 III. Dec. 464, 844 N.E.2d 
462 (2dDist. 2006). 
n3 Paeffv. Hawkins-Washington Realty Co., 320 Mass. 144, 67 N.E.2d 900, 166 A.L.R. 804 (1946); 
Plassmeyer v. Brenta, 24 NJ. Super. 322, 94 A.2d 508 (App. Div. 1953); Wilson v. Daniels, 31 Wash. 2d 633, 
198 P.2d 496 (1948). 
As to waiver of the right of forfeiture by the acceptance of rent, generally, see §§ 262 to 268. 
n4 Wilson v. Daniels, 31 Wash. 2d 633, 198 P.2d 496 (1948). 
n5 LaSalle Nat. Bank v. Helry Corp., 136 III. App. 3d 897, 91 III. Dec. 472, 483 N.EJd 958 (1st Dist. 1985). 
n6 Schultz v. Cardwell, 142 Wash. 489, 253 P. 822 (1927). 
n7 Plassmeyer v. Brenta, 24 N.J. Super. 322, 94 A.2d 508 (App. Div. 1953). 
As to waiver of the right of forfeiture by the acceptance of rent, generally, see §§ 262 to 268. 
n8 Plassmeyer v. Brenta, 24 NJ. Super. 322, 94 A.2d 508 (App. Div. 1953). 
n9 Woollardv. SchafferStores Co., 272NY. 304, 5 NE.2d829, 109 A.L.R. 1262 (1936). 
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0 LexisNexis* 
LEXSTAT 28 AM. JUR. 2D ESTOPPEL & WAIVER § 37 
American Jurisprudence, Second Edition 
Copyright © 2010 West Group 
Francis C. Amendola, J.D., Kimberly Castelaz, J.D., Beth Bates Holliday, J.D., Lucas Martin, J.D., and Eric Surette, 
J.D. 
Estoppel and Waiver 
Part One: Estoppel 
III. Equitable Estoppel, or Estoppel in Pais 
A. In General 
2. Comparisons and Distinctions 
28 Am Jur 2d Estoppel and Waiver §37 
§ 37 Implied waiver 
Although the dividing line between waiver and equitable estoppel is one fairly easy to recognize and preserve when it is 
an express waiver that is under consideration, n30 the line is somewhat less distinct between such an estoppel and a 
waiver implied from conduct. n31 Where an implied waiver is involved, the distinction between waiver and estoppel is 
close, and sometimes the doctrines merge into each other with almost imperceptible gradations, so that it is difficult to 
determine the exact point where one doctrine ends and the other begins. n32 It is unquestionably true that the dividing 
line between waivers implied from conduct and estoppels oftentimes becomes so shadowy that in the law of insurance, 
for instance, n33 the two terms have come to be quite commonly used interchangeably. When the term "waiver" is so 
used, however, the elements of an estoppel almost invariably appear, and it is quite apparent that it is employed to 
designate not a pure waiver, but one which has come into an existence of effectiveness through the application of the 
principles underlying estoppels. n34 Indeed, in some jurisdictions at least, the doctrine of implied waiver applies only 
to situations involving circumstances equivalent to an estoppel, and the one claiming the waiver must show that he was 
misled and prejudiced thereby in order to prevail. n35 
FOOTNOTES: 
n30 Bernhardv. Rochester German Ins Co., 79 Conn. 388, 65 A. 134 (1906). 
n31 Generally, as to waivers implied from conduct, see §§ 197 et seq. 
n32 Gould v. Transamerican Associates, 224 Md. 285, 167 A.2d 905 (1961); Milas v. Labor Ass'n of 
Wisconsin, Inc., 214 Wis. 2d 1, 571 N.W.2d 656, 156L.R.RM (BNA) 3179(1997). 
n33 
Related References: 
28 Am Jur 2d Estoppel and Waiver § 37 
Page 2 
44 Am. Jur. 2d, Insurance §§1571 et seq. 
n34 Northern Assur. Co. of London v. Grand View Bldg. Ass'n, 183 U.S. 308, 22 S. Ct. 133, 46 L. Ed. 213 
(1902); Bernhardv. Rochester German Ins. Co., 79 Conn. 388, 65 A. 134 (1906); Schindel v. Danzer, 161 Md. 
384, 157 A. 283 (1931); Mitchell v. American Mut. Ass'n, 226 Mo. App. 696, 46 S. W.2d 231 (1932); 
Homesteaders' Life Ass'n v. Holden, 288 S.W. 242 (Tex. Civ. App. El Paso 1926), writ refused, (Jan. 26, 1927). 
But see In re Millers' & Mfrs. Ins. Co., 97 Minn. 98, 106 N. W. 485 (1906), in which it was held that while many 
authorities take the view that the words "waiver" and "estoppel" lose their legal meaning as soon as they are 
invoked in cases between the parties to a contract of insurance, the Minnesota court has always recognized the 
distinction between waiver and estoppel, and holds that a waiver need not be based either upon a new agreement 
or an estoppel. 
n35 Brown v. Taylor, 120 KM. 302, 901 P.2d 720 (1995). 
REFERENCE: West's Key Number Digest, Estoppel [westkey]52(l)-52(8), 52.5, 52.10(1) 
A.L.R. Digest: Estoppel & Waiver §§ 34, 34.2, 34.4, 34.6, 34.8, 45-47 
A.L.R. Index: Equitable Estoppel; 
A.L.R. Index: Estoppel & Waiver; 
A.L.R. Index: Promissory Estoppel 
9A Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Estoppel & Waiver § 61; 
19B Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Pleadings § 143 
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IN, THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, a Utah : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
municipal corporation, 
: CASE NO. 070903735 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
: 
BIG DITCH IRRIGATION COMPANY, a 
Utah nonprofit corporation, JAMES : 
GARSIDE, J L.C., a Utah Limited 
Liability Company, RYAN LITKE, : 
LAYNE DOWNS, and JOHN DOES 1 
through 10, : 
Defendants. : 
This matter came before the Court for a hearing on October 22, 2007, 
in connection with Salt Lake City's ("the City's") Motion to Dismiss 
(seeking to dismiss Counterclaims V and VI and defendants' request for 
attorney's fees) and the defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
for Failure to State a Claim (seeking to dismiss Salt Lake City's claims 
against "all defendants other than Big Ditch Irrigation Company"). 
During the hearing, counsel stipulated to the dismissal of Counterclaim 
VI, asserting a claim under the Utah Unfair Practices Act. After counsel 
completed their oral argument, the Court took the matter under advisement 
to further consider the parties' written submissions and the relevant 
legal authority. Being now fully informed, the Court rules as stated 
herein. 
^ / i l J l J j / i iU i t i l l V . 
BIG DITCH IRRIGATION PAGE 2 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
Motion to Dismiss. 
In light of the stipulation concerning the dismissal of Counterclaim 
VI, the Court will address only the portion of the City's Motion to 
Dismiss dealing with the defendants' Counterclaim V, asserting a claim 
under the Utah Antitrust Act, and the argument that the defendants may 
not be awarded attorney fees because the City's slander of title claim 
is meritorious. 
The Utah Antitrust Act (Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-911 et. seg.) at 
Section 76-10-914 defines illegal anticompetitive activities as: 
(1) Every contract, combination in the form of trust or 
otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce is 
declared to be illegal. 
(2) It shall be unlawful for any person to monopolize, or 
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other 
person or persons to monopolize, any part of trade or 
commerce. 
Id. 
Section 76-10-915 exempts from this definition "the activities of 
a municipality to the extent authorized or directed by state law." Id. 
§ 76-10-915 (1) (f). This Section was recently discussed in the case of 
Summit Water Distribution Co. v. Summit County, 123 P.3d 437 (Utah 2005). 
In Summit Water Distribution, the Utah Supreme Court indicated that "in 
order for a party's activities to be exempt under section 76-10-915(1) (f) 
from an antitrust claim, the party must be a 'municipality' and its 
SALT LAKE CITY V. 
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activities must have been 'authorized or directed by state law."' Id. at 
442. 
In its Motion to Dismiss, the City first argues that the Antitrust 
Act is inapplicable because it does not compete with the defendants' 
activities. Utah Code Ann., § 10-7-4(1), grants Utah municipalities 
authority to acquire or purchase water, waterworks systems, etc. 
(including through condemnation proceedings). The Utah Constitution 
prohibits municipalities from voluntarily leasing, selling or disposing 
of any of their waterworks, water rights or sources of water supply. 
Under this statutory and Constitutional scheme, the City contends that 
it simply delivers water to its citizens, but does not otherwise compete 
either in the delivery or the sale of culinary water. The City argues 
that the "defendants, by contrast, have no treatment and delivery system 
and do not sell water to end users (with the exception of the delivery 
of irrigation water to shareholders within the area historically served 
by Big Ditch)." The City also argues that the defendants cannot 
complain about competition in the sale of water because the Constitution 
prohibits this. 
Alternatively, the City argues that even if it were in competition 
with the defendants, its activities as a municipality are exempt under 
Utah Code Ann., § 76-10-915(1) (f) . Specifically, the City argues that 
as a municipality, it is authorized to provide water and sewer services 
as a public utility. The City cites a number of cases which stand for 
SALT LAKE CITY V. 
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the proposition that any anticompetitive effects from such activities 
(which are expressly authorized by statute) are foreseeable and therefore 
permissible. 
The defendants, in turn, argue that the City competes "for shares 
in numerous water and irrigation companies, as well as for board 
positions in these companies." However, as the City correctly observes, 
this allegation is not found in the Counterclaim. Further, rather than 
focusing on specific instances of competition, the defendants merely 
argue that the City is interfering with its business. 
After considering the parties' respective legal positions, the Court 
concludes the City's Motion to Dismiss with respect to Counterclaim V is 
well-taken and therefore granted. Specifically, there are no allegations 
in the defendants' Counterclaim which would sustain their contention that 
the City competes with them in the same relevant marketplace for 
antitrust purposes. For instance, the City does not sell water rights 
and does not sell irrigation water to Big Ditch's customers. Big Ditch, 
in turn, has no water system by which it can distribute or sell water to 
end users. 
Further, the Court is satisfied that the City's activities are 
specifically authorized by statute or case law and that even if these 
activities could be viewed as anticompetitive, the City is exempt from 
the Utah Antitrust Act. Indeed, any anticompetitive conduct which 
results from the City providing water or sewer services as part of its 
SALT LAKE CITY V. 
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public utility function is specifically contemplated and foreseeable. 
In reaching this conclusion, the Court carefully considered the case law 
cited by the City in its supporting Memorandum, which the defendants have 
not adequately addressed or distinguished. 
Finally, the principal case relied on by the defendants, Summit 
Water Distribution, is distinguishable on several grounds, including the 
defendants' failure to allege any facts which would establish the 
existence of a "contract, combination, or conspiracy" in unreasonable 
restraint of trade. Unlike Summit Water Distribution, where there were 
specific allegations that Summit County engaged in an actual arrangement 
to gain a monopoly, the defendants here have merely alluded to the City's 
alleged interference with their business. Nowhere have the defendants 
identified specific instances where the City contracted, combined or 
conspired in restraint of trade. Nor have the defendants identified with 
whom the City acted in concert. Indeed, as the City points out, the 
defendants' allegation that the City is acting unilaterally is fatal to 
their antitrust claim. 
Based on the foregoing, the City's Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim 
V is granted. 
Next, the Court rules that it is premature for it to determine 
whether the defendants are entitled to attorney's fees under § 78-27-56. 
Such a determination would require an analysis of the City's slander of 
title claim and whether or not it is without merit or brought in bad 
SALT LAKE CITY V. 
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faith. The Court concludes that the issue of entitlement to attorney's 
fees cannot be assessed until the underlying claim is resolved. 
Therefore, the City's Motion to Dismiss as to the issue of attorney's 
fees is denied. 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment for Failure to State a Claim: 
In this Motion, the defendants argue that defendants Garside, J 
L.C., Litke and Downs (referred to in the defendants' moving papers as 
"the Shareholders"), as stockholders, officers and/or directors of Big 
Ditch are protected by the corporate-shield doctrine. The defendants 
also argue that these Shareholders uare not proper parties to [the 
City's] declaratory relief claims because [they] do not have or claim any 
interest that would be affected by a declaration." 
The Court determines that the vxShareholders," having asserted 
individual standing in bringing their Counterclaim and alleging their own 
claims of declaratory judgment and slander of title, cannot now take the 
inconsistent position that while they can advance counterclaims, the City 
cannot assert claims against them. Clearly, if the Shareholders have 
standing to assert these claims independent of Big Ditch, they can also 
be sued in their individual capacities. 
In addition, the Court determines that the defendants have simply 
not met the summary judgment standard. For instance, the defendants rely 
solely on the allegations of the City's Complaint and have provided no 
other evidence to support their Motion. 
SALT LAKE CITY V. 
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Finally, the Court concludes that defendant J L.C. is clearly a 
proper party to the City's claim for slander of title, having signed the 
change applications filed with the State Engineer. While the defendants 
suggest that in signing the change applications, defendant J L.C. was 
acting only as a shareholder of Big Ditch, they have not provided any 
evidence in support of this position. 
For all of these reasons, the Court denies the defendants' Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment. 
This Memorandum Decision will stand as the Order of the Court, 
granting the City's Motion to Dismiss in part and denying it in part and 
denying the defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
Dated this jiay of October,/2007. 
TYRONE 
DISTRI 
MEDLEY 
COURT JUDGE 
,4
 GL*^^Y-^*W ^ 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, a Utah : MINUTE ENTRY 
municipal corporation/ 
: 
Plaintiff, CASE NfO. 070903735 
vs. 
BIG DITCH IRRIGATION COMPANY, a 
Utah nonprofit corporation, JAMES : 
GARSIDE, J L-C, a Utah Limited 
Liability Company, RYAN LITKE, and : 
John Does 1 through 10, 
Defendants. 
This matter comes before the Court in connection with the following 
pending Motions, which the parties have submitted for decision: Salt 
Lake City's (the vxCity") Motion for Entry of Discovery Order; the City's 
Motion to Strike the Affidavit of James Garside, Defendants James 
Garside, J L.C. and Ryan Litke's (the "Individual Defendants") Motion to 
Strike Portions of Affidavit of Jeffry Niermeyer, and the defendants' 
Rule. 41 Motion to &i&ftd#s Aiiti-Trtf&t claims Mthoafc Prejudice; Rule 64 
Motion to Correct Memorandum Decision and Motion to Reconsider. Having 
reviewed the moving and responding memoranda concerning each of the 
foregoing Motions, the Court rules as stated herein. 
SALT LAKE CITY V. 
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The Defendants1 Rule 54 Motion to Correct Memorandum 
Decision/Rule 41 Motion to Dismiss/Motion to Reconsider 
As procedural background, the Court notes that the City previously 
filed a Motion to Dismiss as to the defendants' counterclaims alleging 
violations of the Utah Anti-Trust Act and the Utah Unfair Practices Act. 
Judge Medley granted this Motion in a Memorandum Decision, dated October 
30, 2007. The defendants move to have this Court "correct" and 
reconsider Judge Medley's decision and, by way of their Rule 41 Motion 
to Dismiss, to reinstate the antitrust counterclaim and subsequently have 
it dismissed without prejudice. 
After considering the defendants' and the City's respective legal 
positions on these three Motions, the Court determines that they are not 
well-taken and are therefore denied- Specifically, the Court is not 
convinced that there is any legal or factual basis for it to reconsider 
or otherwise correct Judge Medley's decision. Indeed, in requesting 
reconsideration of this decision, the defendants have primarily relied 
on re-arguments of points which they previously advanced iii "their 
opposition to the Oity's* Motion to 0i©mi£#
 % 
Further, the fact remains that all of the defendants, including the 
Individual Defendants, collectively advanced the antitrust counterclaim 
against the City and continued to pursue such claim, both in memoranda 
SALT LAKE CITY V. 
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opposing the City's Motion to Dismiss and at oral argument, until Judge 
Medley rendered his decision. Therefore, all of the defendants are bound 
by Judge Medley's decision to dismiss the antitrust counterclaim with 
prejudice. 
In addition, there are no legal grounds for the Court to reinstate 
previously dismissed claims, only to have the defendants voluntarily 
dismiss them. 
Overall, the Court is satisfied that Judge Medley properly dismissed 
the antitrust counterclaim as to all of the defendants with prejudice. 
Accordingly, the defendants' Rule 54 Motion to Correct Memorandum 
Decision, Rule 41 Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Reconsider are denied 
in their entirety. 
The City's Motion for Entry of Discovery Order 
The City requests that the Court enter a scheduling and discovery 
order. Apparently, counsel have held a scheduling conference, but could 
not stipulate to a Scheduling Order because the defendants have refused 
to agree to any discovery deadlines or the scheduling of depositions 
until the pending Motions are resolved. 
The Court determines that with the resolution of the foregoing three 
Motions, it is appropriate for discovery in this matter to proceed. In 
addition, the Court is satisfied that a discovery deadline is 
SALT LAKE CITY V. 
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appropriate. Accordingly, the City's Motion for Entry of Discovery Order 
is granted. 
Individual Defendants' Motion to Strike Portions of the 
Affidavit of Jeffrey Niermeyer 
Mr. Niermeyer is the Director of the Salt Lake City Department of 
Public Utilities and he has opined on a number of matters in this case, 
including the City's water deliveries both historically and those 
currently made to defendant Big Ditch Irrigation Company. The 
Individual Defendants have moved to strike Paragraphs 9, 10, 11, 12 and 
14 of Mr. Niermeyer's Affidavit on the basis that they lack foundation 
and are conclusory in nature. They also assert that since Mr. Niermeyer 
was not alive in 1905, he cannot know the facts asserted in certain of 
these paragraphs. 
The Court agrees with the City that the statements at issue are 
based on Mr. Niermeyer's expertise and institutional Jcnowledge as 
Director of the Department of Public Utilities. Moreover, Mr. Niermeyer 
can opine on historical activities even though he may not have been alive 
in 1905, J>ased on fri# review of e&i#fciag tmtex ^ tepords, summaries and 
charts dating back to this time. The Court concludes that Mr. Niermeyer 
has laid sufficient foundation for his conclusion and that the Individual 
Defendants' objections to Paragraphs 9, 10, 11, 12 and 14 are without 
SALT LAKE CITY V. 
BIG DITCH IRRIGATION PAGE 5 MINUTE ENTRY 
merit. Their Motion to Strike these Paragraphs from Mr. Niermeyer's 
Affidavit is denied. 
The City's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of James Garside 
The City has moved to strike the Affidavit of James Garside in the 
entirety on the basis that it is "rambling and conclusory" and that Mr. 
Garside has no competence to make the assertions he has made ip the 51 
paragraphs of his Affidavit. The principal basis for striking a large 
portion of Mr. Garside's Affidavit is that it pertains to the defendants' 
now-dismissed antitrust and unfair competition counterclaims. The Court 
agrees that these statements are irrelevant to the remaining issues and 
should be stricken. However the Court is not prepared to strike the 
remainder of Mr. Garside's Affidavit, but will instead consider it for 
what it is worth. Therefore, the City's Motion to Strike Mr. Garside's 
Affidavit is granted in part and denied in part. 
This Minute Entry decision will stand as the Order of the Court. 
Dated this .day of May, 2008. 
rft/jrt 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, a Utah : 
municipal corporation. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
; 
BJG DITCH IRRIGATION COMPANY, a 
Utah nonprofit corporation, JAMES : 
GARSIDE, J L.C, a Utah Limited 
Liability Company, RYAN LITKE, and : 
John Does 1 through 10, 
Defendants * 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NO. 070903735 
This matter comes before the Court in connection with defendant Big 
Ditch Irrigation Company's ("Big Ditch") Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment that Water Quantity is Fixed. The Court notes that in footnote 
1 of Salt Lake City's (the "City") Opposition to this Motion, the City 
objects to the Court's consideration of certain documents which Big Ditch 
has included witlvits moving papers. The City's position is that these 
fiiiftgg 4# feoi ?>tt&*e<it *m#tprial #r vommtimt nridtm^^ and should 
7 
therefore not be considered. Big Ditch interprets this footnote as being 
akin to a motion in limine or to strike and has therefore filed an 
Opposition to Motion to Strike Supporting Documents. The City has 
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responded with a Reply Memorandum, again asking the Court to strike the 
two supporting documents at issue. 
After considering the parties' respective arguments, the Court 
determines that the City's request, as framed in footnote 1, is not 
procedurally appropriate because it is not set forth in a separate 
motion, with a supporting memorandum. In addition, the City's request 
has no substantive merit and is based on the conclusory assertion that 
the documents are not material or competent. Given the procedural 
shortcomings of the City's request and the lack of support for its 
position, the Court denies the City's request to strike the two 
supporting documents. 
This Mitiute Entry request will stand as the Order of the Court, 
denying the Cityfs infoitel request. 
Dated this /( day of June, 2008, 
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J. Bryan Quesenberry 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY/ STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, a Utah : 
municipal corporation/ 
Plaintiff, 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NO. 070903735 
vs. 
BIO DITCH IRRIGATION COMPANY, a 
Utah nonprofit corporation/ JAMES : 
GARSIDE, J L.C, a Utah Limited 
Liability Company/ RYAN LlTKE/ and : 
John Does 1 through 10/ 
: 
Defendants. 
This matter comes before the Court in connection with defendants 
James Garside, J L.C. and Ryan Litke's (the *Individual Defendants") Rule 
56(f) Motion for Additional Time to Respond to Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. The Court notes that the Individual Defendants filed 
a combined Memorandum in opposition to the City's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on its First and Second Causes of Action and in support 6t their 
Rul£r~56(f) Mdtiofc. Th& City filed ait Opposition £o the Rul& $£{$} J-lotion 
and the Individual Defendants have now filed a final reply. Having 
reviewed the moving and responding memoranda, the Court determines that 
SALT LAKE CITY V. 
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the Individual Defendants' Motion is not well-taken and is therefore 
denied. 
Specifically, the Court determines that the Individual Defendants 
have not established a sufficient basis under Rule 56(f) to justify a 
continuance for further discovery. The Court is satisfied that the 
Individual Defendants can formulate a meaningful response to the City's 
Motion without additional discovery and, indeed, they have done so. In 
addition, much of the information which the Individual Defendants seek 
has either been produced, is in their possession, or has no direct 
relevance to the City's pending Motion. 
This Minute Entry decision will stand as the Order of the Court, 
ruling that since the Individual Defendants have failed to demonstrate 
how a continuance will aid in their ability to oppose the City's Motion, 
the Court denies their Rule 56(f) request. 
Dated this .day of June, 2008. 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this X cTday of June, 2008: 
Edwin C. Barnes 
Steven W. Clyde 
Wendy Bowden Crowther 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
201 S. Main Street, Thirteenth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Phillip E. Lowry 
Leslie W. Slaugh 
Elijah L. Milne 
Attorneys for Defendant Big Ditch Irrigation 
120 East 300 North 
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Provo, Utah 84603 
J. Bryan Quesenberry 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, a Utah : MINUTE ENTRY 
municipal corporation, 
Plaintiff, CASE NO. 070903735 
vs. 
BIG DITCH IRRIGATION COMPANY, a 
Utah nonprofit corporation, JAMES : 
GARSIDE, J L.C, a Utah Limited 
Liability Company, RYAN LITKE, and t 
John Does 1 through 10, 
Defendants. 
The Court has before it a request for decision filed by defendants 
James Garside, J L.C. and Ryan Litke (the "Individual Defendants") 
seeking a ruling on their Supplemental Motion to Compel. At the outset, 
the Court notes that the Individual Defendants' Supplemental Motion to 
Compel essentially pertains to the same types of documents that are the 
subject of the Motions for Protective Order previously filed and 
f«uWltted £or declaim by Salt Lak£ City {the MCity^) . ~ — 
The general issue presented by these various Motions is whether the 
Individual Defendants are entitled to information about the City's water 
transactions and expenditures, which the City contends is irrelevant to 
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the claims before this Court. The Individual Defendants counter that 
these documents are relevant to issues which the City has raised, 
including its detrimental reliance on the parties' alleged history of 
water use and the potential for "prejudice" it will experience if the 
Court were to upset the quantities of water delivered by the Cit^ to Big 
Ditch. 
After considering the parties' respective legal positions, the Court 
determines that the issues raised by the parties' discovery Motions may 
be resolved or at least clarified by the resolution of the City's Motion 
for Summary Judgment on its First and Second Causes of Action and the 
defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment that Water Quantity is 
Fixed* Therefore, the Court grants the City's Motions for Protective 
Order and precludes discovery of the information at issue until the 
Motions for Summary Judgment and Partial Summary Judgment can be 
considered at the upcoming hearing on July 22, 2008, and ruled upon. The 
Court reserves making a final ruling on the Individual Defendants' Motion 
to Corap&l Until tbes£ corollary Motions are resolved. 
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This Minute Entry decision will stand as the Order of the Court. 
Dated this (ST day of July, 2008. 
-2ni«f 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, a Utah 
municipal corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BIG DITCH IRRIGATION COMPANY, a 
Utah nonprofit corporation, JAMES 
GARSIDE, J L.C, a Utah Limited 
Liability Company, RYAN LITKE, and 
John Does 1 through 10, 
Defendants, 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 070903735 
This matter came before the Court for a hearing on July 22, 2008, 
in connection with Big Ditch Irrigation Company's (uBig Ditch") Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment that Water Quantity is Fixed and Salt Lake 
City Corporation's (the uCity") Motion for Summary Judgment on its First 
and Second Causes of Action. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court 
took the matter under advisement. The Court has now had an opportunity 
to again review the parties' written submissions and the relevant legal 
authority, in light of counsel's oral argument. Being now fully 
informed, the Court rules as stated herein. 
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LEGAL ANALYSIS 
It is undisputed that on June 27, 1905, the City and Big Ditch 
entered into an Agreement (the "1905 Agreement"). Paragraph 1 of the 
1905 Agreement states that "[BDIC] hereby grants, bargains and sells to 
[the City] all of the right of it, [BDIC], to the use of all of its 
portion of the water flowing in Big Cottonwood Creek, Salt Lake County, 
Utah. . . " Paragraph 2 of the 1905 Agreement provides: 
[The City], in consideration of the covenants of [Big Ditch], 
hereby agrees with [Big Ditch], that it, [the City], will 
perpetually and continuously deliver to [Big Ditch] from the 
first day of April until the first day of October of each and 
every year hereafter, for the use of [Big Ditch] , at the place 
or places hereinafter provided, a continuous stream or flow of 
water, which stream or flow of water shall be equivalent to 
seventy-one two hundredths (71/200) of the water flowing in 
said Big Cottonwood Creek as shall from time to time be 
determined by the measurements hereinafter provided for 
(provided, however, that [the City] shall never at any time be 
required to deliver to [Big Ditch] a stream or flow of water 
running more then [sic] thirty-five (35) cubic feet per 
second,) and which said water shall be suitable for the 
purposes of irrigation; and during all of the remainder of 
each and every year hereafter, [the City] agrees to deliver to 
[Big Ditch] a stream, or flow of water which shall be 
equivalent to one sixtieth (1/60) of the water flowing in said 
Big Cottonwood Creek, as shall be determined by the said 
measurement. 
The City's Motion for Summary Judgment pertains to its First and 
Second Causes of Action. The City's First Cause of Action is for 
declaratory relief as to Big Ditch and defendant J L.C. In this claim, 
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the City seeks a determination from this Court that pursuant to the 1905 
Agreement, it acquired an ownership interest in the water rights at issue 
in this case. 
The City further claims that the Third District Court in the case 
of Progress Co. v. Salt Lake City, No. 8921, confirmed the City's 
ownership interests when it issued what has been termed "the Morse 
Decree." The Morse Decree provides that "the title and right of the 
defendant, Salt Lake City, is hereby confirmed and quieted to all the 
waters of said Big Cottonwood Creek acquired by said City from the 
defendant Big Ditch Irrigation Company . . . by virtue of the said 
exchange contract dated June 27, 1905 . . . " 
In addition, the City's First Cause of Action seeks a determination 
that it has met and continues to meet its obligations to Big Ditch under 
the 1905 Agreement. The City seeks a declaration that because Big 
Ditch's contractual rights are limited to receiving irrigation water, it 
has no right to file change applications with the Utah State Engineer. 
The City's Second Cause of Action seeks declaratory relief as to the 
remaining defendants. As with the First Cause of Action, the City seeks 
a determination that the "Individual Defendants'" rights are limited and 
that they are similarly barred from seeking to alter the City's interests 
by filing change applications with the State Engineer. 
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Big Ditch's Motion for Summary Judgment seeks a determination that 
under the terms of the 1905 Agreement, the City is required to supply Big 
Ditch with a fixed amount of water each year. Big Ditch argues that the 
amount of water that the City is required to deliver is set forth in 
Paragraph 2 of the 1905 Agreement and that this Court can rule as a 
matter of law that the City is indeed required to deliver this amount to 
Big Ditch each year. Big Ditch disputes that these amounts were intended 
to gradually diminish. 
The City counters that the parties' intentions were that the City's 
obligations would be restricted to providing irrigation water for 
irrigable land. The City argues that these intentions are confirmed by 
a course of conduct over an extensive period of time, resulting in the 
City providing a diminishing amount of water to Big Ditch as its 
irrigation demands declined. 
In support of its position, the City submits the Affidavit of Mr. 
Niermeyer, the Director of the City's Department of Public Utilities. 
Mr. Niermeyer indicates that the water delivered by the City to Big Ditch 
has historically been used for irrigation purposes only. Mr. Niermeyer 
further attests that the amount of water delivered to Big Ditch over the 
years has gradually decreased "with the increasing urbanization . . ." 
Niermeyer Aff. at para. 10. 
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After considering the parties' respective legal positions, the Court 
first determines that the 1905 Agreement is not ambiguous. Further, 
although the 1905 Agreement does not contain a specific "integration" 
clause, the undisputed facts demonstrate that it was a final and complete 
expression of the City's and Big Ditch's agreement. Tangren Family Trust 
v. Tangren, 182 P.3d 326, 330 (Utah 2008) . Where the 1905 Agreement is 
unambiguous and constitutes an integrated agreement, the Court must 
interpret it on its face, without considering parol evidence such as 
course of conduct and prior dealings. 
Next, the Court determines that the City's interpretation of the 
1905 Agreement is incorrect. Specifically, while the 1905 Agreement 
mentions that the water to be provided is to be "suitable for the 
purposes of irrigation," the Court is not persuaded that the inclusion 
of this language acts as a limitation on the nature of the use of the 
water or the place of use. Indeed, to interpret this language otherwise 
would essentially render Paragraph 2 of the 1905 Agreement meaningless. 
Giving full meaning to all of the parts of the 1905 Agreement, the Court 
must conclude that the City is required to deliver the amounts of water 
stated in Paragraph 2 of the 1905 Agreement to Big Ditch. Therefore, Big 
Ditch's Motion for Summary Judgment on this point is granted. The Court 
denies the City's Motion to the extent that it seeks a determination that 
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its contractual obligations are diminishing and require only the delivery 
of sufficient irrigation water to supply the Big Ditch shareholders whose 
lands are irrigated from the Big Ditch system. 
It is important to make clear at this juncture what the Court is not 
deciding. First, the Court is not deciding whether Big Ditch has 
reversionary rights under Paragraph 9 of the 1905 Agreement. In 
addition, the Court does not determine whether the City has failed in its 
historical delivery of water to Big Ditch or whether Big Ditch acquiesced 
in the diminishing quantities of water being delivered. These issues, 
as well as the issues surrounding whether a modification or amendment of 
the 1905 Agreement occurred, are factual ones and cannot be determined 
on summary judgment. 
Next, the Court does not reach the issue of whether Big Ditch's 
system is capable of receiving and distributing the amount of flow 
provided for under the 1905 Agreement or whether it can beneficially use 
this water. As a corollary, the City asserts that it has beneficially 
used the excess water and has relied on the parties' course of dealing, 
including in its allocation of water resources and in making capital 
expenditures. These issues are tangential, in dispute and would require 
the Court to impermissibly delve into and weigh evidence. 
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The Court next turns to the principal issue presented by the City's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, whether it is the owner of the water rights 
in question. The Court determines that the Morse Decree is controlling 
to this issue. The Fifth Paragraph of the Decree confirms that the 
City's title to these water rights was quieted in that underlying action. 
The Decree also confirms that these rights were acquired by virtue of the 
1905 Agreement. Accordingly, the City is entitled to the declaratory 
relief requested in its First Cause of Action that the water rights at 
issue belong to the City and not to Big Ditch. The Court reserves the 
issues surrounding the propriety of the filing of change applications 
with the State Engineer for the upcoming hearing on Big Ditch's Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment regarding slander of title. 
Finally, the Court addresses the parties' outstanding discovery 
Motions, which were previously submitted for decision. Before the Court 
are the Individual Defendants' Motions to Compel and the City's Motions 
for Protective Order. As the Court noted in its recent Minute Entry 
decision, the primary issue presented by these Motions is whether the 
Individual Defendants are entitled to information about the City's water 
transactions and expenditures. In light of the Court's ruling above and 
given that the City has specifically raised the issue of detrimental 
reliance, the Court determines that the information sought by the 
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Individual Defendants should be produced. At the same time, the Court 
is not interested in meaningless discovery and fishing expeditions. 
Therefore, if the City believes that the Individucil Defendants are 
overreaching, it can seek a protective order on a situational basis. 
This Memorandum Decision will stand as the Order of the Court. 
Dated this ^ day of August, 2008. 
ROBIN W. REESE 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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BIG DITCH IRRIGATION COMPANY, a 
Utah nonprofit corporation, JAMES : 
GARSIDE, J L.C, a Utah Limited 
Liability Company, RYAN LITKE, and : 
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: 
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This matter came before the Court for a hearing on September 15, 
2008, in connection with Big Ditch Irrigation Company's ("Big Ditch'') 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re Slander. The Court notes that 
defendant J L.C. filed a similcir Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on 
Salt Lake City's (the "City") slander of title cause of action against 
it. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court took the matter under 
advisement. The Court has now had an opportunity to review the parties' 
written submissions, the relevant legal authority and, has again 
considered counsel's oral argument. Being now fully informed, the Court 
rules as stated herein. 
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LEGAL ANALYSIS 
The primary issue before this Court is whether Big Ditch's actions 
of first obtaining water right file numbers and then in filing change 
applications with the State Engineer provide the basis for the City to 
assert a slander of title cause of action. The City maintains that Big 
Ditch's actions in this regard (and J L.C.'s joinder in Big Ditch's 
actions) represented claims of ownership over the City's water and an 
entitlement to file change applications thereon. The City further 
contends that Big Ditch also published its ownership claims to third 
parties. 
Big Ditch counters that even if the City owns the water rights at 
issue, it is'contractually entitled to the beneficial use of a portion 
of those waters and, under Utah Code Ann., § 73-3-3, is therefore 
expressly permitted to file change applications seeking to make permanent 
or temporary changes with respect to such water use. Alternatively, Big 
Ditch argues that the act of filing a change application and the 
representations made therein are absolutely privileged. 
The Court's review of Utah case law on slander of title reveals that 
the fundamental element for sustaining such an action is the 
disparagement of another's title by the assertion of ownership. See Jack 
B. Parsons Cos. v. Nield, 751 P.2d 1131 (Utah 1988). At the heart of the 
City's slander of title action is the premise that in change applications 
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t32290, a31743 and a31965, Big Ditch and J L.C. claimed to be the owner 
of the respective water rights. 
Having carefully reviewed the change applications at issue, which 
were attached to Big Ditch's Motion, the Court determines that the City's 
characterization of these documents is incorrect. Specifically, it does 
not appear to the Court that in filing these applications, Big Ditch or 
J L.C. were representing themselves to be the owners of the underlying 
water rights. Rather, the applications confirm that Big Ditch was 
instead claiming a contractual right to the beneficial use of the water. 
For instance, the "source" of the water in these applications is 
identified as u[c]ontract water in the BDIC carrier system." Application 
t32290 also indicates: "This water right is based on the contract between 
Salt Lake City and Big Ditch Irrigation Company (BDIC) dated June 27, 
1906." Application a31743 indicates: "This application is based on 
BDIC's right to use water granted under that certain contract with Salt 
Lake City . . .and not upon BDIC s original water right . . . " Further, 
the State Engineer's Order and the correspondence from the Regional 
Engineer suggest to the Court that in reviewing Big Ditch's change 
applications, the State Engineer acknowledged and understood that the 
City maintained ownership of the water rights at issue and that Big Ditch 
was merely asserting contract rights to the use of the water. Based on 
its review of these documents and in light of the parties' respective 
legal positions, the Court is not persuaded that Big Ditch (or, by 
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extension, J L.C.) was asserting an ownership interest in the City's 
water rights by the mere filing of the change applications. 
Next, the Court determines that in seeking the assignment of water 
right numbers by the State Division of Water Rights, Big Ditch did not 
disparage the City's title to those water rights. Rather, this was 
simply a procedural precursor to the filing of the change applications 
and the Court does not view the assignment of such numbers as an 
"'acknowledgment" by the State Engineer of a claim of ownership by Big 
Ditch. To the contrary, when viewing Big Ditch's application process in 
its entirety, it appears that the State Engineer continually recognized 
the City's title and that Big Ditch was asserting an entitlement to use 
these waters under the parties' contract. 
The City's final argument is that Big Ditch made assertions of 
ownership to various duck clubs when it indicated that it was authorized 
to file change applications. While the City asserts this argument 
primarily in the context of privilege and excessive publication, the 
Court will nevertheless address this point because it bears on the issue 
of whether Big Ditch asserted ownership of the City's water rights. At 
issue is a duck club agreement (which has been provided to the Court in 
multiple copy forms presumably because of counterpart signatures) between 
Big Ditch and the various duck clubs memorializing n[t]hat Big Ditch 
Irrigation Company is authorized to file change applications for the use 
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of their water to irrigate the lands owned by the duck clubs listed 
below." 
The Court determines that Big Ditch's statement concerning authority 
to file a change application does not translate into an assertion of 
ownership of the underlying water right. Indeed, when considering the 
duck club agreement against the backdrop of the change applications, it 
becomes clear that Big Ditch's assertion that it has authority to file 
change applications is premised on its contractual right to the 
beneficial use of water rather than an outright ownership interest in the 
water right itself. 
Further, Utah Code Ann., § 73-3-3(2)(a) specifically authorizes 
those who are entitled to use water to file change applications. The 
City's argument that only an owner can file a change application is based 
on a narrow reading of § 73-3-3, which specifically deals with the 
concept of use, rather than ownership.1 The Court concludes that the duck 
club agreement does not constitute an assertion of ownership by Big Ditch 
and does not disparage the City's title to the underlying water rights. 
1
 It should be noted that the Court is dealing with the narrow issue of whether Big Ditch 
could indicate to the duck clubs that it was "authorized" to file a change application without 
slandering the City's title. While it appears that under § 73-3-3, Big Ditch would be authorized 
to merely file a change application based on its contractual rights to beneficial use of water, the 
Court does not opine on whether Big Ditch could actually effectuate a change without Salt Lake 
City's consent or endorsement. That issue is not before the Court. 
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Based on the foregoing, the Court determines that the City's slander 
of title claim fails as a matter of law as to both Big Ditch and J L.C. 
Therefore, the Court does not reach the issue of whether the State 
Engineer's consideration of a change application is an administrative or 
judicial function, such that privilege would apply to proceedings before 
the State Engineer. 
This Minute Entry decision will stand as the Order of the Court, 
granting Big Ditch's and J L.C-'s Motions for Partial Summary Judgment. 
Dated this K-J ^  day of September, 2008. 
ROBIN W. REESE 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, a Utah : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
municipal corporation. 
Plaintiff, CASE NO. 070903735 
vs. 
BIG DITCH IRRIGATION COMPANY, a 
Utah nonprofit corporation, JAMES : 
GARSIDE, J L.C, a Utah Limited 
Liability Company, RYAN LITKE, and : 
John Does 1 through 10, 
Defendants. 
This matter came before the Court for a hearing on October 9, 2008, 
in connection with Big Ditch Irrigation Company's ("Big Ditch") Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment on Title and Exchange Rights. At the 
conclusion of the hearing, the Court took the matter under advisement, 
along with the currently pending Motion for Leave to File Supplemental 
Affidavit of Ronald K. Christensen. The Court now rules as stated 
herein. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
Big Ditch's Motion seeks partial summary judgment that under the 
parties' "1905 Agreement," the subsequent Morse Decree and based on the 
City's practices, the City acquired from Big Ditch a right to use the 
water flowing from Big Cottonwood Creek, rather than title to this water. 
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As a corollary, Big Ditch seeks partial summary judgment that the City 
is judicially estopped from now claiming ownership over this water. 
In light of the Court's prior Memorandum Decision, the issue of 
whether the City acquired title to, as opposed to the right to use, the 
water from Big Cottonwood Creek has now been resolved. Therefore, the 
bulk of the issues raised in Big Ditch's Motion are moot. However, the 
Court notes that Big Ditch has filed a separate Motion asking this Court 
to reconsider its decision on title. Although the Court can see no basis 
for reconsideration, it will reserve making a final determination pending 
the completion of briefing and the submission of Big Ditch's Motion for 
Reconsideration for decision. 
That brings the Court to the remaining issue which counsel for Big 
Ditch focused on during the oral argument. Specifically, the issue is 
whether, pursuant to the 1905 Agreement, Big Ditch acquired not merely 
a contractual commitment from the City to a fixed amount of water, but 
actually title to that water. According to Big Ditch, if the Court's 
ruling on title stands, the 1905 Agreement should be interpreted as an 
exchange of titles, with the City acquiring title to Big Cottonwood Creek 
from Big Ditch and Big Ditch acquiring title to the exchange waters. 
Having carefully considered the parties' positions on this issue, 
the Court determines, consistent with its prior rulings, that Big Ditch 
acquired a contractual right to the delivery of the amounts of water 
stated in Paragraph 2 of the parties' 1905 Agreement. The Court does not 
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interpret the 1905 Agreement as elevating Big Ditch's contractual right 
to an outright conveyance of title to the exchange waters. Indeed, as 
counsel for the City pointed out, Big Ditch lacks the fundamental 
attributes of ownership over the exchange waters primarily because the 
City retains the right to designate the source of the water to be 
delivered from a combination of sources. The Court is not persuaded by 
Big Ditch's logic that there is a symmetry to the 1905 Agreement or that 
the parties to the Agreement must have exchanged identical interests. 
In this regard, the City has the better reasoned position that an 
exchange did occur, with the City receiving title to the Big Cottonwood 
Creek water and Big Ditch receiving cash and the annual delivery of the 
amount of water specified in Paragraph 2 of the 1905 Agreement. 
Accordingly, Big Ditch's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is denied, 
with the Court reserving the issue of reconsideration of the ruling 
concerning title. 
Finally, the Court turns to Big Ditch's Motion for Leave to File 
Supplemental Affidavit of Ronald K. Christensen. Given the already 
voluminous amount of documents submitted in this case, the Court 
determines that a supplementation of Mr. Christensen's Affidavit is 
unnecessary and unhelpful. As Big Ditch recognizes, there is no 
procedural mechanism for supplementing Affidavits and the Court sees no 
procedural reason why supplementation should be permitted under these 
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circumstances. Therefore, Big Ditch's Motion for Leave to File 
Supplemental Affidavit is denied. 
This Memorandum Decision will stand as the Order of the Court. 
Dated this day of October, 2008. 
ROBIN W. REESE 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
SALT LAKE CITY V. 
BIG DITCH IRRIGATION PAGE 5 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this_ PI _day of 
October, 2008: 
Edwin C. Barnes 
Steven W. Clyde 
Wendy Bowden Crowther 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
201 S. Main Street, Thirteenth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Phillip E. Lowry 
Leslie W. Slaugh 
Elijah L. Milne 
Attorneys for Defendant Big Ditch Irrigation 
120 East 300 North 
P.O. Box 1248 
Provo, Utah 84603 
J. Bryan Quesenberry 
Attorney for Defendants J L.C., and Litke 
4844 North 300 West, Suite 300 
Provo, Utah 84604 
FILED 0SSTH1CT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
NOV 1 8 .T08 
By ' ' ' 
Deputy Clerk 
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municipal corporation, 
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BIG DITCH IRRIGATION COMPANY, a 
Utah nonprofit corporation, JAMES : 
GARSIDE, J L.C, a Utah Limited 
Liability Company, RYAN LITKE, and : 
John Does 1 through 10, 
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Defendants. 
This matter comes before the Court in connection with two pending 
Motions: Big Ditch Irrigation Company's ("Big Ditch") Motion to File 
Second Amended Counterclaim and Motion to Reconsider Re Title. Having 
reviewed the parties' written submissions regarding each of these 
Motions, the Court rules as stated herein. 
The Court first addresses Big Ditch's Motion to File Second Amended 
Counterclaim. It appears that this Motion was filed in conjunction with 
a Motion to Reconsider, which has since been denied, and similarly 
attempts to revive an antitrust claim previously dismissed with 
prejudice. Additional proposed amendments include claims that were 
previously withdrawn and are now being reasserted and an expansion of 
claims that may now be inconsistent with the series of rulings that the 
SALT LAKE CITY V. 
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Court has made in the nearly one-year time period since Big Ditch 
originally brought its Motion to File. Further, with respect to certain 
of the proposed new claims, Big Ditch has not provided an adequate 
explanation as to why these claims were not asserted in the first place. 
Finally and perhaps more fundamentally, a number of the proposed 
amendments are stale and, in light of the Court's recent rulings, would 
be subject to dismissal if the Court were to permit Big Ditch to assert 
them. The Court therefore denies the Motion to File in its present form. 
The Court next turns to Big Ditch's Motion to Reconsider which 
challenges the merits of the Court's decision regarding title. The Court 
determines that in moving for reconsideration of this decision, Big Ditch 
is primarily re-arguing points previously addressed by the Court. 
Further, with respect to the issue of the consideration of extrinsic 
evidence, Big Ditch is now taking positions which are contrary to the 
positions taken in Motions that it filed before the Court and which its 
counsel advocated during oral argument. In fact, as Salt Lake City 
points out, Big Ditch's argument concerning extrinsic evidence is 
internally inconsistent because Big Ditch is not seeking reconsideration 
of those portions of the Memorandum Decision where the Court ruled in its 
favor on the partial basis that the 1905 Agreement was an unambiguous, 
integrated contract which the Court was required to consider without 
resorting to extrinsic evidence. 
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Overall, the Court is not convinced that there is newly discovered 
evidence or any other factual or legal grounds for it to reconsider its 
decision concerning title. Big Ditch's Motion to Reconsider is therefore 
denied. 
This Minute Entry decision will stand as the Order of the Court. 
Dated this ( ' day of November, 2008. 
fU&.«-% ^tsA*^ 
ROBIN W. REESE 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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Utah nonprofit corporation, JAMES ; 
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Defendants. 
The Court has before it a request for decision filed by the Big 
Ditch Irrigation Company ("Big Ditch") seeking a ruling on its Motion to 
Compel Mediation. Having reviewed the moving an# respondinq Memoranda 
concerning Big Ditch's Motion, the Court is not persuaded that compulsory 
mediation would be beneficial at this stage in the Mtigation, 
particularly where Salt Lake City (the wCity") resists mediation. After 
the parties "have had an opportunity to con^plete discovery a&&J;fi±3i matter 
i$ dqm -fecf1 bni^BMSStiffSI^ #<*£ fcrial. ,t&e Court timlfemiWmmyR&Q' 
*$gaisi co&si&disri^ should iM compelled. wu£a®®m^4M%my 
&e that the City's initial jres&rvatiohs will dissipate a$ discovery 
progresses and there may be a greater willingness on the part of the City 
to explore mediation as a viable option. Given the relatively narrow 
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issues remaining in this case, the Court views mediation, with the 
assistance of a skilled mediator, as potentially advantageous to both 
sides. At this juncture, however, Big Ditch's Motion is premature and 
is therefore denied. 
This Minute Entry decision will stand as the Order of the Court. 
Dated this / *-- day of December, 2008. 
ROBIN W. REESE 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, a Utah : MINUTE ENTRY 
municipal corporation, 
Plaintiff, CASE NO. 070903735 
vs. 
BIG DITCH IRRIGATION COMPANY, a 
Utah nonprofit corporation, JAMfiS * 
GARSIDE, J L.C, a Utah Limited 
Liability Company, RYAN LITKE, and : 
John Does 1 through 10, 
: 
Defendants. 
This matter comes before the Court in connection with Salt Lake 
City's Motion for Summary Judgment; the "Shareholder Defendants'" Motion 
for Summary Judgment and Big Ditch Irrigation Company's Motion for 
Summary Judgment Regarding Estoppel and Modification. It appears that 
the briefing on these Motions is nearly complete. The Court has had an 
opportunity to review the Memoranda that have been filed thus far. The 
Court now requests that the plasties submit very brief Memoranda outlining 
Spec %im Court & &#scri^fci<m of ^ t ^ j&i^ roif istofc A&#ues, from each pas&v'^ sr 
standpoint, rhat repsain ^&tiam& itf llghtT of the Moti&ftS v K M « r 
heretofore. Counsel should submit such Memoranda within five (5) days 
of this Minute Entry decision. 
»0URT 
"'strict 
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This Minute Entry decision will stand as the Order of the Court. 
Dated this J^-7 day of February, 2009. 
ROBIN W. REESE 
DISTRICT COURT 
M&GiwiKSCr COURT 
Third Judicial District 
MAR 2 0 2009 
Sntl LMKb BOUNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, a Utah : MINUTE ENTRY 
municipal corporation, 
« 
Plaintiff, CASE NO. 070903735 
t 
vs. 
s 
BIG DITCH IRRIGATION COMPANY, a 
Utah nonprofit corporation, JAMES i 
GARSIDE, J L.C, a Utah Limited 
Liability Company, RYAN LITKE, and t 
John Does 1 through 10, 
Defendants. 
The Court has before it a request for decision filed by Big Ditch 
Irrigation Company ("Big Ditch") seeking a ruling on its Motion to Strike 
Statements and Objections Made in the City's Opposition Memorandum. 
The Court notes that although recently submitted for decision, Big 
Ditch's Motion to Strike was originally filed on June 6, 2008, in 
response to Salt Lake City's (the "City") Opposition to the then-pending 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Title and Exchange Rights. The 
Court considered the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at a heariiig 
mi&'~&~*M*NMt'''9, 2008* jt&d 6i&*egb*ktXy ruled on fcltff - Mtftlon is a 
Memorandum Decision, dated October 27, 2008. 
Since the Court has now ruled on the Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment, Big Ditch's Motion to Strike is moot. Nevertheless, having 
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reviewed the Motion to Strike, the Court determines that aside from being 
rendered moot, the Motion has no substantive merit. The City's 
references to the individual defendants as Speculators" and its 
attachment of e-mail exhibits had no bearing on this Court's decision 
with respect to the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Further, the 
Court is not persuaded that there was any basis to strike the City's 
factual statements. In addition, to the extent that Big Ditch believed 
that the City injected arguments in its recitation of the facts, it had 
the opportunity to address the same by way of its Reply Memorandum to the 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Accordingly, the Court denies Big 
Ditch's Motion to Strike both on procedural and substantive grounds. 
This Minute Entry decision will stand as the Order of the Court. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, a Utah : 
municipal corporation, 
* 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BIG DITCH IRRIGATION COMPANY, a 
Utah nonprofit corporation, JAMES 5 
GARSIDE, J L.C, a Utah Limited 
Liability Company, RYAN LITKE, and : 
John Does 1 through 10, 
t 
Defendants. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NO. 070903735 
The Court ha& before it Big Ditch Irrigation Company's (*Big Ditch") 
Motion in Limine to Exclude the Affidavit of Jeffry Niermeyer. The Court 
notes that procedurally, Big Ditch's Motion is essentially a request that 
the Court 'strike Mr. Niermeyer'& Affidavit. It appears th&t Big Ditch 
has brought a Mtf^ ion in Limine instead of a Motion to Strike because Mr. 
Niermeyer's second Affidavit had not yet been filed. 
After considerinq Big Ditch's Motiox* and S^lt Lake City'p (th$ 
^CitY* L &3MKIfc&to6L thereto, the Court 4efeft2a&i&*0 that fehe„&old^B.i-a MQ£, 
'-«B»"^ aJ:«fl &S3 isf^therefor^^d^i^d^" fn^«S/"t:fee marj^ifi^'^&i^Bit-ehr*^ 
current argument-S are no different than the arguments which the Court 
previously rejected when it reviewed Big Ditch's Motion to Strike Mr. 
Niermeyer's first Affidavit. See Minute Entry decision, dated May 30, 
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2008. The Court remains satisfied that Mr. Niermeyer has provided 
sufficient foundation for his statements and can attest to matters 
relating to this case because of his knowledge as an engineer and as an 
employee and, subsequently, Director of the Department of Public 
Utilities. Further, the Court determines that the scope of Mr. 
Niermeyer's Affidavit need not be limited to issues that are presently 
pending. Accordingly, Big Ditch's Motion in Limine is denied. 
This Minute Entry decision will stand a^roe Ord^^pf the Court;. 
Dated this 3 I day of March, 2009. 
RQBIN W. REEB^ f' ^ 
DISTRICT COURT*" 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 070903735 
This matter came before the Court for a hearing on May 21, 2009, in 
connection with the following Motions; Salt Lake City's (the "City") 
Motion for Summary Judgment; defendants James Garside, J L-C. and Ryan 
"Litke's (the "Shareholder defendants'") Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Big Ditch Irrigation Company's ("Big Ditch") Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment Re Estoppel & Modification, At the conclusion of the hearing, 
the Court took tt^ e matter under advisement to further consider the 
parties' respective legal positions, the relevant legal authority and 
•daufi&ei' s-arai &t$$$fcnt- B^ in«* now fully-i^f^rmed, &h&^&®&ith rules' k& 
stated herein. 
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LEGAL ANALYSIS 
At the outset, the Court notes that the various Motions before it 
are overlapping in nature. The Court begins its analysis with the City's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. There are two key issues presented by this 
Motion: Whether the City continues to have the obligation to deliver 
the amount of water originally provided for in the 1905 Agreement and 
whether Big Ditch's contractual right to receive water from the City 
permits it to effectuate a change in the City's water rights by 
unilaterally filing change applications. 
As to the first issue, the City takes the position that its 
contractual obligations under the X905 Agreement must be judged by the 
parties' conduct subsequent to entering into this Agreement. The City 
presents evidence, which Big Ditch has not refuted, that demonstrates a 
historical reduction in the amount of water which Big Ditch obtained from 
the City. The City emphasizes that this historical reduction is 
Consistent over the years and is the result of Big Ditch voluntarily 
taking a diminishing quantity of water. 'Further, the Affidavits 
submitted by the City outline its reliance upon this historical reduction 
in lfc$ $lm$Mn$ ahd its ^>rpenditu£ree- Aaqor#ng to the City, this 
evidence supports the legal conclusion that a modification of the 1SG5 
Agreement has occurred* Alternatively, the City invokes the principles 
of equitable estoppel and waiver. Based on these principles, the City 
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seeks summary judgment on its claim that Big Ditch can no longer seek the 
full amounts of water under the 1905 agreement. 
Big Ditch's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment challenges the 
City's reliance on estoppel and modification principles. Big Ditch first 
argues that the City's modification claims are barred by the statute of 
frauds. With respect to estoppel, Big Ditch appears to argue thctt the 
City cannot meet the reliance element because it relied not on Big 
Ditch's conduct, but rather on its own legal interpretation that there 
was a diminishing legal obligation under the 1905 Agreement, an 
interpretation which this Court previously rejected based on the four-
corners of that Agreement. Big Ditch argues that legal uncertainty does 
not equate to estoppel. 
After carefully considering these positions, the Court determines 
that the principles of equitable estoppel and modification apply to bar 
Big Ditch from demanding the full amount of water under the 1905 
Agreement. With respect to equitable estoppel, the uncontroverted 
evidence establishes that the City relied upon decades of conduct where 
Big Ditch consistently nought decreasing amount*? &£ water- During this 
same
 rcxme period, it fftay be tkvafa th# City 'reached certain l^^l 
conclusions concerning its obligations to Big* Dteen unaer the 1905 
Agreement. However, the Court concludes that the City's legal 
interpretations played a minor role in terms of reliance and that the 
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overriding factor is the City's reliance on Big Ditch's conduct in 
historically seeking decreasing amounts of water. 
Further, the uncontroverted facts in the record demonstrate that 
virtually all of the City's planning with respect to its water resources, 
its changes in infrastructure and its dealings with others in trading 
irrigation rights for culinary water rights have been predicated on the 
reduction in the amount of water taken by Big Ditch. Accordingly, the 
Court rules that the City has established the element of reliance and 
that Big Ditch is estopped from making claims for amounts of water in 
contradiction of its longstanding pattern of conduct. 
In addition, the Court rules that there has been a modification of 
the parties7 1905 Agreement both with respect to the City's contractual 
obligations to deliver certain levels of water under the Agreement and 
in relation to Big Ditch's and its shareholder's historical beneficial 
use of the water for irrigation purposes. As to the latter, the Court 
notes that it previously ruled that based on the four-corners of the 1905 
Agreement, there was no limitation as to the nature of the use of the 
w&ter to be provided to Big Ditch nor its place of use. However, tb6 
,
^a^%3^JS^9A wiU&ism before t!$e CtMXt BUppqttB fch&tr the p&xtlkB. kfyf»" 
and"Intended that the water delivfcjfed toy the City to Big Ditch Vould be 
used for irrigation purpose, on lands servecf by the Big Ditch system, and 
that the City's contractual obligations would diminish as the irrigable 
lands diminished. This historical conduct clearly demonstrates that the 
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parties modified or amended the terms of the 1905 Agreement in this 
regard. 
Further, consistent with the Court's analysis above, the statute of 
frauds does not preclude the City from relying on modification because 
Big Ditch is estopped from asserting the statute of frauds to the 
parties' modification of the 1905 Agreement. As the City points out, 
there are a number of legal authorities in Utah which support the 
principle that estoppel can function as a shield to esto£ a party from 
raising the statute of frauds where the other party has changed its 
position by performing an unwritten modification after the first party 
*has induced or consented to the former going forward." Bamberger Co. v. 
Certified Prods., Inc., 48 P.2d 489, 492 (Utah 1935). As indicated in 
Bamberger: 
Sometimes the resulting disability has been characterized as 
ah estoppel, sometimes as a waiver. . . . We need not go into 
the accuracy of the description. . . . The truth is that we 
are facing a principle more nearly ultimate than either waiver 
or estoppel, erne with roots in the yet larger principle that 
no one shall be permitted to found any claim upon his own 
inequity or take advantage of his own wrong. . . . The statute 
Of frauds was not intended to offer an asylum of escape from 
that": fundamental nrin^iple of justice. 
Because the Court determines that Big Ditch is estopped from 
asserting the statute of frauds, the Court need not delve into whether 
the doctrine of part performance and the exclusively referable 
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requirement has been satisfied. Accordingly, based on direct and 
uncont rover ted evidence that the City and Big Ditch modified the 1905 
Agreement and then acted in conformity with that modification, combined 
with the evidence of the City's reliance, the Court rules that the 
Agreement has been modified with respect to both delivery obligations and 
nature and place of use of the water.1 
As a corollary, the Court rules that since the amount of water taken 
each year and beneficially used by Big Ditch was determined by Big Ditch 
and not the City, there has not been a breach of the 1905 Agreement and 
therefore no basis to support a reversion back to Big Ditch. Therefore, 
the City's Motion for Summary Judgment on these points is granted and Big 
Ditch's Counter-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is denied. 
Next/ the Court addresses the issue of whether Big Ditch could 
effectuate a change in the essential attributes of the water rights 
delivered to it by the City by unilaterally filing change applications. 
It must be recognized that there is a spectrum of rights in relation to 
water and that Big Ditch's contractual right to receive and beneficially 
use water Sails along that spectrum at a poiut that is uhigue ^  and 
1
 While the Court makes the general determination that the City's delivery obligations 
have been modified, the Court has not been asked and does not decide the more specific question 
of the precise amount of water which the City is now obligated to deliver. It does not appear to 
the Court that this specific issue was the subject of the pleadings. 
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water at their home. At the same time, however, consistent with its 
prior rulings, the Court reiterates that Big Ditch's contractual rights 
are not equivalent to water rights and that in fact it is the City who 
owns these rights. 
Further, the Court previously noted that Utah Code Ann., § 73-3-
3(2)(a), authorizes those who are entitled to use water to file change 
applications, At that time, the Court indicated that while it appeared 
that Big Ditch could file a change application without slandering the 
City's title, it specifically reserved the issue of whether Big Ditch 
could actually effectuate a change without Salt Lake City's consent or 
endorsement. 
Having now had the opportunity to review the case of East Jordan 
Irrigation Co. v. Morgan, 860 P.2d 310 (Utah 1993)/ the Court determines 
that the notion of water usage, as referenced in Utah Code Ann., § 73-3-
3, must be considered in the context of whether that right to use is 
accotnpanied by other fundamental attributes of water rights, such that 
the user (and therefore the applicant) is an wappropriator" or owner of 
the water right. Likewise, in Frisbrev v. Bloominaton Water Co., 82 P.3d 
Uliar?H£&h ZQQ3), tl&rtjt&h Sap££i^ Court eo&ftw«Sf ZhaX g&# authority to 
fil#W>ohange application rests with the appropriator and that a m$te 
right to use is not sufficient. 
Ba£ed on this legal authority, the Court is persuaded by the City's 
position that the ability to file change applications and, more 
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importantly, to effectuate a change to essential attributes of water 
rights belongs exclusively to the owner of those rights, the City. The 
Court agrees that Big Ditch's contractual right to the delivery of water 
is not sufficient to grant it authority to modify or make changes m the 
attributes of City's water rights. It follows logically that since Big 
Ditch has no such authority, its shareholders similarly have no right to 
file change applications either directly or by compelling Big Ditch to 
do so. Accordingly, the Court grants the City's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on these issues. 
The City's next set of arguments pertain to the Shareholder 
defendants, who have brought their own Motion for Summary Judgment, The 
Shareholder defendants appear to argue that since they concede that they 
have no right to file change applications, there is no basis to force 
their "participation" in this lawsuit. Relying in part on the 
Shareholder defendants' concession, the City, in turn, seeks summary 
judgment on its claims against them. 
The Court determines that the City has asserted valid claims against 
the Shareholder defendants and that their concession regarding th^ir lack 
&f ^ fchftSrity to 2&1&'£&ax!tge applications in nofe a fe^is for <51pB*is&i$g 
tflfctt'ffroh this l&wsttit. To the contrary, the City is Correct that this 
concession provides the basis for granting the City sunanary judgment on 
its First and Second Causes of Action seeking declaratory judgment that 
the defendants, including the Shareholder defendants, have no right to 
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file change applications with regard to the City's water rights either 
directly with the State Engineer or by request made to Big Ditch in 
accordance with Utah Code Ann., § 73-3-3.5. Based on the Court's rulings 
above, Salt Lake City is entitled to a declaration in this regard, as 
well as a declaration that the Shareholder defendant's interests in Big 
Ditch represent only the right to receive irrigation water for use on the 
lands historically irrigated by the Big Ditch system. The City is 
entitled to summary judgment on these points and the Shareholder 
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. 
Based on the foregoing and for the reasons detailed in the City's 
Memoranda, the City's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted in the 
entirety and Big Ditch's and the Shareholder defendant's Motions are 
denied. 
It appears to the Court that this Memorandum Decision, together with 
the Court's prior rulings, resolves all outstanding issues in this case. 
Therefore, the Court requests that counsel for the City prepare an Order 
and submit the same to the Court for review and signature. 
Dated this / day of July, 2009* 
ROBIN' W- REESE 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, a Utah : MINUTE ENTRY 
municipal corporation. 
Plaintiff, CASE NO- 070903735 
: 
VS. 
: 
BIG DITCH IRRIGATION COMPANY, a 
Utah nonprofit corporation, JAMES : 
GARSIDE, J L.C, a Utah Limited 
Liability Company, RYAN LITKE, and : 
John Does 1 through 10, 
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Defendants. 
This matter comes before the Court in connection with Salt Lake 
City's (the *City") proposed Final Order and Judgment (*Order and 
Judgment'3') . The Court notes that defendant Big Ditch Irrigation Company 
(*Big Dit£h") has filed an Objection to the City's proposed Order and 
Judgment and has submitted its own version of an Order and Judgment. 
Having reviewed these various submissions, the Court determines that the 
City's Order and Judgment is consistent not only with the Court's most 
recent j^ ett^ randum Decision, but appropriately £ncot8pas&ea the Court's 
.prior'xvli&jfr i#eo <m& final Order and Judgment. The Court &g£&e# with 
the City that it is beneficial to ftave all of the Court's rulings 
incorporated in a single document without the necessity of referencing 
prior decisions. Further, the Court is satisfied that Big Ditch's 
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individual objections to various paragraphs of the City's proposed Order 
and Judgment are not well-taken and therefore denied. Accordingly, the 
Court has entered the City's Order and Judgment on a date contemporaneous 
with this Minute Entry decision. Big Ditch's proposed Order and Judgment 
is being filed unsigned. 
This Minute Entry will stand as the Order of the Court, denying Big 
Ditch's Objection and no further Order in this regard will be necessary. 
Dated this / day of August, 2009. 
ROBIN W. REES 
DISTRICT COUR' 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, a 
Utah municipal corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BIG DITCH IRRIGATION COMPANY, a 
Utah nonprofit corporation, JAMES 
GARSIDE, J L.C, a Utah Limited Liability 
Company, RYAN LITKE, LAYNE 
DOWNS, and John Does 1 through 10, 
Defendants. 
FINAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 070903735 
Judge Robin W. Reese 
This matter came before the Court for a hearing on May 21, 2009, on the 
following motions: Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiff Salt Lake City 
Corporation ("Salt Lake City"); Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants 
James Garside, J L.C. and Ryan Litke (the "Shareholder Defendants"); and Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment re Estoppel and Modification filed by Defendant Big Ditch 
Irrigation Company ("Big Ditch"). Salt Lake City was represented at the hearing by 
Edwin C. Barnes of Clyde Snow & Sessions; Big Ditch was represented by Phillip E. 
Lowry of Howard, Lewis & Petersen; J L.C. and Ryan Litke were represented by J. 
Bryan Quesenberry of Hill, Johnson & Schmutz; and James Garside appeared pro se. 
Salt Lake City filed its complaint in this action on March 8, 2007, seeking a 
declaration from the Court that: (1) Salt Lake City acquired title to Big Ditch's Big 
Cottonwood Creek water right under the terms of the 1905 Agreement between Salt 
Lake City and Big Ditch in exchange for consideration, including a contractual obligation 
to deliver irrigation-quality water to Big Ditch; (2) Big Ditch cannot treat its contractual 
right to receive irrigation quality water from Salt Lake City like a legitimate water right; 
(3) Salt Lake City has and continues to meet its delivery obligations to Big Ditch under 
the 1905 Agreement by delivery at the existing point of diversion of the amount of water 
that can be beneficially used by Big Ditch shareholders for the irrigation of land served 
by the Big Ditch system; (4) Big Ditch and J L.C. do not have the right or authority to file 
change applications with the Utah State Engineer to change the attributes of Salt Lake 
City's water rights; and (5) the Shareholder Defendants' stock in Big Ditch represents 
only the to receive and use irrigation water on lands served by the Big Ditch system. 
Salt Lake City also sought an award of damages from Big Ditch and J L.C. for slander 
of title. 
Defendants responded to the complaint with an answer and counterclaims 
against Salt Lake City, including claims: (1) that Salt Lake City had breached the 1905 
Agreement and the water rights conveyed therein should revert to Big Ditch; (2) for 
tortious interference with prospective business relationships; (3) for slander of title; 
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(4) that Salt Lake City had violated the Utah Antitrust Act; (5) that Salt Lake City had 
violated the Utah Unfair Practices Act: and (6) for forfeiture of water rights. After the 
Court dismissed the claims brought by Defendants under the Antitrust and Unfair 
Practices Acts, the counterclaims were amended and were thereafter only pursued by 
Big Ditch. The amended Big Ditch counterclaims alleged: (1) breach of the 1905 
Agreement; (2) declaratory judgment that the Big Cottonwood Creek water right had 
reverted to Big Ditch under the terms of the 1905 Agreement; and (3) tortious 
interference with prospective business relationships. 
Ruling on earlier motions filed by the parties, the Court has previously: 
1. Dismissed with prejudice Defendants' counterclaim alleging violations of 
the Utah Antitrust Act because Defendants failed to state a claim upon which relief 
could be granted, and because the activities of Salt Lake City's water utility are 
authorized by law and are exempt from the Utah Antitrust Act. (Memorandum Decision 
dated October 30, 2007.) 
2. Determined that Big Ditch conveyed title to its original Big Cottonwood 
Creek water right to Salt Lake City in the 1905 Agreement. The Court also held that the 
1905 Agreement between Salt Lake City and Big Ditch is integrated and unambiguous, 
that the agreement as drafted required the City to deliver the amounts of water yielded 
by the formula stated in paragraph 2 of the Agreement, and that the "suitable for the 
purposes of irrigation" language of the agreement did not in and of itself act as a limit 
on the nature or place of use of the water delivered to Big Ditch. In that ruling the Court 
specifically reserved for later consideration issues rising out of conduct of the parties 
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after 1905, including modification or amendment of the Agreement, acquiescence, 
waiver, capacity of the system, beneficial use, breach and forfeiture. (Memorandum 
Decision dated August 22, 2008.) 
3. The Court dismissed Salt Lake City's cause of action for slander of title 
against Big Ditch and J L.C. because Big Ditch and J L.C. did not represent themselves 
to be owners of Salt Lake City's water rights in the change applications they filed with 
the Utah State Engineer. The Court reserved the issue of whether any change could 
be effectuated by Big Ditch or J L.C. without the City's consent. (Memorandum 
Decision dated September 30, 2008.) 
4. The Court held that Salt Lake City also holds title to the water rights the 
City utilizes to deliver water to Big Ditch pursuant to the 1905 Agreement and that Big 
Ditch thereunder acquired only a contractual right to the annual delivery of water. 
(Memorandum Decision dated October 27, 2008.) 
At the hearing held on May 21, 2009, on Salt Lake City's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, the Shareholder Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, and Big 
Ditch's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment re Estoppel and Modification, the parties 
represented to the Court that the outstanding issues were ripe for summary judgment 
and encouraged the Court to resolve the remaining claims as a matter of law. The 
Court carefully considered the matters raised in the motions, memoranda and 
arguments and issued a final Memorandum Decision dated July 1, 2009. Therein, the 
Court ruled: (1) that the parties, through their historical conduct, had modified the terms 
of the 1905 Agreement to limit the use of the water delivered by Salt Lake City to 
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irrigation purposes on lands served by the Big Ditch system and that the amount of 
irrigation water Salt Lake City is obligated to furnish has diminished as the amount of 
irrigable land served by that system diminished; (2) alternatively, the principles of 
equitable estoppel bar Big Ditch from now demanding the full amount of water under 
the 1905 Agreement; (3) that since the amount of water taken each year and put to 
beneficial use by Big Ditch was determined each year by Big Ditch, there has been no 
breach of the 1905 Agreement by Salt Lake City and, therefore, no basis for a reversion 
of the Big Cottonwood Creek water rights to Big Ditch; (4) that, since the contractual 
right of Big Ditch to receive and put to beneficial use the irrigation water received under 
the 1905 Agreement is not accompanied by other fundamental attributes of water rights 
(which attributes are owned by Salt Lake City), neither Big Ditch nor the Shareholder 
Defendants have the right to file change applications with the State Engineer seeking to 
modify or make changes to the attributes of Salt Lake City's water rights; and (5) that 
Salt Lake City 's Motion for Summary Judgment should therefore granted in its entirety 
and the motions filed by Big Ditch and the Shareholder Defendants should be denied. 
As the July 1, 2009 Memorandum Decision and the Court's prior rulings resolve all 
outstanding issues in this case, entry of final judgment is appropriate at this time. 
Therefore, the Court having considered parties' respective positions, the 
arguments of counsel and relevant legal authority, and being fully advised in the 
premises, hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES, and DECREES as follows: 
1. Big Ditch conveyed title to its Big Cottonwood Creek water right to Salt 
Lake City in the 1905 Agreement. Salt Lake City holds title to that right, as well as the 
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other water rights utilized by Salt Lake City to meet its contractual commitments to Big 
Ditch under the 1905 Agreement. 
2. Though the Court previously ruled, from the four corners of the 1905 
Agreement, that the Agreement required water deliveries in accordance with the 
formula set forth therein, the uncontroverted evidence confirms that Salt Lake City and 
Big Ditch have since, by decades of consistent conduct, modified the requirements of 
the 1905 Agreement. In particular, that evidence confirms that the parties knew and 
intended that the water delivered to Big Ditch would be used only for irrigation purposes 
on lands served by the Big Ditch system, and that the amount of water the City was 
contractually obligated to deliver into the Big Ditch system would diminish over time as 
the irrigable lands served by that system diminished. Salt Lake City is presently 
obligated only to deliver to Big Ditch water for the irrigation use by its shareholders on 
lands served by the Big Ditch system. 
3. The principle of equitable estoppel also applies to bar Big Ditch from 
demanding the full amount of water specified by the 1905 Agreement. Big Ditch is 
estopped from making claims for delivery of amounts of water in excess of the 
consistently decreasing amounts of water Big Ditch has historically taken, which use 
has been relied upon by Salt Lake City in planning with respect to its water resources, 
its changes in infrastructure and its dealings with others. 
4. Salt Lake City has not breached the 1905 Agreement and there is no 
basis to support a reversion of title to the Big Cottonwood Creek water right back to Big 
Ditch. 
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5. As Salt Lake City holds title both to the Big Cottonwood Creek water right 
it acquired from Big Ditch in 1905 and to the other water rights it utilizes in its discretion 
to meet its contractual obligations to Big Ditch, Big Ditch does not have authority to file 
change applications seeking to change the attributes of Salt Lake City's water rights. It 
follows that, since Big Ditch has no such authority, its shareholders (including the 
Shareholder Defendants) have no right to fiie such applications, either directly or by 
requesting that Big Ditch do so under statutory procedures. 
6. The claims of Big Ditch and the Shareholder Defendants alleging that the 
practices of Salt Lake City's Division of Public Utilities violate the Utah Antitrust Act are 
dismissed with prejudice because the activities of Salt Lake City's water utility are 
authorized by law and exempt from the Utah Antitrust Act. The claims brought by Big 
Ditch and the Shareholder Defendants under the Utah Unfair Practices Act are 
dismissed by stipulation of the parties. 
7. All other counterclaims asserted by Defendants against Salt Lake City are 
dismissed as a matter of law, with prejudice, all parties to bear their own costs and 
attorney fees. a v>/; 
Dated this ^ day of Ji/ly 2009. 
ROBIN VjyR££8§'X;Zf cv 
District Court Judge "*• 
7 
Approved as to form: 
Phillip E. Lowry 
Leslie W. Slaugh 
Elijah L. Milne 
Attorneys for Big Ditch Irrigation Company 
J. Bryan Quesenberry 
Attorneys for Defendants J L.C. and Ryan Litke 
James Garside 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Final Order and 
Judgment was served by e-mail and by U.S. Mail to the following the 20th day of July 
2009, in accordance with Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the original 
of which will be filed with the Court upon receipt of an objection or upon expiration of 
the time allowed for objection: 
Phillip E. Lowry 
Leslie W. Slaugh 
Elijah L. Milne 
Howard, Lewis & Petersen, P.C. 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 1248 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Attorneys for Big Ditch Irrigation Company 
J. Bryan Quesenberry 
Hill, Johnson & Schmutz, L.C. 
4844 North 300 West, Suite 300 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Attorneys for Defendants J L.C. and Ryan Litke 
James Garside 
2077 East 1710 South 
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 
An updated copy of the Final Order and Judgment with changes to the final 
sentence of the first, partial paragraph on page 5, made in response to e-mailed 
comments from counsel, was served by e-mail to the attorneys and party listed above 
on July 22, 2009. 
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Exhibit M 
Edwin C. Barnes (Bar No. 0217) 
Steven E. Clyde (Bar No. 0686) 
Wendy Bowden Crowther (Bar No. 8842) 
CLYDE, SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON 
201 South Main Street, 13th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 322-2516 
Facsimile: (801) 521-6280 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Salt Lake City Corporation 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, a 
Utah municipal corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BIG DITCH IRRIGATION COMPANY, a 
Utah nonprofit corporation, JAMES 
GARSIDE, J L.C, a Utah Limited Liability 
Company, RYAN LITKE, LAYNE 
DOWNS, and John Does 1 through 10, 
Defendants. 
Plaintiff, Salt Lake City Corporation complains of Defendants and alleges as 
follows: 
PARTIES 
1. Plaintiff is a municipal corporation organized under the laws of the State 
of Utah. 
2. Defendant Big Ditch Irrigation Company ("Big Ditch") is a nonprofit 
corporation organized and operating under the laws of the State of Utah. Big Ditch is 
COMPLAINT 
Civil No. Oy&<703 73S~~ 
Judge: JVeJ/^ 
an irrigation company which owns and maintains a series of ditches and delivers water 
to its shareholder for irrigation use on lands located within its historical system. That 
system is located in Salt Lake County, Utah, and its historical service boundaries are 
reflected on the map attached as Exhibit "A" to this Complaint. 
3. Defendant James Garside ("Garside") is believed to be a resident of 
Spanish Fork, Utah. Garside claims to have purchased stock in Big Ditch, and holds 
himself out as the President and a member of the Board of Directors of Big Ditch. 
Plaintiff is informed and believes, and therefore alleges, that Garside owns no land that 
has historically been irrigated by the Big Ditch system. Plaintiff also believes, and 
therefore alleges, that Garside purchased stock in Big Ditch for the purpose of 
speculating in the value of the stock and the water rights he believes to be represented 
by that stock. 
4. Defendant J L.C. ("J L.C") is a Utah limited liability company with its 
principal place of business located in American Fork, Utah. J L.C. is reflected on the 
Big Ditch records as having purchased stock in Big Ditch for or in connection with one 
Evan Johnson. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and therefore alleges, that J L.C. 
owns no land that has historically been irrigated by the Big Ditch system. Plaintiff also 
believes, and therefore alleges, that J L.C. purchased stock in Big Ditch for the purpose 
of speculating in the value of the stock and the water rights it believes to be 
represented by that stock. 
5. Defendant Ryan Litke ("Litke") is reflected on the Big Ditch records as an 
individual affiliated with Garside who acquired stock in Big Ditch. Plaintiff is informed 
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and believes, and therefore alleges, that Litke is a resident of Lehi, Utah, who owns no 
land that has historically been irrigated by the Big Ditch system. Plaintiff also believes, 
and therefore alleges, that Litke purchased stock in Big Ditch for the purpose of 
speculating in the value of the stock and the water rights he believes to be represented 
by that stock. 
6. Defendant Layne Downs ("Downs") is reflected on the Big Ditch records 
as an individual affiliated with Garside who acquired stock in Big Ditch. Plaintiff is 
informed and believes, and therefore alleges, that Downs is a resident of American 
Fork, Utah, who owns no land that has historically been irrigated by the Big Ditch 
system. Plaintiff also believes, and therefore alleges, that Downs purchased stock in 
Big Ditch for the purpose of speculating in the value of the stock and the water rights he 
believes to be represented by that stock. 
7. Defendant John Does 1 through 10 are other individuals or entities that 
own no land that has historically been irrigated by the Big Ditch system and that have 
purchased stock in Big Ditch for the purpose of speculating in the value of the stock and 
the water rights they believe to be represented by that stock. Plaintiff will seek leave to 
amend this complaint to identify these individuals or entities when their identities are 
discovered. 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
8. Jurisdiction and venue are proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 78-3-4, 78-13-1 and -4, and 78-33-1. 
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GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
9. On June 27, 1905, Plaintiff and Big Ditch entered into a contract ("1905 
Contract") which conveyed to Plaintiff title to all of the Big Cottonwood Creek water 
rights held by Big Ditch for use in the Plaintiffs culinary system. In exchange for the 
conveyance of the water rights, Big Ditch contracted to receive future deliveries, from 
any source or sources Plaintiff saw fit, of sufficient irrigation quality water for Big Ditch 
"to supply the water users whose lands are irrigated from said Big Ditch...." A copy of 
the 1905 Contract is attached hereto as Exhibit "B". 
10. The 1905 conveyance of title to the Big Ditch Big Cottonwood Creek water 
right to Plaintiff was subsequently confirmed by the Third District Court in the Big 
Cottonwood Decree (The Progress Company v. Salt Lake City, Civil No. 8921, dated 
April 13, 1914, aff'd 53 U. 556, 173 P. 705 (1918))(the "Decree"). In paragraph Fifth of 
the Decree Judge Morse specifically "confirmed and quieted" in Plaintiff, as against Big 
Ditch and others, the title and right to all waters of Big Cottonwood Creek Plaintiff 
acquired from Big Ditch in 1905. A copy of the Big Cottonwood Decree is attached 
hereto as Exhibit "C". Big Ditch and its shareholders are bound by the Decree and are 
estopped from claiming any interest in the waters of Big Cottonwood Creek adverse to 
the Plaintiffs interest. 
11. Plaintiff is a municipal corporation which owns water rights, and owns and 
operates diversion, treatment, storage and delivery facilities to supply water to its 
customers. These water rights include the Big Cottonwood Creek right Plaintiff 
acquired from Big Ditch and other rights held by it which are used, in part, to furnish 
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irrigation quality water for the irrigated lands served by the Big Ditch system pursuant to 
the 1905 Contract. Once water rights are acquired or come under the control of a 
municipal corporation such as Plaintiff, Article XI, Section 6 of the Constitution of the 
State of Utah prohibits their sale, alienation or disposal. Plaintiff has not disposed of 
the Big Cottonwood Creek right it acquired from Big Ditch. 
12. Paragraph 4 of the 1905 Contract requires Plaintiff to deliver the irrigation 
water Big Ditch contracted to receive at the point where Big Ditch connects with Big 
Cottonwood Creek. Plaintiff has no obligation to deliver water to Big Ditch at any other 
place or on any condition not set forth in the 1905 Contract. The irrigation water may 
be delivered to Big Ditch from any source Plaintiff "may see fit". 
13. The 1905 Contract reserved to Big Ditch the option of diverting and using 
water directly from Big Cottonwood Creek under the right it conveyed to Plaintiff as a 
remedy in the event Plaintiff were to fail to deliver to Big Ditch the contracted-for 
irrigation water required by the water users whose lands are actually irrigated by the Big 
Ditch system . 
14. For over 100 years, Plaintiff has diverted and beneficially used the Big 
Cottonwood Creek water rights conveyed to it by the 1905 Contract, the title to which 
was confirmed in Plaintiff by the Decree. 
15. For over 100 years, and without exception, Salt Lake City has delivered to 
Big Ditch at the specified point of diversion, from a variety of sources, all of the irrigation 
quality water requested by Big Ditch for beneficial use by the stockholders whose 
irrigated lands are located within the area historically served by the company. 
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17. The intent of the 1905 Contract, as demonstrated by its plain terms, by 
the Decree, and by more than 100 years of consistent practice by both parties, was to 
vest Plaintiff with title to the culinary quality Big Cottonwood Creek water rights in 
exchange for the delivery of irrigation water for use by Big Ditch stockholders on lands 
located in the area historically served by Big Ditch from April until October each year. 
The 1905 Contract provided for the eventuality that the amount of agricultural land 
within the area historically served by the Big Ditch system (and thus the quantity of 
irrigation water required) would decrease over time by limiting Plaintiffs delivery 
obligation to "sufficient water" as Big Ditch "shall require to supply the water users 
whose lands are irrigated from said Big Ditch ...." The parties' consistent conduct since 
1905 has confirmed the decreasing nature of this obligation. 
18. After 100 years of cooperative interpretation and consistent performance 
of the 1905 Contract, Garside, J L.C., Litke, Downs and others (the "Speculators") 
began to acquire Big Ditch stock. Garside assumed the position of President of Big 
Ditch in 2005 following a disputed special election. 
19. The Speculators now claim to be the majority stockholders of Big Ditch, 
though, upon information and belief, they neither reside nor own any property within the 
area historically served by Big Ditch. The Speculators do not irrigate any land within the 
Big Ditch area and cannot use irrigation water delivered with respect to Big Ditch 
shares. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and therefore alleges, that the Speculators 
acquired their Big Ditch stock with the intention of asserting claims to, and marketing for 
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a profit, water rights owned by Plaintiff, including the Big Cottonwood Creek water right 
Plaintiff acquired from Big Ditch. 
20. After Garside became president of Big Ditch, Big Ditch began making 
claims that it was entitled to the delivery of water from Plaintiff in excess of the quantity 
of water needed to meet the beneficial use requirements of the remaining irrigable 
lands located within the area historically served by the Big Ditch System. Big Ditch also 
for the first time began asserting claims of entitlement to the delivery of water from 
Plaintiff for purposes other than irrigation and at locations outside of the lands 
historically served by Big Ditch. 
21. Garside, purporting to act as President of Big Ditch, has also falsely 
alleged that Plaintiff is in breach of the 1905 Contract. 
22. Garside, purporting to act as President of Big Ditch, contacted the Utah 
State Engineer and demanded that a water right file be created for the Big Cottonwood 
Creek water conveyed to Plaintiff in 1905, and that Big Ditch be shown in that file as the 
owner of record of the water right it conveyed to Plaintiff more than a century ago. 
23. Plaintiff, in an effort to protect its water right from the claims of 
Defendants, filed a Report of Conveyance with the Utah State Engineer showing that 
Plaintiff holds title to the Big Cottonwood Creek water it acquired from Big Ditch, which 
title was confirmed in Plaintiff against the claims of Big Ditch and others by the Decree. 
The State Engineer properly updated his records to confirm Plaintiffs title to that right. 
24. On July 6, 2006, Big Ditch and J L.C. filed Change Application a31743 
with the Utah State Engineer seeking to change the use of "Contract water in the BDIC 
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carrier system", as if the water Big Ditch receives by contract from Plaintiff may be 
treated like a water right. Big Ditch and J L.C. sought to change the point of diversion 
for the water from the point of delivery specified in the 1905 Contract to a series of wells 
located west of the Jordan River near the south end of the Salt Lake Valley, to change 
the nature of use for the water from the seasonal irrigation use provided in the 1905 
Contract to year-around municipal use, and to change the place of use for the water 
away from the Big Ditch historic service area to Riverton City. Plaintiff is informed and 
believes, and therefore alleges that Big Ditch and J L.C. do not own property in Riverton 
City and that they hoped to market water there or elsewhere for a profit. Significantly, 
Change Application a31743 sought to change the use of 3740.4 acre-feet of water, a 
quantity in excess of the entire amount of irrigation water to which Big Ditch is entitled, 
i.e., that amount that may be beneficially used for irrigation on the agricultural land 
remaining in the area historically served by the Company. A copy of Change 
Application a31743 is attached hereto as Exhibit "D". 
25. On September 21, 2006, Big Ditch filed Change Application a31965 
seeking to change the use of an additional 5.6 acre-feet of water that it claimed Plaintiff 
was obligated to deliver under the 1905 Contract. A copy of Change Application 
a31965 is attached hereto as Exhibit "E". 
26. Plaintiff filed written protests against the two change applications with the 
Utah State Engineer in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-7. Among other things, 
Plaintiff protested the change applications on the grounds that it, not Big Ditch, is the 
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owner of the underlying water right and therefore Big Ditch has no authority to file 
applications seeking to change the use of the water right. 
27. On November 28, 2006, the State Engineer held a hearing on the two 
change applications. At considerable time and expense, Salt Lake City prepared for 
and participated in the State Engineer hearing to defend its water rights. 
28. On December 18, 2006, Big Ditch filed a temporary change application 
with the Utah State Engineer, again seeking to change the point of diversion, place of 
use and nature of use of water that it claimed Plaintiff was obligated to deliver under the 
1905 Contract. A copy of this filing, Change Application t32290, is attached hereto as 
Exhibit T" . 
29. On January 9, 2007, before the State Engineer could take action on the 
applications, Big Ditch withdrew Change Applications a31743 and a31965; Change 
Application t32290 remains pending. 
30. Despite withdrawing the first two change applications, Big Ditch has 
persisted in its claim that it is the owner of water rights owned by Plaintiff, that it is 
entitled to the delivery of water from Plaintiff in excess of the amount that can be used 
to irrigate land within the area historically served by the company, and that it has the 
right to file applications with the Utah State Engineer seeking to change the use and 
other attributes of Plaintiffs water rights, as demonstrated by Exhibit "F". Big Ditch also 
continues to incorrectly suggest that Plaintiff is in breach of the 1905 Contract. 
31 . Defendants' ongoing claims and actions jeopardize Plaintiffs ability to 
meet the requirements of its public stewardship. They threaten Plaintiffs important and 
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constitutionally protected water rights and adversely impact Plaintiffs ability to plan for 
and address the growing needs of Salt Lake City. Declaratory judgment is necessary to 
confirm Plaintiffs ownership of its water rights, to declare the nature and extent of the 
contract right to the delivery of irrigation water retained by Big Ditch, and to protect 
Plaintiff from filings attempting to claim ownership or change the attributes of Plaintiffs 
water rights. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
Declaratory Relief - Big Ditch and J L.C. 
32. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 31. 
33. The actions and claims of Big Ditch and J L.C. with regard to Plaintiffs 
water rights and its performance under the 1905 Contract are adverse to Plaintiff and 
represent a challenge to Plaintiffs legally protected interests. 
34. The actions and claims of Big Ditch and J L.C. present justiciable 
controversies between Plaintiff and those defendants which are ripe for determination 
by the Court. 
35. Plaintiff is entitled to have the Court construe the terms of the 1905 
Contract and the Decree, and to determine the rights and obligations of the parties 
thereunder. 
36. In particular, as Plaintiff acquired the Big Cottonwood Creek right from Big 
Ditch in 1905 and its ownership of that right was confirmed by Judge Morse in the 
Decree and is therefore res judicata, Plaintiff is entitled to a determination by the Court 
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that Defendants cannot treat the contract right to delivery of irrigation water like a 
statutorily recognized water right with all of the attributes associated with such rights. 
37. Plaintiff is entitled to a determination by the Court that it has met, and 
continues to meet, its obligations to Big Ditch under the 1905 Contract by delivering to 
Big Ditch, at the point specified in the 1905 Contract, sufficient irrigation quality water to 
supply the Big Ditch water users whose lands are irrigated from the Big Ditch system. 
Big Ditch does not have title to the water right it conveyed to Plaintiff under the 1905 
Contract. It received as consideration for the conveyance a contractual right to the 
delivery of the amount of water that can be beneficially used by its shareholders for the 
irrigation of land within the historic service area of the company together with a 
contractual remedy in the event of a failure of delivery. 
38. Plaintiff is further entitled to a determination by this Court that, because 
Big Ditch holds only a contractual right for the delivery of irrigation water from Plaintiff, 
Big Ditch and J L.C. have no right or authority to file applications with the Utah State 
Engineer seeking a change in the point of diversion, nature of use, place of use or any 
other attribute, either of Plaintiff's water rights or of the irrigation water delivered to Big 
Ditch by Plaintiff pursuant to the 1905 Contract from other rights owned by Plaintiff. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
Declaratory Relief - Speculators 
39. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 38. 
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40. The actions and claims of the Speculators with regard to Plaintiffs water 
rights are adverse to Plaintiff and represent a continuing challenge to Plaintiffs legally 
protected interests. 
41 . The actions and claims of the Speculators, in particular their assertion that 
the Big Ditch stock they acquired represents or may be converted into a portion of 
Plaintiffs water rights, presents a justiciable controversy between Plaintiff and the 
Speculators which is ripe for determination by the Court. 
42. Plaintiff is entitled to a determination by the Court that the Speculators' 
Big Ditch stock represents the right only to receive and use on lands historically 
irrigated from the Big Ditch System the irrigation water delivered pursuant to, and during 
the period described in, the 1905 Contract. 
43. Inasmuch as Big Ditch does not have title to the underlying water right, 
Plaintiff is further entitled to a determination by the Court that the Speculators do not 
have the right or authority to file change applications with regard to Plaintiffs water 
rights or the irrigation water delivered to Big Ditch by Plaintiff pursuant to the 1905 
Contract from other rights owned by Plaintiff, either directly with the State Engineer or 
by request made to Big Ditch made in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-3.5. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
Slander of Title - Big Ditch and J L.C. 
44. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 43. 
45. Big Ditch conveyed title to its Big Cottonwood Creek water right in 1905, 
and title to that right was quieted in Plaintiff, as against Big Ditch and others, by the 
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Third District Court in the Decree. Plaintiffs ownership of that water right is res 
judicata. Big Ditch and J L.C. are aware of Plaintiffs ownership of that right by virtue of 
their actual knowledge of the 1905 Contract, the Decree, and subsequent 
communications with Plaintiff. J L.C. and the other shareholders of Big Ditch are bound 
by the terms of the Decree. 
46. Notwithstanding their actual knowledge of Plaintiff's ownership of the right 
previously conveyed by Big Ditch, Big Ditch and J L.C. filed written Change Applications 
a31743 and a31965 with the State Engineer claiming ownership of that water right. Big 
Ditch also filed written Change Application t32290 seeking to change attributes of 
irrigation water Big Ditch receives by contract from Plaintiff as if it owned the underlying 
water right. 
47. The claims of ownership made by Big Ditch and J L.C. were false and 
were published knowingly and wrongfully, giving a false impression adverse to Plaintiffs 
title to the water rights. 
48. Plaintiff was required to protest, and to prepare for and participate at a 
hearing on Change Applications a31743 and a31965 filed by Big Ditch and J L.C. 
Plaintiff incurred substantial expense in protesting the Change Applications and in 
preparing for and participating in the hearings to defend the title to its water rights, 
which expenses were reasonably foreseeable to Big Ditch and J L.C. If Big Ditch 
proceeds with Change Application t32290, Plaintiff will be required to incur additional 
expenses to defend the title to its water rights. 
13 
49. Plaintiff is entitled to recovery from Big Ditch and J LC. the expenses it 
incurred in protesting the Change Applications and in preparing for and participating in 
hearings to defend the title to its water rights, together with all other expenses that 
might be incurred by Plaintiff to defend its title against ongoing, slanderous claims, as 
special damages in an amount to be established at trial. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against the Defendants as follows: 
1. Declaring that, as Plaintiff acquired the Big Cottonwood Creek right from 
Big Ditch in 1905 and its ownership of that right was confirmed by Judge Morse in the 
Decree and is therefore res judicata, Defendants cannot treat its right to receive 
delivery of irrigation water by contract like a legitimate water right with all of the 
attributes associated with such rights. 
2. Declaring that Plaintiff meets its obligations to Big Ditch under the 1905 
Contract by delivery at the existing point of diversion of the amount of water that can be 
beneficially used by Big Ditch shareholders for the irrigation of land within the historic 
service area of the company . 
3. Declaring that Big Ditch and J L.C. do not have the right or authority to file 
applications with the Utah State Engineer seeking to change the point of diversion, 
nature of use, place of use or any other attribute, either of Plaintiffs water rights or of 
the irrigation water delivered to Big Ditch pursuant to the 1905 Contract. 
4. Declaring that the Speculators' Big Ditch Stock represents only the 
contract right to receive and use irrigation water on lands historically irrigated from the 
Big Ditch System during the season described in the 1905 Contract, and that the 
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Speculators do not have the right or authority to file change applications with regard to 
water rights owned by Plaintiff. 
5. Awarding Plaintiff damages for slander of the title to its water rights in an 
amount to be established at trial. 
6. For an award of attorneys' fees and costs, together with such other and 
further relief as the Court may find just and equitable. 
Dated this 8th day of March 2007. 
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON, P.C 
^r<2?s,— 
Edwin C. Barnes 
Steven E. Clyde 
Wendy Bowden Crowther 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Plaintiffs Address: 
1530 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
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EXHIBIT A 

EXHIBIT B 
A 2 B 5 * M 5 * 5 £ 
THIS AGREHENT made this 27 day of June, A. D. 1905, at Salt 
Lake City, Utah, by and between Salt Lake City, a municipal cor-
poration of Salt Lake County, State of Utah> party of the first 
part; and Big Ditch Irrigation Company, a corporation of the 
State of Utah, party of the second part, WITNESSETH: 
THAT WHEREAS the party of the sefond part is the owner of a 
portion and of the right to the use of a portion of the waters of 
Big Cottonwood Greek, flowing in Salt Lake County, Utah; 
AND WHEREAS the party of the first part desires to procure 
from the party of the second part the right to use the said water; 
NOW THEREFORE be it, and it is, hereby mutually agreed as 
follows, to~wit: 
1. The party of the second part hereby grants, bargains and 
sells to the party of the first part all of the right of it, the 
party of the second part, to the use of all its portion of the 
water flowing in Big Cottonwood Creek, Salt Laie County, Utah, 
only, however, until the time that the party of the second part 
shall be entitled to again take and use the said water as herein-
after provided upon the failure of the party of the first part to 
keep the covenants herein provided by it, the party of th§, first 
part, to be kept. 
2. The party of the first part, in consideration of the 
covenants of the party of the second part, hereby agrees with the 
party of the second part, that it, the party of the first part, 
will perpetually and continuously deliver to the party of the 
second part from the first day of April until the first day of 
October of each and every year hereafter, for the use of the par-
ty of the second part, at the place or places hereinafter pro-
vided, a continuous stream or flow of water, which stream or flow 
of water shall be equivalent to seventy-one two hundredths 
(71/200} of the water flowing in said Big Cottonwood Creek as 
shall from time to time be determined by the measurements herein-
after provided for (provided, however, th&t the party of the 
f irst part shall never at any time be required to deliver to the 
party of the second part a stream or flow of water running more 
then thirty-five (35/ cubic feet per second,) and which said 
water shall be suitable for the purposes of irrigation; and during 
all of the remainder of each and every year hereafter, the party 
of the first part agrees to deliver to the party of the second 
part a stream, or flow of water which shall be equivalent to one 
sixtieth (l/60) of the water flowing in said Big Cottonwood Creek, 
as shall be determined by «he said measurement. 
3# For the purpose of determining the quantity of water 
flowing in said Big Cottonwood Creek* measurements thereof shall 
be made at the mouth of Big Cottonwood Canyon on the 1st day of 
April, the 15th day of April, the 1st day of May, the 15th day of 
May, the 1st day of June, the 15th day-of June, the 1st day of 
July, the 15th day of July, the 1st day of August, the 15th day 
of AuguBt, the 1st a£ day of September, the 15th day. of September, 
and the 1st day of October of each and every year hereafter and 
the total quantity of water found flowing at the mouth of Big 
Cottonwood Canyon at each of the measurements above provided for 
shall be considered for the purposes of this contract, as the 
quantity of water flovang in said Big Cottonwood Creek until the 
time of the next succeeding measurement; provided, however, that 
if the said measurements shall be made at a point below what is 
known as Butler Ditch, then and in that event the quantity of 
water flowing in Butler Ditch shall always be added to the water 
found flowing at each of said measurements. 
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4. The putrty of the firs* port akall havo tiie right to do-
liver the said water Co the party of the second part, from any 
source that it, the pirty of the first petrt, may see fit, and in 
case the water so delivered to the party of the second part shall 
come from any source Dther than what is known as Spring Creek, 
which rises near Murny, Salt Lake County, Utah, the said water 
shall he delivered tc the party fo the second part in the canal 
of the party of the second part known as Big Ditch, at the point 
where said Big Ditch now connects with Big Cottonwood Creek, but 
if a portion of said water shall be delivered to the party of the 
second part from said Spring Creek it shall be delivered at a 
point in said Big Ditch as high up on said Big Ditch as the said 
water from said Sprirg Creek can be made to flow; and in case a 
portion of said wate-i shall be delivered from said Spring Creek, 
then and in that event sufficient water shall be delivered at the 
points, where said Big Ditch connects with said Big Cottonwood 
Creekt&iASn£t^e8ond part shall require to supply the water users 
whose lands are irrigated from said Big Ditch at a point or points 
above the place where the waters from Spring Creek shall be deliv-
ered by the party of the first part to the party of the second 
part in said Big Ditch. 
5. On or before the 5th d$y of January of each and every 
year hereafter a board of three commissioners shall be chosen in 
the manner following, to-wit: One of said commissioners shall be 
chosen by the party of the first part, and one shall be chosen by 
the party of the second part, and the two parties so chosen by 
the parties hereto shall choose the third member, provided, how-
ever, if the members so chosen by the parties hereto fail for a 
period of ten days to choose a third member, then, and in that 
event, the said third member shall be chosen by the Governor of 
the State of Utah, ^ lich member shall not be a resident of Salt 
Lake City nor interested in said Cottonwood stream, nor a proper-
ty owner in Salt Lake City; and provided further, that if either 
of the parties hereto fails to choose a member on or before the 
5th day of January of each and every year hereafter, then, and in 
that event, the other paruy hereto shall have the right to choose 
three disinterested persons, who shall constitute said board of 
commissioners. 
When the said board of commissioners shall have been chosen 
as above provided, the 6aid commissioners shall have the right to 
exercise and perform the duties and powers herein conferred upon 
them until such time as their successors shall be chosen. The 
decision of any two of said commissioners upon any question or 
matter which they are empowered to decide 6hall be binding and 
conclusive upon each of the parties hereto. 
It shall be the duty of the said commissioners to measure 
the waters flowing in said Big Cottonwood Creek at the times and 
places above mentioned, a:id#hey shall also within t^o days of the 
date of making each of said measurements report to each of the 
pajrties hereto the .total quantity of yrater by them _f ound flowing: . 
in said creek, and the finding of said commissioners as to the 
quantity of water flowing in said creek shall, for the purposes of 
this contract, be considered as the quantity of water flowing 
therein, until the time for tne next succeeding measurement. 
6. The said commissioners, within two days of the date of 
making each of the measurements of Big Cottonwood Creek above pro-
vided for, shall measure at the place of delivery the water which 
it is above provided shall be delivered by the party of the first 
part to the pa±y of the second part; provided, however, that the 
party of the second part shall have the right to require the said 
commissioners to measure the said water to be delivered to the 
said party of the second part at any time or times which it, the 
party of the second part, shall see fit, and the finding of the 
said commissioners, or a majority of them as to the quantity of 
water being delivered to the party of the second part by the 
pajrty of the first part shall be binding and conclusive upon each 
pf the parties hereto. 
-2-
7* The party of tho first p^rt horoby a^reoa that it will 
cause to be constructed, at its expense, at the point of measure-
ment upon 3ig Cottonwood Creek and at the points where water shall 
be delivered in the 6econd party's Big Ditch good and sufficient 
weirs, and that it will continue to keep the same in good repair; 
and also it will cause to be constructed at the point where the 
party of the first part shall divert the .said tfater from the Big 
Cottonwopd Creek, good and sufficient gates, which shall be so 
constructed that the water flowing in Big Cottonwood Creek can be 
readily and^ fconveniently returned into said Creek channel, in case 
the party of the second part shall at any time exercise its right 
to revest itself with the use of the waters of Big Cottonwood 
Creek, and it agrees to keep the said gates in good repair. 
The party of the first part also agrees that it will from 
time to time pay all of the expenses that shall be incurred in the 
making of the various measurements of water, as herein provided, 
including the compensation of the commissioners, together with all 
expens&SHn^carrying into effect this contract. 
g. The party of the first part hereby agrees to maintain all . 
of the existing rights of the party of the second part to the 
waters and to the channel of said Big Cottonwood Creek, and to 
bring and defend, at the expense of it, the party of the first,part 
any and all suits for the purpose of maintaining said rights. 
9* It is hereby mutually agreed that if the party of the 
first part shall at any time fail to deliver to the party of the 
second part at the point or points above mentioned the full quan-
tity of water which is above provided shall be delivered to the 
party of the second part by the party of the first part, and pro-
vided that said default shall continue for a period of twenty-
four hours, then and in that event the party of the second part 
ah-11 have the right to immediately retake and shall be immedi-
ately restored to t negater B of said Big Cottonwood Creek, which 
are being used by the party of the first part under the terms 
of this contract, and for the purpose of retaking and again using 
the said water the party of the second part shall have the right 
to immediately return the waters of said Big Cottonwood Creek 
into the original channel of said Creek, and shall have the right 
to the use of said/Water during all the time that said default 
shall continue, and said right nray be exercised by the party of 
theaeacond»part as often as the party of the first part shall be 
in default. 
It is expressly understood and agreed, however, that upon 
any failure of the party of the first part to deliver to the party 
of the second part the full quantity of water above provided to be 
delivered to the party of the second part for a period of six 
months, all of the rights of the party •- of the first part to the 
use of the waters of Big Cottonwood Creek now belonging to the 
party of the second part shall, at the option of the party of the 
second part, upoa .h_rty d^ys1 notice in writing given to the 
party of the first, part- immediately cease and terminate, and the 
rights of the party of the second part to the use of the v/aters 
oc Big Cottonwood Creek above granted to the party of the first 
part shall thereupon be immediately vested in the party of the 
second part as fully and completely as though this contract had 
never been made. 
The right of the party of the second part to retake the said 
waters of Big Cottonwood Creek anf the right of the party of the 
second part to terminate the rights of the party of first part 
hereunder shall and is hereby declared to be a cumulative remedy 
and shall in no wise be construed to deprive the party of the 
second par$ of any remedy at law or in equity which the party of 
the second part might otherwise have to enforce its rights under 
this contract, 
by fulJ-V and perpetually terminated, the pSRy or the rirst part 
shall not be liable to the party of the second part for any dam-
ages accruing after the date of such perpetual termination. 
IN WITNESS THEREOF the party of the first part has caused 
its name to be signed hereto by Richard P. Morris, its *Mayor, and 
its corporate seal to be affixed hereto; and the party of the 
second part has caused its name to be signed hereto by James C. 
Hamilton, its president, anc/attested by the signature of its 
secretary, and its corporate seal to be affixed at the time and 
place first above written. 
SALT LAK& CITY, 
By Richard P. Morris 
Its Mayor 
Seal J0hn S. Cntchlow 
Its Recorder 
BIG DITCH IRRIGATION COMPANY 
By James Ci Hamilton 
Its President 
Seal J. A. Cornwall 
Secretary 
State of Utah, 
County of Salt Lake 
On the 27th day of June, A. D. 1905* personally appeared 
before me James C, Hamilton, who being by me duly sworn, did say 
that he is the president of the Big Ditch Irrigation Company * and 
that said instrument was signed in behalf of said corporation by 
authority of resolution of board of directors and said James C. 
Hamilton acknowldged to me that said corporation executed the same* 
Wm. H. Bramel 
Notary Public 
My commission expires May 19 > 19^9 
ss. 
Seal 
EXHIBIT C 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
THE PROGRESS COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs.-
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal 
corporation, and numerous 
other persons and parties, 
Defendants. 
WHEREFORE, by reason of the premises and the said 
Findings of Fact, and the Conclusions of Law, and the law, 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED in this cause as 
follows: 
FIRST. 
That as between and among the water users and owners of 
the Butler Ditch, the Brown and Sanford Ditch, the Upper Canal, 
the Upper Ellison Ditoh,'tho Lowor Ellioon Ditch, the Newman Ditch, 
the Tanner Ditch, the Green Ditch, the Walker Ditch, the Farr and 
Harper Ditch, the narpor and Taylor Diteh, the Lower Canal, the 
Big Ditcht the Hill Ditch, the Bagley and IQiudsen Ditch, there is ! 
no priority of appropriation of the waters of said Big Cottonwood 
Creek, but each and all of said parties are equal in point of time 
in respect of their several respective appropriations of the same* 
SECOND. 
That the title of the plaintiff, the Progress Company, 
is hereby confirmed and quieted to the use of all of the waters 
of Big Cottonwood Creek flowing in 3aid stream at a point immed-
iately below the upper intake of the Hill Ditch; also, all the 
waters flowing in Little Green River for use at its power plant 
located at or near State Street, and for domestic, culinary and 
jtflUKUNLML 
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other useful purposes, including the use of all the waters of Spring 
Greek not in this decree awarded and quieted to other parties, to be 
used for power purposes at plaintiff's power plant known as the Miller 
plant; the quantity of water hereby decreed to said plaintiff not 
to exceed one hundred and fifty (150) cubic feet per second of time. 
And it is further hereby DECREED that the title and rigjit 
of said plaintiff and Rudolph Knudsen be and the same is hereby 
confirmed and quieted to divert from said Big Cottonwood Creek all 
the waters thereof above the intake of their mill race at the Knud-
sen plant, not otherwise in this decree quieted and awarded to other 
parties, not to exceed seventy-five (75) cubic feet per second of 
time, for power purposes at their power plant known as the K&udsen 
plant, but such water shall, after use at said power plant, be re-
turned to said Big Cottonwood Creek, undiminished in quantity, and 
unimpaired in quality; subject, however, to the right of Salt Lake 
City to divert the waters of said Big Ditch and Lower Canal into 
its conduit above the intake of said Knudsen race. 
THIRD. 
That the titles and rights of each and all the parties to 
this action who have heretofore diverted and used the waters of 
Big Cottonwood Creek at and above the upper intake of the Hill 
Ditch during the irrigation season, that is, from the first day of 
April to the first day of October of each year, are hereby con-
firmed and quieted to the use of all said waters, when the flow 
of the same does not exceed three hundred and fifty-one and one-
half {351J) cubic feet per second of time, injproportlon to the 
oapacity of their several canals, which capacity of said canals 
is severally as follows: 
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Name of Canal 
Butler 
Brown & Sanford 
Upper Canal 
Upper E l l i s o n 
Newman 
Tanner 
Green 
Walker 
Farr & Harper 
Lower Canal 
Big Ditoh 
H i l l 
Lower E l l i s o n 
McGhie 
Harper & Taylor 
Severson 
Bagley 
Knudsen 8c Bagley 
Knudsen 
Capacity 
Second Feet . 
10 . 
50 
60 
9 
4 
60 
24 
3 
4 
30 
60 
7 
8 
1Q 
4 
4 
3 
1 
* 
Shares or 
S i x t i e t h s . 
1.71 
8.52 
10.23 
1.54 
.69 
10.23 
4.09 
.51 
.69 
5.12 
10.23 
1.21 
1.37 
1.71 
.69 
.69 
.52 
.17 
.08 
That during the said irrigation season, and when the water 
flowing in said Big Cottonwood Creek at and above said upper intake 
of the Hill Ditch does not exceed one hundred and twenty (120) cub-
ic feet per second of time, the titles and rights of each and all 
of the following named ditches and canals, and the owners thereof, 
and the water users thereunder, are hereby quieted and confirmed to 
all of the waters flowing in said Big Cottonwood Creek at and above 
said intake, to be divided and apportioned among them in shares or 
sixtieths, as follows: 
Name of Canal Shares or Sixtieths 
Butler .5 
Brown & Sanford 3.6 
Upper Canal 10.5 
Upper Ellison .7 
Newman .3 
Tanner 13.21 
Green 5.3 
Walker .32 
Farr & Harper .5 
Lower Canal 5.8 
Big Ditch 17.1 
Hill 2.13 
Bagley & Knudsen .04 
And the quantity of water flowing in the stream shall be 
determined by measuring the water flowing into each of the said 
several canals and ditches, and the aggregate of this measurment 
pjTQjn^j^ tiftftnw* tht* t.rvhwi ^QW_of said creek. The portion of 
water to which said Butler Ditch is entitled shall be measured 
to it at the point where the weir is now situate on said Butler 
Ditch, at a point about two miles below the intake thereof. 
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FOURTH. 
That the titles and rights of each and all of the said 
parties to this aotion who have heretofore diverted and used 
the waters of Big Cottonwood Creek above the said upper intake 
of the Hill Ditch during the non-irrigation season, that is, be-
5 b
° ^
t w e e n tlle
 ti*3* d a7 of" October of each year and the first day of 
u
^ April following, are hereby confirmed and quieted to divert and 
use all the waters flowing in said creek above the Big Ditch dam 
whenever the quantity of said water flowing therein is fifty (50) 
dubio feet per second of time, or less, in the following propor-
tions, to wit: 
Butler Ditch 
Brown and Sanford Ditch 
Upper Canal 
Thomas S. Newman 
Tanner Ditch 
Green Ditoh 
Walker Ditch 
Farr & Harper Ditoh 
Knudsen & Bagley Ditch 
Big Ditch 
Lower Canal 
Hill Ditoh 
That whenever, during said non-irrigation season, the 
quantity of water flowing in said Big Cottonwood Creek as afore-
said, exceeds fifty (50) cubic feet per second, the right and title 
of said plaintiff, Progress Company, is hereby confirmed and quiet-
ed to have such excess of water flow down said stream into said Gor-
don race, together with all the waters of said Big Cottonwood Creek 
flowing therein at a point immediately below the upper intake of 
the Hill Ditch and the waters of little Green River and Spring 
Creek, as provided in the second paragraph of this Deoree; the whole, 
however, not to exceed one hundred and fifty (150) second feet. 
FIFTH. 
That the title and right of the defendant, Salt Lake City, 
is hereby confirmed and quieted to all the waters of said Big 
Cottonwood Creek acquired by said City from the defendant Big 
.67 
6.25 
9.63 
. 0 4 
11.40 
7.30 
1.20 
. 4 3 
.0& 
15.75 
5.34 
1.96 
s i x t i e t h s . 
n 
tt 
w 
ft 
ff 
tt 
tt 
t» 
« 
w 
n 
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ditoh Irrigation Company, and the defendant Big Cottonwood Lower 
Canal Company, by vifcue of the said exchange contracts dated June 
27th, 1905; and also the right of said city is hereby confirmed and 
quieted to divert said water into Its said conduit for the use of 
said City and its inhabitants, during the said irrigation season, and 
also during the non-irrigation season, in the same quantities repre-
sented by the shares or sixtieths of said Big Cottonwood Creek, whicl 
are mentioned in the Findings of Ifoot herein, and which in the third 
and fourth paragraphs of this Decree are apportioned to the said Bii 
Ditch and Lower Canal, respectively* That is, from the said Big 
Ditch during said irrigation season, when the water flowing in Big 
Cottonwood Creek does not exceed 120 cubic feet of water per second 
17#1 sixtieths, and when the water flowing in said creek during said 
irrigation season exceeds 120 cubio feet per second and does not ex-
ceed 35l£ cubic feet per second 10,23 sixtieths, and during said nor 
irrigation season 15,75 sixtieths; and from said Lower Canal during 
said irrigation season when the water flowing in Big Cottonwood Cre< 
does not exceed 120 cubic feet per second 5*8 sixtieths, and when t] 
water flowing in said creek during said irrigation season exceeds 1 
cubio feet per second and does not exceed 351 & cubio feet per secon 
5.12 sixtieths, and during said non-irrigation season 5.34 sixtieth 
as apportioned in said third and fourth paragraphs hereof, and when 
the Hill ditch is entitled to have water tttrned down past the Big 
Dltoh dam to the Hill Ditch, as in the findings herein provided, tt 
Salt Lake City shall be entitled to take an equivalent quantity of 
water in lieu thereof from Big Cottonwood Creek into its conduit» J 
moreover, the title and rijgit of said Salt Lake City is hereby con 
ed and quieted to divert said water into its said conduit, for the 
uses aforesaid, against the title and right of said plaintiff and 
said Knudsen to divert the waters of said Big Cottonwood Creek int 
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the said Knudsen race whioh furnishes water to said Knudsen Power 
plant, and the said right of plaintiff and Knudsen to divert the 
waters of said creek into said race at said power plant is subse-
quent and subordinate and subjeot to the right of said Salt Lake CltyT 
to divert said waters into its said conduit for its said uses, as 
aforesaid, as well also as against each and all other parties to 
this action. And moreover, the title and rigfct^  of said Salt Lafce \^ 
City is hereby confirmed and quieted to all the waters of said Big 
Cottonwood Creek acquired by its said contract with the Hill Ditch 
owners, dated June 28, 1905, against said Hill Ditch owners, and 
each and all the parties to this action; that is, during said irriga-
tion season, when the water flowing in Big Cottonwood Creek does not 
exceed 120 cubic feet per second, 2.13 sixtieths; and when the water 
flowing in said creek during said irrigation season exceeds 120 cub-
ic feet per second and does not exceed 551 i cubic feet per second, 
1.21 sixtieths; and during said non-irrigation season, 1.96 sixtieths. 
And moreover, the right and title of said Salt Lake City is hereby 
confirmed and quieted to all and singular the reservoir sites 
and locations and reservoirs and water in said reservoirs, acquir-
ed by Salt Lake City from J.M. Thomas and H.B. Cole, the appropri-
ations and locations whereof are of the dates of February 2nd, 1900, 
and June 11th, 1900, and known as Twin Lake Gulch Reservoir, and in-
cluding Lake Mary, Lake Martha, Lake Phoebe, and Dog Lake, and des-
cribed in Finding Thirteen herein, for the purpose of storing, saving 
and impounding surplus waters for the use of Salt Lake City and the 
inhabitants thereof, not to exceed twenty (20) cubic feet per second 
of time for each of said locations and reservoirs and appropriations, 
that is to say: For Twin Lake Gulch location and reservoir, twenty 
(20) cubic feet per second; for Lake Mary location and reservoir, 
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twenty (20) cubic feet per second; for Lake Martha location and rese: 
voir twenty (20) oubic feet per seoond; for Lake Phoebe location and 
reservoir, twenty (20) cubic feet per second; for Dog Lake location 
and reservoir, twenty {20) cubic feet per second, during such time a 
may be necessary to keep such reservoirs full, and to release, diver 
and commingle the waters so stored, with the water of said creek, 
and to recover and divert it, and to fLow the same down said creek 
into Salt Lake Cityfs conduit for its use and the use of its inhabi-
tants. And moreover the right and title of said Salt Lake City is 
hereby confirmed and quieted, and it is hereby adjudged to have the 
right to divert and use for its beneficial uses aforesaid, during 
the said non-irrigation season of each year, forty-eight and eight-
tenths (48.8) cubic feet per seoond of the surplus waters of said^ 
Big Cottonwood Creek, whenever in said non-irrigation season there i 
flowing in said creek water in excess of that awarded in this decree 
to all the other parties to this action, under and by virtue of tfre 
said Salt Lake Cltyys appropriation and looatlon thereof. as eviden 
ed by the certificate of the State Engineer of Utah, dated October 
21st. A.D. 1908, and mentioned in Finding Thirteen of the said 
Findings of Fact herein. 
SIXEH. 
That the title and right of defendant B.B. Bitner is hereby 
confirmed and quieted to divert and use so much of the water from t 
Hill Ditch as shall be necessary to fill his ice ponds during the 
season for making ice, so arranging the intake and outlet to and 
from said ponds as that the waters not frozen into ice shall retun 
to the Hill Ditch. 
SEVENTH,. 
That the right and title of the defendant Utah Light and 
Railway Company is hereby confirmed and quieted to take all the wa 
tars of said Big Cottonwood Creek for power generating purposes, a 
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a point approximately one thousand (1000) feet above what is known 
as "The Stairs", and to convey such water through its pipes and flumes 
to its power plant, returning such water to said creek above the in-
take of the said conduit of Salt Lake City, and above the head of the 
Brown & Sanford ditch undiminished in quantity and unimpaired in qual-
ity. Provided, that sufficient water shall arise in the bed of the 
stream to supply the amount awarded to the Butler Ditch, and in the 
event there is not sufficient for this purpose arising in the bed of 
the stream, then sufficient shall be allowed to flow down the stream 
for the purpose of supplying the amount awarded to the Butler Ditch. 
EIGHTH. 
That the right and title of the defendants John Branborg and 
B. Gustave Branborg and John C. Barnard is hereby confirmed and quitt-
ed to take and use all the waters flowing from the Meadow Tunnel, 
the Gustave Adolph Tunnel, and the Clara N» Tunnel in Big Cottonwood 
Canyon, and to conduct the said waters through ditches constructed 
by them into said Big Cottonwood Creek, and to commingle the waters 
of said tunnels with the waters of said creek, and to measure said 
tunnel waters at the points where they are commingled with the waters 
of said Creek; and to retake and recover said tunnel waters at a 
point lower down said creek, for the purpose of using the said tun-
nel waters for irrigating land adjacent to said creek or for other 
useful purposes, deducting, however, from said tunnel water so com-
mingled and flowed down the creek, ten per cent, thereof, on account 
of loss by seepage and evaporation in so commingling, flowing, retak-
ing and recovering the same. 
NINTH. 
That the right and title of Richard D. Maxfield Is hereby con-
firmed and quieted to divert and use from said Big Cottonwood Creek 
water for culinary and domestic purposes, at his residejigfl near what 
is called "The Stairs'1; and his right and title is also hereby con-
firmed and quieted to divert from said creek and use one (1) cubic 
foot of water per second of tiae one day in every ten days 
to 
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i rr iga te seven aores of land during the period only, however, when tb 
volume of water flowing in said creek exceeds one hundred andjtwenty 
(ljJO) oubio f ee t per second of time, as provided and determined in th 
f indings here in . 
TENTH 
That the defendants Charles Heberer, ^ i ld redHeberer , 
Delia Clays, Kate Farrington, William C. Ri t t er , and Charles 
_ — . ' _ _ _ _ _ _ _ — . • _ _ ^ _ — ^ 
Hitter, are not, nor is either of them entitled to a Decree 
or to any relief whatever in this action, and their answer_and 
counter claim herein is hereby dismissed. 
ELEVENTH. 
That the rights and titles of 0,W. Sowers, William 
H- Brighton, Mary W. Critohlow, Anna M. Lowe, Franklin Webb, 
William C. Hall, Richard W. Young,J.H. Brown, Elmer E. Dar-
ling, T.D. Lewis, Neri Butler, Caroline Flowers, Will Reece, 
Horace C, Whitney, Emarette S.W. Pyper, J.T.Crorall, M.H» 
Walker, D,F. Walker, S.S. Walker Estate Company, the Estate 
of J.R. Walker, deceased, Janet Rogers, John T. Buckle,Julia E. 
Rawlins, Adelaide Hampton,Myron G. Brooks, Kate J. Lawrence 
Young, Rosina Godbe, E.W. Druce, I.M. E. Anderson, Samuel 
McNutt, George F. Goodwin, Frank Knox, Caroline Sadler, Catherine 
A. Brockbank, Florence D. Morris, Robert A. Brighton, The Great 
Western Gold & Copper Mining Company, John Dubei, Robert T« O&ell, 
James H« Moyle, Emma S. Ellerbeok, Sarah E. Kiarriok, J.M. Thomas, 
H.B. Cole and Anna Hooper Caine, and of each and all of them, are 
hereby confirmed and quieted to divert and use, sufficient water 
from said Big Cottonwood Creek during the months of June, July, 
August and September of each year, for their culinary and domestic 
purposes at the cottage of each of them, respectively, at and near 
Brighton or Silver Lake; all waters not used to be returned to sai 
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for irrigating about twenty aorea of meadow land situated in the 
West half of the Northwest Ouarter of Section 35, Township 2 South, 
Range 3 East of the Salt Lake Meridian, or other useful purposes. 
FOURTEENTH. 
That the right and title of the Mountain Lake Mining 
Company is hereby conflimed and quieted to divert and use the 
waters of said Big Cottonwood Creek for culinary and domestic 
purposes. 
FIFTEENTH. 
That the rights and titles of Frank E. Bagley and E.C. 
Bagley are hereby confirmed and quieted to divert and use 
water from the Bear Trap Fork and Willow Patch Fork and Silver 
Spring Fork, tributaries of said Big Cottonwood Creek, for 
watering stock and for culinary and domestic purposes, that is, 
sufficient water for the watering of two hundred and fifty (250) 
head of horses and cattle grazing on lands owned by said defend-
ants, adjacent to said tributaries, and to supply the camps of 
defendants maintained on said lands with water for culinary and 
domestio purposes, from the first day of June to the first day of 
November in each year. And for the purpose of using said waters 
as aforesaid, defendants may divert from each of said forks or 
tributaries, not to exceed one cubic foot per second of water, and 
run or convey the same through their said lands in proper ditches 
or conduits; provided, however, that the waters thus diverted and 
conveyed, which are not consumed in the watering of said live 
stock, and at said camps as aforesaid, shall be flowed back or 
returned into said Big Cottonwood Creek or its proper natural trib 
utaries or tributary, without waste, contamination or pollution, 
and unimpaired in quality. 
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SIXTEENTH. 
That the rights and titles of H.<U Bagley, J.W. Boyce, 
Isaac Ferguson, Isaac Ferguson Jr., George A, Boyce, Thomas H. 
Pierce, Alexander Dahl, Charles Reynolds, William Reynolds, Asa 
Reynolds, William Boyce, Brighara Smith, John B. Hanson,Joseph 
Hobbs, William W. Smith, J.C. Walker, Frederick Ungrioht, Ray 
Huffaker, Johanna A« Tarpey and Grant C. Bagley, and eaoh and all 
of them are hereby confirmed and quieted to divert and use in 
severalty, water during said non-irrigation season from Spring 
Creek, for culinary, domestic and fish-pond purposes; and during 
said irrigation season six (6) oubic feet per second, for the 
irrigation of about three hundred and sixty (360) acres of land 
owned in severalty by said parties, lying in Sections 8, 9, 16 
and 17, in Township 2 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian, on 
the South side of the natural channel of said Big Cottonwood Creek, 
and near the head waters of said Spring Creek. 
SEVENTEENTH. 
That the right and title of defendant Alice E. Moyle is 
hereby confirmed and quieted to divert and use the waters from 
the springs and seeps located upon the land owned by her in Section 
16, Township 2 South, Range 1 East, SaltLake Base and Meridian, for 
irrigation, culinary, domestic and stock purposes, and for the 
purpose of raising fish. 
EIGHTEENTH. 
That the right and title of defendant Mary J. Miller is 
hereby confirmed and quieted to divert and use from the waters 
of Spring Creek for irrigation, culinary, domestic and fish 
culture purposes, one (1) cubic foot per second thereof; one-
half of siid one second foot of water may be diverted at a point 
about 200 yards west of the State Fish Hatchery No. 1, in Section 8 
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Township 2 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian, and the 
other half thereof at the intersection of 17th South and 9th. 
East Streets of said Salt Lake City, where said Spring Creek oomes 
to and flov/s northerly along said 9th East Street, 
NINETEENTH. 
That the rights and titles of defendants Charles A. 
Harper and James A, Taylor; and of Andrew Jensen, and Mary 
Knudsen and Catherine Grantor and Margaret Poulson; and of Frank 
Walker and Milo Andrus and J.M. Piepgrass; and of L.S. Hills, 
and each and all of them are hereby confirmed and quieted as 
follows: 
The said Charles A. Harper and James A* Taylor each, 
respectively, to take and use two-fifths (2/5) of the 
waters which by this Decree are awarded to the Harper 
& Taylor Ditch; 
The said Ahdrew Jensen to take and use one-fifth 
(1/5) of the said water of the said Harper & Taylor Ditch 
during his lifetime, and at his death, said Mary Knudsen, 
Catherine Grantor and Margaret Poulson, each to have an 
undivided one-third of said one-fifth; 
And moreover, out of the waters by this decree awarded 
to the said Farr & Harper Ditch „ 
The said Charles A« Harper to take and use twenty-four 
and one-half sixty-fourths (24^/64) thereof; 
The said Frank Walker, twenty sixty-fourths (20/64) 
thereof; 
The said Milo Andrus, seven sixty-fourths (7/64) 
thereof; 
The said J.M.Piepgrass, seven and one-half sixty-
fourths (7^/64) thereof; 
The said L.S. Hills, five sixty-fourths (5/64) 
thereof. 
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TWEWTIETH. 
That the r ights and t i t l e s of said defendants Jul ia 
Gunderson; and Clesson S. Kinney and Robert Green; and Lawrence 
Romney; and Victoria Romney; and Jennie A. Froi3eth, and each of 
them to take and use the water by t h i s Decree awarded to the 
said Upper El l i son Ditch, are hereby confirmed and quieted to 
them, as fo l lows: 
The said Julia Gunderson to take and use a l l of 
the waters in said Upper E l l i son Ditch for i r r i g a t i o n 
purposes , nineteen and two-tenths (19.2) hours in each 
e ight days during said i rr iga t ion season; 
The said Clesson S. Kinney and Robert Green, j o i n t l y , 
t o take and use a l l of the same for ty - f ive (45) hours in 
each e ight days; 
The said Lawrence Romney to take and use a l l of the 
same thirty-two and f i f t y - f i v e one-hundredths (32.55) 
hours in each eight days; 
The said Victoria Romney t o take and use a l l of the 
same nineteen and two-tenths (19.2) hours in each e ight days; 
The said Jennie A. Froiseth to take and use a l l of the 
same seventy-s ix and f ive one-hundredths (76.05) hours in 
each e ight days; 
a l l during the i r r i g a t i o n season aforesa id . 
TWENTY-FIRST. 
That the r ights and t i t l e s of defendant MarjrJTudge ; of 
Clesson S. Kinney and Robert Gggen; of Joseph Marriott; of Jul ia 
Levi and Georgenne Gunderson, and each of them are hereby confirm-
ed and quieted to take and use the waters by th i s decree awarded 
to the said Lower E l l i s o n Ditch, for i r r i g a t i o n , cul inary, doioestic 
and other useful purposes, in the following proportions, to wi t : 
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The said Mary Judge, one-fourth (1 /4) thereof; 
The said Clesson S. Kinney and Robert Green, j o i n t l y 
one-fourth (1 /4) thereof; 
The said Joseph Marriott, one-fourth (1 /4 ) 
thereof; 
The said J u l i a , Levi and Georgenne Gundersoh, 
j o i n t l y , one fourth (1 /4) thereof, 
TWENTy*SECOND. 
That none of the other part ies to t h i s act ion are 
e n t i t l e d to any decree or r e l i e f whatever here in . 
That each and a l l of the part ies to t h i s ac t ion , and 
the ir respect ive h e i r s , executors , administrators , grantees, age 
successors and a s s i g n s , be and they are hereby perpetually enjo l 
and refrained from in any manner interfer ing with any of the 
r ights to the use of any of the waters herein awarded and decree 
t o any of the other part ies t o t h i s s u i t . And each party hereto 
sha l l pay h i s or i t s own c o s t s , 
TWENTY-THIRD 
And i t i s further ordered, adjudged and decreed that 
for the purpose of carrying in to effecfc t h i s decree, according 
t o i t s true intent and purpose, a commissioner of t h i s court be 
appointed to supervise and -regulate the proper measurement, d iv 
s ion and d i s tr ibut ion of the waters herein awarded t o the said 
eral part i e s to th i s deoree according t o the terms and requires 
thereof, and to d i rec t , supervise and inspect a l l meana and app 
ances for the d ivers ion, conveyance and use of the waters of aa 
Big Cottonwood Creek, and report t o the Court from time to tiro 
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any violation of the provisions of this Deoree; and T,F, McDonald 
is hereby appointed such commissioner, 
TWEIOT-FOURTH 
That this Court shall and does hereby retain its original 
jurisdiction over this cause and the subject matter thereof and 
the said parties to this Deoree, for the purpose of hereafter 
making suoh supplemental orders and decrees as shall be found 
necessary to authorize and enable said commissioner or the sever-
al parties to this Decree, to divert and use the waters of said 
Big Cottonwood Creek herein awarded to them respectively, accord-
ing to their respective rights; and to prevent unnecessary waste, 
pollution or contamination thereof; and to authorize and enable 
said commissioner, or said parties, to install and maintain such 
proper diverting dams, measuring weirs, and other appliances and 
improvements as shall be found necessary to effect the proper con-
trol, diversion and distribution of the waters of said creek among 
the several parties hereto, according to the true intent, meaning, 
terms, and requirements of this Decree; and to ascertain and deter-
mine the reasonable cost of the same; and to apportion such reason-
able cost and expense thereof, between or among such of the par-
ties hereto, as ought in equity to bear the same; and to make 
all orders and decrees herein that may be necessary to render 
effectual the rights awarded and preserved by this decree; 
Done in open court this 15th day of April A.D. 1914. 
ATTEST; 
/s/ L.P. PALMER-Clerk 
By William Groesbeck 
Deputy Clerk 
/s/ C,W. Morse _ 
Judge of sqid District Court, 
EXHIBIT D 
APPLICATION FOR PERMANENT CHANGE 
RECtlVtD
 Q F W A T E R Rcc. by. 
JUL Ob 2006 FeeWd$ 
0 , ^ W T S STATE OF UTAH _>,,» 
WATER BIGHTS 
For the purpoiSAWinnigpermrssion to make a permanent change of water in the State of Utah, application is hereby made to the State 
Engineer, base J upon the following showing of facts, submitted in accordance with the requirements of Section 73-3-3 Utah Code 
Annotated 1953. as amended. 
•WATER RIGHT NO. •APPLICATION NO. a 
Changes are proposed in (check those applicable) 
point of diversion. place of use. nature of use. period of use. 
1. OWNER INFORMATION ^ J ffifc *$ TtfW^5*" 
Name: rW<i fiihU H r r i y f t i o / N d h w p 9 n v ^ " ^ •Interest: JOO 
Address: 1.Q11 & \1\D^ -Sfrn -
City: S p f l i f M ^ f v ? r k State: O X Zip Code: 9%QO 
2. •PRIORITY OF CHANGE: _ • FILING DATE: 
• I s this change amendatory (Yes/No): ___ 
RIGHT EVIDENCED BY: b ^ K t J y l / A C ^ ^ W ^ r A 
Prior Approved Change Applications for this right:_ 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • H E R E T O F O R E * ^ * * * ^ * * ^ * ; * * * * * * * ^ ^ 
4. QUANTITY OF WATER: cfs and/or O ~7ft"/ 4.7HO>L( ac-ft. 
5. SOURCE: S A a W X*\ ~v*>Q \<L g f l v C t e x - ^ V A 
6. COUNTY: S f t U L a f a * C . A ^ ^ 
7. POINT(S) OF DIVERSION: ^ fl\^j' W S ^ ' ( V o ^ MC Lbr- S % T Z S , R < r 
Description of Diverting Works: __-__ 
?. POINT(S) OF REDIVERSION 
The water has been rediverted from at the point: 
Description of Diverting Works:_ 
POINT(S) OF RETURN 
The amount of water consumed is cfs or ac-ft. 
The amount of water returned is cfs or ac-ft. 
The water has been returned to die natural stream/source at a poinds): 
hese items are to be completed by the Division of Water Rights. 
10. NATURE AND PERIOD OF USE 
Irrigation: 
Stockwatcnng: 
Domestic: 
Municipal: 
Mining: 
Power: 
Other 
U. PURPOSE AND EXTENT OF USE 
Irrigation: 
Stockwatering (number and kind):_ 
Domestic: 
From A^AXL- to JQcfcJL 
From 
From 
From 
From 
From 
From 
/ / 
/ / 
/ / 
/ / 
/ / 
/ / 
to 
to 
to 
to 
to 
to 
/ 
/ / 
/ / 
t / 
/ / 
/ / 
_acres. Sole supply of T H V > f "7 H %• ° % f... <t acres. 
Families and/or Persons. 
Mining: 
Ores mined: 
Power: Plant name: 
Other (describe): 
_  Mining District in the 
type: Capacity: 
mine. 
12. PLACE OF USE 
Legal description of place of use by 40acre traces): _ 5 W frvl fp f t+jxrx' o f f i faA *Tijl{fi)f"2CCfcs 
13. STORAGE 
Reservoir Name: 
Capacity: 
p Storage Period: from m to 
Height of Dam: 
Legal description of inundated area by 40 traces): 
ac-ft. Inundated Area: 
feet 
acres. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • T H E FOLLOWLNG CHANGES ARE P R O P O S E D ^ * * * * * * * * * * * * * * ^ * * 
14. QUANTITY OF WATER: cfs* 
15. SOURCE: f>-€^ Af^f. • k*»A f - y x J C W liY. \\^ 
Balance of the water will be abandoned: _ , or will be us( 
« * * ^ ? ^ " ? ?. ltf° l< ac-a 
sed as heretofore: 
16. COUNTY: 9^3 \\ Lg V,<, P O / M J 
17. POINTO) OF DIVERSION: c^p ^\\xc\r*k 
Inscription of Diverting Works:__ 
•COMMON DESCRIPTION: _ 
18. POlNT(S) OF REDI VERSION 
The water will be rediverted from at the point: 
Description of Diverting Works: 
19. POiNT(S) OF RETURN 
The amount of water to be consumed is 
The amount of water to be returned is 
cfs or _ 
CfS0T 
The water will be returned to the natural stream/source at a point(s): 
ac-ft. 
" ac-ft. 
20. NATURE AND PERIOD OF USE 
Irrigation: 
Stockwatering: 
Domestic: 
Municipal: 
Mining: 
Power: 
Other: 
21. PURPOSE AND EXTENT OF USE 
Irrigation: 
From flf H i U - t 0 -QcA J - ' . 
* 
From i 
From 
From 
From t 
From I 
From 1 
( 1 
t t 
f 1 
f t 
t 
1 
to 
to i 
to i 
to i 
to J 
to 1 
t / 
f
 / 
' 
/ 
' I 
1 
acres. Sole supply 
Stockwatering (number and kind). 
Domestic: 
or ~>Hg\H J £f %> O o acres. 
Families and/or 
Municipal (name): R , t w * f n v N f . f h / (*Hf?.<e, l e - f r y ^ 
Mining: ^ Mining Distnct at the _ 
Ores mined: 
Power. Plant name: 
Other (describe): 
.Type: 
22. PLACE OF USE 
Legal description of place of use by 40acre tract(s): l? f t r f j r f c v y ^ \ j\jt \ 
_ Capacity: 
Persons. 
Mine. 
23. STORAGE 
Reservoir Name: 
Capacity: 
Height of danr 
Storage Period: from _ 
ac-ft. Inundated Area: 
feet 
Legal description of inundated area by 40 traces): 
to 
acres. 
L EXPLANATORY 
The following is set forth to define more clearly the full purpose of this application. Include any supplemental water rights 
used for the same purpose. (Use additional pages of same size if necessary): ^>e.-g Flffcr w C { -
t * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * ^ 
undersigned hereby acknowledges that even mough be/shc/they may have been assisted in the preparation of the above-
ibered application through the courtesy of the employees of the Division of Water Rights, all responsibility for the accuracy of 
nformarion contained herein, at the time of filing, rests with the applicants). 
mire of Applicants) 
tS.bi.c . 
Signature of Ap] 
SI-.*. 
Attached Sheet for Permanent Change Application for Big Ditch Irrigation Company 
Ownership: 
c/o President Garside 
Big Ditch Irrigation Company 
2077 East 1710 South 
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 
J L.C. 
327 North 200 East U2 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
666.025 shares of 1,760 = 3,740.4 acre-feet (5.616 acre-feet of irrigation per share) for the sole 
supply of 748.08 acres 
Based on: 
Data Source: Water Year 1899 thru 1950-SaIt Lake City Engineer 
Using the average figure for 51 years 
9,884.153 minimum guaranteed delivery amount for irrigation. 
Area of Use: 2,400 acres in Murray, Holladay, South Salt Lake, Salt Lake County. See map and 
letter dated July 8,2005. 
Point of Diversion Big Ditch: 
South 2151 feet West 595 feet from NE corner. Section 09. T 2South. Ranee 1 East SLBM 
HEREAFTER: 
Quantity of water: 3,740.4 acre-feet for the sole supply of 748.08 acres 
Points of Diversion 
From existing nine 16- inch diameter wells. 40 to 130 feet deep, Located: (1) North 1290 feet 
and East 2765 feet. (2) North 1930 feet and East 2500 feet. (3) North 2800 feet and East 2160 
feet. (4) North 3500 feet and East 2500 feet (5) North 4650 feet and East 2760 feet. (6) North 
5310 feet and East 3300 feet all from the SW Corner of Section 26. (7) South 770 feet and East 
1490 feet. (8) South 360 feet and East 1680 feet. (9) South 370 feet and East 2390 feet all three 
from the NW Corner of Section 26, all in T3S, Rl W, SLB&M. The water is to be used for 
irrigation purposes in Riverton City Service Area. 
Explanatory: 
This application is based on water after it is to delivered to the Big Ditch Irrigation Company 
(BDIC) after which the water shall be delivered back into the Big Cottonwood Creek and/or the 
Jordan River to administer the change. This application is based on BDICs right to use water 
granted under that certain contract with Salt Lake City (SLC), and not upon BDIC's original 
water right represented by 57-10349 for 16,000+ acre-feet with a market value of $92,000,000. 
BDIC owns the reversion rights to 57-10349. Based on SLC water fees, BDIC estimates that its 
exchange partner SLC receives up to $9,000,000+ per year in potential water revenues. BDIC is 
currently the sole owner _of the right to use the water under that certain contract with SLC. 
Because the proposed calculations are based on the amount of water that is a guaranteed 
jnmimum* it is not subject to changejrom year to year except that the amount may be more than 
the minimum guaranteed by the contract which would be more than the amount proposed under 
this change. While the ability to use water under these types of changes would allow BDIC 
about a 25% partial equivalent benefit of the value it traded, without changes BDIC would 
receive virtually no equivalent benefit This application excludes any water available during th 
non-irrigation season. 
EXHIBIT E 
APPLICATION FOR PERMANENT CHANGE 
OF WATER ***_<*_ 
FceAmt.$425JJ0. 
STATE OF UTAH Receipt # OtyWl jQO^ 
or the purpose of obtaining permission to make a permanent change of water in the State of Utah, application is hereby made to the State 
ngineer, based upon the following showing of facts, submitted in accordance with the requirements of Section 73-3-3 Utah Code 
nnotated 1953, as amended. 
CHANGE APPLICATION NUMBER: Q^lflf/fn WATER RIGHT NUMBER: 57-10371 
(C4572WKNIGHT) ^ 1 l i t / - / 
c***************ick************k*kk*kkkk 
This Change Application proposes to change the NATURE OF USE 
-kick******* ******************* k***W*************^^ A A A A A A A"A"A*"A A A A A A * A A A A * • • 
OWNERSHIP INFORMATION. QETPPIX/FD 
A. NAME: Big Ditch I r r igat ion Company ' " 
ADDRESS: c/o Jim Garside. President / , , SEP 2 1 2006 
2077 East 1710 South 5 _
 Q i r . W T s 
Spanish Fork. Utah 84660 W C A L T L / S < E 
B. PRIORITY OF CHANGE: FILING DATE: 
C. EVIDENCED BY: 
59- 10371. a portion of 57-10370. Based on an agreement between BOIC and SLC dated June 27. 1906 
Based on 1 share Big Ditch Irrigation Company stock. 
* * 
* DESCRIPTION OF CURRENT WATER RIGHT: * 
* * 
SOURCE INFORMATION. 
A. QUANTITY OF WATER: 5.616 acre-feet 
J. SOURCE: Contract water in the BDIC carrier system COUNTY: Salt Lake 
'. POINT(S) OF DIVERSION. 
POINT OF DIVERSION -- SURFACE: 
(1) S 2.151 feet W 595 feet from NE corner. Section 09. T 2$. R IE. SLBM 
VTER USE INFORMATION. 
RIGATION: from Apr 1 to Oct 31. IRRIGATING: 1.1232 acres. 
CHANGE APPLICATION NUMBER: for Water Right: 57-10371 (C4572WKNIGHT) Page: 2 
4. PLACE OF USE. 
(Which includes all or part of the following legal subdivisions:) 
BASE TOWN RANG SEC 
SL IS 
SL IS 
IE 06 
08 
09 
30 
31 
32 
33 
IW 241 
25 
35 
36 
1 NORTH-WEST^ NORTH-EAST^ SOUTH-WEST]* SOUTH-EAST^ 
[NW NE SW SE NW NE SW SE NW NE SW SE NW NE SW SE 
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X 
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X 
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x X 
X 
X 
1 X 
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X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X| X| 
x 
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 X 
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x 
x 
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X 
X 
X 
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X| 
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 X 
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X| 
x 
1 * * * 
*** 
*** 
•kick 
•kirk 
irk* 
•kirk 
•kick. 
*** 
*** 
* ** 
x 
x 
1 x X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X| 
x 
x 
x 
x 
I x X 
X 
X| 
X 
x 
x X 
! X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
x 
x 
x 
x JO 
Xi 
1 X 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
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*_ 
* * 
-* 
THE FOLLOWING CHANGES ARE PROPOSED: 
COUNTY: Salt Lake 
5. SOURCE INFORMATION. 
A. QUANTITY OF WATER: 5.616 acre-feet 
B. SOURCE: Contract water in the BDIC carrier system 
C. POINT(S) OF DIVERSION. Same as HERETOFORE. 
D. COMMON DESCRIPTION: BDIC service area 
6. WATER USE INFORMATION. Changed as Follows: 
OTHER: from Apr 1 to Oct 31. Duck habitat, ponds 
7. PLACE OF USE. 
8. EXPLANATORY. 
Same as HERETOFORE. 
Big Ditch Irrigation Company (BDIC) seeks to comply with title 73 on the uses 
of its water. 
CHANGE APPLICATION NUMB. for Water Right: 5 | .0371 (C4572WKNIGHT) Page: 3 
9. SIGNATURE OF APPLICANt(S). 
The undersigned hereby acknowledges that even though he/she/they may have been assisted 
in the preparation of the above-numbered application, through the courtesy of the 
employees of the Division of Water Rights, all responsibility for the accuracy of the 
information contained herein, at the time of filing, rests with the applicant(s). 
t&m'«-
EXHIBIT F 
APPLICATIONTOR TEMPORARY CHANGE 
OF WATER ^ * J ^ _ 
Fee Aim, $.$25^)0 
STATE OF UTAH ^*&zcm> 
r the purpose of obtaining permission to make a temporary change of water in the State of Utah, application is hereby made to the State 
gineer, based upon the following showing of facts, submitted in accordance with the requirements of Section 73-3-3 Utah Code 
notated 1953, as amended. 
mG£ APPLICATION N U M B E R : \ J $ J O ? P WATER RIGHT NUMBER: 57-10370 
(C4860JAUSICK) 
This Change Application proposes to change the POINT(S) OF DIVERSION and PLACE OF USE. 
OWNERSHIP INFORMATION. RECEIVED 
A. NAME: Big Ditch Irrigation Company &DFr i o orv« 
ADDRESS: c/o Jim Garside. President ^ tw ' ° <wS 
2077 East 1710 South W A T E R fi/ru-ro 
Spanish Fork. Utah 84660 SALT LAKE 
8. PRIORITY OF CHANGE: FILING DATE: 
:. EVIDENCED BY: 
57-10370 
* 
DESCRIPTION OF CURRENT WATER RIGHT: * 
_ * 
URCE INFORMATION. 
QUANTITY OF WATER: 2.808 acre-feet 
SOURCE: Contract water in the BDIC carrier system COUNTY: Salt Lake 
POINT(S) OF DIVERSION. 
POINT OF DIVERSION -- SURFACE: 
(1) S 2.151 feet W 595 feet from ME corner. Section 09. T 2S. R IE. SLBM 
R USE INFORMATION. 
light represented by this change application is SUPPLEMENTAL to other Water Rights. 
ATION: from Apr 1 to Oct 31. IRRIGATING: 0.5616 acres. 
tliANGE APPLICATION NUMBER: for Water Right: 57-10370 Tc4860JAUSICK) Page: 2 
4 . PLACE OF USE. (Which includes all or part of the following legal subdivisions:) 
BASE TOWN RANG SEC 
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-* 
THE FOLLOWING CHANGES ARE PROPOSED: 
SOURCE INFORMATION. 
A. QUANTITY OF WATER: 2.808 acre-feet 
B. SOURCE: Jordan River 
C. POINT(S) OF DIVERSION. Changed as Follows: 
COUNTY: Salt Lake 
POINT OF DIVERSION -• SURFACE: 
(1) N 275 feet E 840 feet from SW corner. Section 14. T IS. R IW. SLBM 
POINTS OF REDIVERSION: 
(1) S 800 feet W 1.280 feet from N>4 corner. Section 13. T 1N&.R 2W. SLBM 
(2) S 1.320 feet W 1.450 feet from l\ corner. Section 13. T IN; R 2W, SLBM 
D. COMMON DESCRIPTION: Ambassador Duck Club. NSL 
6. WATER USE INFORMATION. Same as HERETOFORE. 
OTHER: from Jan 1 to Dec 31. Duck club uses and irrigation purposes 
7. PLACE OF USE. Changed as Follows: 
(Which includes all or part of the following legal subdivisions:) 
BASE TOWN RANG SEC 
SL IN 2W 02 
03 
04 
09 
NORTH-WEST^ NORTH-EASTk SOUTH-WEST!* SOUTH-EAST^ 
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* * * 
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CHANGE APPLICATION NUMBt .. for Water Right: 5 0370 (C4860JAUSICK) Page: 3 
101 Xj Xj X| Xj***l XI XI XI X|***[ X| XI 1 Xj***[ XI X] XI XI 
3. SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT(S). 
The undersigned hereby acknowledges that even though he/she/they may have been assisted 
in the preparation of the above-numbered application, through the courtesy of the 
employees of the Division of Water Rights, all responsibility for the accuracy of the 
information contained herein, at the time of filing, rests with the applicant(s). i nerein. ai tne Lime OT Tiling, rests wiu 
] B i g Ditth Irrigation Company 
CigAA^s^Z 
Thicd Juoiciai ui9u.v% 
APR 1 6 2007 
A SALT LAKE COUNTY J 
Deputy Cleric 
PHILLIP E. LOWRY (6603), and 
ELIJAH L. MILNE (11171), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, P.C. 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 1248 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Our File No. 28499-2 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, a Utah 
municipal corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BIG DITCH IRRIGATION COMPANY, a 
Utah nonprofit corporation, JAMES 
GARSIDE, J.L.C, a Utah limited liability 
company, RYAN LITKE, LYNE DOWNS, 
and JOHN DOES 1 through 10, 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANTS' ANSWER, 
COUNTERCLAIMS, 
AND JURY DEMAND 
Case No. 070903735 
Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
Defendants answer Plaintiffs Complaint as follows: 
DEFENSE I 
The Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 
DEFENSE II 
Defendants answer the numbered allegations of Plaintiff s Complaint as follows: 
1. Admit. 
2. Admit that Big Ditch Irrigation Company ("BDIC") is a mutual water company. Deny 
that there are any geographical restrictions upon BDIC water. 
3. Admit as to the identity of the Defendant. Otherwise, deny. 
4. Admit as to the identity of the Defendant. Otherwise, deny. 
5. Admit as to the identity of the Defendant. Otherwise, deny. 
6. Admit as to the identity of the Defendant. Otherwise, deny. 
7. Deny. 
8. Deny. 
9. Admit the existence of a 1905 Contract, but deny any characterization thereof. The 
ocument speaks for itself. 
10. Admit the existence of a Decree, but deny any characterization thereof. The document 
>eaks for itself. 
11. Deny. 
12. Admit the point of diversion is specified, but deny balance of allegation. 
13. Deny. 
14. Deny. 
2 
15. Deny. 
16. Paragraph 16 is not present in the Complaint. 
17. Deny. 
18. Deny. Further, dispute the pejorative and conclusive language "Speculators" used 
here and throughout the Complaint. 
19. Deny. 
20. Deny. 
21. Deny. 
22. Deny. 
23. Deny. The document speaks for itself. 
24. Deny. 
25. Admit. 
26. Admit protest was filed, but deny any characterization thereof. 
27. Admit hearing was held, but deny any characterization thereof. 
28. Admit. 
29. Deny. 
30. Deny. 
31. Deny. 
32. Defendant incorporates by reference paragraphs 1-31. 
3 
33. Deny. 
34. Deny, 
35. Deny. 
36. Deny. 
37. Deny. 
38. Deny. 
3 9. Defendant incorporates by reference paragraphs 1-38. 
40. Deny. 
41. Deny. 
42. Deny. 
43. Deny. 
44. Defendant incorporates by reference paragraphs 1-43. 
45. Deny. 
46. Deny. 
47. Deny. 
48. Deny for lack of knowledge. 
49. Deny. 
DEFENSE III 
Defendants affirmatively set forth the defense of estoppel. 
4 
DEFENSE IV 
Defendants affirmatively set forth the defense of waiver. 
DEFENSE V 
Defendants affirmatively set forth the defense of laches. 
DEFENSE VI 
Defendants affirmatively set forth the defense of unclean hands. 
DEFENSE VII 
This Court lacks jurisdiction over this matter. Pursuant to the 1914 Decree, which Decree 
was obtained at Plaintiff s request, all matters relating to water rights in Area 57 must be adjudicated 
as part of the general adjudication—not as part of a specific adjudication—in order to avoid 
conflicting or disputable claims of water rights. Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to give a 
declaratory judgment in favor of Plaintiff 
DEFENSE VIII 
Plaintiffs third cause of action, wherein Plaintiff alleges slander of title, is without merit and 
not brought or asserted in good faith; consequently, Defendants are entitled to an award of 
reasonable attorney fees under section 78-27-56 of the Utah Code. 
In paragraph 13 of its Complaint, Plaintiff recognizes that the 1905 Contract granted BDIC 
a reversionary interest in the rights BDIC conveyed to Plaintiff. In light of the fact that a cause of 
action for slander of title requires that a party knowingly record or publish an untrue statement, 
5 
Plaintiffs claim of slander of title must fail because the 1905 Contract clearly grants, as admitted 
by Plaintiff, a reversionary interest in the rights BDIC conveyed to Plaintiff. 
DEFENSE IX 
As shareholders or officers of BDIC, Defendants James Garside, J.L.C., Ryan Litke, and 
Layne Downs are protected by the corporate shield doctrine and, consequently, cannot be sued in 
their individual capacities. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, Defendants pray that: 
1. Plaintiffs Complaint be dismissed with prejudice; 
2. Defendants be awarded their costs and attorney fees incurred herein, pursuant to 
aragraph 8 of the 1905 Contract and section 78-27-56 of the Utah Code; and 
3. Defendants be awarded the relief sought for in the Counterclaims below. 
COUNTERCLAIMS 
Defendants complain and allege as follows: 
1. In the event this Court determines that it has jurisdiction over the allegations raised 
the Complaint, then this Court also has jurisdiction over the following Counterclaims arising out 
he 1905 Contract and 1914 Decree. 
2. The 1905 Contract expressly states that Plaintiff is required to provide an equivalent 
5.5% of the water flowing in the Big Cottonwood Creek to Defendants from April through 
6 
October of each year, as well as 1/60 of the water flowing in the Big Cottonwood Creek during the 
remainder of each year, provided that such amount shall never exceed thirty-five cubic feet per 
second (the "Defendants' Allotment"). 
3. There is no mention in the 1905 Contract of a historical service area or any similar 
language. 
4. Plaintiff has not provided Defendants with the water referred to in the 1905 Contract. 
5. The 1905 Contract states that in the event Plaintiff fails to comply with it, Defendants 
shall take immediate right and title to the water. 
6. Plaintiff owns rights to far more water than it beneficially uses; Plaintiff has held such 
rights for many years. 
7. Plaintiff is unreasonably wasting approximately 600,000 acre-feet of water. 
8. In the past fifteen years, Plaintiff has pumped less than 2% of the well rights it owns. 
9. Plaintiff currently holds more water than it could reasonably use by the year 2050. 
10. The rights that Plaintiff holds to the water that is not beneficially used are wasted and 
lost by Plaintiff. 
11. This loss does not constitute an alienation, sale, or disposal of such rights. 
12. The water rights that Plaintiff loses do not adversely impact Plaintiffs ability to 
provide water for its inhabitants now or in the future. 
7 
13. The water that Plaintiff held under color of right, but for which Plaintiff has already 
lost rights because of Plaintiff s failure to put such water to beneficial use, cannot be legally used 
to satisfy the requirements of the 1905 Contract. 
14. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff owns or controls over 99% of the water rights 
in Big Cottonwood Creek. 
15. Plaintiff is unreasonably hoarding Utah's water. 
16. Plaintiff is engaging in water speculation. 
17. Plaintiff has perpetuated a water monopoly intended to reduce competition in 
Area 57. 
18. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff uses its water rights to control building permits 
md zoning requests outside of its city limits. 
19. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff seeks to purchase land in areas outside of its 
ity limits after denying landowners water services. 
20. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff has inflated the cost of water. 
21. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff has used anti-competitive practices to purchase 
iter shares in companies with which it holds exchange contracts. 
22. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff has made false and misleading statements to 
Division of Water Rights. 
8 
23. Plaintiff has interfered with BDIC' s business contracts and relationships by protesting 
BDIC's applications. 
24. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff unlawfully sells BDIC water outside city and 
state limits in violation of the 1914 Decree and the Utah Constitution. 
COUNTERCLAIM I 
(Breach of Contract) 
25. Defendants incorporate all previous paragraphs. 
26. The 1905 Contract between Plaintiff and BDIC is a valid and enforceable contract. 
27. BDIC completely performed all of its duties, obligations, and promises under the 
1905 Contract. 
28. Plaintiff breached the 1905 Contract. 
29. Defendants have suffered damages as a direct and proximate result of Plaintiffs 
breach of the 1905 Contract. 
COUNTERCLAIM II 
(Declaratory Judgment: Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-1 et seq.) 
30. Defendants incorporate all previous paragraphs. 
31. Pursuant to Paragraph 9 of the 1905 Contract, Plaintiff s rights in the water described 
therein have terminated and reverted back to BDIC. 
9 
32. Defendants are entitled to a judgment from this Court that Plaintiff is in breach of the 
1905 Contract. 
33. Defendants are entitled to a judgment from this Court that the water rights Plaintiff 
claims under the 1905 Contract have terminated and reverted back to BDIC. 
34. Declaratory relief is presently necessary and appropriate so that Defendants may 
determine their rights under the 1905 Contract. 
COUNTERCLAIM III 
(Tortious Interference with Prospective Business Relationships) 
35. Defendants incorporate all previous paragraphs. 
36. A valid contract or business relationship both existing and prospective exists between 
)efendants and other parties. 
37. This contract or business relationship may be evidenced by Defendants' efforts to 
lake administrative changes in their use of the BDIC water. 
38. Plaintiff has opposed such changes. 
39. Plaintiff has knowledge of Defendants' valid contract or business relationship. 
40. Plaintiff has intentionally interfered with this contract or business relationship, 
reby causing a breach or termination of the contract or business relationship. 
41. Plaintiff has done this without justification or good cause. 
10 
42. As a direct and proximate result of Plaintiffs actions. Defendants have suffered 
damages. 
COUNTERCLAIM IV 
(Slander of Title) 
43. Defendants incorporate all previous paragraphs. 
44. Pursuant to the 1905 Contract, the water rights that were initially conveyed to 
Plaintiff have terminated and reverted back to Defendants. 
45. Plaintiff is aware of Defendants' ownership interest in these water rights by virtue 
of their actual knowledge of the 1905 Contract, the 1914 Decree, and subsequent 
communications with Plaintiff. 
46. Plaintiff has wilfully recorded or published matter which is untrue and disparaging 
to Defendants' title. 
47. Plaintiffs conduct was a product of malice. 
48. Defendants have been specifically injured by Plaintiffs conduct. 
COUNTERCLAIM V 
(Violation of Utah Antitrust Act: Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-910 et seq.) 
49. Defendants incorporate all previous paragraphs. 
50. Plaintiff has engaged in unlawful restraint of trade or commerce in violation of 
section 76-10-914(1) of the Utah Code. 
11 
51. Plaintiff has monopolized, or combined or conspired with another person or persons 
to monopolize, a part of a trade or commerce, in violation of section 76-10-914(2) of the Utah Code. 
52. Plaintiffs activities are not authorized or directed by state law. 
53. Defendants are citizens of the State of Utah or residents of the State of Utah. 
54. Plaintiffs actions in violation of the Utah Antitrust Act have injured or threatened 
to injure Defendants in their business or property. 
55. Pursuant to section 76-10-919(1) of the Utah Code, Defendants are entitled to 
injunctive relief enjoining Plaintiff from continuing to violate the Utah Antitrust Act. 
56. Pursuant to section 76-10-918(2) of the Utah Code, a civil penalty of not more than 
5500,000 should be imposed upon Plaintiff for each of its violations of the Utah Antitrust Act. 
COUNTERCLAIM VI 
(Violation of Utah Unfair Practices Act: Utah Code Ann. § 13-5-1 et seq.) 
57. Defendants incorporate all previous paragraphs. 
58. In violation of the Utah Unfair Practices Act, Plaintiff has engaged in unfair methods 
^competition in commerce or trade. 
59. In violation of the Utah Unfair Practices Act, Plaintiff has engaged in unlawful 
;crimination. 
60. For example, while Plaintiff has refused to trade with Defendants, Plaintiff has 
>ressed a willingness to trade with other parties. 
12 
61. Defendants have suffered injuries and damages due to Plaintiffs violation of the Utah 
Unfair Practices Act. 
62. Pursuant to section 13-5-14 of the Utah Code, Defendants are entitled to injunctive 
relief enjoining Plaintiff from continuing to violate the Utah Unfair Practices Act. 
63. Pursuant to section 13-5-14 of the Utah Code, Defendants are entitled to recover from 
Plaintiff three times the amount of the actual damages they sustained or $2,000, whatever is greater, 
plus court costs. 
COUNTERCLAIM VII 
(Forfeiture: Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-1 et seq.) 
64. Defendants incorporate all previous paragraphs. 
65. Plaintiff has abandoned or ceased to use all or a portion of a water right for a 
period of five years. 
66. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff has not filed a verified nonuse application 
with the state engineer before the expiration of this five-year period. 
67. Pursuant to section 73-1-4(3) of the Utah Code, Plaintiffs abandoned or unused 
water rights revert back to the public. 
68. Defendants are entitled to a judgment declaring that Plaintiffs abandoned or 
unused waters rights have reverted back to the public. 
13 
JURY DEMAND 
Defendants hereby request that this case be tried to a jury. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Defendants pray for judgment against Plaintiff as follows: 
1. For all general damages as are proven at the time of trial; 
2. For all special damages as are proven at the time of trial; 
3. For interest on damages as provided by law; 
4. For an order declaring that the water rights transferred by the 1905 Contract have 
terminated and reverted back to Defendants; 
5. For an order declaring that Plaintiff is a monopoly; 
6. For the imposition of a civil penalty upon Plaintiff pursuant to the Utah Antitrust Act; 
7. For injunctive relief; 
8. For reasonable attorney fees; 
9. For costs of court; and 
10. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable. 
DATED this j J U a y of April, 2007. 
PHILLIP E. LOWRY, and 
ELIJAH L. MILNE, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the following, 
postage prepaid, this J^Jrday of April, 2007. 
Edwin C. Barnes, Esq. 
Steven E. Clyde, Esq. 
Wendy Bowden Crowther 
CLYDE, SNOW, SESSIONS & SWENSON 
201 South Main Street, 13th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
SECRETARY 
IABig Ditch 28499-2\Answer wpd 
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PHILLIP E. LOWRY (6603), 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH (3752), and 
ELIJAH L. MILNE (11171), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, P.C. 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
PO Box 1248 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone (801)373-6345 
Facsimile (801)377-4991 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Our File No 28499-2 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, a Utah 
municipal corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BIG DITCH IRRIGATION COMPANY, a 
Utah nonprofit corporation, JAMES 
GARSIDE, J.L.C, a Utah limited liability 
company, RYAN LITKE, LYNE DOWNS, 
and JOHN DOES 1 through 10, 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANTS' AMENDED ANSWER, 
COUNTERCLAIMS, AND 
JURY DEMAND 
Case No. 070903735 
Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
Defendants answer Plaintiffs Complaint as follows: 
DEFENSE I 
The Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 
DEFENSE II 
Defendants answer the numbered allegations of Plaintiffs' Complaint as follows: 
1. Admit. 
2. Admit that Big Ditch Irrigation Company ("BDIC") is a mutual water company which 
among other purposes owns and maintains a series of ditches and which provides water for its 
shareholders' use. Deny that there are any geographical restrictions upon BDIC water and deny any 
inference that BDIC can provide water to shareholders only through ditches. Deny all allegations 
not specifically admitted. 
3. Admit that Garside is a resident of Spanish Fork, Utah, that he has purchased BDIC 
stock, that he is a member of the board and president of BDIC, and that he currently owns no land 
in the area described on Exhibit A to plaintiffs complaint. Deny as to all other allegations. 
4. Admit that J L.C. is a Utah limited liability company with its registered place of 
business in American Fork, Utah, that it purchased stock in BDIC, and that it currently owns no land 
in the area described on Exhibit A to plaintiffs complaint. Deny as to all other allegations. 
5. Admit that Ryan Litke acquired stock in BDIC and currently owns no land in the 
area described on Exhibit A to plaintiffs complaint. Deny as to all other allegations. 
6. Admit that Layne Downs acquired stock in BDIC and currently owns no land in the 
area described on Exhibit A to plaintiffs complaint. Affirmatively assert that Downs is no longer 
a shareholder of BDIC. Deny as to all other allegations. 
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7. Deny. 
8. Deny. 
9. Admit the existence of a 1905 Contract, but deny any characterization thereof. The 
contract speaks for itself Deny all allegations inconsistent with the contract. 
10. Admit the existence of a decree, but deny any characterization thereof The document 
speaks for itself Deny all allegations inconsistent with the decree. 
11. Admit plaintiff is a municipal corporation which owns water rights and seels water 
for a profit. Assert that the cited constitutional provision speaks for itself, and deny any 
characterization inconsistent with the terms of the provision. Defendants lack knowledge or 
information sufficient to form a belief as to all other allegations of paragraph 11. 
12. Admit that the contract requires plaintiff to deliver water as provided in the contract, 
ssert that the contract speaks for itself, deny that plaintiffs characterization of the delivery 
bligation is correct, and deny all other allegations. 
13. Admit that the 1905 Contract grants BDIC certain rights, including the right to 
take the waters of Big Cottonwood Creek described in the contract and to terminate any rights of 
aintiff under the contract, but deny plaintiffs characterization of those rights. The document 
saks for itself. 
14. Deny. 
15. Deny. 
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16. Paragraph 16 is not present in the Complaint. 
17. Deny. 
18. Admit that Garside, J L.C., Litke, and Downs acquired BDIC stock, and admit that 
Garside was appointed by the board as president and subsequently duly elected at a regular BDIC 
annual meeting. Object to the pejorative term "Speculators" used here and throughout the Complaint 
to the extent it implies defendants are gamblers or their business is gambling in nature. Deny all 
other allegations. 
19. Deny. 
20. Admit that BDIC claims it is entitled to the quantity of water specified in the 1905 
contract. Deny all other allegations. 
21. Admit that Garside is the president of BDIC, admit that plaintiff is in breach of the 
1905 contract, and deny all other allegations. 
22. Admit that Garside is the president of BDIC, admit that the right to the use of water 
may be evidenced by a contract which water contract is the basis of the BDIC water right number, 
not the water right conveyed "a century ago," and deny all other allegations. 
23. Lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the motivation for 
plaintiffs actions, assert that the Report of Conveyance and the Decree each speaks for itself, and 
deny all other allegations. 
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24. Admit that BDIC filed Change Application a31743, assert that it contained express 
language that the application did not seek to change plaintiffs water rights, deny plaintiffs 
characterization of the application, and deny all other allegations. 
25. Admit. 
26. Admit protest was filed, but deny any characterization thereof and deny all other 
allegations. 
27. Admit hearing was held, but deny any characterization thereof and deny all other 
allegations. 
28. Admit. 
29. Admit that BDIC withdrew Change Applications a31743 and a31965. Deny all other 
illegations. 
30. Admit that BDIC asserts it is entitled to the full quantity of water specified in the 
905 contract together with the right to beneficially use that water, that it had the right to transfer 
lat water without state permits in 1905, and has the right to transfer that water with state permits 
esently to beneficially use the exchange water. Deny all other allegations. 
31. Deny. 
32. Defendant incorporates by reference paragraphs 1-31. 
33. Deny. 
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34. Assert the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to determine rights to the water, but 
otherwise admit. 
35. Admit that the court should determine the rights and obligations of the parties under 
the 1905 Contract, and deny all other allegations. 
36. Admit that the Decree is res judicata of the issues determined by the Decree, assert 
that the rights of plaintiff and BDIC are subject to the 1905 contract, and deny all other allegations. 
37. Deny. 
38. Deny. 
39. Defendant incorporates by reference paragraphs 1-38. 
40. Deny. 
41. Deny that defendants have made any assertion as alleged and therefore deny all 
allegations of paragraph 41. 
42. Deny. 
43. Deny. 
44. Defendant incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 -43. 
45. Admit that the Decree is res judicata of the issues determined by the Decree, assert 
that the rights of plaintiff and BDIC are subject to the 1905 contract, and deny all other allegations. 
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46. Admit change applications a31743 and a31965 were filed, affirmatively assert that 
the applications clearly stated they were not based on plaintiffs water rights, and deny all other 
allegations. 
47. Deny. 
48. Deny that plaintiff was or will be required to protest or incur expenses, and lack 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations of 
paragraph 48. 
49. Deny. 
DEFENSE III 
Defendants affirmatively set forth the defense of estoppel. 
DEFENSE IV 
Defendants affirmatively set forth the defense of waiver. 
DEFENSE V 
Defendants affirmatively set forth the defense of laches. 
DEFENSE VI 
Defendants affirmatively set forth the defense of unclean hands. 
DEFENSE VH 
This Court lacks jurisdiction over this matter. Pursuant to the 1914 Decree, which Decree 
s obtained at Plaintiffs request, all matters relating to water rights in Area 57 must be adjudicated 
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as part of the general adjudication—not as part of a specific adjudication—in order to avoid 
conflicting or disputable claims of water rights. Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to give a 
declaratory judgment in favor of Plaintiff. 
DEFENSE VIII 
Plaintiffs third cause of action, wherein Plaintiff alleges slander of title, is without merit and 
not brought or asserted in good faith; consequently, Defendants are entitled to an award of 
reasonable attorney fees under section 78-27-56 of the Utah Code. 
In paragraph 13 of its Complaint, Plaintiff recognizes that the 1905 Contract granted BDIC 
a reversionary interest in the rights BDIC conveyed to Plaintiff. In light of the fact that a cause of 
action for slander of title requires that a party knowingly record or publish an untrue statement, 
Plaintiffs claim of slander of title must fail because the 1905 Contract clearly grants, as admitted 
by Plaintiff, a reversionary interest in the rights BDIC conveyed to Plaintiff. 
DEFENSE IX 
As shareholders or officers of BDIC, Defendants James Garside, J L.C., Ryan Litke, and 
Layne Downs are protected by the corporate shield doctrine and, consequently, cannot be sued in 
their individual capacities. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, Defendants pray that: 
1. Plaintiffs Complaint be dismissed with prejudice; 
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2. Defendants be awarded their costs and attorney fees incurred herein, pursuant to 
Paragraph 8 of the 1905 Contract and section 78-27-56 of the Utah Code; and 
3. BDIC be awarded the relief sought for in the Counterclaims below. 
COUNTERCLAIMS 
BDIC complains and alleges as follows: 
1. In the event this Court determines that it has jurisdiction over the allegations raised 
in the Complaint, then this Court also has jurisdiction over the following Counterclaims arising out 
of the 1905 Contract and 1914 Decree. 
2. The 1905 Contract expressly states that Plaintiff is required to provide an equivalent 
)f 35.5% of the water flowing in the Big Cottonwood Creek to BDIC from April through October 
f each year, as well as 1/60 of the water flowing in the Big Cottonwood Creek during the remainder 
f each year, provided that such amount shall never exceed thirty-five cubic feet per second. 
3. There is no mention in the 1905 Contract of a geographic restriction to a historical 
rvice area or any similar language. 
4. Irrigation water companies have service areas which exceed their water source and 
urally shift over time to prevent waste. 
5. Plaintiff has not provided BDIC with the water referred to in the 1905 Contract. 
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6. The 1905 Contract states that in the event Plaintiff fails to for six months to deliver 
the full quantity of water required by the contract, BDIC shall have the immediate right to use the 
Big Cottonwood Creek water as fully and completely as though the contract had never been made. 
7. Plaintiff uses BDIC's original water right outside the terms and conditions set by 
Judge Morse in the 1914 decree. 
8. Plaintiff monopolizes the water of Big Cottonwood Creek to control building and 
zoning in Big Cottonwood Canyon even to extent of wasting Big Cottonwood Creek water which 
includes a portion of BDIC's original water right. 
9. A portion of BDIC's original water rights upon which BDIC owns a reversionary 
right has been run waste by SLC and is subject to forfeiture. 
10. Plaintiff has interfered with BDIC's enjoyment of its contract water by protesting 
BDIC's applications to block water use permits and thereby withhold BDIC's exchange water. 
11. Plaintiff competes against BDIC's shareholders for BDIC stock. 
12. Plaintiffs intentional blocking of BDIC's ability to obtain proper state water use 
permits devalues BDIC stock. 
13. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff unlawfully uses BDIC's original water right 
in temporary "surplus" sales contracts to meet permanent state building water requirements. 
14. Plaintiff runs to waste a portion of Big Cottonwood Creek water. 
15. Plaintiff runs to waste a portion of BDIC's original water right. 
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COUNTERCLAIM I 
(Breach of Contract) 
16. BDIC incorporates all previous paragraphs. 
17. The 1905 Contract between Plaintiff and BDIC is a valid and enforceable contract. 
18. BDIC completely performed all of its duties, obligations, and promises under the 
1905 Contract by exchanging its 1905 71 /200th claim to the waters of Big Cottonwood Creek with 
plaintiff. 
19. Plaintiff breached the 1905 Contract by, among other things, failing to deliver all the 
water to which BDIC is entitled and blocking BDIC's ability to obtain state water transfer permits 
referred to as change applications. 
20. Plaintiff breached the 1905 Contract by protesting BDIC's change applications. 
21. BDIC has suffered damages as a direct and proximate result of Plaintiff s breach of 
he 1905 Contract. 
COUNTERCLAIM II 
(Declaratory Judgment: Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-1 et seq.) 
22. BDIC incorporates all previous paragraphs. 
23. Pursuant to Paragraph 9 of the 1905 Contract, Plaintiffs rights in the water described 
srein have terminated and reverted back to BDIC. 
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24. BDIC is entitled to a judgment from this Court that Plaintiff is in breach of the 1905 
Contract. 
25. BDIC is entitled to a judgment from this Court that the water rights Plaintiff claims 
under the 1905 Contract have terminated and reverted back to BDIC. 
26. Declaratory relief is presently necessary and appropriate so that BDIC may determine 
its rights under the 1905 Contract. 
COUNTERCLAIM III 
(Tortious Interference with Prospective Business Relationships) 
27. BDIC incorporates all previous paragraphs. 
28. A valid contract or business relationship both existing and prospective exists between 
and among BDIC, its shareholders, and other parties. 
29. This contract or business relationship may be evidenced by BDIC's efforts to make 
administrative changes in its use of the BDIC water. 
30. Plaintiff has opposed such changes and encouraged others to also block BDIC change 
applications. 
31. Plaintiff has knowledge of BDIC's valid contract or business relationships. 
32. Plaintiff has intentionally interfered with BDIC's contract or business relationships, 
thereby causing a breach or termination of the contract or business relationships. 
33. Plaintiff has done this without justification or good cause. 
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34. As a direct and proximate result of Plaintiff s actions, BDIC has suffered damages. 
COUNTERCLAIM IV 
(Violation of Utah Antitrust Act: Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-910 et seq.) 
35. Defendant incorporate all previous paragraphs. 
36. Plaintiff has engaged in unlawful restraint of trade or commerce in violation of 
section 76-10-914(1) of the Utah Code. 
37. Plaintiff has engaged in concerted action in the form of a contract, combination, or 
conspiracy to monopolize the waters of Big Cottonwood Canyon. 
38. Plaintiff has imposed an unreasonable restraint of trade upon the waters of Big 
Cottonwood Canyon's water market. 
39. This unreasonable restraint of trade has had a substantial adverse effect on 
competition in Big Cottonwood Creek's water market. 
40. Plaintiff has monopolized, attempted to monopolize, or combined or conspired with 
nother person or persons to monopolize, a part of a trade or commerce, in violation of section 
6-10-914(2) of the Utah Code. 
41. Plaintiff has monopoly power in Big Cottonwood Creek's water market. 
42. Plaintiff claims to own or control the primary waters of Big Cottonwood Creek. 
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43. Plaintiff has wilfully acquired or maintained this monopoly power as distinguished 
from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic 
accident. 
44. Plaintiffs activities are not authorized or directed by state law. 
43. Plaintiff has wilfully devalued the value of the Big Ditch Irrigation Company. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, BDIC prays for judgment against Plaintiff as follows: 
1. For all general damages as are proven at the time of trial; 
2. For all special damages as are proven at the time of trial; 
3. For interest on damages as provided by law; 
4. For an order declaring that the water rights transferred by the 1905 Contract have 
terminated and reverted back to BDIC; 
5. For injunctive relief; 
6. For reasonable attorney fees; 
7. For costs of court; and 
8. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable. 
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JURY DEMAND 
Defendants hereby request that this case be tried to a jury. 
DATED this f^ l lay of October, 2007. 
PHILLIP E. LOWRY 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, and 
ELIJAH L. MILNE, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendants 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the following, 
)ostage prepaid, this day of October, 2007. 
Edwin C. Barnes, Esq. 
Steven E. Clyde, Esq. 
Wendy Bowden Crowther 
CLYDE, SNOW, SESSIONS & SWENSON 
201 South Main Street, 13th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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Public Utilities 
Amount of Charges 
FY 2006/2007 
c i t y $29,894,939.83 
County $19,948,096.39 
Cubic Feet Consumed 
FY 2006/2007 
City 2,438,245,300 
County 1,135,235,200 
143 
JORDANELLE SPECIAL SERVICE DIS 
P O BOX 519 
HERBER CITY, UT 84032-5519 
ATTN: LEE ROY FARRELL 
14206 
01/23/2006 
$229,784.54 
14206 
02/22/2006 
143 
WATER SALE FOR WATER FLOW THRU 
ONTARIO TUNNEL FROM 7-01-05 
TimU 12-31-05 ( [ Z O • °lO far ^ 
Invoice to reflect only current charge. 
Payments, credits and past-due balances do 
not show on current invoice, 
$229,784,54 
$229,784.54 
$229,784.54 
>" R. iii 7 o 1 J >> t i 143 
14560 
0 7 / 1 3 / 2 0 0 6 
JORDANELLE SPECIAL SERVICE DIS 
P O BOX 519 
HERBER CITY, UT 84032-5519 $197,620.10 
ATTN: LEE ROY FARRELL 
08/12/2006 
14560 143 
WATER SALE FOR WATER FLOW THRU $197,620.10 
ONTARIO TUNNEL CflP^\ Q -f^ 
1/1/06 THRU 6/30/06 
Invoice to reflect only current charge. 
Payments, credits and past-due balances do 
not show on current invoice. 
$197,620.10 
$197,620.10 
SLC PUBLIC UTILITIES DEPARTMENT 
WATER STOCK INFORMATION 
JULY 1, 2002 - JUNE 30, 2003 
WATER STOCK LEDGER AS OF JUNE 30, 2003 
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<?4 
Cottonwood Lower Canal 
Cottonwood Tanner Ditch 
Ditch irrigation Company 
oundry Springs Water Users 
ton and North Point Irrigation Company 
_ jrrows Spring Water 
Qahoon and Maxfiefd irrigation Company 
Bast Jordan Irrigation Company if, ^ 
MiUcreak Wator Company - Primary (A) ' 
Mfflcreek Water Company ~ Secondary (B) / 
Dale Wator Company / 
W. FL rL irrigation Company / 
DHch Water Company *~ 
Ditch Company * ' 
. toiiday Water Company ~ CuUnarys , 
HbWay Water Company-Irrigation ' 
\Kfrtnedy Ditch Irrigation Company 
UJttie Cottonwood Brown Ditch s 
\Uttte Cottonwood Tanner Ditch^ 
\utfwer ifflcreek Irrigation Company - A 
Lower MUicreek Irrigation Company - B 
N&Ghie Irrigation Company^ 
Richards DHch 
Silver Lake Company 
Urifon and Jordan Irrigation Company 
Canal Irrigation Company 
Ditch 
Resort Water Company 
He Ditch irrigation Company 
29.00 
337X10 
143.50j 
57.705! 
31.00J 
5,220.0G[ 
1,430.75 
2,485.751 
13.92| 
34.52 
33.241.00] 
12.00-
157J50J 
746X>0i 
80,00 
20.00 
1.072.45 
4.00| 
92328 
13.35j 
277.00 
76.00J 
3.50] 
1.00| 
2J0O\ 
3,768.00] 
18.00] 
150.00 
47.00 
55,587.4731 
PAGE 54 
Steven E. Clyde (Bar No. 0686) 
Edwin C. Barnes (Bar No. 0217) 
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON 
201 South Main, 13th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 801-322-2516 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Salt Lake City Corporation 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, a 
Utah municipal corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BIG DITCH IRRIGATION COMPANY, a 
Utah nonprofit corporation, JAMES 
GARSIDE, J L.C, a Utah Limited Liability 
Company, RYAN LITKE, LAYNE 
DOWNS, and John Does 1 through 10, 
Defendants. 
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF 
JEFFRY NIERMEYER, P.E. 
Civil No. 070903735 
Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ) 
Jeffry Niermeyer being first duly sworn deposes and says as follows: 
1. My name is Jeffry Niermeyer. I am over the age of 21 years and all 
matters attested hereto are of my own personal knowledge unless otherwise stated. 
2. On November 30, 2007,1 signed an Affidavit setting forth details of my 
knowledge and experience as Director of the Salt Lake City Department of Public 
Utilities and furnishing certain information relating to the 1905 Agreement between Salt 
Lake City and Big Ditch Irrigation Company and the City's understanding of and 
performance of its obligations to Big Ditch under that Agreement. I have again reviewed 
that Affidavit and affirm that all statements therein are accurate. 
3. This Affidavit has been prepared to provide additional background 
information supporting the statements in my prior Affidavit. 
4. I have been a licensed professional engineer since 1981. A copy of my 
curriculum vitae is attached hereto as Exhibit A. As indicated therein, I have been 
involved in the design, construction, operation and supervisor of water resources 
systems throughout my entire career. 
5. I have been employed by the Salt Lake City Department of Public Utilities 
since October 1991. During my tenure with the City, I have been directly and personally 
nvolved in the administration and maintenance of the City's water rights and the City's 
lumerous exchange agreements; the operation, maintenance and balancing of Salt 
ake City's water sources in order to most efficiently utilize its water rights and meet its 
^ligations under the various exchange agreements; and the planning of and budgeting 
r the facilities necessary to meet Salt Lake City's responsibility to provide water to its 
izens and others connected to the City's water system. 
6. I have personal knowledge of Salt Lake City's plans for and operation of 
\ City's water resources, including its historic, present and planned future operations. 
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I am personally involved in the planning and budget process and have knowledge of the 
past and anticipated future expenditures by the Department of Public Utilities, as well as 
the understandings and assumptions upon which such operations and expenditures 
have been planned. 
7. A part of my responsibilities for the City has been the supervision and 
maintenance of the voluminous records of the Department of Public Utilities. These 
documents are maintained under my direct supervision and control. 
8. I also supervise the responses made by the Department of Public Utilities 
to requests made under the Government Records Access and Management Act 
("GRAMA"). Over the past four years, Salt Lake City has received in excess of 70 
GRAMA requests from Mr. Garside, J L.C., and their associates and has provided, to 
date, several thousand pages of documents in response to these requests. 
9. Among the information requested by and furnished to Mr. Garside have 
been the records evidencing the water deliveries from Salt Lake City to Big Ditch under 
the 1905 Agreement prior to 1950. The City presently has available such information 
for the years 1932, 1933 and 1938, and from 1950 to the present. True copies of the 
flow records heretofore produced to Mr. Garside and those for the years 1950 to the 
present are attached as Exhibit B to this Affidavit. These flow records were created by 
Salt Lake City as a regular practice and have been regularly maintained by the City for 
the years since 1950. These records provide the data points used in the preparation of 
the graph attached as Exhibit C to my earlier Affidavit. As I reviewed this information, I 
noticed a minor input error in the amount of water shown on that graph as having been 
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delivered in the year 1982. Accordingly, I attach to this Affidavit as Exhibit C a graph 
reflecting the correct figure for 1982. 
10. I am personally familiar with the Big Ditch irrigation system, including a 
general awareness of its capacities and the area it has historically served. The map 
evidencing that historical service area attached to the Complaint in this matter was 
prepared by my staff under my direction. I am also familiar with the diversion structure 
used to divert water into the Big Ditch system. During the time I have been employed 
by Salt Lake City, Big Ditch has operated the control valve and determined the amount 
of irrigation water diverted into the Big Ditch system for supply to the lands of its 
shareholders. It is my understanding, as Director of the Department of Public Utilities, 
that Big Ditch operated the control valve in the same manner in the years prior to my 
employment with the City. 
Dated this V " day of February 2008. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this of February 2008. 
T *~ "— — - * ~~/Tyj5$cmm ^ ?>v KARKyNGBeWttAf I 
Exptftft 
1.2010 I 
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PHILLIP E. LOWRY (6603), 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH (3752), and 
ELIJAH L. MILNE (11171), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, P.C. 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 1248 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile (801)377-4991 
Attorneys for Big Ditch Irrigation Co. 
Our File No. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BIG DITCH IRRIGATION COMPANY, et 
al, 
Defendants. 
BIG DITCH'S SECOND AMENDED 
COUNTERCLAIM 
Case No. 070903735 
Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
BDIC complains and alleges as follows: 
1. In the event this Court determines that it has jurisdiction over the allegations raised 
in the Complaint, then this Court also has jurisdiction over the Counts in this Counterclaim arising 
out of the 1905 Water Exchange Contract and 1914 Morse Decree. 
2. The 1905 Water Exchange Contract expressly states that the City is required to 
provide an equivalent of 35.5% of the water flowing in the Big Cottonwood Creek to BDIC from 
April through October of each year, as well as 1/60 of the water flowing in the Big Cottonwood 
Creek during the remainder of each year, provided that such amount shall never exceed thirty- five 
cubic feet per second. 
There is no mention in the 1905 Water Exchange Contract of a geographic restriction to a historical 
service area or any similar language. 
3. Irrigation water companies have service areas which exceed their water source 
and naturally shift over time to prevent waste. 
4. The City has not provided BDIC with the water referred to in the 1905 Water 
Exchange Contract. 
5. The 1905 Water Exchange Contract states that in the event The City fails to for six 
months to deliver the full quantity of water required by the contract, BDIC shall have the immediate 
*ight to use the Big Cottonwood Creek water as fully and completely as though the contract had 
tever been made. 
6. This reversion is effective 24 hours from when the six-month period expires. 
7. The City uses BDIC s original water right outside the terms and conditions set by 
idge Morse in the 1914 decree. 
8. A portion of BDIC's original water rights upon which BDIC owns a reversionary right 
s been run to waste by the City and is subject to forfeiture. 
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9. Plaintiff has interfered with BDIC's enjoyment of its contract water by protesting 
BDIC's applications to block water use permits and thereby withhold BDIC's exchange water. 
10. The City has engaged in conduct to depress the value of BDIC stock with a view to 
consolidating control and ownership over BDIC. The City Has Made a Disproportionate 
Aggregation of Water Rights and Preferential Entitlements to Use Water 
11. The City has acquired water rights and preferential entitlements to use water far in 
excess of its current or future needs. 
12. In the fiscal year 2006-2007 Salt Lake City sold inside its corporate limits 
$29,894,939.83 of water, representing 2,438,245,300 cubic feet of water. 
13. In the fiscal year 2006-2007 the City sold outside Salt Lake City corporate limits but 
within Salt Lake County $19,948,096.39 worth of water, representing 1,135,235,200 cubic feet of 
water. 
14. The City invoiced the Jordanelle Special Service District in Wasatch County for the 
time period of July 1,2005 through December 31,2005 for $229,784.54, for "WATER SALE FOR 
WATER FLOW THRU ONTARIO TUNNEL." 
15. The City invoiced the Jordanelle Special Service District in Wasatch County the time 
period of January 1, 2006 through June 30, 2006 for $197,620.10, for "WATER SALE FOR 
WATER FLOW THRU ONTARIO TUNNEL." 
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16. The two invoices together represent a total annual water sale of $427,404.64 to the 
JSSD, representing 1,539,698.65 cubic feet of water sold. 
17. The total amount of water the City has therefore sold, combining its sales in its 
corporate boundaries and outside its corporate boundaries in Salt Lake County, is 3,573,480,500 
cubic feet, excluding water sold in Wasatch County. 
18. It is unclear whether this figure includes the sole supply of surplus water sold to the 
Town of Alta. 
19. Of the water Salt Lake City invoices to water customers, it sells approximately 32% 
of said water extraterritorially (outside its corporate limits in Salt Lake and Wasatch counties). 
20. According to the City, "Salt Lake City owns all or the largest percentage of water 
rights in each of the Wasatch Canyons, from City Creek on the north to Little Cottonwood Creek on 
he south, except Red Butte Creek. Since Salt Lake City (and in some cases other municipalities) 
vater rights cannot be alienated, the Utah Constitution effectively prohibits development in the 
Vasatch Canyons without contracting for Salt Lake City "surplus" water. A state statute recognizes 
lis practice, authorizing cities to "sell and deliver the surplus product or service capacity of any such 
orks, not required by the city or its inhabitants, to others beyond the limits of the city" (Utah Code 
im. § 10-8-14). In this manner Salt Lake City has been able to respond to the intense demand for 
e of its water in the canyons." Salt Lake City Management Plan '98 Final Draft March, 1999 at 
-25. 
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21. This same management plan states on page 27 that the Town of Alta, population 396, 
receives its water through a revocable contract with the City for the City's "surplus" water. 
22. According to the water use data report filed by the City with the Utah Division of 
Water Rights, the City claimed it delivered in 2006 76,645 acre-feet. 
23. This amount is both within and outside its corporate boundaries. 
24. The City has water rights, or preferential entitlement to water delivery, from the 
mountain canyons, Utah Lake and the Provo River. 
25. Utah Lake is a major source of water for Salt Lake County, including Salt Lake City. 
The lake is situated in Utah County and covers 93,000 acres at compromise level. It is a fresh water 
lake. Even so, because of certain springs and the high evaporation rate of the lake, it tends to be 
slightly saline. However, this has not prevented it from being a priraary irrigation water supply for 
thousands of acres of farmland in Salt Lake County. At the turn of the century 50,628 acres of land 
was irrigated by the waters of Utah Lake and the Jordan River. Canals built during the early 1900s 
irrigated thousands of additional acres. 
26. The Jordan River is the outlet for the lake, flowing in a northerly direction to the 
Great Salt Lake. 
27. Today, there are two major dams, the Turner Dam at the Jordan Narrows and the Joint 
Dam about one mile downstream that diverts water into the Jordan & Salt Lake City and the South 
Jordan Canals. The Turner Dam diverts water to the East Jordan and Utah & Salt Lake Canals. 
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28. The earliest recorded diversions out of the Jordan River were in 1850 by the Bennion 
Mill at 5 cubic feet per second and the Gardner Mill Race at eleven cubic feet per second. In 1853, 
the North Jordan Irrigation Company extended the Gardner tailrace to a point near Taylorsville, 
enlarging the canal to carry 125 cubic feet per second to irrigate 8,000 acres of land. The canal was 
completed in 1881. 
29. Various other smaller canals were constructed to divert water from the Jordan River, 
but the next large canal built was the South Jordan Canal in 1870, with a capacity of 142 cubic feet 
per second. 
30. Simultaneously, in 1870, the Utah and Salt Lake Canal was constructed at a capacity 
of 246 cubic feet per second to irrigate 9,000 acres of land. The canal works was completed in 1880. 
31. Salt Lake City completed the Jordan and Salt Lake City Canal in 1882, with a 
apacity of 150 cubic feet per second. The 28-mile canal provided irrigation and municipal water to 
alt Lake City. 
32. The last large canal was constructed in 1877, when the East Jordan Canal Company 
instructed the East Jordan Canal with a capacity of 170 cubic feet per second to irrigate 16,000 
res of land along the southeastern portion of Salt Lake County. 
33. In 1899, Salt Lake City, the Utah and Salt Lake Canal Company, East Jordan 
gation Company and the North Jordan Canal and Irrigation Company entered into an agreement 
hedge the Jordan River in order to gain more water out of Utah Lake during this drought period. 
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This effort forged a relationship which would lead to the joint construction of pumps at Utah Lake 
and shared operations and maintenance of the facility. These "Associated Canal Companies,1' 
including Salt Lake City, jointly manage the pumping plant through the "Board of Canal Presidents." 
34. The City's rights in Utah Lake provide the means for exchanging Utah Lake water for 
water in Parleys, Mill Creek, Big and Little Cottonwood streams, providing 60 percent of the water 
supply within the City's service area. 
35. Salt Lake City had constructed the Jordan and Salt Lake City Canal as a means of 
increasing its water supply. Limited to City Creek and Emigration stream flows, it needed more 
water to meet the growing population of the City. However, Utah Lake and Jordan River water 
proved unsatisfactory for domestic purposes because of its quality. As the City sought new water 
supplies from the Wasatch Canyons, farmers had already appropriated the water for irrigation. 
36. In order to gain the rights to these waters, the City exchanged its Utah Lake water for 
the farmer's mountain water. In 1888 the City entered into its first exchange agreement with the 
Parleys Water Users. The City diverted Parleys Creek water into a reservoir and pipeline at Suicide 
Rock at the mouth of Parleys Canyon for municipal use within Salt Lake City. In exchange, the City 
provided the farmers water from the Jordan and Salt Lake City Canal in proportions that would 
ensure late season irrigation water to mature their crops. Subsequently, at the turn of the century, 
additional exchange agreements were made with the farmers owning Big Cottonwood Creek water 
rights. 
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37. By the end of the 1930s, the City entered into exchange agreements with nearly all 
the water owners of the canyon streams flowing along eastern Salt Lake County. In 1995 nearly 60 
percent of Salt Lake City's culinary water supply came as a result of these canyon stream exchange 
agreements. 
38. The Ontario Drain exchange agreement allows the City to run water that used to flow 
in Big Cottonwood Creek through the Provo River. This exchange recognizes that Big Cottonwood 
Creek has a diminished flow. 
39. This diminished flow alters the flow rates in creek to which the exchange contracts 
are fixed. 
40. The City's delivery obligation to BDIC varies with the flow of Big Cottonwood 
Creek. 
41. The alteration caused by the Ontario Drain exchange contract, without corresponding 
tpward adjustment, wrongfully reduces the City's delivery obligation to BDIC. 
42. The Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake & Sandy (MWDSLS) is a special 
r^vice district formed in 1935 by the Salt Lake City Commission. 
43. The MWDSLS's primary function is to create a firm water supply for Salt Lake City. 
44. The MWDSLS was formed to avoid various legal impedimenta to the City 
rticipating in federal reclamation projects and other water development projects. Its sole purpose 
o provide water to the City. 
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45. The MWDSLS is accordingly an alternative legal vehicle for the City to acquire and 
manage water rights. 
46. In the 1940s the MWDSLS exercised sufficient independence to warrant a lawsuit 
from the City, alleging that the District was exceeding its statutory authority. 
47. The lawsuit was settled, with the district agreeing thenceforth to have all of its future 
water rights filings or acquisitions approved by the City. 
48. Also, the district agreed to provide the City copies of their board meeting minutes, 
make periodic reports to the City and submit all water rights applications to the City Attorney and 
Engineer for review before filing them with the State Engineer. 
49. The MWDSLS has numerous water rights separate and distinct from the City's water 
rights, but to which the City has preferential rights. 
50. As noted, as part of the lawsuit settlement, the City essentially controls the District. 
51. Contemporary members of both entities cannot recall any acrimonious disagreements 
over the past 40 years. 
52. In 1990, Sandy City annexed into the District. 
53. Sandy City had acquired approximately 36 percent of the water rights in Little 
Cottonwood Creek through exchange agreements. Salt Lake City owned the remainder through 
exchange agreements. Sandy City was anxious to treat its own water supply and sought membership 
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in the district to utilize the Little Cottonwood Water Treatment Plant located about one-mile 
downstream of the mouth of the canyon. 
54. Little Dell Reservoir made it possible to annex Sandy City into the district. In 1986, 
the district had entered into an agreement with the U.S. Corps of Engineers and Salt Lake County 
Flood Control to build Little Dell Reservoir in Parleys Canyon. 
55. The dam and diversions would capture flood waters from snowmelt, providing on an 
average year about 7,900 acre-feet of municipal water supply. With the anticipation that the project 
would be completed in the early 1990s (it was turned over to the sponsors in 1992), Salt Lake City 
agreed to allow Sandy City to annex into the district. 
56. Sandy City receives 25 million gallons per day of capacity in the District's Little 
Cottonwood Water Treatment Plant and aqueduct. In turn Sandy City paid for the expansion of Salt 
^ake City's Parleys Water Treatment Plant at a cost of $6.5 million, and the District paid $2.5 million 
awards the cost of construction of three segments of water conveyance pipes so that water deliveries 
ould be made from the Jordan Aqueduct in the northwest quadrant. 
57. Salt Lake City waived its preferential rights to 7,940 acre-feet of water in incremental 
nounts between 1990 and 2020. Sandy City preferential right was limited to the same 7,940 
re-feet of water from the water supply of the District, comprising of 61,700 acre feet of Provo 
ver Project water in Deer Creek Reservoir; approximately 3,100 acre feet average annual yield of 
tie Dell Lake Project water in Little Dell Lake Reservoir and 20,000 acre-feet of Bonneville Unit 
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Project water in Jordanelle Reservoir. Salt Lake City exchanged 2,000 acre-feet of water rights in 
two wells for 2,000 acre-feet of District water in Little Dell Lake Project. The District made this 
water available to Sandy City. 
58. The annexation of Sandy City into the District was accomplished in part by the sale 
of water to the Sandy City from the District. 
59. The Utah Constitution prohibits a City from selling its water rights. 
60. One of the reasons the District was originally formed was to created an entity 
firewalled from the City that could buy and sell water rights without constitutional violation, but still 
under control of the City. 
61. The ability to buy and sell water enhances the District's (and therefore the City's) 
ability to leverage its influence on market forces, generate revenue, and pursue the City's water 
management and acquisition agenda. 
62. Currently the District provides wholesale water to Salt Lake City, Sandy City, and 
Jordan Valley Water Conservancy District. 
63. The District is citizen-administered through a Board of Trustees comprised of seven 
individuals: five appointed by the Salt Lake City Council, and two appointed by the Sandy City 
Council. 
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64. The MWDSLS operates major pieces of infrastructure. These include the Little 
Cottonwood Treatment Plant, the Point of the Mountain Treatment Plant, the Salt Lake Aqueduct, 
and the Point of the Mountain Aqueduct. 
65. The Salt Lake Aqueduct was completed in 1951, and transports water from Deer 
Creek Reservoir to the Little Cottonwood Water Treatment Plant which was constructed in 1960. 
66. The District's main water supplies are Little Cottonwood Creek and Deer Creek 
Reservoir. 
67. Water from Deer Creek Reservoir is transported through the Salt Lake Aqueduct, a 
gravity-fed pipeline approximately 33 miles in length, to the Little Cottonwood Water Treatment 
Plant. 
68. Irrigation water is provided in accordance with a contract implemented in 1958 
between the District and the Utah Lake Distributing Company. Utah Lake Water is reconveyed 
hrough the Jordan Narrows Pumping Station, located near the point of the mountain, to meet 
rrigation needs. 
69. Through a series of appropriations, diversions, and transactions, the MWDSLS 
ecame the owner of irrigation rights in Utah Lake and the Jordan River, as described below. 
70. In 1908, the Utah Lake Irrigation Company (Company) filed an application to 
>propriate 135 cubic feet per second of water from April 1 to October 31 of each year. The 
)mpany constructed a pumping plant on the west side of Utah Lake and pumped water in two 
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branches of a conveyance system. The lower branch served the Company's Utah County stockholders 
and the upper branch its Salt Lake County stockholders. However, during the 1934 drought, the 
Associated Canal Companies constructed a new pumping plant at Pelican Point and dug a canal 
through the Company's facilities, rendering the pumping plant useless. The Company's water rights 
were junior to those of the Associated Canal Companies. 
71. When the Provo River Project was developed, the Company subscribed to 15,200 
shares of the 100,000 shares available. As part of the project, the Bureau of Reclamation in the late 
1940s constructed a turbine and pump facility at the Jordan Narrows to deliver the Company's water 
to the two branch ditches. Water released from the newly constructed Deer Creek Reservoir was 
delivered to the Narrows through the Provo Reservoir Canal. 
72. In 1952, the Utah Lake Distributing Company acquired the rights of the Company. 
On December 16, 1952 the Utah Lake Distributing Company, as a means of resuming the use of 70 
cfs and an additional 65 cfs under the Company's filings, entered into an agreement with the 
Associated Canal Companies to pump their junior Utah Lake water rights into the Jordan River 
through the Utah Lake Pumping Plant, not to exceed 70 cfs. 
73. In an effort to enlarge the water supply, the Utah Lake Distributing Company entered 
into an agreement with the Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake City (MWD)(MWDSLS's 
predecessor) in 1958. The Company would receive up to 135 cfs of irrigation water delivered to its 
two branch ditches. The MWD would bear the expense of delivering said water in return for, and in 
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exchange of, the Company's 15,200 shares of Provo River Project water. MWD could pump the 
specified water from the Jordan River or deliver Provo River Project water through the turbine and 
pump at the then newly constructed pumping plant up-stream from the Turner Dam. Under the 
agreement MWD would also bear the cost of pumping at the Utah Lake Pumping Plant, constructing 
a facility at the Narrows with back-up power generating capability and all the costs associated with 
the 15,200 shares of Provo River Project water. 
74. Under this arrangement, MWD acquired an additional 15.2 percent of the Provo River 
Project, increasing its ownership to 61.7 percent. This increased the M & I supply available to 
MWD. 
75. Moreover, these additional 15,200 shares of Provo River Project rights became 
available to Salt Lake City as part of its preferential rights to MWD's water supply. 
76. This expanded the original reason for creating the MWD: to participate in the Provo 
liver Project and the Deer Creek Reservoir. 
77. In the water year 2005-06, MWDSLS claimed 86,237 acre-feet of water sources. 
78. In the water year 2005-06, MWDSLS delivered 85,561 acre-feet of water, as follows: 
acre-feet to Salt Lake City Department of Public Utilities, 17,451 acre-feet to the Sandy City 
apartment of Public Utilities, 19,238 acre-feet to the Utah Lake Distributing Company Exchange 
jreement, and 436 acre-feet to other agencies. 
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79. The MWDSLS delivered 79,814 acre-feet of water in 1999-2000, 78,627 acre-feet 
of water in 2000-01, 66,178 acre-feet of water in 2001-02, 59,881 acre-feet of water in 2002-03, 
67,585 acre-feet of water in 2003-04, and 51,368 acre-feet of water in 2004-05. 
80. The district boundaries are coterminous with the boundaries of Salt Lake City and 
Sandy City. 
81. The district claimed net assets of $122,258,743 and net income of $11,759,195 in 
2006. 
82. The Central Utah Water Conservancy District (CUWCD) was formed in 1967 to 
construct projects that would ultimately capture a portion of Utah's share of the Colorado River. 
83. Utah Lake is a key feature in the development of the municipal and industrial water 
(M& I) supply for the Wasatch Front. 
84. Water diverted from the Uinta Basin that would otherwise flow into the Colorado 
River is conveyed through a collection system to the enlarged Strawberry Reservoir. 
85. In order to bring this water to the Wasatch Front, it is released through Syar Tunnel, 
then flows to the Spanish Fork River, finding its way into Utah Lake. This water replaces water in 
Utah Lake that can be stored up-stream on the Provo River in Jordanelle Reservoir. This stored water 
in Jordanelle is later released for treatment and distribution to municipal water users in Utah and Salt 
Lake Counties. 
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86. In an effort to enhance the water supply for the Bonneville Unit of the Central Utah 
Project, CUWCD purchased 25,000 acre-feet of MWD's Utah Lake water rights (acquired from the 
City) and 57,073 acre-feet of Kennecott water rights in the lake. 
87. Through this transaction, Salt Lake City acquired additional municipal water in Little 
Dell and the CUWCD was able to convert the Utah Lake water into M & I water supply in Jordanelle 
Reservoir. Since urbanization had eliminated much of the farmlands, the exchange and sale of water 
to the CUWCD converted irrigation water to municipal water that was needed by the growing Salt 
Lake County population. 
88. When drought occurs, the water users in Salt Lake County suffer for the lack of water 
to irrigate their crops, and Salt Lake City is forced to meet its exchange agreement obligations from 
Dther sources of supply. 
89. Before the CUWCD sale and exchange, the City traded 25,000 acre-feet of Utah Lake 
/ater at a ratio of 8.7 acre-feet of Utah Lake water to 1 acre-foot of culinary grade water with the 
1WD. The parties represented that this exchange was of equal value. 
90. Subsequently, MWD sold this same 25,000 acre-feet to the CUWCD for $4.1 million. 
WD also sold approximately 9,237.95 acre-feet of well water right to Sandy City. 
91. MWDSLS owns, among other shares, 61,700 shares of Provo River Water Users 
sociation located in Pleasant Grove, Utah County. 
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92. Provo River Water Users Association was formed to organize and conduct diversion 
of water from the Provo and Duchesne rivers into Deer Creek Reservoir and, eventually, into Utah 
Valley and Salt Lake Valley. Thus, based on the City's MWDSLS ownership of said shares, 
MWDSLS owns a 61.7% interest Provo River Water Users Association. 
93. The City further demonstrated its controlling interest in the MWDSLS when in 1977 
it requested that the MWD petition 20,000 acre-feet of Central Utah Project Bonneville Unit 
(Wasatch Front) M&I System water to meet the City's future water supply needs. 
94. The City had previously conveyed to the United States 9,000 acre-feet of water rights 
in the Colorado Plateau in exchange for a commitment from the United States and the CUWCD to 
allocate that water to the Bonneville Unit of the CUP. 
95. The City has a preferential right to call on MWDSLS water at the City's discretion, 
at preferential rates. 
96. The City has numerous wells all over Salt Lake County, 26 of which are large wells 
whose purpose is to provide culinary water (these 26 wells are listed on the Utah Division of Water 
Rights under public water supply information). 
97. Historically, these 26 wells are operated annually at or less than only about 6% of the 
City's water deliveries, yielding about 4,922 acre-feet per year. 
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98. Despite these figures, in July of 2007 the City claimed that 15 percent of the City's 
water supply on average comes from ground water from a series of deep wells that operate primarily 
during the summer months to meet peak demand within the water distribution system. 
99. This contradicts the 6% figure, quoted above, that City engineers have reported to the 
Division of Water Rights over the past eight years. 
100. The wells represent approximately 165,000 acre-feet (228.39 cfs) of approved water 
rights according to a 1960 City water right analysis. 
101. The 1960 City water right analysis further indicates pending unapproved filings for 
another 210 cfs, or 152,000 acre-feet. 
102. The wells represent 165,000 acre-feet of approved water rights. 
103. The wells further represent pending unapproved filings for another 152,000 acre- feet. 
104. The City is in the process of securing approval for these filings. 
105. An engineering study done for MWD in May of 1964 inventoried 21 City wells, and 
mcluded that they have a discharge capacity of 97.9 cfs (70,859.53 acre-feet per annum). 
106. The City has since added at least 5 deep wells to the above discharge capacity. 
107. The City may call on these wells at will to supplement or replace its culinary water 
Dply. 
108. The City wells have an estimated annual discharge capacity of approximately 80,000 
s-feet 
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109. The City may call on these wells at will to supplement or replace its culinary water 
supply. 
110. The City reported it used about 20,000 acre-feet of Big Cottonwood Creek water since 
1979. 
111. The City claims Big Cottonwood Creek has an average flow of 54,000 acre-feet, and 
claims it owns or controls 98% of the Creek. 
112. The City claims to have paid $90,869.76 for replacement water at the rate of $85 per 
acre-foot from MWDSLS. 
113. The City had the option to pump water from its 26 deep culinary wells at a cost less 
than that of buying water from MWDSLS. 
114. In 1908 the City claimed there was no unappropriated water in Big Cottonwood 
Creek. 
115. In 1963, MWD filed an application 57-3287 (A34941) to appropriate 60,000 acre-
feet of Big Cottonwood Creek water to build a 370 feet high dam in Big Cottonwood Canyon. 
116. In 1997, the City claimed there was no unappropriated water in Big Cottonwood 
Creek or its tributaries. 
117. In 2003, the MWD Salt Lake & Sandy updated the title to the 1963 application 
57-3287 (A34941). 
118. On or about June 19, 2007, KCPW radio interviewed Jeffry Niermeyer. 
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119. Mr. Niermeyer is an employee of Salt Lake City Public Utilities. 
120. Mr. Niermeyer was the Deputy Director of Public Utilities in June of 2007. 
121. KCPW reported: "Niermeyer says the City has just enough water to last through 
2050-with a strong focus on conservation." 
122. On December 10, 2007, on KCPW's national public radio Bottomline, when asked 
how much more water the city needed, Mr. Niermeyer stated: "We are looking upwards of 180,000 
acre-feet of water that still may be required out to the year 2020." 
123. When Mr. Niermeyer made this statement he was Director of Salt Lake City Public 
Utilities. 
124. Mr. Niermeyer did not specify whether this additional water was needed for Salt Lake 
City's inhabitants or for new customers to the City's general water sales business operating outside 
LC corporate limits. 
125. Through counsel Mr. Niermeyer retracted this statement as "off the cuff and not 
ised on any water inventory or other document. 
126. Mr. Niermeyer's statements are an example of the City's exaggerating its water needs. 
127. Mr. Niermeyer's statements are an example of the City's underrepresenting its 
ter supply. 
128. Year 2050 population projections of 225,066, and 2005 water data, reflect that the 
fs demand for water would be approximately 60,000 acre-feet without adjusting for conservation 
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targets, leaving approximately 109,000 acre-feet of 2010 supply with future development un-needed 
by Salt Lake City within its corporate boundaries. 
129. The 91,000 acre-feet of 2010 existing supply and 109,000 acre-feet of supply figure 
with future development does not take into account the 15,514.723 water shares owned by the City. 
The City Holds and Actively Increases Interests in Entities that Own or Control Water Rights in 
Order to Control the Entities and to Further Aggregate Its Water Holdings. 
130. The East Jordan Irrigation Company has issued approximately 10,000 shares of stock. 
131. The City owns 2488.75 shares, or about 25%, of East Jordan stock. 
132. By June 30, 2003, the City had acquired 55,567.473 water shares in 25 water 
companies. 
133. The City owned from July 1,2005 through June 30,2006 15,514.723 shares of water 
stock representing over 25,000 acre-feet, down from the 55,567.473 shares previously reported. 
134. The decrease in share ownership was the result of exchanging deeds in lieu of shares. 
135. The City actively seeks to buy shares in exchange partner companies as part of its 
long-term water management plan. 
136. The City has used water exchange agreements to gain control of the canyons. 
137. Regarding water exchange contracts, the city has a policy to eliminate the exchanges 
and purchased the contracts outright. 
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138. The City claims, accurately, that through these exchange agreements, Salt Lake City 
has gained control of the canyons. 
139. The City claims that if an individual or company was successful in transferring their 
water, either by stock or water right up into the other canyons, Salt Lake City will loose control of 
the ability to control growth by denying water sales contracts. 
140. The City claims it would be a mistake to invite others to deal with those who own the 
water rights in these canyons. The City Exercises Disproportionate and Improper Influence over 
Entities and their Owners/Shareholders to Protect the City's Agenda. 
141. The City owns little or no land in most of the 25 water companies in which it owned 
stock in 2006. 
142. The City irrigates no land in Big Ditch, Hill Ditch, or Wasatch Resort. 
143. The City has offered to purchase shares from Big Ditch shareholders. 
144. The City has expressed interest in buying treasury shares from Big Ditch. 
145. The City blocks water transfers in Big Ditch. 
146. The City blocks water transfers to devalue Big Ditch stock. 
147. The City blocks water transfers to reduce the number of competing potential buyers. 
148. Jan Striefel is the secretary/treasurer of Lower Millcreek Irrigation Company. 
149. Ms. Striefel is also a member of the City's Public Utility Advisory Committee. 
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150. On or about October 29,2007, Ms. Striefel sent to shareholders in Lower Millcreek 
Irrigation Company a letter. 
151. The letter states: "DONT VIOLATE COMPANY BY-LAWS BY SELLING TO 
SPECULATORS." 
152. The bylaws in question are illegal. 
153. It is illegal to place a restriction on share ownership based on ownership of land 
within an irrigation company distribution area. 
154. Such a restriction impedes beneficial use of water. 
155. Such a restriction is an unreasonable restraint of alienation on an interest in real 
property. 
156. Such a restriction is an unreasonable restraint of trade. 
157. Before the October 29,2007 letter was sent, Jim Garside, the president of BDIC, had 
sent a post card to shareholders in Lower Millcreek to purchase shares. 
158. The letter was sent as a direct response to the Garside postcard. 
159. The City continues to buy water and shares in Big Ditch, Hill Ditch, and Big Tanner 
Ditch Companies. 
160. The City has agreed to purchase about 500 additional shares in Hill Ditch. 
161. The City does not own any land within Hill Ditch. 
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162. The City has offered to purchase shares from BDIC shareholders and has expressed 
interest in buying treasury shares from BDIC. This despite the City's claim that it already owns BDIC 
water. 
163. The City has also taken the position that BDIC water must be restricted to its service 
area. 
164. This position is illegal. 
165. Such a restriction impedes beneficial use of water. 
166. Such a restriction is an unreasonable restraint of alienation on an interest in real 
property. 
167. Such a restriction is an unreasonable restraint of trade. 
168. Such a restriction does not promote efficient distribution of water. 
169. The old BDIC board acquiesced in the City's insistence on this position. 
170. The City colluded with the former board of BDIC to fend off the current board's 
^adership challenge. 
171. The City entered into a j oint defense agreement with the former BDIC board and paid 
DIC s legal fees in resisting the current board's leadership challenge. 
172. The Salt Lake City Watershed Management Plan specifically directs that the City 
tively acquire shares of irrigation companies with which it has exchange agreements. 
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173. As Salt Lake City succeeds in doing so, the original reasoning behind the exchange 
agreements evaporates. That reasoning was based on the City parting with water it acquired in Utah 
Lake in exchange for better quality canyon water. 
174. The City has an incentive to devalue as much as possible the Utah Lake exchange 
water. 
175. The City's goal is to reacquire the Utah Lake exchange water at the cheapest price 
possible. 
176. The City blocks water transfers in BDIC to devalue the stock and reduce competing 
potential buyers. 
177. Mr. Jeff Niermeyer is the Public Utility Director for the City. 
178. Mr. Niermeyer is a board member of Provo River Water Users Association. 
179. Mr. Niermeyer is the vice president of the East Jordan Irrigation Company. 
180. Mr. Niermeyer is the president of the Board of Canal Presidents. 
181. Mr. Niermeyer's multiple roles demonstrates the power and influence the City holds 
with these major water entities. 
The City Exercises Disproportionately Aggressive Legal and Administrative Challenges to 
Interests the City Deems Hostile to its Water Management Agenda 
182. The City has maintained an overly aggressive posture to applications filed with the 
Utah State Engineer. 
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183. Illustratively, at one time the City, MWDSLS, Provo River Water Users, Board of 
Canal Presidents, and East Jordan Irrigation Company caused to be filed approximately 1,737 
protests with the Division regarding water transfers. 
184. During the same time period, Orem City filed an estimated seven protests. 
185. The City uniformly and consistently challenges any attempt to develop or use water 
in the Cottonwood Canyons. 
186. The City has prevented counterclaimant JLC from developing or using water in the 
Cottonwood Canyons. 
187. The City has entered into interlocal agreements to enforce strict planning and zoning 
requirements outside its territories, particularly in the Cottonwood Canyons. 
188. Such requirements include a ban on recreationists having their dogs accompany them 
n the Cottonwood Canyons. 
189. The Town of Alta permits only a set number of dogs to be owned within its 
oundaries. 
190. The Town of Alta has collaborated with the City in setting this dog limit. 
191. The interconnection between the Town of Alta and the City is further evidenced by 
ite Black, the Town of Alta recorder, being a former employee of the City. 
192. Lee Kapolowski, a lawyer and board member on MWDSLS, represents the Town of 
ta in water matters and sits on the planning commission. 
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193. In 1996, the City claimed in an affidavit by Mr. Niermeyer that the City paid 
approximately .$192,132.00 to the Salt Lake County Sheriff Department for watershed patrols. 
194. According to the Salt Lake County Sheriff Department, the amount referenced on its 
records indicate for watershed patrols $114,631. 
195. The City has therefore misrepresented the cost of its watershed patrols. 
The City Sells "Surplus" Water in Inconsistent Long-term Sole-supply Contracts to 
Municipalities and Extraterritorial Customers. 
196. The City charges wildly disparate amounts to its extraterritorial customers. 
197. The Town of Alta obtains its water supply from a terminable "surplus" sales contract 
with the City, which provides water at the rate of $0.16 per 1,000 gallons. 
198. Wasatch County's Jordanelle Special Service District is a party to a terminable surplus 
sales contract, for which it pays $0.63 per 1,000 gallons. 
199. Entities in Cottonwood Heights pay up to $3.28 per 1,000 gallons for treated water 
under a similar contract. 
200. The customers are not delighted with this conduct. Referring to the City's 
extraterritorial general water sales business, "'It's just like a monopoly,'" [Salt Lake City Public 
Utility Finance Administrator James M.] Lewis said. Lewis said the benefit would be for public 
relations with county customers who have no representation on the City Council or with the Public 
Utilities Advisory Panel, which recommend the rate restructuring. And without representation, those 
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county customers might feel they are getting a raw deal if higher rates are approved." Water Fee May 
Soar In County, Deseret News, March 21, 2003. 
201. Salt Lake City banks water rights for non-water right purposes to control planning 
and zoning outside city limits, to control water customers of other cities, for profit, and for increased 
political influence outside city limits. 
202. The City lauds the Town of Alta, and admits its extraterritorial control of recreational 
use of the Cottonwood Canyons (where no dogs are allowed), by stating, "Existing standards and 
measures developed by Salt Lake City for watershed protection are applicable in the Town of Alta." 
Salt Lake City Watershed Management Plan '98 Final Draft March, 1999 at 27. 
203. Salt Lake County residents that take their water under the surplus contracts are 
disenfranchised ratepayers with no choice in water providers and with no elected voice in Salt Lake 
City government. 
204. The county residents that take their water under the surplus contracts pay 35% higher 
ates than SLC residents. 
205. Salt Lake City sells water at rates of $1.14 to $3.28 per 1,000 gallons, with 2.8 
nployees per 1,000 connections. 
206. In contrast, Orem City sell water at a rate of $0.55 per 1,000 gallons with 1.2 
aployees per 1,000 connections. 
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207. The City does not own the water rights that it claims have been impaired by BDIC 
s change applications. 
208. The City lacks ownership since it has a mere exchange right, not title, to the exchange 
water it draws from the mountain canyons. 
209. The City has failed to make appropriate filings and/or failed to beneficially use the 
water under the exchange agreements. 
210. The City has failed to beneficially use its other water rights, including well water 
rights, Utah Lake Water, and water represented by irrigation company shares. 
211. The City has sold water in Big Cottonwood Canyon absent the authority of the State 
Engineer to do so under Utah Code Annot section 73-3-3 and in knowing violation of that statute. 
Through this course of conduct the City has essentially sold this water twice: once to the upstream 
diverters under an illegal arrangement and once to persons connected to the City's service system. 
212. The Morse Decree only adjudicated certain water rights and did not adjudicate all of 
the underground and surface water rights in Big Cottonwood Creek. 
213. BDIC officers testified at the behest of the City in that matter. 
214. BDIC was not adverse to the City in the Morse Decree. 
215. In the Morse Decree, the City needed to establish the scope of BDIC's exchange rights 
to prove that the Progress Company could not divert in derogation of those rights. 
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216. As a result, the court's decree did not adjudicate BDIC's title to water vis-a-vis the 
City. 
217. Rather, the Court's decision fixed BDIC s right to exchange water as against Progress. 
218. In this respect, BDIC prevailed against Progress, as did the City. 
219. The City, by its own records and admissions, has not used more than 25,300 
acre-feet of the 54,000 acre-feet of Big Cottonwood Creek water at its Big Cottonwood Water 
Treatment Plant. 
220. The City has never filed a non-use application on any Big Cottonwood Creek water, 
a large portion of which runs to waste. 
221. The City has filed no other application concerning the use of the 34,000 acre-feet of 
jnused water. 
222. The City has exchange agreements for Big Cottonwood water, but by the City's own 
dmission and pleadings, water for the exchange partners comes not from the Big Cottonwood 
anyon, but from Utah Lake. 
223. Any claim that exchange water accounts for the discrepancy is further ablated by the 
ty's claim that exchange deliveries have diminished over time. 
224. The City has demonstrated a propensity to overstate its water requirements. 
225. The City has demonstrated a propensity to understate its water resources. 
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226. The City's purpose in making false representations regarding its water needs and 
resources is to further its desire to amass water rights far beyond its requirements, and to influence 
water markets in its favor. 
227. The City has further demonstrated its desire to disproportionately influence water 
markets by either colluding with canyon exchange partners, or by harassing or intimidating them, 
for the purpose of driving down the value of exchange water and then securing that water at reduced 
value. 
228. The City has amassed water far in excess of what it requires. 
229. It has done so in order to prevent other entities, like the Town of Alta, Holliday, 
Cottonwood Heights, and BDIC, from competing with the City for water resources, to influence 
water policy and nonwater policy (such as planning and zoning) in communities sharing the same 
watershed, for purposes of speculation, and to generate profit from the sale of water on a per-gallon 
basis. 
230. The City currently claims to sell water Holliday, Murray, Cottonwood Heights, Town 
of Alta, and unincorporated Salt Lake and Wasatch counties. 
231. With an estimated in-city demand of around 60,000 acre-feet, Salt Lake City would 
have available up to 90,000 acre-feet of existing 2010 water supply for "surplus" sale, which is more 
water than the City's internal use. 
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232. There is no other city in Utah which comes remotely near to the water predatory water 
practices and holdings of Salt Lake City. 
233. The City uses its acquisition and control of water and control of water entities to 
influence and direct the growth and development of adjacent municipalities, all to the City's 
advantage. 
234. The City uses its acquisition and control of water and control of water entities in an 
unlawful extraterritorial exercise of authority. 
235. The unlawful exercise of authority violates the Utah Constitution. 
236. statute. The unlawful exercise of authority violates the City's authority granted under 
237. The unlawful exercise of authority exceeds the powers granted to the City 
ander its charter. 
238. There is no statutory authorization for the City's activities. 
239. The City claims that section 10-8-14 authorizes its sale of water, but it does not. The 
tatute contemplates sale of "surplus" water. The sheer scale of the City's acquisition, both through 
tie and through preferential entitlements, and subsequent sale of such water demonstrates that any 
ile of water is not a "surplus" sale. 
240. Apart from lacking statutory authorization to sell water, the City lacks authority to 
quire or warehouse water to the degree that it has done so. The City has the obligation to use the 
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water it has acquired or forfeit it. Yet there is no lawful way to use the water the City has acquired 
without violating the constitutional prohibition on alienating water, or violating section 10-8-14. 
COUNT I—FORFEITURE—FAILURE TO BENEFICIALLY USE 
241. BDIC incorporates herein all prior allegations of this Counterclaim consistent with 
this Count. 
242. BDIC requests a declaration that the City has forfeited its water rights or a portion 
thereof under Utah Code Annot. section 73-1-4. 
243. The Court should declare such water forfeited, and to the degree the City has forfeited 
any water belonging to BDIC, declare that BDIC may appropriate the City's forfeited water to make 
BDIC whole. 
COUNT II—FORFEITURE—FAILURE TO FOLLOW STATUTORY PROCEDURES 
244. BDIC incorporates herein all prior allegations of this Counterclaim consistent with 
this Count. 
245. The City has failed to follow the procedures of the State Engineer pursuant to Utah 
Code Annot. section 73-1-1, et seq. 
246. The City has purported to extraterritorially sell surplus water under Utah Code Annot. 
section 10-8-14. 
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247. The City has not complied with section 10-8-14 in that the water it is claiming as 
"surplus" under the statute is in reality speculatively acquired excess water that the City is selling for 
a profit. 
248. An additional reason that the City is selling its excess water is to retain control over 
the water for reasons beyond simply retaining the water for future growth and development needs. 
249. A further reason the City is selling its excess water is to protect itself from claims of 
forfeiture by claiming to put the excess water to beneficial use. 
250. BDIC requests that this Court declare the water rights of the City or a portion thereof 
invalid and further declare that the City has knowingly violated Utah Code Annot. section 73-3-3 
by selling water absent compliance with that statute. 
251. Beneficial use must be a lawful use. 
252. By exceeding the prescription and mandate of section 10-8-14, the City is not 
beneficially using the water it sells extraterritorially. 
253. The City has failed to beneficially use such water for a period exceeding five years. 
254. The City has forfeited such water. 
255. The Court should declare such water forfeited, and to the degree the City has forfeited 
any water belonging to BDIC, declare that BDIC may appropriate the City's forfeited water to make 
BDIC whole. 
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COUNT III—DECLARATORY RELIEF—EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION 
256. BDIC incorporates herein all prior allegations of this Counterclaim consistent with 
this Count. 
257. The City claims, or exercises its authority consistent with a claim, that it may exercise 
control of watershed management, zoning and other matters outside of its boundaries. 
258. BDIC request that the Court declare that the City has no such extraterritorial 
jurisdiction by law or right. 
COUNT IV—BREACH OF CONTRACT 
259. BDIC incorporates herein all prior allegations of this Counterclaim consistent with 
this Count. 
260. The 1905 Water Exchange Contract between the City and BDIC is a valid and 
enforceable contract. 
261. BDIC completely performed all of its duties, obligations, and promises under the 
1905 Water Exchange Contract by exchanging its 1905 71/200th claim to the waters of Big 
Cottonwood Creek with the City. 
262. The City breached the 1905 Water Exchange Contract by, among other things, failing 
to deliver all the water to which BDIC is entitled and blocking BDIC's ability to obtain change 
applications. 
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263. The City has failed to deliver the full allotment of water under the 1905 water 
exchange agreement. 
264. It has failed to do so because it has forfeited water of Big Cottonwood Creek, as 
alleged above. 
265. It has further failed to do so because it has diminished the flows of Big Cottonwood 
Creek so as to reduce the contractually available water under the exchange contract. 
266. The City has further breached the 1905 Contract by protesting BDIC's change 
applications. 
267. BDIC has suffered damages as a direct and proximate result of Plaintiff s breach of 
the 1905 Contract 
COUNT V—DECLARATORY JUDGMENT: UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-33-1 ET SEQ. 
268. BDIC incorporates herein all prior allegations of this Counterclaim consistent with 
this Count. 
269. Pursuant to Paragraph 9 of the 1905 Contract, Plaintiffs rights in the water described 
therein have terminated and reverted back to BDIC. 
270. BDIC is entitled to a judgment from this Court that Plaintiff is in breach of the 1905 
Contract. 
271. BDIC is entitled to a judgment from this Court that the water rights Plaintiff claims 
under the 1905 Contract have terminated and reverted back to BDIC. 
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272. Declaratory relief is presently necessary and appropriate so that BDIC may determine 
its rights under the 1905 Contract. 
COUNT VI—TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH PROSPECTIVE 
BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS 
273. BDIC incorporates herein all prior allegations of this Counterclaim consistent with 
this Count. 
274. A valid contract or business relationship both existing and prospective exists between 
and among BDIC, its shareholders, and other parties. 
275. This contract or business relationship may be evidenced by BDIC1 s efforts to make 
administrative changes in its use of the BDIC water. 
276. The City has opposed such changes and encouraged others to also block BDIC change 
applications. 
277. The City has knowledge of BDIC's valid contract or business relationships. 
278. The City has intentionally interfered with BDICs contract or business relationships, 
thereby causing a breach or termination of the contract or business relationships. 
279. The City has done this without justification or good cause. 
280. As a direct and proximate result of the City's actions, BDIC has suffered damages. 
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COUNT VII—VIOLATION OF UTAH ANTITRUST ACT: UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 76-10-910 ET SEQ. 
281. BDIC incorporates herein all prior allegations of this Counterclaim consistent with 
this Count. 
282. Plaintiff has engaged in unlawful restraint of trade or commerce in violation of 
section 76-10-914(1) of the Utah Code. 
283. The City, together with other entities over which it asserts or maintains control 
(including MWDSLS, PRWUA, and the Consolidated Canal Companies) has conspired, agreed, and 
combined to unlawfully encumber or hinder the sale, distribution and delivery of water to BDIC, and 
engage in other restraints of trade and impair competition. 
284. Similarly, the City has engaged in illegal conspiracies, combinations and 
arrangements by anti-competitive conduct in order to gain a monopoly over culinary and irrigation 
water distribution on the Wasatch Front. 
285. The City has engaged in concerted action in the form of a contract, combination, or 
conspiracy to monopolize the waters made above and draining to the Wasatch Front, including Big 
Cottonwood Canyon. 
286. The City has imposed an unreasonable restraint of trade upon the waters made above 
and draining to the Wasatch Front, including Big Cottonwood Canyon. 
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287. This unreasonable restraint of trade has had a substantial adverse effect on 
competition in the water market of waters made above and draining to the Wasatch Front, including 
Big Cottonwood Canyon. 
288. The City has monopolized, attempted to monopolize, or combined or conspired with 
another person or persons to monopolize, a part of a trade or commerce, in violation of section 
76-10-914(2) of the Utah Code. 
289. The City has monopoly power in the Wasatch Front water market. 
290. The City claims to own or control the waters of Big Cottonwood Creek. 
291. The City claims to own or control the waters of the Wasatch Front to a degree 
disproportionate to its size, both present and foreseeably potential. 
292. Plaintiff has willfully acquired or maintained this monopoly power as distinguished 
from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic 
accident. 
293. The City's anticompetitive conduct is not a foreseeable result of action authorized by 
a state statute. 
294. Specifically, UCA section 10-8-14 does not contemplate the sale of surplus water 
when: 
a. Said sale constitutes 32% of the City's total water billings; and 
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b. Said sale has become the foreseeable permanent water supply for other 
municipalities and unincorporated areas of Salt Lake County and Wasatch County, and is relied on 
by those communities as such. 
295. Further, state statutes authorizing cities to acquire water rights do not contemplate, 
nor foresee the acquisition of such rights for purposes of speculation or in a manner that could lead 
to forfeiture, to the degree that the City has amassed water rights, including warehoused water in 
other entities (such as MWDSLS). 
296. Plaintiffs activities are not authorized or directed by state law. 
297. Specifically, the City has violated section 10-8-14 in claiming to alienate surplus 
water in excess of the amount authorized by that statute. 
298. This violation of section 10-8-14 demonstrates the City's lack of any statutory 
authority exempting it from section 76-10-914(2). 
299. Plaintiff has willfully devalued the value of the Big Ditch Irrigation Company with 
a view toward eventually acquiring BDIC shares. 
300. BDIC has been damaged by the City's conduct in the following illustrative, but not 
exhaustive, ways: 
301. The City has protested BDIC's right to exchange its water. 
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302. It has done so by claiming irremediable impairment, yet cannot demonstrate that 
impairment. It attempts to do so by understating its water holdings, but ultimately, can only intimate 
some sort of impairment. 
303. Were the City to disclose its true water holdings, its impairment arguments would 
ring hollow. 
304. The City exerts control over municipalities and irrigation companies through 
"surplus" water sales contracts, share ownership or board membership. Through this control it 
induces these entities, together with the City, to resist efforts by BDIC and similarly situated entities 
to put water to the highest beneficial use (through change or exchange). Preventing such highest 
beneficial use depresses the value of BDIC shares. This in itself is an unreasonable restraint on trade 
and bad public water policy. 
305. The City actively is attempting to acquire shares of BDIC and its other exchange 
partners. The City therefore has a clear motive to depress the value of BDIC shares. 
306. The City has colluded with the prior board of BDIC to pay BDIC's legal fees in 
shareholder challenges and to otherwise coopt BDIC's favorable position toward the City. 
307. The City exerts full control over the Metropolitan Water District, and therefore has 
the ability, at pleasure, to introduce Provo River water into the Salt Lake Valley for sale or use. The 
City disproportionately and intentionally influences water markets by doing so, and in the process 
has in the past, and has the future ability, to depress the value of BDIC shares. 
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308. The City has acquired water for the sole purpose of speculation, given the marked 
excess of the City's water holdings vis-a-vis its needs. Such acquisition is illegal. Speculation on this 
scale, by definition, is an anticompetitive activity. 
3 09. The City has violated the legislature's requirement that municipalities sell only surplus 
water—the City has acquired water for the sole purpose of becoming a water reseller, which is 
prohibited. By dumping excess water on the market, the value of BDIC's water has decreased. 
COUNT VIII—VIOLATION OF UTAH CONSTITUTION ARTICLE XII, 
SECTION 20. 
310. BDIC incorporates herein all prior allegations of this Counterclaim consistent with 
this Count. 
311. The City's actions violate Article XII, Section 20, for the same reasons that they 
violate the provisions of the antitrust act, alleged above. 
312. BDIC has been damaged by the City's conduct. 
COUNT IX—QUIET TITLE—WATER AND INFRASTRUCTURE 
313. BDIC incorporates herein all prior allegations of this Counterclaim consistent with 
this Count. 
314. BDIC retains a reversionary right to cancel the water exchange agreement if the City 
breaches. 
315. The Morse Decree fixed BDIC's delivery rights. 
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316. BDIC has title in those delivery rights and to the water delivered thereby. 
317. BDIC has title to all of the infrastructure now existing and existing since the 
execution of the agreement, including structures, real estate and easements. 318. The Court should 
enter a decree vesting BDIC with such title. 
OTHER CLAIMS 
319. BDIC hereby reserves the right to file additional and amended counterclaims at such 
time as they are discovered and reserve the right to convert any affirmative defense to a 
counterclaim. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, BDIC prays for judgment against Plaintiff as follows: 
1. For all general damages as are proven at the time of trial; 
2. For all special damages as are proven at the time of trial; 
3. For interest on damages as provided by law; 
4. For an order declaring that the water rights transferred by the 1905 Contract have 
terminated and reverted back to BDIC; 
5. For injunctive relief; 
6. For reasonable attorney fees; 
7. For costs of court; 
8. For a declaration quieting title to water and real estate; 
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9. For a declaration invalidating the City's exercise of extraterritorial control; and 
10. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable. 
DATED this day of February, 2008. 
PHILLIP E. LOWRY, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Big Ditch Irrigation Co. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the following, 
postage prepaid, this day of February, 2008. 
Edwin C. Barnes 
Steven E. Clyde 
Wendy Bowden Crowther 
CLYDE, SNOW, SESSIONS & SWENSON 
201 South Main Street, 13th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
J. BRYAN QUESENBERRY 
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, L.C. 
4844 North 300 West, Suite 300 
Provo, UT 84604 
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Salt Lake City Council Minutes December 12, 1904. 
Resolution No. 210 . By Councilman Bernstrom. 
WHEREAS, the Committee of Citizens, appointed by the Mayor, in conjunction with 
the Special Committee on Water Supply of this Council, have formulated an address to the tax 
payers of this city for their consideration, prior to the Special election to be held on January 3rd, 
prox, therefore, be it 
RESOLVED, that the said address to the taxpayers be made a part of this resolution 
and adopted by this Council as the plan for the proposed water increases; and be it further, 
RESOLVED, that the Mayor be authorized to have said address, together with this 
resolution, published in the press of this city and that the Mayor be further authorized to have the 
said address and resolution printed in pamphlet form and a copy thereof be placed in every home 
and business house in this City, at a cost of not to exceed $500.00. 
TO THE PROPERTY TAXPAYERS OF SALT LAKE CITY: 
The City Council having ordered a special election to be held January 3, 1905, for the 
purpose of submitting to the qualified voters, the proposition of the issuance of $1,000,000 four 
per cent bonds, with which to obtain money to secure a permanent and adequate water supply, 
and to make necessary sewer extensions, it is deemed advisable that this address be given the 
widest possible publicity among the people to be affected. The advantages that will accrue to Salt 
Lake City and County by favorable action upon the momentous question involved, are so 
manifold and so manifest, and the objections so far and so groundless, that there can be no doubt 
as to the outcome of the issue when the taxpayers shall have passed upon the same at the polls. 
The success of the plan means a Great Salt Lake; a larger and richer city- the 
permanent solution of a problem that has impeded the groth (sic) and progress of our city for 
many years; one that now threatens to halt its expansion altogether unless it shall be satisfactorily 
disposed of. The means of solution are finally at hand. It remains only for the taxpayers to ratify 
them. That done, the future of Salt Lake City will be assured. Naturally, every citizen will want 
to know just what is proposed, what the city's abilities are, and what the cost will be. On all of 
these points he will be given only accurate information based upon official records and obtained 
from the most conservative sources. 
Under the law the city has the right to borrow money for water, artificial light and 
sewer improvements, the sum of $1,250,000.00 The proposition that the city council has ordered 
to be voted upon, is for the issuance of $1,000,000.00, in bonds, of which sum- $850,000.00 is to 
be utilized in securing a permanent water supply several times the volume of what we now have, 
and $150,000 for sewering the southern and western part of the city, an improvement that would 
be worse than usual unless more water is secured to make it effectual. 
By way of information the taxpayer will probably ask specifically how the interest 
1 
is to be raised on this issue of bonds, and whether it means an increase in taxation. The answer 
will doubtless be more pleasing than he imagined. 'It may be stated first of all, that no increase of 
taxation is contemplated. An examination of the records of the waterworks department, covering 
a long period of years, proves conclusively that the revenues in that branch of the municipality 
alone are more than ample to pay the annual interest of the proposed water bond issue. Besides, 
these revenues are constantly increasing at a rate exceeding five per cent each year; and that too, 
in the face of an inadequate water supply and retarded growth in population. The figures which 
follow, entirely justify the conclusion that with a numerical augmentation of people, an increase 
in wealth and property improvements, and consequently a greater tax-paying capacity, that there 
will be a still greater revenue from this department. 
For several years past there has been suplied (sic) a sum averaging a sum 
averaging over $55,000 annually for water services betterments, redemption of scrip, increasing 
of waterworks stores and reserve fund, every cent of which has been derived from the department 
itself, which, at the same-ratio, after paying the $34,000 interest on the proposed bonds, will 
leave a margin of $21,000. The water revenues beginning with the year 1900, are as follows: 
1900, $ 87,808.65 
1901, 102,810.92 
1902, 103,262.72 
1903, 112,883.79 
And the records of 1904 disclose the interesting fact that there will be a 
proportionate increase in the same department this year. Surely, such a showing as this should 
inspire the taxpayers with full confidence in the ability of the waterworks system of the city to 
support itself, including the payment of the interest on the proposed bond issue, and leave a 
handsome annual margin in addition, that must grow larger with the years, and which should be 
supplied to the redemption of the bonds themselves. 
Another important fact to remember is that, at the very outset of the annual drain 
that has been made upon the waterworks fund for betterments will cease. This highly desirable 
condition will be made possible by the provision that requires a prompt expenditure of $100,000 
to make all necessary improvements heretofore undertaken and carried out in piece-meal fashion. 
CITY WATER SUPPLY. 
Providing water for a city that is situated in the very heart of this rainless region is 
a work fraught with difficulties unknown to other places. Many problems must be solved for 
which there is no predecent (sic) for a guide. Originality, therefore, becomes a necessity in 
dealing with many matters that are inseperable from the question of providing an increase in the 
water supply of this city. Due allowance should be made for this by the taxpayers who are called 
upon to decide this important question, a question which involves the growth and greatness of the 
city, 
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The present water supply of this city is derived from four separate sources. These 
sources and the quantity of water that each supplies daily, during the season of minimum flow, 
are as follows: 
City Creek, 4,802,134 gallons. 
Emigration creek, 1,000,000 gallons. 
Parleys Creek, 4,202,740 gallons. 
Utah Lake Reservoir, 43,580,000 gallons. 
Total daily supply, 53,564,874 gallons. 
Of this total daily quantity only the creek water, (10,004,874 gallons) is suitable 
for drinking. The remainder, (42,580,000 gallons) which comes from the Utah Lake Reservoir, is 
suitable only for irrigation and kindred uses. The creek water comes into the city from the 
mountains through three separate and substantial conduits. 
The distribution system comprises four districts or zones, known as the lower, the 
upper, the Thirteenth Street and the Capitol Hill districts, respectively. The lower and the upper 
districts are each supplied with the commingled waters of Parley's, Emigration and City Creeks. 
The 13th Street and the Capitol Hill districts, are both supplies from City Creek exclusively. 
The Utah Lake Reservoir water is brought into the city through an open channel 
known as the Jordan and Salt Lake City Canal. The water from this source is used for irrigation 
partly by the farmers in exchange for Parley's Creek and partly through the system of irrigation 
ditches which ramify the City. 
All the creek water comes from the canyons and is distributed by gravity, thus 
insuring the least cost for carriage and distribution. 
The reservoir water originally ran out of the Lake into Jordan River and through 
the canal to the city by gravity, but, during the last three seasons it has been necessary to pump 
the water from the lake into the river channel on account of the water in the reservoir having 
receded to a point below the level of the river outlet. 
So far as quantity is concerned, the City's present water supply is sufficient for 
many years to come. The greater portion of the water, however, is not of the quality required for 
general use and the need is therefore of more water of the required quality. 
On account of the dryness of the climate and the consequent need for a liberal use 
of water in lawn and street sprinkling, it has been estimated that a daily supply of 300 gallons per 
capita is not an excessive requirement and should be made the basis for determining the city's 
needs. 
On this basis it is clear that the city's present supply of potable water, (10,004,874 
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galons (sic)), is only about half enough to properly supply the present population. Such a 
condition points out, more plainly than words can possibly do, the need for early and united 
effort to supply this deficiency and at the same time provide in a reasonable degree for the future 
growth and needs of the city. 
In considering any plan for relief from the conditions that confront us, the 
taxpayers should keep in mind the facts that, wherever we go the water supply has already been 
appropriated by others and cannot be taken by the city without just compensation; that the sum of 
money which it is prepared to spend for increasing the water supply is only $850,000, and that.. 
. by which this sum can be materially increased. 
If this water is purchased the price of the water must include the value of the land, 
and all appurtenances, upon which the water is now being used. To take the water from the land 
implies its degradation and the practical destruction of all improvements that are upon it. 
In case of condemnation the obligation to provide the price of water taken, would 
not be removed nor could the loss of time and increased cost due to such procedure be avoided. 
In addition to the price of water that might be procured through either purchase or 
condemnation there must be provided a sum sufficient for the construction of a conduit in which 
to carry the acquired water from its source into the city, and it is impossible to accomplish both 
the purchase and the carriage of the needed water with the sum of $850,000. 
Coming into the valley from the nearby mountains on the East are the several 
streams known as Mill Creek, Big Cottonwood and Little Cottonwood, respectively. The water 
from each of these streams is of well known purity and is so situated that it can be brought into 
the city by gravity through works which will cost infinitely less than needed to bring in an 
equivalent supply from any other possible source. But the water from these streams has already 
been appropriated and is used by a large number of individuals to irrigate a considerable area of 
high-priced land that lies adjacent to the city. This water must therefore be acquired before its use 
by the city can be made possible. 
From careful and repeated measurements it has been ascertained that the daily 
supply of water which these sources afford, in seasons lowest flow, is as follows: 
Mill Creek, 6,631,211 gallons. 
Big Cottonwood, 17,883,588 gallons. 
Little Cottonwood, 7,827,867 gallons. 
Total Daily Supply, 32,342,666 gallons 
It is proposed to acquire the water from these sources and so make available for 
city use during times of lowest flow, the following daily supply of potable water: 
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Present supply, 10,004,874 gallons. 
Increased supply, 32,342,366 gallons. 
Total Daily Supply, 42,347,540 gallons. 
At the estimated rate of 300 gallons daily per capita this would provide amply for 
the needs of at least double our present population, and so relieve the present unfortunate 
condition as well as provide in a reasonable measure for the future. That it is practicable for the 
city to acquire this additional quantity of potable water and construct a conduit for bringing it 
into the city at cost, in money, not to exceed the $850,000, available for water supply purposes, is 
shown by the following statement of facts: 
Two thirds of the land upon which this water is now used lies below the city's 
canal, and there are no physical difficulties in the way of irrigating these lands with water from 
the canal. The owners of this land have expressed a willingness to use water from the canal in 
lieu of their present supply from the mountains, and the city has taken options for the exchange, 
in this manner, of one-half the water of Big Cottonwood Creek. Negotiations are pending by 
which it is expected that practically all the waters of Big Cottonwood and Will Creek will be 
acquired by exchange and lease, as well as the waters of Little Cottonwood, as soon as the 
necessities of the city shall require. 
The terms of exchange are practically the same as those relating to Parley's Creek, 
except that, in this instance, the city is to pay a bonus often dollars per acre to the farmers, and 
give them, during the irrigation season, an additional quantity of twenty-five percent., more canal 
water than it receives of mountain water. These are the best terms that can be made now, and 
they do not seem unjust when the difference in value between the mountain waters and the waters 
from Utah Lake is considered. 
It is proposed to acquire such portions of the waters of these mountain streams as 
are used on lands above the City canal by lease, for a long term of years, and assurances have 
been given that such leases can be obtained at a very low rental. 
It is proposed in the options, to "grant, bargain and sell" to the City all of the 
farmer's rights to the perpetual use of the mountain water, unless default is made by the city in 
furnishing them the exchange water, and, in that event, they reserve the right to use the mountain 
water only during the time that the default continues, but there can be no forfeiture of the 
contract, unless the failure of the city to furnish the exchange water continues for a period of six 
months, and than it is optional with the farmers whether the contract shall be terminated or not. 
While an absolute and unconditional exchange of the waters of the mountain streams for the lake 
water would be more desirable, still, the City runs no risk of forfeiting the right to use the 
mountain water, because, by carrying out the contemplated plan and making the available supply 
of water at Utah Lake absolutely certain, it would render any forfeiture or even default or 
interruption in the use of the water practically impossible. The essence of the proposed exchange 
agreement lies in the City's ability to furnish a sufficient and certain substitute for the mountain 
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water. 
The quantity of water that will be ultimately required, daily, for the exchange of 
mountain water will, under the plan proposed, be as follows, for a period of 180 days: 
For Parleys Creek, 4,202,740 gallons. 
For Mill Creek, 6,631,211 gallons. 
For Big Cottonwood, 17,883.588 gallons. 
For Little Cottonwood, 7,827,867 gallons. 
For the 25% bonus, 8,085,666 gallons. 
Total daily requirement for 180 
days, or daring exchange period, 44,631,072 
At the lowest known stage of water which occurred last year there was, at the end 
of the irrigation season, in the Utah Lake Reservoir, 143,748,000,000 gallons of unused water. 
One-fifth of this quantity, or 28,749,600,000 gallons, the City's share of this stored water, is the 
equivalent of a daily flow of 152,720,000 gallons for a period of 180 days. This, with the quantity 
which the city drew from this source the same season, would make the City's total daily supply 
from the lake, in seasons of lowest flow, for a period of 180 days, as follows: 
Daily available flow, 43,580,000 gallons. 
Daily unused flow, 159,720,000 gallons. 
Total possible daily flow, 203,280,000 gallons, 
or four and one-half times the ultimate daily requirement for exchange according to the proposed 
plan. 
There is no doubt that all the water necessary for exchange purposes can be made 
available from Utah Lake Reservoir through the installation of additional pumps, or the 
ratification of the river channel, and that its certain delivery to the farmers, can be effected by a 
reasonable expenditure for repairs on the City Canal. 
In addition to the prospective rights, the City has taken an option on Spring Creek, 
which can be exercised if it shall be thought prudent to do so. But the Spring Creek proposition is 
not included in any of the recommendations or estimates of this address. 
There is nothing experimental in the plan of procuring a supply of potable water 
for an equivalent of irrigation water. The city has had the use of Parley's Creek water for the past 
fifteen years, under a similar plan and during that time there has not been to exceed two days of 
interrupted flow- no longer than it is necessary to shut off the water from some street main to 
effect a needed repair. 
The work by which it is proposed to consummate the plan and the cost of such 
work, as estimated by the City Engineer, are as follows: 
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Conduit from Cottonwood to Parleys, $250,000.00 
Power Plant at north of Parley's, 40,000.00 
Development at Utah Lake, 200,000.00 
Repairs on City Canal, 20,000.00 
Improvements of distributing system, 100,000.00 
Money consideration in exchange of water, 50,000.00 
Extinguishment of power rights and incidentals, 50,000.00 
Engineering preliminaries and supervision, 40,000.00 
Total Estimated cost, $850,000.00 
The proposed conduit will be constructed of cement concrete and be of such 
dimensions as will carry the acquired water. It will discharge the Will Creek and Cottonwood 
waters into Parley's Creek at an elevation of 130 feet above the intake of the Parley's Canyon 
Conduit, through which the water will be carried to the city. The 130 feet of fall between the 
discharge end of the proposed conduit and the intake of Parley's Canyon conduit will be utilized 
through the construction of the proposed power plant, in the production of power for pumping 
sewage from the proposed west side intercepting sewer up into the present gravity sewer. 
The development work at Utah Lake will be of such character as will make certain 
and sufficient, for exchange and other purposes, the supply of water from that source. This work 
may be done in connection with that for which plans are now being prepared by the U.S. 
Reclamation Service, or independently as may be found most advantageous to the City. 
The repairs on the City canal will consist of such work as will cut the channel in 
proper condition to deliver with certainty the water which will be developed at the Lake. 
The improvements of the distribution system will comprise such enlargements and 
extensions in the present pipe system as will enable the proper distribution of the added water 
supply. The many considerations in effecting the proposed exchange of water will require the 
sum shown in the above statement. 
The cost of extinguishing the several power rights situated below the point of 
proposed diversion of Big Cottonwood, and for miscellaneous incidentals it is estimated will 
require the amount placed in the schedule for these purposes. 
The cost of the preliminary and supervising work for engineering has been 
estimated at five per cent, of the cost for the entire work, which it is thought will be ample. 
The city is not in a condition financially to obtain an absolute title to the mountain 
water, because it is not able to purchase the water rights. If the City were bonded to the 
constitutional limit, it would not have sufficient money, after constructing the conduit and 
making provision for the distribution of water in the city, to purchase sufficient mountain water 
to materially increase the present supply. But, even if the City could raise the money to purchase 
7 
the water, inasmuch as it already owns a canal and valuable water rights from Jordan River and 
Utah Lake, would it not be a better business proposition to utalize (sic) that water, for which the 
City has no other use, in acquiring the mountain water, than to procure the same by purchase? 
There is no such thing known to th law as an absolute title to the water itself, but only to the use 
thereof, and, as the City will have the perpetual right to use the water, subject only to such 
conditions as it can control, there is but little difference in effect between the proposed 
arrangement and an absolute transfer to the City of the mountain water rights. It is believed that, 
when these plans are carried out and the development of Utah Lake and the establishement (sic) 
of permanent irrigation works for the distribution of the water are completed, farmers will see 
that their supply is just as secure and satisfactory from the Lake as from the mountains, and then 
a mutually satisfactory arrangement can be made by which the City will become the absolute 
owner of the mountain water rights. 
All questions of a legal nature which related to the contracts for exchange or lease 
of the water, the increase of an available supply from the lake, or that may arise from any cause 
connected with the proposed work will be cared fro by the City Attorney and able associate 
counsel who can be depended upon to protect and safeguard the interests of the City. 
The engineering work will be carefully designed and executed under the 
immediate directions of the City Engineer who will have the aid and advice of a competent 
consulting engineer. 
The making of all contracts for construction and the approval of all bills, estimates 
and other matter requiring the payment of money and also the final acceptance of the work are 
matters which the law places in the hands of the Board of Public Works, whose actions must be 
approved by the City Council and Mayor. 
These are assurances that the work will be properly designated and well 
constructed; that the money will be prudently expended and that the City's interest will be 
properly and fully protected. 
In addition to the work above described, it is proposed to construct an intercepting 
sewer for the southern and western portions of the City where it is imperative from a sanitary 
view, than an effective system be provided for disposing of the sewage from that section. To 
accomplish this will, according to the estimates of the City Engineer, require the expenditure of 
$150,000 for which provision has been made in the proposed bond issue. 
The advantages to be derived from a thorough and satisfactory solution of the 
water problem, the seriousness of which has been increasing each year, are so numerous and 
apparent as to require no particular citation. Benertheless, it may be briefly stated that these 
mean better health for the people, a lower death rate, more sprinkled streets, more threes (sic), 
lawns and flowers. In short, a more beautiful city with better facilities to extinguish fires, a 
reduction in fire insurance rates that will amount to many thousand of dollars annually and a 
restriction of water meters to the business and manufacturing districts. More than than, it means, 
too, that we will have more new business blocks; and more people will come here to invest their 
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capital and start industries that will give employment to many wage-earners, while those who are 
now residents will further improve their property. Manufacturing establishments are much 
needed in our city at the present time. There will be still greater necessity for them in the future. 
If we ever have them we must increase our water supply and in achieving that result it must be 
known that the increase is permanent, the source pure and the solution of problem certain. It is 
highly gratifying to this committee to be able to state to the entire people of Salt Lake that the 
solution is certain, the source pure and the increase permanent. 
RICHARD P. MORRIS, Mayor. 
F. J. HEWLETT, OJ. SALISBURY 
F. S. BERNSTRUM, Special Council Committee JOHN CLARK. 
GEO. D. DEAN, W. MONT FERRY. Citizens Committee. 
RULON S. WELLS. NEPHI L. MORRIS. 
GEO. A. WHITAKER. 
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WATER RIGHTS PURCHASES: Q 
AS A MEANS OF PROTECTING THE WATERSHEDS 
1. Salt Lake City has had a long standing policy of acquiring 
water rights in the canyon streams alonq eastern Salt Lake 
County~ 
2. The City's water rights in Parleys, Millcreek, Big and 
Little Cottonwood Canyons are based on n exchange * agreements with 
the original appropriators, whereby Salt Lake City provides Utah 
Lake water in exchange for the high quality canyon water •. These 
exchanges were made between 1888 and 1935. 
3. Through these exchange agreements, Salt Lake City h^s gained 
control of the canyons. 
a. 19X4 and 1934 Congressional legislation to protect 
Salt Lake City Water supplies, 
b. Utah State Legislation granted first class pities 
(Salt Lake City) extraterritorial jurisdiction! to 
protect: its water supply and watersheds* 
c Through ownership of the water rights the city has 
controlled growth in the canyons by controlling water 
sales permits* Salt Lake has had in place a water 
sales moratorium since 1981. 
4. The City has purchased water rights as they have come 
available. In this manner Salt Lake City becomes the "outright 
owner* of the rights rather than an owoer through contract. As 
the owner through contract, the City^ frmst fully comply with the 
terms and conditions of the exchange agreements. We are dealing 
with individual owners and companies that have their interests to 
protect. The City has had several law suits over the years with 
various companies* 
5. As long as the water rights are held by the individual or 
the companies there is a potential for water being transferred 
into the canyons, A case in point is the Boyer Development in 
Emigration Canyon. By acquiring water rights from Mount Olivet 
Cemetery and transferring them up the canyon they were able to 
acquire the necessary water rxghts to develop • Salt Lake City 
had refused to provide water to this development-
6. If an individual or company was successful in transferring 
thexr water, either by stock or water right up into the other 
canyons, Salt Lake City will loose control of the ability to 
control growth by denying water sales contracts. 
Water Rights Purchases 
page 2 
August 16, 1909 
7* Controlling the water rights is just as important as owning 
the land, where there is so much private land available. It is 
to the City's beat interest to acquire water rights from the 
various owners with whom it; has exchange contracts* If we do not 
do so, they will seek out others to meet their best Interest* Up 
until now the city has controlled the canyons and the water 
rights. It would be a mistake to invite others to deal with 
those who owii the water rights in these canyons. 
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PHILLIP E. LOWRY (6603), 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH (3752), and 
ELIJAH L. MILNE (11171), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, P.C 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
PO Box 1248 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone (801)373-6345 
Facsimile (801) 377-4991 
lowryp@provolawyers com 
slaughl(5)provo lawyers com 
rrulneeffiprovolawyers com 
Attorneys for Big Ditch Irrigation Co. 
Our File No 28499-2 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BIG DITCH IRRIGATION COMPANY, et 
al.. 
Defendants. 
BIG DITCH IRRIGATION COMPANY'S 
APPENDIX A TO THE COMPANY'S 
REPLY MEMORANDUM SUPPORTING 
ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON TITLE AND 
EXCHANGE RIGHTS 
Case No. 070903735 
Judge Robin W. Reese 
INDEX 
1. Three months after BDIC signed the 1905 agreement, Union and Jordan Irrigation 
Company signed an exchange agreement with the City. "As an inducement, Salt Lake City offered 
the company 25 percent more water than the company transferred to the city plus a bonus of $ 1,500 
1 
in cash."1 In its contract with Union and Jordan Irrigation Company, the City specifically contracted 
for all the water under the company service area, and gave the company a premium in exchange. The 
parties set forth their respective exchange obligations. Had BDIC agreed to a "diminishing" 
obligation, that would have been set forth in the contract. 
2. On June 16,1932, the City submitted documentation to support a change application 
on newly-acquired exchange water out of Little Cottonwood Canyon. In that documentation the City 
acknowledges that its exchange partners are "owners" of the water.2 
3. On May 29, 1931, the City entered into an exchange agreement with Richards 
Irrigation Company.3 The agreement was based on Richards' title to water awarded it in a decree.4 
4. On August 25, 1931, the City filed a change application on the water. In the 
explanatory the City describes the exchange agreement as giving the City the "right to the use o f 
the waters of Richards Irrigation Company. The City did not file the change application outright in 
1
 Thomas Alexander, Interdependence and Change: Mutual Irrigation Companies in Utah ys Wasatch 
Oasis in an Age of Modernization, 1870- J930, 71 Utah Historical Quarterly 292, 306 (2003) ("Ex. 
A"). 
2Letter from R.C. Fowler (June 16, 1932) ("Ex. B"). 
3SeeEx. C. 
4See Ex. D. 
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its own name. Rather, it submitted the application as the "agent" for the irrigation company.5 Had 
the City claimed title, acting as an agent would have been unnecessary. 
5. Similarly, the City acted as an agent for its exchange partner, the Little Cottonwood 
Tanner Ditch Company.6 
6. Later, in the 1940s, the City filed for extensions of time for filing proof on four 
different change applications on water delivered to four different exchange partners (Little 
Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Company, Cahoon & Maxfield Irrigation Company, Walker Irrigation 
Company, and Richards Irrigation Company). In every instance the City held itself out as the agent 
for the companies.7 
7. The Walker Irrigation Company agreement provided that the company's irrigation 
water was limited to the lands then under the company's delivery obligation.8 The contract contained 
an express territorial limitation, and exchanged the use of water with the City. Nevertheless, the City 
still opted to act as the company's agent in filing for change applications, rather than claim outright 
title. 
See Ex. E. 
6See Ex. F. 
7See Ex. G. 
8See Ex. H. 
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8. One of the City's exchange partners, Cahoon & Maxfield Irrigation Company, 
recently filed a change application on its exchange water, with no objection from the City, neither 
based on a title claim nor for any other reason.9 
9. A similar change application was filed in 2002 by the Cahoon company. The 
application was signed by a representative of the City and a representative of the company. If the 
City claimed title, the company's signature would not be necessary.10 
10. The Butler Ditch Company owned the right to irrigate 70 acres under the same 1914 
Morse Decree as BDIC. The City purchased the defunct Butler Ditch Company, dissolved the 
company, abandoned the rights of water, and permanently plugged the heatdgate by December 20, 
1974. Twenty-two years later, on March 19, 1997, former City Mayor Jake Garn, acting as President 
of the Butler Ditch, deeded the Butler water to the City.11 If the City had received title to the Butler 
water through the decree, as it claims it received the BDIC water, the deed would not have been 
necessary. 
11. In 1993 the City initiated a hostile strategy to control and dissolve a water company 
in Little Cottonwood Canyon. The City decided to use its "muscle" to protect the Albion Basin 
watershed; the fear was that the company would cave in to pressure from developers seeking to 
9See Ex. I; see also Ex. J. 
10SeeEx.K. 
11
 See Ex. L; see also Ex. M; Ex. N. 
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increase their allotment to company water. The City felt that while the company continued to exist, 
the risk of it caving in was too great, so it took steps to acquire and dissolve the company. The City 
acknowledged throughout its strategy that the exchange contracts it had with the shareholders of this 
company gave it a right to manage, but not ownership, of the company water.12 
DATED this 2 _ day of June, 2008. 
PHILLIP E. LOWRY, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant BDIC 
12See Ex. O. 
BIG COTTONWOOD EXHIBI1 "C" 
V 
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Oecombar 17„ 1975 
Kr, Basil B; Mc6lQctvHn> Dfipcter 
Highways jwd^Uod Control $ «Q*Cast •830* tforth *" 
W4¥a]a, U|ah 84047 
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rtjnt at wajf^utd.bi abandoned. 
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that itpiiould^ot ba possible ia d1v#rt wt*r fnto thU ditch U 
the f jjturb. 
Sincerely, 
General Superintendent 
CWW/ms 
cc: Paul Karst of 
Caldwell fcichards and Sareusen* Inc. 
Exhibit "M" 
LCHOV W. KOOTON, »|R. 
DIRECTOR DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 
WATER SUPPLY A N D W^TEUWORKS 
WATER RECLAMATION AND STORMWATER 
DEEDEE CDRRADINI 
MAYOR 
August 25,1997 
Jim Riley 
State Engineer Office 
1636 No Temple 
Salti,akeCity,UT84116 
Dear Mr. Riley. 
Enclosed for your consideration is the information you requested concerning Butler 
Ditch irrigation boundaries 
We have attached a copy of the Supreme Court t>f the "State of Utah Appellant's Abstract of 
Record dated February 1916, page 318, paragraph 585 which discusses the area irrigated 
by Butler Ditch as 200 acres. We have also enclosed a map of the area irrigated by Butler 
Ditch The boundary of the area irrigai ed by ButlerDitch was taken from a map prepared in 
1974 by JackSollwinkle of our staff We have transferred that boundary and area to a GIS 
coverage we have for this portion of our service area. The area as defined on our GIS 
system that was serviced by the Butler Ditch actually measures at 224 acres. To determine 
the amount of land still under irrigation, we measured a test area of approximately 22 acres 
using aerial photographs This analysts indicates that 50 percent of the area is still under 
irrigation as yards. We believe that a credit for return flows should be available format least 
50 percent of the area irrigated by Butler Ditch water. 
If you need .any additional information, please call Jeff Niermeyer at 483-6785. 
Sincerely, 
LeRoy w, Hooton, It \ 
Director 
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Exhibit "N" 
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LerovW Hooton l r HANCY WORKllAW 
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Salt Lake City Corporation fl jf t# *T£f» RIGHTS K C &VlZ JW*®* f DEPUTY - m 
1530 South West Tempie * SALT LAKE 
Salt Lake City, UT 84115 
WATER RIGHTS QUIT CLAIM DEED 
BUTLER DITCH IRRIGATION COMPANY, a corporation organized and existing 
under the laws of the State of Utah (the "Company"), has been dissolved, as evidenced 
by a Certificate of Dissolution Issued by the Office of the Secretary of State of the State 
of Utah on December 20,1974, which dissolution has been authorized by a resolution 
adopted by the gwftrting t>©#of §&rtt la te City Corporation, the sole shareholder of 
the Company, on January 16t 1974, aflrf as a matter of law, all water rights owned by 
the Company automatically reverted to Salt Lake City Corporation as the sofa 
shareholder of the Company upon such dissolution. As part of the winding up of the 
affairs of the Company, and to make Salt Lake City Corporation*s ownership of these 
water rights a matter of public record, the Company, as GRANTOR, by and through Mr, 
EJ. Garnt President of the Company, hereby quit claims to SALT L&KE CITY 
CORPORATION, a municipal corporation organized and existing undBT the laws of the 
State of Utah, whose principal place of business is 451 South State Street, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111, as GRANTEE, for the sum of ten dollars ($10.00) and other good and 
valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, 
PC 
all right, title and interest of the Company in and to the following described water rights: ^ 
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1. Any and all rights to which the Company is entitled in end to the flow of 
~Bi{f CottSfw^ its tributaries as described irC»Ki confirmed )nWA 
awarded to the Company pursuant to, the final decree in The Progress Compaq 
v. Salt Lake City, in the Third Judicial District Court, County of Salt Lake, State 
of Utah, Decree No. 8921, dated April 13, 1914 (commonly referred to as the 
*Big Cottonwood Morse Decree*). The terms of the Big Cottonwood Morse 
Decree are hereby incorporated by reference as if restated herein. 
2. Any and all rights which may accrue to the Company, or its successors 
and assigns, by virtue of its proportionate ownership interest in the flows of Big 
Cottonwood Creek and its tributaries described in the Big Cottonwood Morse 
Decree, 
3. Any and alt other water rights of every nature and description to which the 
Company is or may in the future be entitled, 
GRANTOR makes no warranty whatsoever regarding the title to the above-
described water rights* any qi^et^iiolnment of those rights, the priority of such rights, 
or the quantity or quality of the water, if any, availabte for use pursuant to those rights, 
PC 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the GRANTOR has caused Its corporate name to 
be affixed by Its duly auffioriasd officerts this M day of mat^l ., 1997. 
BUTLER DITCH IRRIGATION COMPANY 
STATE OF UTAH 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
4 The foregoing Instrument was acknowledged before me this /* f day of 
jltai^i , 1997, by £J» ©arf»r sat Bfesftlem of Butler Ditch Irrigation Company, a 
Utah corporation authorized to do business in the State of Utah. 
JT^ 
NOTARY PUBLIC, residing in 
Salt Lafco County, Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
G:\bc67S 
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LEROY W. HOOTON, JR. *%EE2ZGX. "^t£>S^Ul ^ t t i A L ^2^i^Ky^«siC»l^Ji^4 DEEDEE CORRADINI 
DIRECTOR MAYOR 
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 
Water Supply & Waterworks 
Water Reclamation & Stormwater 
Memorandum 
TO: Brian Hatch, Deputy to the Mayor 
FROM: LeRoy W. Hooton, Jr. (Jjj^ fc-V 
DATE: August 30, 1993 \ _ ) 
SUBJECT: Little Cottonwood Water Company 
Introduction 
In order to protect the Albion Basin in Little Cottonwood Canyon, 
it was decided that Salt Lake City would acquire the water 
contracts between lot owners in the Albion Basin and the Little 
Cottonwood Water Company and/or gain control of the company and 
dissolve it. 
Background 
The Little Cottonwood Water company was formed in 1911 and stock 
issued to various ditch companies and individuals using water from 
Little Cottonwood Creek including four companies which have 
exchange agreements with Salt Lake City. Their primary water right 
of 3^03 cfs was acquired by saving water in Little Cottonwood Creek 
by constructing the cutoff ditch just below what is now the 
Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake City's Little Cottonwood 
Water Treatment Plant. They also have water rights in Red Pine and 
White Pine Lakes and Cecret Lake located in Little Cottonwood 
Canyon. Salt Lake City has exchange agreements with many of the 
> stockholders in the" Company and manages/owns the water in the lakes 
as well as their rights in the creek through exchange agreements. 
By virtue of the exchange contracts the City has liability for the 
actions of the Little Cottonwood Water Company but no control over 
their actions. 
The Company entered into various water sales contracts between 1945 
and 1981, and of particular concern were the contracts for lots in 
the Albion Basin. The contracts are for less than the 400 gpd 
required to develop a lot. When this area was annexed into Alta 
City, there was pressure for Alta to provide them culinary water as 
the Little Cottonwood Company contracts were inadequate. Salt 
1530 SOUTH WEST TEMPLE. SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 8*115 * i80"»» «»*"* «7«H - i ^ f p(=cx ^f^n^^ *fi \ ort ih 
Lake City promised Mayor Levitt that it would gain control of the 
Albion Basin contracts in order to protect the area from 
development by using Salt Lake City's watershed management muscle < 
to deny them water. Also, the City would not fold under pressure 
to increase the volume under the contracts, whereas the Little 
Cottonwood Water Company would. 
During the latter part of 1992, the Company became uncooperative 
and aggressive in its attitude toward the City, led primary by 
Tony Rezack, President of the Cahoon Maxfield Irrigation Company, 
who along with the three other irrigation companies holding rights 
in Little Cottonwood Creek, initiated a law suit against Salt Lake 
City entitled Cahoon Maxfield Irrigation Co. et al vs Salt Lake 
City. Judge Rigtrup dismissed the law suit. 
In accordance with the exchange contracts with the Richards Ditch, 
Walker Ditch and Little Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Companies their 
stock in the Little Cottonwood Water Company was transferred to 
Salt Lake City in the 1930s. This spring I requested the Company 
secretary to transfer the stock certificates into the name of Salt 
Lake City, thus eliminating eligibility of the exchange companies' 
members to sit on the Board of Directors. With this action, Salt 
Lake City and Sandy City control the company. 
Action 
Salt Lake City and Sandy City are moving forward to dissolve the 
company. The strategy is to meet with the individual irrigation 
companies to inform them of our intent, hold a board meeting, elect 
new officers consisting of Sand City and Salt Lake City members, 
and set forth a plan to dissolve the corporation. We hope to do 
this in such a way that the City's and Companies' relationship is 
not damaged too severely, but meet our goal of eliminating the 
Company. 
cc: Roger Black 
"i r r, 
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PHILLIP E. LOWRY (6603), 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH (3752), and 
ELIJAH L. MILNE (11171), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, P.C. 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
PO Box 1248 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone. (801)373-6345 
Facsimile-(801) 377-4991 
" Y 
Our File No 28499-2 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BIG DITCH IRRIGATION COMPANY, et 
al., 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF RONALD K. 
CHRISTENSEN, PH.D., P.E. 
Case No. 070903735 
Judge Robin W. Reese 
Attached hereto please find the Affidavit of Ronald K. Christensen, Ph.D., P.E. in the 
above matter. 
DATED this / d a y of July, 2008. 
PHILLIP E. LOWRY, for: ^ - L _ 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Big Ditch Irrigation Co. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the following, 
postage prepaid, this J day of July, 2008. 
Edwin C. Barnes 
Steven E. Clyde 
Wendy Bowden Crowther 
CLYDE, SNOW, SESSIONS & SWENSON 
201 South Main Street, 13th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
J. Bryan Quesenberry 
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, L.C. 
4844 North 300 West, Suite 300 
Provo, UT 84604 
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AFFIDAVIT OF RONALD K. CHRISTENSEN, PhJX, P.E. 
Before me, the undersigned authority, in and for said County and State, personally 
appeared Ronald K. Christensen, Ph.D., P.E., who after first being duly sworn by me, says as 
follows: 
1. My name is Ronald K. Christensen, I am over 18 years of age, and I reside in 
Highland, Utah. 
2. I hold a Ph.D. in Civil and Environmental Engineering, a Juris Doctor of law 
degree, and have experience and expertise in the area of title to water rights in Utah. A copy of 
my Curriculum Vitae (CV) is attached hereto as Exhibit 6. 
3. I have been employed by the Big Ditch Irrigation Company to review and give my 
opinion regarding the Big Ditch Irrigation Company's title to water rights in Big Cottonwood 
Creek flowing from the Wasatch Mountains on the east side of the Salt Lake Valley of Utah. 
4.1 prepared the attached memorandum dated June 30, 2008, to the Big Ditch Irrigation 
Company with subject entitled "Big Ditch Irrigation Company Water Rights" giving my opinion 
regarding the ownership of title to the water rights held by Big Ditch Irrigation Company in the 
waters of Big Cottonwood Creek of the Wasatch Mountains of Utah on the east side of the Salt 
Lake Valley. 
Signed this 1st day of July, 2008. 
(k^Jd V (UAAK^ 
RONALD K. CHRISTENSEN, Ph.D., P.E. 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH 
AFFIDAVIT 
Before me, the undersigned authority, a Notary Public in and for said County and State, 
personally appeared Ronald K. Christensen who being by me first duly sworn, deposes and states 
that the foregoing Affidavit is true and correct to the best of his information, knowledge, and 
belief. 
Sworn to, subscribed before, and executed by me this the 1st day of July, 2008. 
SHERRYLYNCUSTANCE 
KMtmx-imvmt 
M M WEST M M NORTH 
/UEKKAN FORK, OTMI MM) 
COMM. EXP. 9-7-2009 
My Commission Expires:_ 4-7-2009 
0\A< 
WATER AND ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES, LLC. 
Ronald K. Christensen, Ph.D., P.E., JD 
Professional Civil-Water Engineer/Attorney 10832 North Natalie court 
Highland, Utah 84003 
office: (801) 492-0229 
fax: (801) 492*0803 
MEMORANDUM 
Date: June 30,2008 
To: Big Ditch Irrigation Company 
From: Ronald K. Christensen, PhD., P.E., JD. 
Subject: Big Ditch Irrigation Company Water Rights 
Ownership and Conveyance of Title to Water Rights in Utah 
1. In Utah, title to the right to beneficially use water (a water right) is treated as real property. 
2. Fee simple title to water rights in Utah prior to statehood became originally vested 
through actual diversion of water to beneficial use and are today termed diligence rights. 
Subsequent to statehood and the enactment of the Utah Water Code in 1903, fee simple title to 
water rights could only become originally vested through following the procedures of the water 
code and receiving a state issued certificate of appropriation. The latter rights are today termed 
statutory appropriation rights. 
3. Fee simple title vested in an owner endows the owner with full control, subject to state 
law, to use the water under the right, to convey the water right to others through proper deed, or 
to seek changes in the water right to other lands or uses through application to the State Engineer. 
4. Once vested in an individual, corporation, water company, or other legal entity, after the 
enactment of the 1903 Utah Water Code, fee simple title to a vested water right could only be 
conveyed to, vested in, and received by another individual, corporation or other legal entity, 
through actual and bonafide recorded deed substantially in the same manner as real estate.1 That 
requirement of conveyance by recorded deed remains the law today. 
5. Generally water companies in Utah have been organized to hold title to water rights on 
behalf of the company's shareholders. Through the company's articles of incorporation, the 
company shareholders hold the right to receive their aliquot share of water from the water rights 
held by the company. Thus, through the articles of incorporation, the shareholders have a 
contract right to receive and use the waters of the company. But, the shareholders are not the title 
'Utah Code Ann. 73-1-10. 
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holders of the water rights. Rather the company is the actual and bonafide title holder of the 
water rights. In turn, under the articles of incorporation and bylaws, the company is obligated to 
provide the proper share of the company's water to the shareholder. 
6. An individual, company, or other legal entity holding title to a water right can (with the 
approval of company shareholders) grant through contract the right to use the company's water 
right to an outside individual, other corporation, or other legal entity. But, again the actual title 
to the water right remains with the individual, company or other legal entity granting the rights to 
use the water. The title to the right to use the water (the water right) simply becomes 
encumbered by the contract obligation to allow the use of the water by the contract holder 
pursuant to the terms of the contract. The contract does not and cannot convey the title to the 
water right.2 Again, conveyance of title can only be accomplished by actual and bonafide 
recorded deed.3 Title to a water right cannot be recognized in a contract holder without the 
additional and actual execution and possession of a bonafide recorded deed that conveys title to 
the water right to the contract holder. 
7. Fee simple title vested in companies endows the company with full right of control of the 
water rights. Shareholder's rights to use the water of the company is conditional being subject to 
all conditions and obligations set forth in the company's articles of incorporation and bylaws. 
Shareholders can convey their share to others, but not any part of the title to the water right held 
by the company. Further, shareholders cannot make application to the State for approval of 
changes to the water right-
Summary of Title to Water Rights in Utah 
8. The spectrum of the legal right to the use of water in Utah includes: 
a. Fee simple title to water rights originating from a federal government grant vesting title to 
water rights in persons, companies, and legal entities under territorial laws prior to statehood 
(called diligence rights). Such fee simple title water rights are passed on, conveyed, and received 
through actual and bonafide recorded deed. 
b. Fee simple title to water rights obtained by persons, companies, and legal entities through 
vesting under the statutory appropriation laws of the State of Utah (called statutory appropriation 
rights). Again, such fee simple title water rights is passed on, conveyed, and received through 
actual and bonafide recorded deed. 
2Strawberrv Water Users Association v. United States. United States District Court for 
the District of Utah, Central Division, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19767. 
3Utah Code Ann. 73-1-10. 
4East Jordan Irrigation Co. v. Morgan, 860 P.2d 310 (Utah 1993), and Badger v. Brooklyn 
Canal Co., 922 P.2d 745 (Utah 1996). 
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c. An irrigation share which represents a shareholder's conditional contract right to use a 
share of the water rights held by a company, subject to the company's regulation and control 
pursuant to the company's articles of incorporation and bylaws. 
d. Direct contract conditional rights to use water arising from direct contract with a person, 
company, or legal entity that holds title to water rights as described in a. or b>. Similar to a 
shareholder, a contract holder obtains only the contract right to use the water and obtains no title 
to the water right. Grants to the use of water under contracts are essentially equal in rights to the 
use of water under a share in a water company but are subject to the provisions of the contract 
instead of the articles of incorporation. The fee simple title to the water rights remains in the 
company. A contract holder can borrow against a contract grant to the use of water in similar 
manner to an irrigation shareholder's ability to borrow money against his water shares. 
9. Again, fee simple title, either held by individuals or a company, can only be conveyed to 
another individual, company or legal entity through actual bonafide recorded deed and cannot be 
conveyed through a company's articles of incorporation or a company contract. Fee simple title 
can only be received through actual bonafide recorded deed. 
Origination of Big Ditch Irrigation Company Water Rights 
The water rights of Big Ditch Irrigation Company began with Big Ditch landowners, who 
apparently first began diverting and using water in 1847 and Spring of 1848. Those landowners 
received their rights to use water from Big Cottonwood Creek through United States grant in one 
or both of two acts of the United States Congress, the first act being the Congressional 
ratification of the May 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hildago with Mexico (the Treaty), the second 
being the Act of July 26,1866 now codified as 30 U.S.C. § 51 and 43 US.C. § 661. 
Ratification of the Treaty recognized land rights that existed in May 1848, which may have 
included the land and water rights of Big Ditch. If not, the Act of July 26,1866 granted those 
water rights by mandating that water rights vested, accrued, and recognized by local law and 
customs "shall be maintained and protected." At that time local law and customs recognized the 
Big Ditch pre-statehood diligence rights in fee simple title whether arising pre-1848 or post-
1848. Thus, either way, by 1866, the Big Ditch Irrigation Company (or its predecessors) held fee 
simple title in federally granted diligence-type water rights. 
Exchange Agreements in General 
Exchange contracts are typically used between water right holders to exchange (or trade), their 
rights to use water. Utah law enacted sometime after 1905 now requires exchanges to be 
approved by application to the State Engineer. 
Generally the party proposing the exchange (the exchanging party) may incur additional costs to 
facilitate the physical exchange of water (such as pumping, piping, purifying costs) which costs 
are offset by the benefit of the water exchange. Usually a water exchange is for an equal amount 
of water. An inducement to make the exchange may be made by providing more than an equal 
3 
amount of water or cash payments. For example, Salt Lake City provided Big Ditch farmers a 
$10 per acre signing bonus. In 1905, Salt Lake City gave the Union Jordan Irrigation Company 
an extra 25 percent in water to enter into an exchange agreement.5 
To protect the original party from the non-performance of the exchanging party, the contracts 
usually contain a reversion clause that ends the exchange and causes reversion of the right to use 
the water back to the original party for the original party's use as if the exchange agreement had 
not been executed. The contracts also usually contain other provisions that protect the original 
party from incurring additional costs and burden caused by the non-performance of the 
exchanging party. 
In recognition of reversion clauses in exchange agreements, Utah Code Ann. 73-3-20(3), grants 
the State Engineer authority to lapse an exchange application if "(a) the applicant has lost a legal 
interest in the underlying right used to facilitate the exchange;" or "(b) the exchange can no 
longer be carried out as stated in the application." Under such lapse of the exchange application, 
under state law, the water right cannot any longer be used for the place of use and purpose of the 
exchange and the right to use the water reverts back to the original place and purpose of use 
made for the right prior to the exchange. That potential for reversion of the right protects and 
acts as security to the original party by ensuring that the non-performance of the exchanging 
party will in no way harm the original owner's rights to use water. 
To the best of my knowledge, in the 105 years since the 1903 water code was enacted, no 
exchange contract has by itself conveyed title to the water right itself to the exchanging party. 
Since 1903, Utah law has always required a bonafide recorded deed to convey title to water 
rights. 
Big Ditch Exchange Agreement 
With respect to the Big Ditch exchange agreement, Charles Wilson explained in 1981 that: 
"Those exchange agreements were mutually beneficial" because under the agreements the Big 
Ditch water users received more water from the use of Salt Lake City's Utah Lake rights than 
would have come from the canyons while the City received the higher quality canyon water.6 
The 1905 Salt Lake City exchange agreement with Big Ditch Irrigation Company (Big Ditch) 
contains contract clauses typical to exchange agreements.7 Articles 1 and 9 contain clauses that 
5Independence in the Mormon Heartland, Mutual Irrigation Companies and 
Modernization In Utah's Wasatch Oasis, 1870-1930, Thomas G. Alexander. Exhibit 1. 
6Charles Wilson Interview, Utah State Historical Society Oral History Program, February 
11,1981. Exhibits 
7Exhibit 3. 
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effect a cessation of the Salt Lake City right to use Big Cottonwood Creek Big Ditch water rights 
and a reversion of that right back to Big Ditch if Salt Lake City does not perform under the 
contract. To maintain and protect that cessation and reversion right, Article 7 requires Salt Lake 
City to maintain the facilities required for Big Ditch to use its Big Cottonwood Creek water 
rights should Salt Lake City fail to perform. Article 8 requires Salt Lake City to maintain all of 
the Big Ditch's existing rights to use Big Cottonwood Creek channel and water thereby both 
signifying and recognizing that Big Ditch retained its title to the water rights. Article 10 absolves 
Big Ditch from any responsibility for damages to Salt Lake City if under Articles 1 and 9, Big 
Ditch takes back and begins to exercise its rights to use the Big Cottonwood Creek water again 
both signifying and recognizing that Big Ditch retained its title to the water rights. Finally, 
Articles 2 through 6 contain other responsibilities of Salt Lake City that it must perform to 
maintain the exchange including placing essentially all expense and responsibility for effecting 
and maintaining the exchange on Salt Lake City as the exchanging party. 
In effect, the contract simply put into force the principles explained to Salt Lake City's citizens in 
December 12, 1904 Salt Lake City Resolution No. 210.8 Resolution 210 explained that Salt Lake 
City would not be obtaining title to the water rights, but would be obtaining the right to use 
mountain exchange water through contract and subject to contract conditions as follows: 
"The city is not in condition financially to obtain an absolute title to the mountain water, 
because it is not able to purchase the water rights... would it not be a better business 
proposition to utalize (sic) that water, for which the City has no other use, in acquiring 
the mountain water, than to procure the same by purchase? . . . the City will have a 
perpetual right to use the water, subject only to such conditions as it can control, there is 
but little difference in effect between the proposed arrangement and an absolute transfer 
to the City of the mountain water rights/* 
It is thus, my opinion based on: 
(1) the contract articles and language; 
(2) the typical context of the exchange wherein Salt Lake City, as the exchanging party, 
accepted the considerable expense and burden to provide replacement water at no cost to Big 
Ditch while Big Ditch retained its right to end the contract on condition of Salt Lake City's 
nonperformance and resume its use of the water rights, 
(3) Salt Lake City's own Resolution No. 210 explaining to its citizens that it did not intend 
to obtain actual title to the water rights, but only a contract exchange right; and 
(4) the unlikelihood that Big Ditch shareholders intended to accept the inequity and potential 
problems involved in giving up and conveying title to their high quality mountain water Big 
Cottonwood Creek water rights, which they could independently divert into their canal at 
minimal expense, for no water rights at all, but merely for complete dependence in perpetuity 
upon the promised contract performance of Salt Lake City to deliver water under rights 
completely controlled and owned by Salt Lake City; 
Exhibit 4. 
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that the parties to the Big Ditch exchange agreement did not intend to convey title to any 
water rights in the agreement, but intended simply to exchange at Salt Lake City's expense, the 
water supplies yielded by the water rights retained by each party. 
It is further, my opinion that the Big Ditch exchange contract did not and could not convey any 
title to water rights to Salt Lake City, but merely granted a contract exchange right. Having 
prepared numerous water right title evaluations and Reports of Conveyance for submittal to the 
State Engineer's office, I could not prepare a Report of Conveyance and professionally represent 
to the State Engineer that the Big Ditch exchange contract, by itself, without any bonafide and 
recorded deed conveyed title to Big Ditch water rights to Salt Lake City. 
The 1914 Morse decree quieting title to water rights does not change that opinion.9 The first 
section of that decree entitled "First" decrees that the "water users and owners" of Big Ditch are 
equal in point of time in relation to the other water rights from Big Cottonwood Creek. Salt Lake 
City is neither an owner or a water user of the Big Ditch, but diverts Big Ditch water into its own 
system. The sections entitled "Third" and "Fourth" confirm and quiet title and rights to the Big 
Ditch Canal, not to Salt Lake City. 
The section entitled "Fifth" quiets title and right of Salt Lake City to the "waters of said Big 
Cottonwood Creek acquired . . . by virtue of the said exchange contracts dated June 27th, 1905. 
In harmony with the First, Third, and Fourth paragraphs, the decree here quiets title to Salt Lake 
City in the contract right to use Big Ditch water rights "by virtue of the said exchange contracts" 
making that quiet title, as it should be, dependent upon performance of the contracts. Due to its 
performance under the contract to that point in time, Salt Lake City was apparently entitled to use 
without interruption or interference. But, that decree of quiet title did not excuse Salt Lake City 
from its continuing obligation to perform under the contract in the future and has no bearing 
upon today's changed circumstances. The decree cannot be consistently read to have quieted title 
in the Big Ditch water users and owners in the first, third, and fourth sections and then in the fifth 
section to have taken that title away and quieted it in Salt Lake City. 
In fact, the section entitled "Twenty-Fourth" in the decree specifically retains court jurisdiction to 
modify and make supplemental decrees should circumstances change and the need arise to ensure 
that Big Cottonwood Creek water is diverted and distributed among the parties "according to the 
true intent, meaning, terms, and requirements of this Decree." It is thus, my opinion that the 
1914 Decree, quiets title to the subject water rights into the Big Ditch Irrigation Company, and 
then by virtue of Salt Lake City's apparent performance to that date under the Exchange 
Contract, quieted contract title to the right to use the water to Salt Lake City. That quiet title to 
Salt Lake City is only relevant to the contract circumstances in 1914 and is subject to continued 
performance under the terms of the exchange contract and potential modification of the decreed 
Salt Lake City right if Big Ditch Irrigation Company becomes again entitled to use its Big 
Cottonwood Creek water rights due to Salt Lake City's failure to perform. It is thus my opinion 
Exhibits. 
6 
that the Morse Decree quiets title to the water rights of the Big Ditch in the Big Ditch water users 
and land owners, and that, as between Big Ditch Irrigation Company and Salt Lake City, 
determines their respective rights as of 1914 only. 
Again, I could not prepare a Report of Conveyance and professionally represent to the State 
Engineer, or this Court, that the Morse Decree quieted title to Big Ditch water rights in Salt Lake 
City. Rather, professionally, I am constrained to the opinion that in the Morse Decree, Salt Lake 
City received at most quiet title in its exchange contract rights based on its contract performance 
through 1914. Contract rights are different than actual title to water rights. Title is not conveyed 
because such rights remain subject to continued performance under the exchange contract and 
modification of the court decree if Salt Lake City fails to continue to perform. By law, title to 
water rights is required to be conveyed by actual bonafide recorded deed so that there is no 
question as to who holds the title to the water rights. 
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RONALD K. CHRISTENSEN, Esq., Ph.D., P.E. 
WATER/ENVIRONMENTAL ENGINEER/EXPERT 
10832 North Natalie Court, Highland, Utah 84003 
Office:(801) 492-0229 Fax: (801)492-0803 
email:rcwaterexpert@yahoo.com 
EXPERIENCE SUMMARY 
Water and environmental engineering expat and attorney with 28 years experience in water rights, 
water policy and institutions, water/environmental engineering/hydrology, and watershed science. 
Extensive experience in hydrology, water law, water resource and environmental 
institutions/regulations, river basin management, hydrologic modeling, water resource investigations, 
and designing, constructing, and operating water resource supply, storage, and drainage systems. 
Expert witness experience in hydrology, water rights, flooding, reservoir spillway operations, canal 
safety, sedimintation and water quality. Engineering projects include State engineer 
hydrographic/water use surveys, river basin modeling, endangered species in-stream flow analyses, 
reservoir sizing and operational studies, water rights evaluations, water quality evaluations and 
analyses, and municipal water supply planning. Supervised design, construction, and operation of 
canals, pipelines, pump stations, diversion structures, sediment removal ponds, and mechanical 
screening equipment. Performed dam safety inspections and completed probable maximum flood 
spillway designs. 
Legal experience includes water rights and water contracts litigation; water contract drafting, 
negotiations, review and evaluations; water rights valuation, sale, and transfer; State Engineer water 
right applications and hearings; U.S. Reclamation law/regulations/contracts; endangered species; 
wetlands; NEPA and other environmental issues; federal reserved water rights including Indian water 
rights; interstate compacts; and administrative law. 
CREDENTIALS AND EXPERIENCE SUMMARY 
Engineering Credentials/Experience 
• 28 years experience in civil/water engineering and water law in private consulting and government 
• Ph.D. Civil and Environmental Engineering (water resources emphasis), 1996, Utah State 
University, Logan, UT 
• M.S. Civil Engineering (water resources emphasis), 1980, Utah State University, Logan, UT 
• B.S, Watershed Science, 1978, Utah State University College of Natural Resources, Logan, UT 
• Registered Professional Engineer (Utah, 1984, #166380, Alabama, 2006, #28152-E) 
Legal Credentials/Experience 
• Attorney at Law (Utah State Bar #8530; Washington State Bar #37345) 
• J.D. of Law with Environmental and Natural Resources Law Certificate, 1999, University of 
Utah College of Law, Salt Lake City, UT 
EMPLOYMENT SUMMARY 
Civil Engineer/Expert/Principal Consultant/Attorney. Water and Environmental Services, LLC, 
Higjhland, UT. April 2000-Date. 
Adjunct Instructor. Utah Valley State College, Orem, UT. Hydrology. Fall Semester. 2007. 
Adjunct Professor. Civil and Environmental Engineering Dept., Utah State University, Logan, UT. 
1998-2001. 
Ronald IC Christensen, Esq., Ph.D., P.E, 
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Supervising CivilAVater Engineer. Parsons Engineering Science, Inc., Salt Lake City, UT. 1990-April 
2000. 
Law Clerk. Snow, Christensen, and Martineau, Salt Lake City, UT. Part-time 1997-1998. 
Staff CivilAVater Engineer. Central Utah Water Conservancy District, Orem, UT. 1985-1990. 
CivilAVater Engineer. Rollins, Brown, and Gunnell, Inc., Provo UT. 1980-1985. 
Graduate Research Assistant Utah Water Research Laboratory, Logan, UT. Part-time 1977-1980. 
Hydrologic/Forestry Aid. Coconino National Forest, Flagstaff, AZ. Summers 1976-1978. 
Hydrologic Technician. Utah State University College of Natural Resources, Logan, UT. Part-time during 
school years 1976-1977. 
OTHER SPECIAL TRAINING 
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation Workshops 
Water Systems Management Workshop (1 week) 
Dam Tenders Workshop (one day). 
Utah State University, Pipe Network Analysis Workshop (1 week). 
PROJECTS, E X P E R I E N C E AND SKILLS 
Expert Witness Projects 
• Conducted a hydrologic beneficial use analysis and provided trial testimony for domestic and irrigation 
water beneficial use for a water rights case in Utah. 
• Conducted a hydrologic water right beneficial use analysis and affidavit testimony for a large irrigation 
well right in Utah. 
• Completed surface water and ground water hydrology and water quality studies and expert witness 
report involving potential contamination of water supplies from a nuclear power generation facility in 
Florida. 
• Evaluated stream hydrology, flooding, and sedimentation effects on downstream lands and facilities 
from a recreational home/residential development for a lands damage case in West Virginia. 
• Completed a hydrologic investigation of reservoir storm operations and analyzed downstream flooding 
from a hydropower dam and reservoir on the Tallapoosa River, Alabama and provided deposition 
testimony for a flood damage case. 
• Completed a hurricane hydrologic reservoir/spillway operations study for evaluation of downstream 
flooding effects along Big Creek and the Escatawpa River, Mississippi and provided deposition 
testimony for a flood damage case 
• Evaluated hydrology and sources of sedimentation and bar formation in a navigational canal for a boat 
injury case in Louisiana and provided deposition testimony. 
• Evaluated river hydrologic changes, flooding, and sedimentation effects from logging in the Elk River 
watershed in the redwood forest region of North Coastal California for a lands and water rights 
damage case. 
• Conducted a flood drainage/water supply canal safety criteria and design study at a canal/roadway 
Ronald K. Christensen, Esq., Ph.D., P.E. 
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crossing for an injury case in Florida. 
Water Rights Administration 
• Evaluated numerous water rights and prepared and submitted Reports of Conveyance to the Utah 
State Engineer's office regarding title and ownership of water rights in the State of Utah. 
• Served as Technical/Quality Control Director and as a water right file analyst for the highly 
successful Geographical Information System (GIS) based Lower Rio Grande/Nutt Hockett 
Hydrographic Survey completed for the New Mexico State Engineer. This hydrographic survey 
inventoried over 90,000 acres of irrigated lands and over 30,000 wells and individual water rights 
in for a timely adjudication of water rights in the lower Rio Grande Basin of New Mexico. 
• Prepared state water right proofs for wells and hydroelectric plants, prepared water-right change 
applications, and participated in state engineer water right hearings. Completed various water rights 
related investigations involving most of the major river systems of the western United States, 
including evaluation of interstate river compacts on the Colorado, Rio Grande, and Bear Rivers. 
• Assisted irrigation districts throughout the West in defending water rights, benefits, and privileges 
afforded them under Bureau of Reclamation law and contracts. 
• Reviewed and commented on the Jicarilla-Apache federal reserved Indian water rights hydrographic 
survey including amounts and validity of water claims. 
• Completed a water supply/water rights assessment of the Animas River for the San Juan Water 
Commission and determined worst case Indian water rights impacts on the Animas River water 
supply. 
• Completed a review of groundwater and surface water rights and estimated water right yield for the 
ten (10) communities of South Utah County, Utah. 
• Assisted with a water right inventory for the Coconino National Forest, Arizona. 
• Wrote computer program and processed data for a water use inventory of the State of Utah for the 
Utah State Engineer. The computer program and inventory subsequently became an important part 
of water rights and use administration in Utah. 
• Evaluated the hydrologic effects of San Luis Valley irrigation practice changes on Rio Grande flows 
and water rights. 
Hydrology/Modeling/River Basin Management 
• Conducted hydrologic analysis for the enlargement of Bishop Creek Reservoir, Nevada including 
analysis and extension of available streamflow data and reservoir operational modeling for 
determining the optimum size of the reservoir basin for optimum water supply from the reservoir. 
• Conducted watershed and river basin management computer modeling studies of the many of the 
larger rivers of the Western United States including the Rio Grande, the Green River, the San Juan 
River, the Colorado River, the Jordan River, the Bear River, and the North Platte River. Reservoir 
operation studies have included operations of Lake Powell, and Lake Mead for determination of the 
proper water supply intake level at Lake Mead. Other studies have included evaluations on the 
Snake River and Columbia River. 
Ronald IC Christensen, Esq., Ph.D., P.E. 
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• Conducted water supply/quality research investigations for the Central Utah Project: Water rights 
and accounting modeling for reservoir, pipeline and diversion sizing, and operational studies on the 
Duchesne, Weber, and Provo Rivers and on Utah Lake. Included use of all U.S. Bureau of 
Reclamation computer models for simulation of the Central Utah Project and the BYU developed 
Utah Lake Water Quality Simulation Model. 
• Completed a 100-year floodplain evaluation and mapping study for the West Fork Cabin Camp on 
the Madison River, Montana including both gaged and ungaged flood frequency analysis and 
estimation, on-site river survey, and river hydraulic modeling. 
• Assisted in evaluations and negotiations for reservoir operating agreements for Strawberry and Deer 
Creek Reservoirs. Reviewed and commented on reservoir operating agreements for Jordanelle and 
Hyrum Reservoirs. 
• Conducted water supply research investigations: river basin and reservoir modeling of upper Bear 
River Basin in Utah and Wyoming. Included stochastic streamflow generation of upper Bear River 
tributary flows, reservoir and reservoir computer operational studies on stochastically generated 
flows along with water right demand simulations and evaluation of the Bear River Compact and its 
effect on river operations and available water. 
• Analyzed the economic feasibility of flood control methods for the Great Salt Lake through 
stochastic annual streamflow and hydrologic computer simulation including West Desert pumping 
and diking systems at critical areas along the lake shore. 
• Evaluated all significant Rio Grande gaging station records (including low flow conveyance channel 
and Compact stations), Rio Grande Commission records, precipitation and evaporation data, and 
reservoir storage and release data for modeling of the water supplies available from the Elephant 
Butte and Caballo Reservoirs of the Rio Grande Project. Work included statistical analyses, missing 
data estimation, long-term trend analyses, return flow analyses, river gain/loss analyses, and 
hydrogeologic analyses. 
• Evaluated San Juan-Chama Reclamation Project effects on streamflows of the Rio Grande. 
• Retained by the San Juan Water Commission to perform RiverWare operation studies and flood 
control analyses for the Bureau of Reclamation's Navajo Reservoir Re-operation Environmental 
Impact Statement. 
• Performed an independent RiverWare San Juan River modeling output evaluation for the San Juan 
Water Commission and reviewed and commented on BOR/USFWS endangered fish species in-
stream flow evaluations and recommendations. 
• Assisted with fortran computer programming for river basin modeling of the Senegal River, Africa. 
Water Quality Evaluations 
• Researched suspended sediment, settlement, and bedload prediction models and developed a 
suspended sediment and bedload spreadsheet model of the Payette River for the Horseshoe Bend 
Hydroelectric Facility for prediction of diverted flow and downstream river sediment loads. 
• Completed conceptual water treatment plant and system designs for desalination of brackish 
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groundwater and surface water including facility sizing, treatment train formulation, and waste 
stream treatment. 
• Conducted a salinity/water quality investigation of the Jordan River, Utah including water quality 
sampling and monitoring for its entire length from Utah Lake to the Great Salt Lake, all major 
incoming tributaries, and most minor tributaries. 
• Prepared conceptual designs and feasibility analysis for a desalination plant for treating saline 
mineral springs discharging to Utah Lake at Bird Island and Lincoln Point, Utah. 
• Developed storm hydrology design criteria and standards for urban development within American 
Fork City and developed Best Management Practices (BMP's) for water quality compliance 
standards for urban developments in American Fork City, Utah. Included storm drainage system 
mapping, drainage system computer simulation and evaluations and formulation of master drainage 
plans and regulations for future development in the city while meeting EPA regulations. 
• Conducted a water supply and water quality modeling investigation and completed a Salinity 
Management Control Plan for Utah Lake, Utah. 
• Participated on the interagency review team for the CUP Utah Lake Salinity Management Study: 
reviewed modeling assumptions, input data, and model output and made comments on interpretation 
and how to improve model results. 
• Completed a salinity management study for the Lower Mesilla Valley, New Mexico/Texas including 
evaluation of salinity sources, irrigation and natural evapotranspiration salt concentrating effects, 
and development of potential salt management strategies. 
• Completed a salinity management plan for new uses of Utah Lake and Jordan River waters under 
the proposed Utah Lake and Jordan River Storage and Conservation Plan, Utah. 
• Investigated Bird Island Mineral Springs in the middle of Utah Lake to determine salinity and other 
water quality parameters to develop a salinity control and remediation plan for preventing mineral 
contamination of Utah Lake waters. 
• Reviewed and commented on salinity management alternatives for the Great Salt Lake proposed by 
the Utah State Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands. 
• Conducted water quality research project monitoring of Oak Creek, Arizona to determine 
progressive water quality changes downstream and impacts of humans on the aquatic environment. 
Water Supply Planning 
• Completed a municipal water supply Level II feasibility study for Bedford, Wyoming included 
estimation of ungaged and gaged stream flow, evaluation of water rights, and estimation of 
unappropriated water. 
• Conducted a surface water supply study for Star Valley, Wyoming included estimation of ungaged 
and gaged stream flow, evaluation of water rights, and estimation of unappropriated water. 
• Completed a review of water rights, estimated water right yield, and determined additional water 
supply needs for the ten (10) communities of South Utah County, Utah. 
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• Completed municipal water supply evaluations for Orem City and Wasatch County, Utah. 
• Developed a master plan for Elephant Butte Irrigation District, Las Cruces, New Mexico for the 
conversion of nearly 200,000 acre-feet of irrigation water to municipal use including water treatment 
facilities up to 350 mgd in capacity and transmission pipelines up to 96 inches in diameter. 
• Conducted a water supply study to provide a surface water municipal supply for El Paso, Texas: 
computer simulation of two large reservoirs on the Rio Grande and associated delivery systems. 
• Completed a regional water supply plan for the Rincon Valley and the lower Rio Grande Valley 
above Leasburg, for the Elephant Butte Irrigation District. 
• Completed water yield and feasibility studies for alternative configurations of the proposed Animas-
LaPlata Project. 
• Completed municipal return flow analyses for San Juan Water Commission municipal entities. 
Water Management and Conservation 
• Developed a master plan for water conservation, rehabilitation, and upgrade of the Strawberry Valley 
Project, a large irrigation project in South Utah County, Utah. 
• Assisted with the $3 million CUP Water Conservation and Management Study: helped develop water 
conservation and management strategies for the CUP including both municipal and irrigation 
conservation measures. 
• Developed a master plan for re-use of reclaimed wastewater in West Covina, California to irrigate 
parks and golf courses. 
• Completed a water conservation application for the funding of the rehabilitation of the Strawberry 
High Line Canal for the Strawberry Water Users Association. 
• Completed canal seepage/water conservation investigations for the $34 million Duchesne River 
Canal Rehabilitation Program of the CUP. 
Canal/Pipeline/Water System/Hydropower Design 
• Supervised design, construction, and operation of a $34 million irrigation canal rehabilitation project 
including administration of eleven (11) construction contracts, administration of bidding, 
construction scheduling, materials testing and inspection, surveying, weekly construction progress 
meetings, and monthly payment requests, review of plans and specifications, negotiation and liaison 
with canal companies, and supervision of construction inspection. 
• Conducted canal and aqueduct capacity studies including computation of water surface or hydraulic 
profiles for open channels, pipelines, bridges, culverts, and tunnels. 
• Completed research for the feasibility of hydroelectric power generation including estimation and 
evaluation of streamflows and power output for Last Chance Power Plant, Utah 
• Conducted hydroelectric power generation and requirement studies for the Southern Nevada Water 
Authority Treatment and Transmission Facility including power requirement and power source 
option studies. 
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• Designed 2.5 miles of 30-inch wastewater effluent ocean outfall pipeline extending 1.5 miles into 
the ocean. 
• Performed large diameter water transmission pipeline route analyses, hydraulics, and pump station 
evaluations, treated water facility disinfection plans, and electrical power supply and transmission 
facility studies to provide ultimate water delivery to Las Vegas, Nevada. 
• Conducted engineering studies for an environmental impact statement (EIS) on replacing a raw water 
supply pipeline for Boulder, Colorado: evaluation of alternative pipeline alignments, diversion, and 
small storage sites for an 800 psi pressure pipeline. 
• Completed a feasibility study for a 600 mgd pump station connected to Hoover Dam on the Colorado 
River with a hydraulic lift of over 1200 feet. 
• Performed large diameter water transmission pipeline route analyses, hydraulics, and pump station 
evaluations, treated water facility disinfection plans, and electrical power supply and transmission 
facility studies to provide ultimate water delivery to Las Vegas, Nevada. 
• Conducted canal and aqueduct capacity studies including computation of water surface or hydraulic 
profiles for open channels, pipelines, bridges, culverts, and tunnels. 
• Performed large pump station design and operational evaluations. 
• Participated in annual inspections of dams, reservoirs, tunnels, large diameter pipelines, and canals. 
• Completed an overflow evaluation for the Jordan Valley Water Treatment Plant, Salt Lake County, 
Utah and developed overflow control alternatives. 
• Evaluated operational problems for three municipal water treatment plants. 
• Designed water transmission pipelines and large storm drains. 
Hydrogeology/Groundwater/Surface Water Conjunctive Management 
• Prepared geohydrology water source evaluations and well-head protection plans for two wells and 
three springs near Scofield and near Lehi, Utah including evaluation of groundwater travel times and 
determination of water origination areas for the wells and springs. 
• Completed a hydrologic evaluation of aquifer storage and recovery (ASR) system feasibility for two 
sites in the Mesilla Valley of the Lower Rio Grande including analysis of area hydrogeology and 
aquifer storage and yield capability. 
• Completed a hydrogeologic review of the Honerine Mine workings and tunnels to determine 
feasibility of use as a water supply for Tooele City, Utah. 
• Completed a surface water/ground water research investigation for the permitting of a coal loading 
facility, Price, Utah. Performed a well pump test for determination of aquifer characteristics and 
determined groundwater sources. 
• Conducted a surface/groundwater interaction research study to determine sources of groundwater 
for the St. John area of Rush Valley, Utah. 
• Completed canal seepage/water conservation investigations for the $34 million Duchesne River 
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Canal Rehabilitation Program of the CUP. 
Other Water Related Engineering 
• Conducted a geologic and structural evaluation of the Cedar Mountain Tunnel of the Shoshone 
Reclamation Project of Wyoming including sonar sensing of voids behind the concrete walls of the 
tunnel and the development of a tunnel rehabilitation strategy and design. 
• Conducted eight separate flood insurance studies for communities of Utah including research of past 
flooding and flood heights, research of watershed hydrology, completion of hydrology reports, HEC-
1 flood hydrograph simulation and calibration against streamflow records, HEC-2 riverine open-
channel and bridge hydraulics, alluvial fan flooding and prediction, and FEMA floodplain mapping. 
Completed flood insurances studies and mapping for the cities of Logan, St. George, Cedar City, 
Salina, Manti, Richfield, Provo, and Salt Lake County. 
• Performed Probable Maximum Flood reservoir spillway evaluations and design studies for nine 
dams. Dams included: 
Fish Creek Dam, Wyoming Sulphur Creek Reservoir Enlargement, Wyoming 
Reed Valley Dam, Arizona Quail Creek Dam, Utah 
South Willow Dam, Utah Yankee Meadows Reservoir Enlargement, Utah 
West Fork Reservoir, Utah Millerton Reservoir, Utah 
Grantsville Dam, Utah 
Work included estimation and determination of probable precipitation, probable maximum floods 
using the COE HEC-1 program, HEC-1 dam break analyses, hydrologic routing of dam break floods, 
and HEC-2 analysis of dam break flood plains. 
• Completed Corps of Engineers Phase I inspection reports for five dams in Utah including the Pete 
Winward, Big East, McClellan, Dry Lake, and Maple Lake Dams. 
• Developed a storm drainage master plan for the Salt Lake International Airport. Work included 
hydrologic estimation of 10-year and 25-year storm events and computer simulation of the Salt Lake 
International airport storm drainage network system. 
• Developed storm drainage master plan for the 5600 West Central area of Salt Lake County, Utah. 
Work included hydrologic computer simulation of 10-year and 25-year storm events and 
development of storm network systems to handle predicted storm hydrographs. 
• Conducted a sewer/groundwater infiltration study and performed hydraulic calculations for the 
Springville, Utah Wastewater Treatment Plant. 
• Assisted forest hydrologist, conducted stream gaging and water quality monitoring, and constructed 
erosion control structures on the Coconino National Forest, Arizona. 
Institutional/Water Policy 
• Completed an evaluation and assisted the State of Utah in determining the institutional feasibility 
of enlarging the Bureau of Reclamation's Hyrum Reservoir for municipal supply for the Wasatch 
Front, Utah. 
• Participated in multi-disciplinary and multi-project Central Utah Project (CUP) coordination 
meetings and discussions. 
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Environmental and Regulatory Experience 
• Prepared a successful NPDES Clean Water Act permit application for removal of residual chlorine 
prior to release of water to Utah Lake. 
• Reviewed an in-stream flow requirement study for a blue ribbon trout fishery in the Provo River, 
Utah and provided independent analyses and comments on study results. 
• Participated in an interagency team for determining in-stream fishery flow requirements for Rock 
Creek and the Duchesne River, Utah. 
• Reviewed and made comments on interagency team findings for required endangered species in-
stream flows on the San Juan River, New Mexico and Utah including comments on study 
assumptions, findings, and recommendations. 
• Participated as a committee member in the interagency hydrology and coordination committees for 
the Navajo Reservoir Reoperation EIS, 1999-2000. 
• Participated in EIS public scoping meetings and interagency public involvement meetings for 
proposed Bureau of Reclamation Central Utah Project (CUP) facilities. 
• Reviewed and commented on the CUP Spanish Fork/Nephi (SFN) System EIS. Assisted the 
Strawberry Water Users Association in preparing letter comments to the Bureau of Reclamation. 
• Reviewed and provided comments to the San Juan Water Commission on the recently released 
Bureau of Reclamation Animas-LaPlata Project Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement. 
• Reviewed and commented on USGS and State of Utah hydrologic and salinity modeling of the Great 
Salt Lake for Union Pacific Railroad. 
• Reviewed and commented on the Great Salt Lake Comprehensive Management Plan and assisted 
Union Pacific Railroad in preparing letter comments for submittal to the State of Utah regarding 
flood control operations of the Great Salt Lake pumping project and management of lake salinity. 
Contracts/Legal Experience 
• Reviewed contracts for the sale and lease of water rights and made recommendations to clients. 
• Assisted client with reservoir easement issues on federal and private lands. Required review of 
original land patents and Bureau of Land Management historical and current regulations. 
• Extensively researched federal laws governing U.S. Bureau of Reclamation water supply/repayment 
contracts. Evaluated rights and interests of water users in numerous Reclamation project water 
repayment contracts. Clients have included: 
North Platte Project Irrigation Districts, WY & NE Klamath Irrigation District, OR 
Caspar-Alcova Irrigation District, WY Roza Irrigation District, WA 
Miavale Irrigation District, WY Black Sands Irrigation District, WA 
John Stutsman, Shoshone Project, WY Imperial Irrigation District, CA 
Minidoka Irrigation District, ID Strawberry Water Users Association, UT 
Kansas/Bostwick Irrigation District, KS (Pick Sloan Project) Tulelake Irrigation District, CA 
Chinook Joint Irrigation Districts, MT Southern Nevada Water Authority, NV 
Milk River Irrigation Districts, MT Elephant Butte Irrigation District, NM 
San Juan Water Commission, NM Utah Division of Water Resources 
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• Completed water rights valuation assessments. 
• Prepared State Engineer water right applications and provided hearings assistance. 
• Assisted canal companies with canal break issues 
PAPERS AND PUBLICATIONS 
Engineering/Water Resources/Hydrology Publications 
Overflow Evaluation for the Jordan Valley Water Treatment Plant, prepared for the Jordan Valley 
Water Conservancy District, Parsons Engineering Science, Inc., Salt Lake City, Utah, January 2000. 
Development of Salinity Management Alternatives, El Paso - Las Cruces Regional Sustainable Water 
Project, Boyle Engineering and Parsons Engineering Science, Inc., Salt Lake City, Utah, July 1999. 
Water Requirement Study for South Utah County, Utah9 prepared for the Strawberry Water Users 
Association and the Central Utah Water Conservancy District, Parsons Engineering Science, Inc., Salt 
Lake City, Utah, August 1995. 
Surface Water Supply Master Plan for the City of Las Cruces, New Mexico, prepared for the Elephant 
Butte Irrigation District, Parsons Engineering Science, Inc., Salt Lake City, Utah, 1995. 
New Mexico/Texas Aquifer Storage and Recovery Project, prepared for the Texas/New Mexico 
Settlement Commission, Boyle Engineering and Parsons Engineering Science, Inc., Salt Lake City, 
Utah, 1995. 
Last Chance Power Plant Feasibility Study, prepared for the Strawberry Water Users Association, 
Engineering Science, Inc., Salt Lake City, Utah, 1994. 
Regional Water Supply Plan for the Lower Rio Grande Valley Above Leasburg, prepared for Elephant 
Butte Irrigation District, Engineering Science, Inc., Salt Lake City, Utah, April 1994. 
Strawberry Valley Project Master Plan for South Utah County Irrigation Distribution System, 
Rehabilitation, Enlargement, and Water Conservation, prepared for the Strawberry Water Users 
Association, Engineering Science, Inc., Salt Lake City, Utah, March 1994. 
Cedar Mountain Tunnel Evaluation for Shoshone Project Powers Boardy Engineering Science, Inc., Salt 
Lake City, Utah, August 1993. 
Water Conservation Application for the Strawberry High Line Canals prepared for the Strawberry Water 
Users Association, Engineering Science, Inc., Salt Lake City, Utah, June 1993. 
New Mexico/Texas Joint Conveyance Facility for Rio Grande Project Water, Phase I Report, prepared 
for the Joint Settlement Commission, Boyle Engineering Corp. and Engineering Science, Inc., Salt Lake 
City, Utah, May 1993. 
Reclaimed Water Use Plan, prepared for City of West Covina, CA, Engineering Science, Inc., Pasadena, 
CA, August 1991. 
Star Valley Municipal Water Supply Project, Level II, Surface Water Sources, Engineering Science, 
Inc., Salt Lake City, Utah, January 1991. 
Surface Water Supply Alternative for El Paso, Texas, prepared for the New Mexico Entities, 
Engineering Science, Inc., Salt Lake City, Utah, June 1990. 
Salinity Control Plan for Utah Lake, Central Utah Water Conservancy District, Orem, Utah, 1989. 
Investigation of Bird Island Mineral Springs, Utah Lake, Central Utah Water Conservancy District, 
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Orem, Utah, 1989. 
Hydrology Study for Hibbard Bridge on Rancheria Creek, CA, Rollins, Brown, and Gunnell, Inc., 
Provo, Utah, April 1985. 
Hydrology Report for Provo, Utah Flood Insurance Study, prepared for the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, Rollins, Brown, and Gunnell, Inc., Provo, Utah, July 1985. 
Hydrology Report for Richfield, Utah Flood Insurance Study, prepared for the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, Rollins, Brown, and Gunnell, Inc., Provo, Utah, 1985. 
Hydrology Report for Salina, Utah Flood Insurance Study, prepared for the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, Rollins, Brown, and Gunnell, Inc., Provo, Utah, April 1984. 
Airside/Landside Drainage Improvements Final Design Report, prepared for the Salt Lake City Airport 
Authority, Utah, Rollins, Brown, and Gunnell, Inc., Provo, Utah, May 1984. 
5600 West-Central Master Drainage Plan, prepared for West Valley City, Utah, Rollins, Brown, and 
Gunnell, Inc., Provo, Utah, May 1984. 
Salt Lake International Airport Master Drainage Study, prepared for the Salt Lake City Airport 
Authority, Utah, Rollins, Brown, and Gunnell, Inc., Provo, Utah, January 1984. 
Some Lake Level Control Alternatives for the Great Salt Lake9 Utah Water Research Laboratory, 1983. 
Impact of the Level of the Great Salt Lake at the Salt Lake City International Airport, prepared for the 
Salt Lake City Airport Authority, Utah, Rollins, Brown, and Gunnell, Inc., Provo, Utah, September 
1983. 
Hydrology Report of Flood Insurance Studies for Logan, Utah and Adjacent Areas, prepared for the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, Rollins, Brown, and Gunnell, Inc., Provo, Utah, June 1981. 
Hydrology Report of Flood Insurance Studies for Cedar City, Utah and Adjacent Areas, prepared for 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency, Rollins, Brown, and Gunnell, Inc., Provo, Utah, March 
1981. 
Hydrology Report of Flood Insurance Studies for St. George, Utah and Adjacent Areas, prepared for 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency, Rollins, Brown, and Gunnell, Inc., Provo, Utah, February 
1981. 
Pete Winward Dam, Phase I Inspection Report, prepared for the Utah State Division of Water Rights, 
Utah, Rollins, Brown, and Gunnell, Inc., Provo, Utah, September 1980. 
McClellan Dam, Phase I Inspection Report, prepared for the Utah State Division of Water Rights, Utah, 
Rollins, Brown, and Gunnell, Inc., Provo, Utah, September 1980. 
Maple Lake Dam, Phase I Inspection Report, prepared for the Utah State Division of Water Rights, 
Utah, Rollins, Brown, and Gunnell, Inc., Provo, Utah, September 1980. 
Dry Lake Dam, Phase I Inspection Report, prepared for the Utah State Division of Water Rights, Utah, 
Rollins, Brown, and Gunnell, Inc., Provo, Utah, September 1980. 
Big East Dam, Phase I Inspection Report, prepared for the Utah State Division of Water Rights, Utah, 
Rollins, Brown, and Gunnell, Inc., Provo, Utah, September 1980. 
Economic Feasibility of Pumping or Diking as a Means for Flood Control of the Great Salt Lake, Utah 
State University, 1980, Master's Thesis. 
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PHILLIP E. LOWRY (6603), 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH (3752), and 
ELIJAH L. MILNE (11171), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, P.C. 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
PO Box 1248 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile (801)377-4991 
Our File No 28499-2 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BIG DITCH IRRIGATION COMPANY, et 
al., 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR LEAVE 
TO FILE SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT 
OF RONALD K. CHRISTENSEN 
Case No. 070903735 
Judge Robin W. Reese 
The defendant Big Ditch Irrigation Company has moved the Court under Rules 7 and 
56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for leave to file a supplemental affidavit of Ronald K. 
Christensen. 
Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the filing of additional 
memoranda requires leave of court. Rule 56(c) governs the filing of affidavits and other 
documents supporting motions for summary judgment. The older version of Rule 56 allowed the 
filing of affidavits up until the day before the court hearing on the motion. The current rule 
removed this language, but did not provide a mechanism for the filing of additional affidavits. 
Significantly, the revision to the rule did not insert language prohibiting the filing of additional 
affidavits. 
The rules, therefore, do not offer clear guidance on the proper mechanism for filing 
additional affidavits. One reading is that such filing still remains a right, as long as they are filed 
within a reasonable time before the hearing. Another reading is that leave of court is now 
required. Big Ditch does not advocate here which of these approaches is correct, except to say 
that it appears that such filing is still permitted. Out of an abundance of caution and in an effort 
to show respect to the court in the face of this ambiguity, Big Ditch hereby asks leave of the court 
to file the supplemental Christensen affidavit. Big Ditch urges that such leave ought to be 
granted liberally. 
The supplemental affidavit itself addresses additional documents that have been obtained 
since the filing of his original affidavit dated July 1, 2008. The supplemental Christensen 
affidavit discusses his additional opinions based on these new documents. 
The affidavit is submitted as support to all of Big Ditch's pending motions and is attached 
hereto. 
2 
DATED this /ff day of September, 2008 
PHILLIP E. LOWRY, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN; P.C. 
Attorneys for Big Ditch Irrigation Co. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the following, 
postage prepaid, this J^day of September, 2008. 
Edwin C. Barnes 
Steven E. Clyde 
Wendy Bowden Crowther 
CLYDE, SNOW, SESSIONS & SWENSON 
201 South Main Street, 13th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
J. Bryan Quesenberry 
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, L.C. 
4844 North 300 West, Suite 300 
Provo, UT 84604 
SECRETARY 
I \Big Ditch 28499-2\Motions, Memos, & OrdersNBDICs Mot for Leave to File Chnstensen Affidavit\memo in supp of mot for leave to file supplemental 
affidavit of Chnstensen (2008-09-04) wpd 
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AFFIDAVIT OF RONALD K. CHRISTENSEN, Ph.D., P.E. 
Before me, the undersigned authority, in and for said County and State, personally 
appeared Ronald K. Christensen, Ph.D., P.E., who after first being duly sworn by me, says as 
follows: 
1. My name is Ronald K. Christensen, I am over 18 years of age, and I reside in 
Highland, Utah. 
2. I hold a Ph.D. in Civil and Environmental Engineering, a Juris Doctor of law degree, 
and have experience and expertise in the area of title to water rights in Utah. 
3. I have been employed by the Big Ditch Irrigation Company to review and give my 
opinion regarding the Big Ditch Irrigation Company's title to water rights in Big Cottonwood 
Creek flowing from the Wasatch Mountains on the east side of the Salt Lake Valley of Utah. 
4. I prepared the attached First Supplemental Memorandum dated September 2, 2008, to 
the Big Ditch Irrigation Company with subject entitled "Is1 Supplemental Memorandum to Big 
Ditch Irrigation Company Water Rights" reviewing and discussing the attached additional 
documents labeled "Doc. 1" through "Doc. 14" and giving my opinion regarding the ownership 
of title to the water rights held by Big Ditch Irrigation Company in the waters of Big 
Cottonwood Creek of the Wasatch Mountains of Utah on the east side of the Salt Lake Valley. 
Signed this 3rd day of September, 2008. 
(ylAA/lJn At (o,Ai 
RONALD K. CHRISTENSEN, Ph.D., P.E. 
STATE OF UTAH * 
AFFIDAVIT 
COUNTY OF UTAH 
see 
Before me, the undersigned authority, a Notary Public in and for said County and State, 
personally appeared Ronald K. Christensen who being by me first duly sworn, deposes and states 
that the foregoing Affidavit is true and correct to the best of his information, knowledge, and 
belief.
 3(^ S^k^ 
Sworn to, subscribed before, and executed by me this the J-st day of J«ly, 2008. 
Notary Public^ / 
My Commission Expires 9- 7-ZU)°? 
SHERRYLYNCU8TANCE 
ncwrffvauc-mtcrmt 
5405 MSI*** NORTH 
AMERICAN FORK, OTAHMN3 
C O M * EXP. 9-7-2009 
WATER AND ENVIRONMENTAL S ERVICES, LLC. 
Ronald K. Christensen, Ph D., P E.f JD 
Professional Civil-Water Engineer/Attorney 10x32 North Natalie court 
Highland, Utah 84003 
office (801)492-0229 
fax* (801) 492-0803 
FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM 
Date September 2, 2008 
To Big Ditch Irrigation Company 
From Ronald K Christensen, PhD , P E , JD 
Subject 1st Supplemental Memorandum to Big Ditch Irrigation Company Water Rights 
ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS REVIEWED 
I have reviewed the following additional documents attached as Exhibit A and numbered 
documents Doc 1 through 15 and make the following observations 
Doc 1 Summary of Biz Cottorwood Rights^ January 20, 1960 Shows 
P 1 
Average creek flow years 1899-1950 of 74 8 cfs = 54,153.5 acre-feet 
Salt Lake City claimed right is at least 85.76 percent = 46,442 0 acre-feet 
Doc 2 Printout of Utah Division of Water Rights records for Big Cottonwood Water Treatment 
Plant 
P 1-2 
Gives data for Salt Lake City culinary water use years 1979 to 2007 (2 pages) 
Minimum average 7-year use = 21,276 6 acre-feet 
Percent of claimed right = 46 percent 
Maximum average 7-year use = 24,830 4 acre-feet 
Percent of claimed right = 53 percent 
7 years 2000 to 2007 = 24,148 2 acre-feet 
Percent of claimed right = 52 percent 
Conclusion Salt Lake City currently uses only approximately one-half its claimed rights and the 
use of the City's 1905 exchange contract Big Ditch rights has diminished nearly 50 
percent over time as Salt Lake City has gained ownership/control of nearly 100 
percent of Big Cottonwood Creek 
Doc 3 Richards Irrigation Company water rights documents 16 pages 
P 1 -4 Newspaper notices of change application #1177 lists Salt Lake City Corporation as 
agent of Richards Irrigation Company 
P 5-6 Change application dated August 25, 1931 - lists Richards Irrigation Company as 
1 
owner or rights and SLC as agent 
P. 7 Warranty deed conveying Richards Irrigation Company water rights from Richards 
Irrigation Company to the State of Utah, Board of Water Resources 
This kind of deed is usually for security for a loan from the State. 
P. 8-15 Richards Irrigation Company exchange contract with SLC dated May 29, 1931. Is 
basically the same agreement in terms of water rights exchange, title, and company 
reversion rights as the Big Ditch Irrigation Company agreement. 
P. 16 Newspaper notice of dated Mar. 21 to Apr. 4, 1955 of request for extension of time 
and listing Salt Lake City as agent for the Richards Irrigation Company. 
Conclusion: All documents show both State of Utah and Salt Lake City recognition of Richards 
Irrigation Company as the title owner to the water rights with Salt Lake City at 
most acting as agent. 
Doc. 4. Annual Report of Citv Engineer. Marked Year 1908. 
P. 1-3 
Exchange of Water Rights Section 
Conclusion: Recognizes Salt Lake City rights derive through exdiange contract with reversion 
rights back to the irrigation companies, recognizes that "mountain water" remains 
"owned by the individual or company," recognizes that Salt Lake City is obligated 
to deliver exchange water to maintain its grant to use the mountain water under the 
contract. 
Doc. 5. Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Company documents, dated in the year 2008. 
P. 1-4. Quit Claim Deed from the Company to Salt Lake City of company water rights held 
in Big Cottonwood Creek flows. 
P. 5-38 Amended and Restated Water Exchange Agreement - Year 2008 Contract for 
conveyance of company water rights to Salt Lake City by the p. 1-4 quit claim deed. 
Consideration includes vouchers for free water service. 
P 39-43 Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Company exchange contract with SLC dated January 
2, 1920. Is basically the same agreement in terms of water rights exchange, title, 
and company reversion rights as the Big Ditch Irrigation Company agreement. 
Conclusion: Documents show Salt Lake City recognition of Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch 
Company as the title owner to the water rights necessitating: (1) the execution of an 
actual deed to convey the company's water rights to Salt Lake City, and (2) 
additional consideration for that conveyance. 
Doc. 6. Salt Lake Citv 1997-98 Strategic Initiative and Work Plan. 
P. 1-12 
P. 2, 8 Salt Lake City purchases exchange canal company shares of stock to obtain outright 
"ownership of the right rather than rights through an exchange agreement." 
Doc. 7. Lease Agreement Dated 4th October, 1917 between Big Ditch Irrigation Company and 
Salt Lake City. 
P. 1-4 This document was provided by SLC's GRAMA response January 16, 2007. 
Conclusion: Shows post 1914 Morse Decree SLC's acknowledgment of Big Ditch Irrigation 
Company's continuing ownership of Big Cottonwood Creek water rights after the 
decree and payment to the company for the use of the company's water rights. 
Doc. 8. Documents involving Salt Lake City aquisition of Cahoon & Maxfield Irrigation 
Company fC&MV 
P. 1-39. 
P. 1 SLC willing to grant Utah Lake water rights for "clear title" to C&M water rights 
P 2-3 SLC acknowledges its rights derive from exchange agreement and that it does not 
use all of its rights because of high spring runoff 
P. 4-5 SLC acknowledges C&M ownership of the water rights and SLC rights derive 
through an exchange agreement. SLC director of public utilities represents to the 
City Council that C&M "owns 9,500 acre-feet of water on a 30-year average and a 
non-diminished delivery obligation of 11,400 acre-feet despite urbanization 
Contemporaneously, the SLC deputy director represents to C&M that the company 
only owns 5,100 acre-feet of water a portion of which is unusable because of high 
spring flow (p. 2-3). 
P. 6 SLC plans and offers to buy C&M for $4,327,660 for all non-municipal owned 
shares and acknowledges the company's ownership of the water rights being 
bought. 
P. 7-9 SLC plans to buy C&M to acquire clear title to the 'Svater rights of the Company" 
and plans to obtain the deeds necessary for that conveyance. 
P 10 Document indicates purchase of C&M was successfol. 
P 11-13 Documents show SLC personnel as current C&M officers. 
P 14-26 Dispository Agreement for C&M purchase. 
P 27 SLC had only one share in 1997 and letter discusses company sale issues 
P 29-32 Year 2002 change applications on C&M water - lists the company as well as SLC as 
the water right holder. Acknowledges that C&M continues to hold the water rights 
even though SLC now claims to own it. 
P 33-39 C&M files a change application on 9-8-97 as the owner of the water right. 
Conclusion: SLC recognized it did not own C&M water rights through its exchange agreement 
and paid over $4.3 million to purchase the canal company stock from stockholders. 
Thereafter, SLC took over the canal company and transacts water right changes 
through the company name. 
Doc. 9. Water Rights Purchases: As a Means of Protecting Watersheds, August 16, 1989 
P. 1-2 
Conclusion: Acknowledges that SLC must purchase shares to become "the 'outright owner' of 
the rights rather than an owner through contract." 
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Doc. 10 Application for the Right of Exchange of Water. Stewart Canyon Corporation, June 16, 
1970. 
P. 1-2 Approved exchange application based on an exchange of water owned through 
purchase contract with Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake City. 
Conclusion: Water right remains owned by the US Bureau of Reclamation and through a grant of 
use of water under a contract by Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake City. The 
exchange applicant, Stewart Canyon Corporation, under its contract grant to the use 
of water, owned title sufficient to obtain an approved exchange application while 
not owning naked title to the water right. 
Doc. 11. Commissioner's Reports, monthly reports dated April 1962 through May 15. 1989 
P. 1-315 
Conclusion: Commissioner's reports were prepared on Big Ditch Company's water rights at least 
through May 15, 1989 and show that much of that time a full share of water was 
available from the creek to the Company. As late as 1989, the Commissioners, 
under the 1905 agreement determined that "Full Share Available." 
Doc. 12. Various Documents Associated with Application No. A-l175 for C&M Company 
P. 1-13 
Conclusion: Acknowledges (1) the canal companies are the owners of the water rights to Little 
Cottonwood Creek stating that "The water will flow to its owners," (2) that Salt 
Lake City uses the water under its exchange agreements, and (3) that Salt Lake City 
submitted the application to the State as an agent of the canal companies and not as 
the owner of the water right. 
Doc 13. Transcript of State Engineer's Hearing on Temporary Change App. Nos. T92-57-19 and 
t-92-57-2(X August 24. 1993. 
P. 1-46. 
P. 7-8 SLC counsel J. Novak states that "its immaterial here whether Salt Lake City has 
technical legal title. . . . We are here talking about a grant under the specific 
provisions of the exchange agreements" being title sufficient to meet the 
requirements to file change applications under 73-3-3. 
P. 14 The total flow of the creek used to divide the water at the canyon mouth includes 
the return flow from Alta, etc. in the sewer line down the canyon. 
P. 24 SLC counsel J. Novak states SLC's position that SLC Cottonwood canyon water 
rights are based on exchanges under exchange applications. 
P 34-35 Detailed study of State Engineer records by B. Murdock verified that SLC filed its 
original applications as agent of the canal companies and not as owner of the water 
rights and that those applications had lapsed. 
4 
P. 38 B. Murdock found not deeds from the canal companies to the SLC 
Conclusion: SLC rights are based on exchanges and not upon deeds of actual water rights. 
Doc. 14. SLC Answer to 1934 Protest on Tanner Ditch Exchange Application 
P. 1-2. 
P. 1 SLC Commissioner of Water Supply and Water Works swore as an affiant under 
oath that SLC filed Change Application No. a-1174 acting as the "duly authorized 
agent for the Tanner Ditch" under an exchange agreement. 
DISCUSSION 
After reviewing the above listed additional documents, it remains my opinion that the Big Ditch 
Irrigation Company water rights were not, and could not be conveyed to Salt Lake City by virtue 
of their exchange agreement. For many decades, Salt Lake City acknowledged, acted and 
operated under the fact that the irrigation companies who signed exchange agreements were the 
owners of the water rights and that Salt Lake City had only title to a grant to the use of water 
under exchange contracts rather than being the actual owner of the naked title. In recent 
acknowledgment of that fact, Salt Lake City spent $4.3 million to obtain the clear title to Cahoon 
and Maxfield Irrigation Company rights through purchase of the company shares. This year, 
2008, SLC required a deed upon its final acquisition with additional consideration for Big 
Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Company rights thereby finally extinguishing the company rights. 
These documents strengthen my opinion. Again, I could not prepare a Report of Conveyance and 
professionally represent to the State Engineer, or the Court, that Salt Lake City owns title to the 
water rights held by Big Ditch Irrigation Company either through the exchange contract or the 
Morse Decree. Salt Lake City's rights remained contingent upon its performance under the 
exchange contract and the Morse decree remained subject to the continuing jurisdiction of the 
court to modify the decree as needed to enforce that contract. Again, by law, title to water rights 
is required to be conveyed by actual bonafide recorded deed so that there is no question as to who 
holds the title to the water rights. It is my opinion that Big Ditch Irrigation Company owns the 
naked title to its original water rights and that Salt Lake City owns only a grant to use the water 
under the exchange contract. 
5 
Project Completion Act, Section 207 conservation re-
quirements. The Salt I>aJce County Water Conservancy 
District (SLCWCD) and Central Utah Water Conservancy 
District (CUWCD) have been involved with the CVTOOf un-
der the proposal. The SLCWCD BBBB an opportunity to 
gain an additional water supply by converting the con-
served reused water to M t I water xn the future. The 
SLCWCD and CUWCD would share the CUP debt credit and 
CUWCD's O & M credit 66% and 33% respectively. The 
Salt Lake City Suburban District No.l has filed a 
Change Application A6848S (57-7628) on the water col-
lected in its sewer system and discharged to the CVWEF 
treatment facility, including waters from Mill Creek 
and Big Cottonwood Creek. This is in dispute, as Salt 
Lake City and the Metropolitan Water District of Salt 
Lake City believe that this is their water right. 
Action: (1) Make sure the City's water rights 
are honored by the Central Valley Waste Water District 
and we are compensated for the water in the event the 
District sells or reuses the treated effluent, (2) 
Take legal action to protect the water rights filed on 
by the Salt Lake City Sanitary Suburban District Ho.l 
and (3) Continue to find beneficial uses for the 
City'* wastewater effluent. 
T. Aa part of the annexation of Sandy City into 
the Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake City, 
MMDSLC exchanged 2,000 acre-feet of water in Little 
Dell for 2,000 acre-feet of City owned water in the 
Little Cottonwood and Richards Wells. In turn Sandy 
City purchased the water rights, including the wells 
and facilities. Salt Lake City retained a portion of 
the water right. The City needs to beneficially use 
the remaining water right. 
Action: (1) The department needs to keep 
track of Sandy City use so that Sandy City does not 
60 
B. The Record. 
The Memorandum Decision did not consider BDIC's Motion on Title and supporting 
memoranda. At oral argument, BDIC asked the Court to do so, contending that at the very least the 
exhibits cited in that motion and memoranda created factual issues over the City's title argument. 
BDIC argued that under rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court needed to look 
at the entire record when determining if factual issues existed. The Memorandum Decision did not 
even mention BDIC's Motion on Title and supporting memoranda, thus suggesting that the entire 
record was not fully assessed in determining whether factual issues surrounded the City's claims. 
The Memorandum Decision's apparent failure to consider BDIC's pending Motion on Title, 
and its supporting memoranda, has allowed the granting of the City' s Motion for Summary Judgment 
to essentially moot all or part of BDIC's Motion on Title. The Memorandum Decision should have 
considered both of these motions together. This might have allowed for the granting of BDIC's 
Motion on Title or at least ensured that the ultimate decision was based on the full record arrayed 
before the Court. 
C. Internal Inconsistencies. 
BDIC's Motion on Title and supporting memoranda also argued that the 1905 contract should 
be treated for what it is: an exchange contract. If it granted title to the City in creek water, it should 
be read as granting title to BDIC in exchange water. The Memorandum Decision did not so hold. 
Instead, it granted title to the City while leaving undetermined what BDIC owns. This lack of 
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AFFIDAVIT OF RONALD K. CHRISTENSEN, Ph.P„ P X 
Before me, the undersigned authority, in and for said County and State, personally 
appeared Ronald K Christensen, Ph.D., P.E., who after first being duly sworn by me, says as 
follows 
1. My name is Ronald K Christensen, I am over 18 years of age, and T reside in 
Highland, Utah. 
2. I hold a Ph.D. in Civil and Environmental Engineering, a Juris Doctor of law degree, 
and have experience and expertise in the area of title to water rights in Utah 
3. I have been employed by the Big Ditch Irrigation Company to review and give my 
opinion regarding the Big Ditch Irrigation Company's title to water rights in Big Cottonwood 
Creek flowing from the Wasatch Mountains on the east side of t ie Salt Lake Valley of Utah. 
4. 1 piepared the attached First Supplemental Memorandum dated September 2, 2008, to 
the Big Ditch Irrigation Company with subject entitled "1 s t Supplemental Memorandum to Big 
Ditch Irrigation Company Water Rights'' reviewing and discussing the attached additional 
documents labeled "Doc. P through "Doc 14" and giving my opinion regarding the ownership 
of title to the water rights held by Big Ditch Irrigation Company in the waters of Big 
Cottonwood Creek of the Wasatch Mountains of Utah on the east side of the Salt Lake Valley 
Signed this 3rd day of September, 2008 
,gk^vtf./w A t—U*4d* 
RONALD K. CHRISTENSEN, Ph JX, P.E. 
WATER AND ENVIRONMENTAL S ERVICES, LLC. 
Ronald K. Christensen, Ph.D., P.E.. JD 
Professional Civil-Water Engineer/Attorney 10K~t2 North Natalie Court 
Highland, Utah 84001 
office (801)492-0229 
fax (80l)492~OK01 
FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM 
Date: September 2, 2008 
To- Big Ditch irrigation Company 
From: Ronald K. Christensen, PhD., P.E., JD. 
Subject 1st Supplemental Memorandum to Big Ditch Irrigation Company Water Rights 
ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS REVIEWED 
1 have reviewed the following additional documents attached as Exhibit A and numbered 
documents Doc. 1 through 15 and make the following observations 
Doc. L Summary of Bi^CotiotrwoodRights. January 20, 1960. Shows. 
P. 1 
Average creek flow years 1899-1950 of 74.8 efs = 54,153.5 acre-feet 
Salt Lake City claimed right is at least 85,76 percent = 46,442.0 acre-feet 
Doc 2. Printout of Utah Division of Water Rights records for Big Cottonwood Water Treatment 
Plant 
P. 1-2. 
Gives data for Salt Lake City culinary water use years 1979 to 2007 (2 pages). 
Minimum average 7-year use = 21,276.6 acre-feet 
Percent of claimed right = 46 percent 
Maximum average 7-year use = 24,830.4 acre-feet 
Percent of claimed right = 53 percent 
7 years 2000 to 2007 = 24,148 2 acre-feet 
Percent of claimed right = 52 percent 
Conclusion. Salt Lake City currently uses only approximately one-half its claimed rights and the 
use of the City's 1905 exchange contract Big Ditch rights has diminished nearly 50 
percent over time as Salt Lake City has gained ownership/control of nearly 100 
percent of Big Cottonwood Creek 
Doc 3 Richards Irrigation Company water rights documents 16 pages 
P 1-4 Newspaper notices of change application #1177 lists Salt Lake City Corporation as 
agent of Richards Irrigation Company 
P. 5-6 Change application dated August 25,1931 - lists Richards Irrigation Company as 
1 
owner or rights and SLC as agent 
P. 7 Warranty deed conveying Richards irrigation Company water rights from Richards 
Irrigation Company to the State of Utah, Board of Water Resources 
This kind of deed is usually for security for a loan from the State. 
P. 8-15 Richards Irrigation Company exchange contract with SLC dated May 29, 1931 Is 
basically the same agreement in terms of water rights exchange, title, and company 
reversion rights as the Big Ditch Irrigation Company agreement. 
P. 16 Newspaper notice of dated Mar 21 to Apr. 4, 1955 of request for extension of time 
and listing Salt Lake City as agent for the Richards Irrigation Company. 
Conclusion: All documents show both State of Utah and Salt Lake City recognition of Richards 
Irrigation Company as the title owner to the water rights with Salt Lake City at 
most acting as agent. 
Doc. 4, Annual Report of City Engineer, Marked Year 3908. 
P. 1-3 
Exchange of Water Rights Section 
Conclusion* Recognizes Salt Lake City rights derive through exchange contract with reversion 
rights back to the irrigation companies, recognizes that "mountain water" remains 
"owned by the individual or company," recognizes that Salt Lake City is obligated 
to deliver exchange water to maintain its grant to use the mountain water under the 
contract. 
Doc. S Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Company documents, dated in the year 2008. 
P. 1-4 Quit Claim Deed from the Company to Salt Lake City of company water rights held 
in Big Cottonwood Creek flows. 
P. 5-38 Amended and Restated Water Exchange Agreement - Year 2008 Contract for 
conveyance of company water rights to Salt Lake City by the p. 1-4 quit claim deed. 
Consideration includes vouchers for free water service. 
P 39-43 Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Company exchange contract with SLC dated January 
2, 1920. Is basically the same agreement in terras of water rights exchange, title, 
and company reversion rights as the Big Ditch Irrigation Company agreement. 
Conclusion: Documents show Salt Lake City recognition of Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch 
Company as the title owner to the water rights necessitating- (1) the execution of an 
actual deed to convey the company's water rights to Salt Lake City, and (2) 
additional consideration for that conveyance. 
Doc. 6. Salt Lake City 1997-98 Strategic Initiative and Work Plan. 
P. 1-12 
P. 2, 8 Salt Lake City purchases exchange canal company shares of stock to obtain outright 
"ownership of the right rather than rights through an exchange agreement." 
Doc 7 Lease Agreement Dated 4th October. 1917 between Big Ditch Irrigation Company and 
o 
Salt Lake City. 
P. 1A This document was provided by SLC's GRAMA response January 16, 2007. 
Conclusion: Shows post 1914 Morse Decree SLC's acknowledgment of Big Ditch Irrigation 
Company's continuing ownership of Big Cottonwood Creek water rights after the 
decree and payment to the company for the use of the company's water rights 
Doc. 8. Documents involving Salt Lake City aquisition of Cahoon & Maxfield Irrigation 
Company (C&M). 
P 1-39. 
P. 1 SLC willing to grant Utah Lake water rights for "clear title" to C&M water rights 
P, 2-3 SLC acknowledges its rights derive from exchange agreement and that it does not 
use all of its rights because of high spring runoff 
P. 4-5 SLC acknowledges C&M ownership of the water rights and SLC rights derive 
through an exchange agreement. SLC director of public utilities represents to the 
City Council that C&M "owns 9,500 acre-feet of water on a 30-year average and a 
non-diminished delivery obligation of 11,400 acre-feet despite urbanization. 
Contemporaneously, the SLC deputy director represents to C&M that the company 
only owns 5,100 acre-feet of water a portion of which is unusable because of high 
spring flow (p. 2-3). 
P. 6 SLC plans and offers to buy C&M for $4,327,660 for all non-municipal owned 
shares and acknowledges the company's ownership of the water rights being 
bought. 
P. 7-9 SLC plans to buy C&M to acquire clear title to the "water rights of the Company" 
and plans to obtain the deeds necessary for that conveyance. 
P. 10 Document indicates purchase of C&M was successful 
P 11-13 Documents show SLC personnel as current C&M officers. 
P 14-26 Dispository Agreement for C&M purchase. 
P 27 SLC had only one share in 1997 and letter discusses company sale issues 
P 29-32 Year 2002 change applications on C&M water - lists the company as well as SLC as 
the water right holder, Acknowledges that C&M continues to hold the water rights 
even though SLC now claims to own it. 
P 33-39 C&M files a change application on 9-8-97 as the owner of the water right. 
Conclusion: SLC recognized it did not own C&M water rights through its exchange agreement 
and paid over $4.3 million to purchase the canal company stock from stockholders. 
Thereafter, SLC took over the canal company and transacts water right changes 
through the company name. 
Doc. 9, Water Rights Purchases: As a Means of Protecting Watersheds, August 16, 1989 
P. 1-2 
Conclusion; Acknowledges that SLC must purchase shares to become "the 'outright owner' of 
the rights rather than an owner through contract/" 
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Doc. 10 Application for the Right of Exchange of Water, Stewart Canyon Corporation, June 16, 
1970. 
P. 1-2 Approved exchange application based on an exchange of water owned through 
purchase contract with Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake City. 
Conclusion: Water right remains owned by the US Bureau of Reclamation and through a grant of 
use of water under a contract by Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake City. The 
exchange applicant, Stewart Canyon Corporation, under its contract grant to the use 
of water, owned title sufficient to obtain an approved exchange application while 
not owning naked title to the water right. 
Doc 11. Commissioner's Reports, monthly reports dated April 1962 through May 15, 1989 
P. 1-315 
Conclusion: Commissioner's reports were prepared on Big Ditch Company^ water rights at least 
through May 15, 1989 and show that much of that time a full share of water was 
available from the creek to the Company. As late as 1989, the Commissioners, 
under the 1905 agreement determined that "Full Share Available," 
Doc. 12. Various Documents Associated with Application No. A~l 175 for C&M Company 
P. 1-13 
Conclusion: Acknowledges (1) the canal companies are the owners of the water rights to Little 
Cottonwood Creek stating that "The water will flow to its owners," (2) that Salt 
Lake City uses the water under its exchange agreements, and (3) that Salt Lake City 
submitted the application to the State as an agent of the canal companies and not as 
the owner of the water right. 
Doc 13. Transcript of State Engineer's Hearing on Temporary Change App. Nos. T92-57-19 and 
t-92~57-2<X August 24 1993. 
P. 1-46. 
P. 7-8 SLC counsel J. Novak states that "its immaterial here whether Salt Lake City has 
technical legal title. . . We are here talking about a grant under the specific 
provisions of the exchange agreements" being title sufficient to meet the 
requirements to file change applications under 73-3-3, 
P. 14 The total flow of the creek used to divide the water at the canyon mouth includes 
the return flow from Alta, etc. in the sewer line down the canyon. 
P. 24 SLC counsel J. Novak states SLC's position that SLC Cottonwood canyon water 
rights are based on exchanges under exchange applications. 
P 34-35 Detailed study of State Engineer records by B, Murdock verified that SLC filed its 
original applications as agent of the canal companies and not as owner of the water 
rights and that those applications had lapsed. 
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P. 38 B. Murdock found not deeds from the canal companies to the SLC' 
Conclusion: SLC rights are based on exchanges and not upon deeds of actual water rights. 
Doc. 14 SLC Answer to 1934 Protest on Tanner Ditch Exchange Application 
P 1-2 
P 1 SLC Commissioner of Water Supply and Water Works swore as an affiant under 
oath that SLC filed Change Application No a-1174 acting as the "duly authorized 
agent for the Tanner Ditch" under an exchange agreement. 
DISCUSSION 
After reviewing the above listed additional documents, it remains my opinion that the Big Ditch 
Irrigation Company water rights were not, and could not be conveyed to Salt Lake City by virtue 
of their exchange agreement. For many decades, Salt Lake City acknowledged, acted and 
operated under the fact that the irrigation companies who signed exchange agreements were the 
owners of the water rights and that Salt Lake City had only title to a grant to the use of water 
under exchange contracts rather than being the actual owner of the naked title. In recent 
acknowledgment of that fact, Salt Lake City spent $4.3 million to obtain the clear title to Cahoon 
and JVtaxfield Irrigation Company rights through purchase of the company shares. This year, 
2008, SLC required a deed upon its final acquisition with additional consideration for Big 
Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Company rights thereby finally extinguishing the company rights. 
These documents strengthen my opinion. Again, I could not prepare a Report of Conveyance and 
professionally represent to the State Engineer, or the Court, that Salt Lake City owns title to the 
water rights held by Big Ditch Irrigation Company either through the exchange contract or the 
Morse Decree. Salt Lake City's rights remained contingent upon its performance under the 
exchange contract and the Morse decree remained subject to the continuing jurisdiction of the 
court to modify the decree as needed to enforce that contract. Again, by law, title to water rights 
is required to be conveyed by actual bonafide recorded deed so that there is no question as to who 
holds the title to the water rights. It is my opinion that Big Ditch Irrigation Company owns the 
naked title to its original water rights and that Salt Lake City owns only a grant to use the water 
under the exchange contract. 
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SALT LAKE CITY 
WATERSHED 
MANAGEMENT 
PLAN 
FINAL DRAFT 
MARCH, 1999 
Salt Lake City 
Department of 
Public Utilities 
Prepared by 
the Bear West 
Consulting Team 
Salt Lake City Watershed Management Plan *98 
• Recommendation: Continue to research options for utilizing water rights. 
Implementation: Ongoing. 
• Recommendation: Maintain current water rights with the state engineer. 
Implementation: Ongoing. 
2. Acquisition of water stock. 
• Recommendation: Actively acquire stock in mutual irrigation companies with which Salt 
Lake City has exchange contracts. 
Implementation: Ongoing. 
• Recommendation: Develop a program by which Salt Lake City can accept donations of 
water stock. 
Implementation: Salt Lake City will have a donation mechanism in place by June 1,2000. 
3. Irrigation Exchange Contracts. 
• Recommendation: Eliminate the exchanges and purchase the contracts outright. 
Implementation: Ongoing. 
Explanation: Increase communication and public relations with contract holders and 
irrigation companies. Publicize the price Salt Lake City is willing to pay for shares of 
water. 
4. Currently not utilizing Millcreek as a culinary source of water. 
• Recommendation: Continue to preserve water rights in Millcreek Canyon and maintain 
the current water right with the state engineer. 
Implementation: Ongoing. 
• Recommendation: Manage Millcreek Canyon to maintain optimal water quality. 
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EXHIBIT G 
Water Credit Calculations 
Voucher A 
Summer 
Summer Period (April 1st to September 30) 183 days 
Water Volume 
Water Volume per Season 
Less - Salt Lake City Share 
of 19.17% 
Water Available 
Water Available in ccf 
Water Credit per Share (based on 
Voucher A 
Winter 
1,421 Shares) 
1,675,000.00 
306,525,000.00 
-58,760,842.50 
247,764,157.50 
331,235.50 
| 233.10 
gal per day 
gallons 
gallons 
gallons 
ccf 
ccf 
Winter Period (October 1 to March 31st) 182.25 days* 
Water Volume 
Water Volume per Season 
Less - Salt Lake City Share 
of 19.17% 
Water Available 
Water Available in ccf 
Water Credit per Share (based on 
Voucher B 
Summer 
1,421 Shares) 
930,000.00 
169,492,500.00 
-32,491,712.25 
137,000,787.75 
183,156.13 
1 128.89 
gal per day 
gallons 
gallons 
gallons 
ccf 
ccf 
Summer Period (April 1st to September 30) 183 days 
Water Volume 
Water Volume per Season 
Less - Salt Lake City Share 
of 19.17% 
Water Available 
Water Available in ccf 
Water Credit per Share (based o n 2,842 Shares) 
1,790,268.00 
327,619,044.00 
-62,804,570.73 
264,814,47327 
354,030.04 
I 124.57 
gal per day 
gallons 
gallons 
gallons 
ccf 
ccf 
* Summer/Winter day calculations are fractional so as to allow for Leap Years. 
Steven E. Clyde (Bar No. 0686) 
Edwin C. Barnes (Bar No. 0217) 
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON 
201 South Main, 13th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 801-322-2516 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Salt Lake City Corporation 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, a 
Utah municipal corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BIG DITCH IRRIGATION COMPANY, a 
Utah nonprofit corporation, JAMES 
GARSIDE, J L.C, a Utah Limited Liability 
Company, RYAN LITKE, LAYNE 
DOWNS, and John Does 1 through 10, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
JEFFRY NIERMEYER, P.E. 
Civil No. 070903735 
Judge Robin W. Reese 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ) 
Jeffry Niermeyer being first duly sworn deposes and says as follows: 
1. My name is Jeffry Niermeyer. I am over the age of 21 years and all 
matters attested hereto are of my own personal knowledge unless otherwise stated. 
2. I have been a licensed professional engineer since 1981. A copy of my 
curriculum vitae was submitted in connection with a prior affidavit filed herein. 
3. I have been employed by the Salt Lake City Department of Public Utilities 
since October 1991. During my tenure with the City, I have been directly and personally 
involved in the administration and maintenance of the City's water rights and the City's 
numerous exchange agreements; the operation, maintenance and balancing of Salt 
Lake City's water sources in order to most efficiently utilize its water rights and meet its 
obligations under the various exchange agreements; and the planning of and budgeting 
for the facilities necessary to meet Salt Lake City's responsibility to provide water to its 
citizens and others connected to the City's water system. 
4. I have personal knowledge of Salt Lake City's plans for and operation of 
the City's water resources, including its historic, present and planned future operations. 
I am personally involved in the planning and budget process and have knowledge of the 
past and anticipated future expenditures by the Department of Public Utilities, as well as 
the understandings and assumptions upon which such operations and expenditures 
have been planned. 
5. Salt Lake City water system is a very complex system that has evolved 
over more than a century of development. The source waters for the system come from 
a diverse and complimentary system that reflects the highly variable nature of water 
resources in an environment along the edge of a desert. Early pioneers were subject to 
the struggle and trials of developing a community on a water supply that varied not only 
on an annual seasonal basis from high spring runoff to low base stream flows, but also 
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with the constant cycles of drought that are common to the Salt Lake area. This highly 
variable water supply is still a reality today and that variability is projected to increase 
with the impacts of a warming climate. 
6. Salt Lake City relies on the free flowing streams bordering the east side of 
the Salt Lake Valley for the majority of its culinary water supply. Diversions from City 
Creek started within days of the foundation of the Salt Lake community. As the City 
grew, its diversion of water sources moved southward along the Wasatch Front to 
include Parley's Creek, Big Cottonwood Creek and then Little Cottonwood Creek. 
Access to these water resources was made possible through a series of exchange 
contracts that allowed the diversion of mountain stream waters for municipal purposes 
in exchange for an agreement to supply lower quality water suitable for irrigation from a 
variety of sources. 
7. These exchange agreements between Salt Lake City and area farmers 
were negotiated and signed over a hundred-year period between 1888 and 1984. The 
exchanges involve 32 different agreements. The utilization and coordination of these 
exchanged water resources requires an extensive system of storage reservoirs, 
treatment plants, aqueducts, transmission lines and water tanks. The City has made an 
enormous investment of tens of millions of dollars of public money predicated on the 
reliance of the availability of these combined resources to meet the current and project 
water supply demand of the Salt Lake City service area. 
8. The east bench lands of the Salt Lake valley original dedicated to farming 
purposes have steadily been converted from agricultural uses to residential and 
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commercial development, especially in the period since the Second World War. The 
demand for high quality municipal water has increased as this development occurred. 
At the same time, the demand for irrigation water has diminished with the conversion of 
farmland to developed land. 
9. Salt Lake City has relied on this changing use of the east bench lands as it 
developed the systems needed to meet the growing demand for culinary quality water. 
Companies such as Big Ditch have steadily reduced their call for irrigation water over 
the decades as the lands of their shareholders were converted from farming to 
development. To maintain efficiencies in the delivery of the remaining exchange water, 
the capacities of the pump stations and canal systems have been reduced over time 
with the diminishing demand for irrigation exchange water. The pumps and canal 
systems presently lack the capacity to provide the original volume of water represented 
by the 32 combined exchange agreements. This evolution has occurred slowly over 
decades in response to the diminished irrigation requirements of these combined 
systems, and not solely as a reaction to the reduction in flows to any one system such 
as Big Ditch. In other words, there is no one facility or expenditure that was predicated 
solely on the documented reduction of the amount of irrigation water taken by Big Ditch 
over the decades. Rather, essentially all of the City's water resource planning, including 
the maintenance of the pump stations and canals utilized to deliver the exchange water, 
has been based on the reduction in the amount of water necessary to meet the 
combined irrigation needs under the 32 exchange agreements. Restoring the original 
capacity of the pump plants and canals would be extremely expensive and would, in my 
4 
opinion, be a waste of public money since the original amount of water required by the 
combined exchange agreements could not be beneficially used on the lands served by 
those systems. 
10. A normal exchange pattern is and has been used by the City since the 
original exchange agreements started. During the periods of spring runoff, stream 
water is allowed to bypass the treatment plants and is used to meet the City's exchange 
and other down-stream obligations, since high flows provide an opportunity to meet 
those demands without having to bring in other exchange waters in the canal system. 
Due to the decrease in irrigation demand, sufficient water is also available in the spring 
and early summer to take into the treatment plants for culinary and municipal purposes. 
The availability of this water reduces the City's need to develop other water resources. 
If the irrigation demands under the Big Ditch and other exchange agreements were 
increased beyond current levels, additional storage and other water resources would 
need to be developed by the City. This is particularly true during the transition period 
from spring runoff to summer base flows. As the stream volume drops during this 
period of highest demand, all of the stream flows are typically taken into the treatment 
plants and other resources including Utah Lake storage must be brought on line to meet 
irrigation needs. 
11. The City's consistent reliance on the reduced demand for exchange water 
by Big Ditch and the other irrigation companies over the decades has allowed the City 
to meet its increasing culinary demands without developing additional resources. 
Restoring the original exchange volumes to Big Ditch and the other irrigation companies 
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LEROY W. HOOTON, JR. 
OfRCCTOR 
F I L E 
DEEDEE CORRADINl 
MAYOR 
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 
Water Supply & Waterworks 
Water Reclamation & Stormwater 
Memorandum 
TO: Brian Hatch, Deputy to the Mayor 
FROM: LeRoy W. Hooton, Jr. (jja^y 
DATE: August 30, 1993 V _ ) 
SUBJECT: Little Cottonwood Water Company 
Introduction 
Jn order to protect the Albion Basin in Little Cottonwood Canyon, 
it was decided that Salt Lake City would acquire the water 
contracts between lot owners in the Albion Basin and the Little 
Cottonwood Water Company and/or gain control of the company and 
dissolve it. 
Background 
The Little Cottonwood Water company was formed in 1911 and stock 
issued to various ditch companies and individuals using water from 
Little Cottonwood Creek including four companies which have 
exchange agreements with Salt Lake City. Their primary water right 
of 3.03 cfs was acquired by saving water in Little Cottonwood Creek 
by constructing the cutoff ditch just below what is now the 
Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake City's Little Cottonwood 
Water Treatment Plant. They also have water rights in Red Pine and 
White Pine Lakes and Cecret Lake located in Little Cottonwood 
Canyon. Salt Lake City has exchange agreements with many of the 
stockholders in the" Company and manages/owns the water in the lakes 
as well as their rights in the creek through exchange agreements. 
By virtue of the exchange contracts the City has liability for the 
actions of the Little Cottonwood Water Company but no control over 
their actions. 
The Company entered into various water sales contracts between 1945 
and 1981, and of particular concern were the contracts for lots in 
the Albion Basin. The contracts are for less than the 4 00 gpd 
required to develop a lot. When this area was annexed into Alta 
City, there was pressure for Alta to provide them culinary water as 
the Little Cottonwood Company contracts were inadequate. Salt 
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Lake City promised Mayor Levitt that it would gain control of the 
Albion Basin contracts in order to protect the area from 
development by using Salt Lake City's watershed management muscle 
to deny them water. Also, the City would not fold under pressure 
to increase the volume under the contracts, whereas the Little 
Cottonwood Water Company would. 
During the latter part of 1992, the Company became uncooperative 
and aggressive in its attitude toward the City, led primary by 
Tony Rezack, President of the Cahoon Maxfield Irrigation Company, 
who along with the three other irrigation companies holding rights 
in Little Cottonwood Creek, initiated a law suit against Salt Lake 
City entitled Cahoon Maxfield Irrigation Co, et al vs Salt Lake 
City. Judge Rigtrup dismissed the law suit. 
In accordance with the exchange contracts with the Richards Ditch, 
Walker Ditch and Little Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Companies their 
stock in the Little Cottonwood Water Company was transferred to 
Salt Lake City in the 1930s. This spring I requested the Company 
secretary to transfer the stock certificates into the name of Salt 
Lake City, thus eliminating eligibility of the exchange companies' 
members to sit on the Board of Directors. With this action, Salt 
Lake City and Sandy City control the company. 
Action 
Salt Lake City and Sandy City are moving forward to dissolve the 
company. The strategy is to meet with the individual irrigation 
companies to inform them of our intent, hold a board meeting, elect 
new officers consisting of Sand City and Salt Lake City members, 
and set forth a plan to dissolve the corporation. We hope to do 
this in such a way that the City's and Companies' relationship is 
not damaged too severely, but meet our goal of eliminating the 
Company. 
cc: Roger Black 
G<*&1( 
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DIRCCTOW MAYOR 
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC UT IUT IES 
WATCR BUPPUY ANO WATERWORKS 
WATER RECLAMATION AND BTORMWATCR 
Memorandum 
To: Mayor Deedee Corradini 
From: LeRoy W. Hooton,* Jr. LiOH^™^ 
Date: February 16,1996 (^\ 
Subject: Weekly Summary Report 
• Senate Legislative Energy and Resources Committee passed the "Protection of Underground 
Facilities (Blue Stakes)" bill that would require cities to be a member of the Blue Stakes 
organization. We estimate this will cost the department about $100,000. 
• 
• 
At the Utah Conservation Forum Commissioner Horiuchi challenged the group to have a 
countywide water audit program. The County contributed $15,000 to the group. 
An amendment was added to the Sam Safety Act to allow cities to be eligible for 
reimbursement for costs to upgrade high hazard dams. If passed, this will allow Salt Lake 
City to apply to the State Water Resources Board for reimbursement of some of the costs 
already spent or budgeted for the upgrade of ML Dell, Twin and Lake Mary dams. We have 
been working with the Utah Water Users Association to accomplish this amendment. 
Cahoon Maxfield Irrigation Company (area of Murray, Utah) filed a law suit against Salt 
Lake City and Sandy City over the dissolution of the Little Cottonwood Water Company and 
the quality of Utah Lake water. The complaint claims a breach of contract and the return of 
their Little Cottonwood Creek water. Cahoon Maxfield has 27.78% of the primary rights in 
Little Cottonwood Creek and this water represents about 3.6% of the City's total water usage. 
The Company has for some time tried to break the exchange agreement with the City. This is 
the third law suit in the past four years that we've been in with the Company. The real issue 
is that urbanization is reducing the irrigated land and the Company is trying to regain the 
high quality mountain water. According to our studies, the land under irrigation has been 
reduced in 1992 to about 15% of the area when the water right was decreed in 1910. With 
the rapid growth in Murray, this number has been further reduced since 1992. Before it was 
dissolved, the Company had water sales agreements in three subdivisions in the Albion Basin 
and had contacted Snowbird to sell them water. 
I made an initial inquiry with the East Jordan Irrigation Company to segregate Salt Lake 
City's water rights (represented by stock) from the Company and then filing a change 
application in the City's name. This would protect the City's rights in the event that the 
water per share is reduced by the State Engineer as a result of reduced beneficial use as more 
farm land is urbanized. This was suggested several weeks ago by the State Engineer when 
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we met with him in an effort to protect the Ctfy*s water rights in Utah Lake. A meeting will 
be scheduled in the future to begin negotiations 
Met with City Council staff to discuss unsewered structures in the Cit> and private water and 
sewer lines. Kay Christcusen was present CouncitperEon Reid has constituents who are not 
currently connected to the City sewer There are <nes 400 hoi ties and businesses throughout 
the City ttmtare not connected. It is estimated that it would required about $20 million to 
extend mains and connect these structures to the City's sewer system. We were asked to see 
how other Ctty'$ handle this problen » before another meeting is held. 
Mid-February snowpack measurements indicate that the snow pack water content is 114% of 
normal at Brighton; 115% in City Creek and 114% at Cecrut Lake* Little Cottonwood 
Canyon. 
Gil Iker of the Rotary Club contacted im about improving some of the sites at Roiary Park 
and to name them aftei prominent Rotary members. 1 le feels that this will mciease the 
members* and their families interest and to continue their volunteer partnciship ta-fc^the 
area iMintaincd, 
fmt Script - With tine Gaboon Maxfield few ^ It wt now have three law suits attacking fhe 
City's m®& r|^*S, All are an attempt to break the City's canyon water sales ordinance. (1) 
TliaSilv^i^fk^itdeals with mining tunnels which are numerous in Uig and little 
Qmm(xACw&^ if siiveip?#i^^ 
a wilk^ght tp claim that the water vmt®$&$%&k to 1934 and Jitea43igence underground 
witter $Mm, ©The Fait Harper h^k^^^mf^mm it allows the transfer af a 
tDstter right up canyon from the valley; mSwm more distressing allows wells to be drilled in 
tite%v^gAedeanyons greatly expanding development potential, and (1) The Cahoon 
Maxfield suit would break our exchange agreement and provide the potential lor thousands 
ojfaere-feet to be transferred up canyon. Item 2 and 3 are a product ot the Stated fetlureto 
conduct adjudication of water rights i s ordered by the Court in the 1936 complaint filed by 
MiLike City et a i \$> VmmJtidmmhMA law suit nammg 2000 pLumiffs* Now some 
60 years later the problem has only gotten worse as eastern Salt Lake Count} >s nearh 
completely urbanized. However* under the City's eKGhmigc agreements, we ate icquired to 
deliver as much water today as 80 years ago Our engineering studies show that the Cahoon 
Maxfield in 1992 had been reduced to onl\ 15% of its original farm land acreage I he Farr 
Harper area Is about the same. )n the case of Farr Harper, Kh a little different in th it this 
transfer was because thcie was no exchange with the City, hut lathei a watei light m good 
standing unless challenged. But until adjudicated, all Uiese rights are legal!} m tacL and it 
will require individual law suits to settle each of them As the value of water and property in 
the eanjons sky rocket, the incentive to challenge die City Will m&y increase, and if we lose* 
forever change the City's watersheds. 
Brian Hatch 
Roger Black 
»TcA«! LCROY W. HODTDN, JR. 
OIRCCTQft 
OEEOEE CQRRADINI 
MAYOR 
DEPARTMENT OF PUHLIC UTILITIES 
WATER SUPPLY AND WATERWORKS 
W A T E R RECLAMATION AND STQRMWATCR 
Memorandum 
To: Mayor DeeDee Corra 
From: LeRoy W. Hooton 
Date: July 13,1998 
Subject: Weekly Summary Report 
rfcj^o 
The State Engineer approved Change Application Number 55-8901 (a21383) to 
change the point of diversion and nature of use of 4.6775 eft (about 3,415 acre feet) 
of water from the Ontario Tunnel to a number of different points where Salt Lake 
City can beneficially use this water right. This approval culminates about 20 years of 
effort to find a way to get the full benefit of this sizable water right. Originally this 
right was gained through litigation between Salt Lake City and United Park City 
Mines, over the water flowing in the Spiro Tunnel in Park City f Salt Lake Citv v. 
United Park Citv Mines Co. Civil No. 148.376). The City claimed that the mine 
workings intercepted waters that would otherwise belong in Big Cottonwood Canyon. 
The parties settled the case before the Supreme Court decided on an appeal of the 
Third District Court decision in favor of United Park City Mines. The April 8, 1974 
settlement gave Salt Lake City 60 percent of the flow in the Spiro Tunnel beyond the 
6600-foot elevation which averaged 7.5 cfs. However, after gaining the water, the 
City had to find a way to beneficially use it as it was in Summit County and flows 
into the Weber Basin drainage. One plan was to construct a pipeline from Park City 
to Parley's Summit, and by using the old railroad tunnel, convey the Spiro Tunnel 
water into Salt Lake County. This plan was never acted upon, and during the late 
1970's the City did enter into some surplus sales agreements in the Park City area, 
and later with Park City for municipal use. 
On June 12,1993, Salt Lake City exchanged its Spiro Tunnel water right for an equal 
amount of water in the Ontario Tunnel with Greater Park City Mines. Greater Park 
City Mines in turn conveyed this right to Park City for municipal use. The Ontario 
Tunnel water flows into the Provo River - Utah Lake drainage where Salt Lake City 
can directly divert it for use either for a surplus sales contract with Jordanelle Special 
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Service District, Salt Lake Aqueduct, Jordan Aqueduct or irrigation diversions at the 
East Jordan Canal or Jordan & Salt Lake City Canal. The City filed a change 
application on March 27, 1995 and again on June 30, 1997 to include the Jordanelle 
Special Improvement District's diversion point. Other water users recorded protests, 
hearings were held, and now the State Engineer has approved the Change 
Application. A Request for Reconsideration by the Protestants must be filed within 
20 days after July 2, 1998; or within 30 days to file a judicial review action. 
If the decision is not reversed in the courts, this will be a major accomplishment. 
2. EPA Partnership for Safe Water - Phase III Completion Reports have been submitted 
to EPA for review. This completes the data collection phase of the partnership. Once 
the data has been reviewed, a peer review of the water treatment plants, records, 
procedures, management and performance by a team of outside experts will be 
initiated. 
3. Salt Lake City has acquired about 37 percent of the stock in the Lower Boundary 
Springs Water Users Association, located in the area downstream from the mouth of 
Mill Creek Canyon. Most of this stock was acquired with the purchase of Salt Lake 
County Water Inc. from Ken White in 1973. We suspected the quality of the water 
flowing in the Lower Boundary Springs, and with more stringent drinking water 
standards in the 1986 Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments, stopped using this 
source of water in the City's water distribution system. The Board of Directors 
agreed not to charge the city an assessment because it was not using its share of the 
water. However, for the last several years, the Company again began assessing the 
City's stock, amounting to a total assessment of about $16,000 per year. This has 
caused us to rethink our position on using this source of supply. We commissioned a 
study to determine if the Lower Boundary Springs was under the influence of surface 
water, because if it were, complete treatment would be required before it could be 
used for municipal purposes. We also had the same analysis made on the Upper 
Boundary Springs which is currently being used by the City. 
The results revealed that the Upper Boundary Springs was not under the influence of 
surface water and requires no additional treatment; however, the Lower Boundary 
Springs was under the influence and is a "Moderate Risk" and would require full 
treatment if used for municipal purposes. To confirm the results, another analysis has 
been ordered. According to the State Department of Environmental Quality, Division 
of Drinking Water, if the water is used in the City's municipal water distribution 
system it will have to be treated; but if it is only used in the small private system, as it 
is now, it will not. 
Besides the issue of the assessments, we are not on good terms with the Lower 
Boundary Springs Water Users Association. They sided with the Save Mill Creek 
group who has opposed the City's proposed water treatment plant; and they have 
protested the City's change application to provide water to the Boy Scout's Tracy 
Wigwam Camp. Under the Lower Boundary Springs water right, the Association has 
the fight to use the Upper Boundary Springs if the h$W& Spring b not adequate, 
The issues associated with the boundary springs, the assessments, water quality and 
other matters will most likely heat up, as we deal with these matters. 
4. There is still a great deal of activity with the Cahoon Maxfield Irrigation Company 
negotiations. The negotiations are not going well In fact I would rather cut off, and 
negotiate directly with the Cahoon Maxfteld Irrigation Company, rather than through 
John Jacobs, the water broker. Jacob's wants 5,600 acre-feet of Utah Lake water 
rights, which is out of the question. He had earlier offered to sell us some Sharon 
Steel water rights in the Jordan River to lessen the impact on our Utah Lake water 
rights needed to meet all of our other exchange agreement obligations, but we are not 
sure that the Sharon Steel water is a good right, if for no other reason than there may 
be title problems, 
Cahoon Maxfteld has approached Murray City about bi^ yi«$| the Company, mi there 
is a possibility that we could make a jafet43lfer to purchft^ lftife company, with Salt 
Lake City acquiring the water rights and Murray City the4ttch system for drainage, 
This would require Salt Lake City bonding and/or raisingtfttftr mtes to purchase the 
water rights, but it will be well worth the price. Meanwhile, iCahoon Maxfield's 
attorney is thi^tening th^ t they fcave a user that will need all the ^ e r | } ^ m 
mf^0^^^%Kt)tmgt igrimmt and iMth^ mtl^M&^mi^^^^ 
vM0^ti^mWf and are prepared to do so as long a$ they dfotfi a ^ uft to ttiove tf*e 
points of diversion that now exist 
5. Negotiations continue with Sandy City* Sift take Courtly Water Conservancy 
District, Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake City 3fcd Salt Lakfe City to (provide 
Sandy City interim water to serve the southeast part of their system, and secondly to 
provide water to the year 2005, three years beyond the current agreements that expiry 
in 2002 The interim plan is to treat Metropolitan Water District water in the Jordan 
Valley Water Treatment Plant and convey It tk&ugfa the Conservancy District's 
11400 South trans-valley pipeline to Sandy City's southeast service area. 
Construction of 2 pumping stations and increasing pumping capacity will be required 
to accomplish this Metropolitan Water has agreed to pay the extra capital costs to 
install the addit tonal capacity and charge Sandy City a higher rate for the water 
delivered through this system. The system has to be in place to meet Sandy City*s 
m>d summer demand Also as part of these negotiations a number of longstanding 
unresolved issues are being discussed. One such issue is a small enclave of about 300 
Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District customers in the upper Holladay area* 
which h being served off of the Salt Lake Aqueduct, Our position h that these 
customers are taking away capacity from Salt Lake City customers, and Salt Lake 
City should get the same amount of capacity on thfc west side Jordan Aqueduct m 
return. The Consemncy District is talking aboutthese customers/system becoming 
part of Salt Lake City's service area. 
6. Inasmuch as these agreements replace the agreements under which we are now 
operating as a result of Sand City's annexation into Metropolitan Water and de-
annexation from Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District in 1990, there are 
many fine points that need careful attention, so that Salt Lake City's interests are not 
compromised. 
7. Channel 4 is doing a story on City water versus bottled water. 
8. Rebecca Walsh, SLTribune, called and is doing a story on the 5th East 8th South 
Artesian Well. 
9. A joint Planning Commission and Pubic Utilities Advisory Committee hearing on the 
draft Canyon Master Plan has been scheduled for the City Council Chambers on 
August 19, 1998. 
10. A replacement well is being drilled next to Mill Creek and Evergreen Park. Some 
neighbors have complained about working on the weekend, so the contractor has been 
asked not to drill on weekends. 
11. The Park Reservoir located at about 3100 South 1-215 is completed and is being 
tested and disinfected. It will be in service in about one week. 
12. The Utah Power wooden penstock is being replaced in Big Cottonwood Canyon. 
Traffic in the canyon will be affected. 
13. The City County Health Department has contacted us to see if we would run about 
6,000 analyses in our laboratory. They want to close out their lab. I also submitted to 
the South Valley Water Reclamation Board a letter with our laboratory costs per hour 
to manage their laboratory and estimated cost to run their analyses. 
CC: Brian Hatch 
Roger Black 
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°'R*Cra/i PEPARtMENnr OF PUBLIC UTIU1TIEG MAVD* 
WA1VU fdUPPLY AND YYM ILRWORfcS 
WATrR RfcCLAMATIPN A M STORMWATKk 
September 18,2008 
Big Ditch Irrigation 
J. Garside 
2077 East 1710 South 
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 
Re: GRAMA request dated September 2 2008 
Dear Mr. Garside: 
We received your request dated September 2, 2008 and offer you the following response. 
"PGopy(s) of any written agreements modifying the June 27, 1905 WQter cxchang& contract 
between Salt Lake City and Big Ditch Irrigation Company*" 
The City Is aware of no wutten agreements confirming any modification of the 1905 agreement 
^•Copyfs) of my consideration paid by Salt Lake City to Big Ditch Irrigation Company to modify 
the June 27t 1905 water exchange contract between Salt L&ke City end Btg Ditch Irrigation 
Company" 
The City is aware of no documents confirming the consideration for any modification of the 1905 
agreement 
Appe&te can be made to the City's Records Appeals Board by filing a wi ittcn notice with the City 
Recorder within 30 calendar days after the date of this letter, pursuant to City Code § 2.64 140 
The address of the City Recorder is 451 South State Street, Room 415, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111, 
Sincerely, 
V&s&F£=£^ yJLK. UflUf •f-LCMuaA 
JMM CO a ("OjJ^i 0'^ 
Rusty Vefcr-AUameysOffice ^ . ^ P <" ^Au /prKf i * 
Sonya Kintaro- Recorders Office K^(jLK.lj?tt «f& M ^ L . ^ 
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State of Utah 
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES 
DIVISION OF WATER RIGHTS 
1G36 Wel l Norm Tomplo. 5u*!a ??0 
Sati lako C«r. U w h B 4 U 6 3156 
001 536 7240 
001 SOB 7315 \f ox) 
® 
Mtehncl O Leaviit 
Coventor 
Ted Stewart 
&koA»t4v« Director 
HobeH L Morgan 
SiAtr Enjrmecr 
August 10, 1993 
Salt Lake City Corporation 
Department of Public Utilities 
1530 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84115 
Dear Applicant: 
57-10012 (al6843) 
RE: 57-10013 (al6844) 
A hearing on your above-numbered application(s) tas been scheduled for 10:00 a.m. 
Tuesday, August 24, 1993, in the Conference Room of the Division of Water 
Rights #214, 1636 West North Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Prompt attendance of all interested parties will be appreciated. Your hearing 
may be conducted in conjunction w H h other water right hearings. Some of these 
hearings may exceed the time limit expected, please plan your time accordingly. 
Yours yery truly, 
KLJ:jb 
Kent L. Jones, P.E. 
Assistant State Engineer 
for Appropriation 
pc: 
Harfey Stauffer */ 
HB Stauffer Lane Y 
Murray, UT 84107 
Cahoon and Maxfield Irrigation Company 
c/o E. J. Skeen, Attorney +/ 
536 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, 4JT 84102 
Robert J. Murdock et al */ 
2964 East 3135 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84109 
US Forest Service 
Intermountain Region 
324 25th Street 
Ogden, UT 84401 
• 
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That seems to have been the conclusion in 
the McFarland case that we just referred 
to, either express or by necessary 
implication, when it was said that when 
the creek water to which puddle stock 
ownership entitled them was turned into 
the City's mains/ title to such water 
vested in the City and that the City was 
thereafter free to sell its water to 
whomever it pleased/ including the 
stockholders from whom they had purchased 
it. 
Then that next quote: 
Under the pleadings and affidavits and 
the specific provisions of the exchange 
agreement, we believe and hold that the 
agreement was not only valid, but that 
title to any unused water to which the 
signatories otherwise would have been 
entitled by virtue of their shareholders 
interests vested in the City. 
The three cases that we've cited and the language 
taken from those three cases, establishes without 
question as apply to almost Identical exchange 
agreements where either the company or the 
stockholders sold and granted to the City the right 
to the use of the creek water in exchange for 
irrigation water, and in some case, domestic water, 
vested title and absolute ownership in Salt Lake 
City, subject only to a condition subsequent that 
if the City failed to comply with the terms and 
covenants of the exchange agreements, then there 
would be a defeasance of the title of the City. It 
should be noted that in the four exchange 
agreements there is no limitation on where or for 
what purposes Salt Lake City can use the water 
which it acquired under the exchange. 
I suggest that it's immaterial here whether Salt 
Lake City has technical legal title, which is what 
is raised by the protestant. What is material here 
is that Salt Lake City is entitled to the use of 
the Little Cottonwood Creek waters to satisfy the 
requirements of 73-3-3 and you will recall that 
subparagraph (2) of that title provides that any 
person entitled to the use of water may make (i) 
-6-
the original water in ouch stream, body 
of water or reservoir must not be 
deteriorated in quality or diminished in 
quantity and the additional water turned 
shall bear a share of loss by evaporation 
and seepage of the end of said 
maintenance of said reservoirs, an 
equatable proportion of the costa of the 
reservoir site and the construction. 
For the first time, Salt Lake City has of record 
claimed title to the water rights by these exchange 
agreements. Z think a fair reading of all four 
con tract a makes it clear that they were for 
exchange of water only and not water rights. In 
fact, provision after provision would support that 
statement. The Supreme Court has held that the 
transfer of water rights must be by deed, that says 
shall and it's a mandatory provision of the law. 
And after filing change applications in 1931 and 
making numerous requests for extension of time and 
naming themselves as agent only, they now come up 
and say that they own the water rights. 
Even if they owned the water rights, there is no 
change application filed on the water for use in 
Snowbird and Mta, and no change of the water 
rights for use outside of Salt Lake City. The 
application involved mentioned a few minutes ago, 
a746 which was filed, as X remember somewhere 
around 1921 or 22, that states in the application 
itself that the use of the water shall be in Salt 
Lake City and the City has by signing all of these 
documents, plainly indicated an intent to treat 
that as merely an exchange of water and not the 
transfer of water rights itself. That legal 
question is being litigated at present, and the 
City must take it fairly seriously because this is 
one of the pleadings filed by Salt Lake City in the 
case. 
I'll stipulate that Salt Lake City takes this case 
very seriously Mr. Skean. 
I'm aura they take it seriously, but I'm just 
showing how serious they take it to file a pleading 
this thick. Anyway, I feel very strongly that we 
are right on the question of law and I got a case 
before the Supreme Court right now involving the 
-42-
J. NOVAK: No questions, I just want to make a very short 
response to what has been presented. 
R. L. MORGAN; Okay, do we want to go into summation? 
K. SKEKNx X think we'll submit it. Do you have any questions 
T*_£5£A5* 
o 11
Tony? 
No. 
R, L . MORGANt o k a y , go ahead Mr. Novak. 
qnt WYAfi: 
SLC argues water 
[use grants under 
the contract meet 
173-3-3 
requirements, yet 
argues against this 
position when Big 
Ditch attempts to 
|file change 
applications. 
Okay, Mr. Widerberg if you'll look at paragraph 4 
of your exchange agreement, that covers the default 
provision. I just want to comment Mr. Morgan that 
Salt Lake City has demonstrated that it is entitled 
to the use of water to meet the requirement of 
73-3-3 for the purpose of making this change. 
There has been absolutely no evidence to show that 
making the exchange will impair any existing 
rights* either the rights of the protestants ox 
anyone else on this system. In fact, the evidence 
conclusively shows that there will be no 
impairment. Under the law and I'm sure, Mr. Quealy 
will advise you on it, all the 0tate Engineer is 
required to do is to find reason to believe that 
the temporary change can be approved without 
impairing existing rights. And I think the raoord 
is replete with that sort of evidence, and we think 
that after Mr. 8 keen responds # the temporary 
changes must be approved. 
R. L. MORGANi Okay. Change of heart Mr. Skeen. 
B. SKEENt No, I'll submit the matter. 
R. L. MORGANt Okay. Thank you. If there are no other statements 
we'll conclude the hearing at this time. Again 
reminding you that the record will stay open for 
written comments until 5 pm, the first of July 
1992. Thank you gentlemen. 
J. NOVAK: Thank you Mr. Morgan. 
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«00022190 P D F » Br «00022189 P D F » yan, Phil and Jim -
I had intended to respond to the mediation motion last Friday but our 
office was closed and I did not have a notary here Sorry Attached 
are PDF copies of our memo and my affidavit which were filed today 
Hard copies of these documents with exhibits are in today's mail I 
will, of course, accommodate any schedule you might want to set for the 
filing of your replies 
Bryan asked me to explam the relief sought by the City from Mr Litke 
and J L C You will recall that the City named as defendants the 
individual directors who had bought Big Ditch shares but who own no land 
irrigated by the Big Ditch system I won't try to repeat everything in 
the complaint but, in summary, the claims agamst Big Ditch and J L C 
are those of the first cause of action, which seeks a judgment declaring 
that the City owns the water rights referenced m the 1905 Agreement 
(and that Big Ditch does not hold title to those rights), that the City 
is obligated to deliver only the amount of water that can presently be 
put to beneficial use for irrigation within the area historically served 
by Big Ditch, that the City is not in breach of the 1905 Agreement, and 
that neither Big Ditch nor J L C has the right to file applications 
with the State Engmeer based on the City's water nghts As you know, 
the court has decided the title issues, has determined the City's 
delivery obligation as of 1905, and has left open for future decision 
the question of whether the City's delivery obligations have been 
modified (or waived) through the parties' conduct 
Claims against the individual directors (including Mr Litke and J L C ) 
are set forth in the second cause of action There, the City seeks a 
judgment declaring that the shares held by the individual directors 
represent only the right to receive and use water for irrigation on 
lands historically served by the Big Ditch system, and that those 
defendants have no right to file change applications based either on the 
City's water rights or on the irrigation water delivered by the City to 
Big Ditch The final cause of action was agamst Big Ditch and J L C 
for slander of title in the filing of the change applications That 
claim was resolved against the City before all of the title issues had 
been addressed, basically because the court determined there was not the 
intent to assert ownership of the underlying water rights required for 
slander of title 
The City still intends to pursue the declaratory judgment claims against 
Big Ditch and the individual directors to the extent those claims have 
not been decided J L C is still a proper party to those claims 
because it actually filed change applications under a claim of right, 
even though that filing was not found to amount to a separate tort The 
City is also entitled to a declaration of whether it is in breach of 
contract with regard to any rights that might pertain to the J L C 
shares Mr Litke is a proper party as he still holds shares for what 
12/23/2008 PS03 
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appears to be the purpose of attributing water rights to those shares 
and then selling them, and the City is entitled to know both whether 
such ownership (without the ability to irrigate lands within the Big 
Ditch system) carries with it the right or authority to file change 
applications and whether the City is in breach of contract with regard 
to any rights that might pertain to his shares. The same claims lie 
against Mr. Garside and for the same reasons. A determination of the 
claims against Mr. Litke and Mr. Garside will be representative of the 
interests of those who have since acquired paper shares without lands to 
irrigate. For that reason, we have not tried to add Bryan, Phil, or Mr. 
Crawford or Dr. Tolton as parties defendant The claims against Mr. 
Downs, of course, were dismissed on the representation that he no longer 
owns any Big Ditch shares. I hope this brief explanation is helpful. 
Finally, Jim forwarded an email to Rusty Vetter asking him to correct 
the numbers in one of Jim's argument summaries. The City asked me to 
respond and politely decline that invitation because of the pervasive 
errors of logic, calculation and fact set forth. Almost nothing on that 
sheet is factual, as has been demonstrated by the numerous documents 
provided pursuant to GRAMA and our arguments to date. Rather than 
attempt an informal debate with you, Jim, the City will instead address 
and support the relevant facts in the context of the litigation. 
Ted 
Edwin C. Barnes 
Clyde Snow Sessions & Swenson 
201 So. Main, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 -2216 
Office 801-322-2516 
Fax 801-521-6280 
Email ecb@clydesnow.com 
12/23/2008 C^it\&[ 
An AWWA National Landmark 
The Jordan and Salt Lake City Canal 
A paper presented at the Intermountain Section 
of the American Water Works Association 
Annual Conference, September 17,1993, 
(revised 1998) Snowbird, Utah. 
By LeRoy W. Hooton, Jr. 
Preface 
The Jordan and Salt Lake City Canal remains one of the most important water development 
projects ever undertaken by Salt Lake City. It allowed the City to enter into exchange contracts with 
local farmers who had appropriated for irrigation the waters flowing from the Wasatch Canyon 
streams along eastern Salt Lake County. These exchange contracts provide the City with up to 65,000 
acre-feet of water annually of high quality drinking water, and have allowed the Salt Lake Valley to 
grow and prosper for over 100 years. The mountain streams were the City's only sources of water 
until the early 1950s when the Provo River Project was completed and the Metropolitan Water 
District of Salt Lake City began delivering water through the Salt Lake Aqueduct. The exchange 
agreement waters continue today to be the primary source of supply for over 400,000 people. 
Today, the Canal continues to meet its purpose in delivering exchange water during the 
irrigation season, and is as important to Salt Lake City in 1998 as it was in 1882. This will continue 
into the future, as the canyon streams provide 60 percent of the City's water supply. 
The 28-mile Jordan and Salt Lake City Canal traverses eastern Salt Lake County from a point 
north of the Jordan Narrows to South Temple and State Street in downtown Salt Lake City. In the 
beginning it was controversial; however, upon completion in 1882, the Salt Lake Herald called it "one 
of the greatest days in the history of Salt Lake City." 
Early Attempts to Construct Canals 
By the year 1860 most of the waters flowing from the various mountain streams were 
appropriated by the farmers for irrigation; Salt Lake City, as well as the farming community on both 
sides of the Jordan River, looked to the Jordan River for additional water. 
The concept of utilizing Jordan River water within the Salt Lake Valley was long thought 
about, however, its elevation along the valley floor prevented its use for irrigation on the majority of 
the land. The only way to utilize the Jordan River was to divert it through canals at an elevation up-
stream that would allow the water to reach the higher bench lands by gravity flow. 
The water of the Jordan River was first diverted in 1850, but during the following 20 years, 
only small ditches were constructed to convey the water to the farmlands. 
The following description of early plans to develop the Jordan River was taken from the 1903 
Report by the United States Department of Agriculture, entitled, "Irrigation Investigation in Utah:" 
"In 1854 a plan for a great navigation, power, and irrigation canal from Utah 
Lake to Salt Lake City was conceived and was formulated in a law passed by the 
Territorial Legislature. Although acted upon by the State Legislature, the 
construction of a canal never developed. The law contemplated one of the largest 
of the canal plans at that early day. Section 3 of the legislation reads: Said canal 
shall commence above the rapids in Jordan River, where a dam shall be constructed 
across said river of sufficient height to cause slack-water navigation to Utah Lake, 
and proceed as near the base of the mountains on the west of the Great Salt Lake 
Valley as practicable, to Great Salt Lake; and of sufficient depth and width 
for the transportation of boats drawing to 2-1/2 feet of water and 12 feet width 
of hull. There shall also be good and sufficient guard locks and locks for leveling, 
and waste gates, also large reservoirs with good and sufficient embankments to 
contain water for irrigation purposes, at all convenient points." 
In 1860 a canal was planned which was to take the water from the Gardner Mill Race, one of 
the small canals built in 1850 on the alignment now occupied by the North Jordan Canal, but 
extending it farther west. The canal was started at that time and was extended from time to time along 
that alignment up until 1881, when, as the North Jordan Canal, it reached its present size. 
As a result of numerous failures to convey Utah Lake water to the valley's farmlands, an 
irrigation-district law was passed on January 20, 1865. Under the direction of the County Court, this 
law allowed the people of any locality to organize themselves into a company and elect officers, levy 
taxes, build and operate canals. 
On February 2, the County Court made an order organizing all of Salt Lake County lying east 
of the Jordan River into an irrigation district Surveys were made providing for a canal 20 feet wide 
on the bottom, 3 feet deep, and covering 24,750 acres. This plan, like the others, failed. The real 
development of the Jordan Valley began in 1870, when the South Jordan Canal was begun and 
completed in 1875. In the meantime, the other canals on the west side were also being excavated. 
During 1872 the present Utah and Salt Lake Canal, South Jordan and North Jordan Canals 
were begun through county aid to construction. 
In 1878 the East Jordan Canal Company was organized and incorporated, and began 
constructing its canal to irrigate the land on the east side of the Jordan River. 
Salt Lake City Seeks New Water Suppliers 
The municipal water needs of Salt Lake City forced the 
City Council to look at the Jordan River for an additional supply, 
and the idea was first suggested by Alderman Sheets in a City 
Council meeting of August 9,1864. He noted that "In order to 
bring the waters of the Jordan River into the Salt Lake Valley, it 
was necessary to construct a canal at the northern edge of Utah 
Lake which had sufficient elevation to provide flow to the eastern 
boundaries of Salt Lake City." 
On January 10,1865 Brigham Young spoke of the 
beneficial results that could be accrued by irrigating and 
Brigham Young envisioned a 
population of 100,000 people 
Jordan & SL Canal alignment 
along eastern Salt Lake County 
cultivating increased amounts of land. He said that "...the 
bringing of the waters of Utah Lake would be the means of 
sustaining a population in the Great Salt Lake County of 100,000 
inhabitants." 
On September 15,1879 Alderman Raleigh discussed the 
subject of obtaining a major supply of water for the city. The 
subject was referred to a special committee of five to be 
appointed by the mayor. Their instructions were to examine the 
practicability of taking stock or interest in canals being 
constructed in the southern part of Salt Lake County, which 
were taking water out of the Jordan River. Also, they were to 
examine the feasibility of bringing East Canyon Creek located in 
Morgan County to the City by tunneling. 
The committee reported to the mayor on October 21, 
1879 that they had investigated the construction of a 
contemplated canal for conveying water from the Jordan River 
to the City. Further, they reported that, "...the past season has 
fully demonstrated the fact that the supply water from all 
sources to this city, (or) in any dry season, even when managed 
with frugality and distributed to its full capacity both day and 
night, is wholly inadequate ... for without water all efforts will 
be futile." 
At the conclusion of the committee report, Mayor Little, 
Alderman Raleigh, and Jesse Fox, City Surveyor, were 
appointed to a committee to negotiate with land owners to 
acquire the contemplated canal right-of-way as recommended by the Council. 
During the year of 1879 actual construction of the Jordan and Salt Lake City Canal 
commenced, and it was completed in 1882. 
The completion of the of the Canal and water flowing into the City Creek Aqueduct was 
reported by the Salt Lake Herald on July 12,1882, in an article entitled "Salt Lake and Jordan Canal, 
An Immense Benefit to Salt Lake City:" 
"..^Arriving at the mouth of the flume we found a stream of large volume pouring 
into the City Creek stone culvert, from which the citizens north and west of East 
Temple Street obtain their supply for irrigation. The proof was directly under our eyes 
that, but for the Salt Lake and Jordan Canal there would have been a water famine 
this season, the stream flowing from City Creek being like a thread compared to that 
from the flume, and in a few weeks it wilt be nearly, if not quite, entirely dry. In fact 
it is almost so now. What are the evidences of its success? Its object was to convey a 
body of water for irrigation into this city for the relief of the inhabitants. The object is 
accomplished as a large body of aqueous fluid flows through and can be at any time 
increased, if needed... A few people - very few- overlooking the necessity of manifesting 
a largeness of soul that would lead to a consideration of the general weal, object on the 
grounds of the water of Jordan being impure compared with heretofore used The answer 
lies in the increase of quantity for irrigation and the availability of other sources of 
supply -for culinary purposes...." 
The Benefits of the Canal 
The completion of the Jordan and 
Salt Lake Canal paved the way for further 
water development Relieving City Creek of 
supplying both the culinary and irrigation 
needs of Salt Lake City, it allowed the City to 
provide more culinary water within the 
piped City Creek distribution system 
that was constructed in 1876. Later in 1888 
the canal provided the means for the City to 
enter into an exchange agreement with the 
Parleys Water Users. The City agreed to 
exchange Utah Lake water from the Jordan 
Jordan & Salt Lake Canal at 11th East and 12th South, 
looking south. Designed to carry 150 cfs, the Canal as 
viewed in 1900. 
eftrt 
and Salt Lake City Canal in turn for the use of the Parleys stream flow. This worked to both parties* 
benefit; the City gained the right to use the high quality mountain water, and the farmers were 
assured a firm water supply to irrigate crops during the late summer months and drought periods 
from the stored water in Utah Lake. 
As the City's water needs continued to grow, in the 1890s the City planned for additional 
exchange agreements with the water appropriators of Big Cottonwood creek. To make additional 
exchanges the canal had to be enlarged to deliver more water from the Utah Lake-Jordan River. A 
Water Commission composed of J. Fewson Smith and W.E. Jacobs stated, "Upon the canal depends 
the solution of our water problem. Put into the condition suggested (improved and extended) it is 
capable of bringing nearly ninety million gallons daily for use of the City and exchange elsewhere. 
There is no doubt that from 40 to 50 percent of the Cottonwood stream may be obtained when once the 
canal's efficiency is established..." Subsequently, at the turn of the century the City entered into the 
first exchange on Big Cottonwood, with others to follow. With the construction of the Big Cottonwood 
Conduit, the first diversion from Big Cottonwood creek was made on February 5,1907 when 35.9 cfs 
was turned into the conduit. 
During the next 30 years, the City acquired nearly all the water in Big Cottonwood, Little 
Cottonwood and Mill Creek streams through the exchange process. In order to reach the higher 
ditches along the east bench, the City condemned its way into the East Jordan Canal, acquiring over 
20 percent of the Canal's stock. The East Jordan Canal was extended from the Fort Union area to a 
pump plant built in 1923 at 6200 South above Highland Drive to lift water to the higher ditches 
irrigated from Big Cottonwood Creek. 
Jesse W. Fox 
The story of the Jordan and Salt Lake City Canal would not be complete without telling about 
the human aspect of this water development effort. 
Jesse Fox was the engineer who was responsible for constructing the Canal. His contribution 
to this project and many other canals during this early history of the Mormon settlement of the Great 
Basin deserves recognition. 
According to his family history entitled, "The Life Of Jesse W. Fox, Sr.," by F. Y, Fox, he was 
born on his father's farm near Adams Centre, Jefferson County, New York on March 31,1819. He 
joined the Mormon Church and moved to Nauvoo in 1844 joining the pioneer migration in 1849 to the 
Salt Lake valley. Learning surveying as an assistant to the County Surveyor, he was employed by the 
church in 1850 to survey city lots and farm allotments. Later he would survey for a railroad to Red 
Butte Canyon to bring foundation stone to construct the Temple; however, in 1852, the railroad idea 
was abandoned. Jesse Fox became County Surveyor on August 2,1852 followed by being appointed 
Territorial Surveyor, which he vacated in 1876. 
He became involved in the construction of the Jordan and Salt Lake City Canal when the City 
decided to find a new source of water from the Jordan River. On 
August 17,1879 a mass meeting was held in the Bowery on Temple 
Square, resulting in a decision to make a preliminary survey of a 
canal to tap the Jordan River at the Narrows. Surveyor General 
Fox was employed to make a survey and cost estimate. The 
proposed 25-mile canal was estimated to cost $280,000. A bond 
election was held to finance the canal in 1880. During the debate 
over the bond, the engineering ability of Jesse Fox became an issue. 
Opponents of the bond attacked him for his involvement in the 
failed canal from Little Cottonwood Canyon that was intended to 
carry the granite slabs to the Temple. Some members of the City 
Council opposed the canal, believing that if the canal was 
constructed, water would never flow through segments about 5 miles southeast of the City. 
Ultimately, a bond election was held and approved on April 5,1880, with five to one in favor. The City 
Council hired Jesse Fox to construct the canal. 
The canal was completed and water flowed from the diversion at the Jordan Narrows to Eagle 
Gate on July 12,1882. Despite his critics, he must have been pleased to read the words of the Salt 
Lake Herald: 
"The water from the Jordan and Salt Lake Canal flowed into the City Creek 
aqueduct east of the head gates on East Temple Street last evening. The canal is 
practically finished, and today the people of city will be reaping some of the benefits 
from the investment of their money in this great enterprise. ...(We) commend 
Jesse W. Fox Pioneer 
Engineer (1819-1894). 
£fin 
Mr. Jesse W. Fox, Engineer, his skill, having the manhood to acknowledge his 
business...and the Herald regards this as one of the greatest days in the history of 
Salt Lake City." 
During the span of his career, Jesse Fox was the Chief Engineer for all five major canals in 
Salt Lake County. He did the early survey work on the present Weber/ Provo Canal through the 
Kamas Bench that would later become a key feature of the Provo River Project. He surveyed the 
early waterworks system in City Creek Canyon in 1872, establishing the diversion, settling tanks and 
4 miles of cast iron pipe serving the city's downtown business district. 
Jesse Fox left his mark on early water development in the west. His engineering legacy helped 
shape the history of the Salt Lake Valley. 
Utah Lake Pumping Plant 
An integral part of the Jordan and Salt Lake City Canal is Utah Lake. The lake, situated in 
Utah County, covers 93,000 acres at compromise level and provides the water storage necessary to 
meet the late season irrigation needs of the farmers. It is a fresh water lake; however, due to certain 
springs and high evaporation rate the lake contain total dissolved solids ranging from 600 to 1500 
ppm. 
The Jordan River is the outlet of 
Utah Lake, and flows in a northerly 
direction to the Great Salt Lake. The 
Jordan River is nearly flat in grade, 
which with construction of a dam at the 
Jordan Narrrows, allows the storage of 
water in Utah Lake. It appears that the 
first dam in the Jordan River was 
constructed inl859 by Ferimortz Little 
and others to irrigate land on the west 
side of the river. 
Compromise monument at the outlet of Utah Lake. Circa 
1895. Bulletin No. 124-Report of Irrigation Investigations 
in Utah, Elwood Mead, Chief of Irrigation Investigations. 
According to the 1903 U.S. Department of Agriculture Report entitled "Irrigation 
Investigations in Utah," Salt Lake County constructed a dam at the Jordan Narrows in 1872. During 
the next spring the county court of Utah County asserted that the lake had risen, and it was suggested 
that the two county courts meet to resolve the problem. Apparently, no resolution was forthcoming, 
and the dam was washed out. According to the records of the court of Salt Lake County, "...the head 
gates washed out, being helped by persons unknown." The issue of a dam in the Jordan River 
continued to be a point of contention between the two counties. The dam was rebuilt in the spring of 
1874. 
The landowners around the lake continued to complain about the dam and that it flooded 
their property. Their complaints were investigated by the county court of Salt Lake, with findings 
that the dam had no effect on the elevation of water in Utah Lake. In 1880, the dam was raised 
provoking stronger outcries from the Utah County landowners. After several years of dispute, a 
committee of prominent citizens, who established a compromise elevation of 4,515.799 feet City 
datum, made an arbitration in 1885. This compromise level held for nearly a century, when after the 
1983-86 flood period, a lawsuit settlement in 1985 established a new compromise level at 4489.0455 
above sea level. 
In order to draw water from Utah Lake when it is below compromise, a pumping plant was 
constructed during the turn of the century. The plant, located at the outlet of the lake on the Jordan 
River, originally consisted of four pumps. In 1905, the fifth pump was installed, followed in 1907 by 
the sixth pump. Shortly thereafter, with the permission of the court, the seventh pump was installed. 
To accommodate the pumps, two *, -^^ fr***,, " w 
new 175-kilowatt step-down ^ a f ^ t S i f i f i ^ i ^ ^ 
transformers and related equipment 
were installed. Concerned about 
meeting its exchange agreement 
obligations, the City installed a 130 
horsepower emergency gasoline 
engine. According to the "1907 City 
Engineer's Report", the Utah Lake 
Pumping Plant was the largest 
pumping plant in the United States, 
capable of delivering 
Utah Lake Pumping Plant as viewed in 1901. By 1907, the 
pump plant was the largest in the United States at 700 cfs. 
700 cubic feet per second, or 452 million gallons per day. 
As in the past, the Utah Lake Pumping Plant, continues today to be an important component 
of the City's water system, feeding water to the Jordan and Salt Lake City Canal and the East Jordan 
Canal to meet exchange agreement obligations. 
The Jordan and Salt Lake City Canal During the 20th Century 
During the 20th century the canal became even more important. The City's population 
continued to grow, demanding more water. The City entered into more exchange contracts with the 
canyon water owners of Big Cottonwood, Little Cottonwood and Mill Creek. The importance 
of the canal was stressed by A. F, Dorenus, Engineer Water Supply, in the "1907 City Engineer's 
Report," in which he pleaded for monies to replace the old wooden flumes and bridges along the 
canal with suitable concrete structures. "When the canal fails, the city's right to use of the mountain 
water ceases, and restoration of the use of mountain water is contingent on the restoration of the canal 
flow." He further added "... no more profitable expenditure of the public money can be made...." 
As the City grew, homes encroached on the open canal, replacing the farmlands. By 1914, the 
City began replacing the canal with buried concrete conduit. The "1917 City Engineer's Report," 
described the placement of 270 feet of 3x6 foot reinforced concrete conduit through the property near 
Fifteenth South Street at a cost of $4.11 per linear foot. 
Charles W. Wilson, Water Department Superintendent (1951-1980), recollects that during the 
depression a major effort was made to clean and restore the canal to its original capacity of 150 cubic 
feet per second. In 1933, the Civil Works Administration (CWA), using 17 sight seeing buses, 
transported workers to the canal in two shifts per day to cut trees and hand dig the canal. Equipped 
with mattocks, the workers reconstructed the canal from the Jordan Narrows to the Big Cottonwood 
Creek spill, widening the bottom of the canal to 18-1/2 feet and shaping the sides at a 1-1/2 slope on 
each side. Survey crews went ahead of the workers to establish the grades. 
Beginning in the 1950s the Salt Lake valley's population moved to the suburbs. During the 
next 40 years most of the land between Salt Lake City and Draper became developed. Homes and 
businesses have built up to the canal's right-of-way owned by the City in fee. Operating the canal in 
an urban setting has become more difficult as the population has encroached on this water conveyance 
facility. The City's obligation to deliver exchange water has not lessened since that first exchange 
agreement in 1888 and major improvements are planned to upgrade the canal during the 1990s. 
Recognition 
On August 10,1991, the Canyon Rim Chapter, Sons of Utah Pioneers, dedicated a granite 
rock monument that recognized the Jordan and Salt Lake City Canal. The Monument is atop the 
canal (1250 East) in Sugar House on 2100 South Street. 
Two years later, the American Water Works Association 
recognized the Jordan and Salt Lake City Canal as an American 
Water Landmark. This designation places the Jordan and Salt 
Lake City Canal among other famous national landmarks that 
have contributed to the nation's water supply development. The 
designation was published in the October 1993 issue oiAWWA 
MainStream. The construction of this water facility 
demonstrates the efforts of the early pioneer settlers and their 
determination to survive in the harsh desert environment of the 
Salt Lake Valley where the annual precipitation is less than 16-
inches, requiring a firm water supply to grow crops and build a 
city. 
Conclusion 
The Jordan and Salt Lake City Canal is one of the most important water development projects 
ever undertaken by Salt Lake City. However, as time has passed, it has become only one of many. 
The City's formation of the Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake City in 1934 to build the Provo 
River Project added a major source of stored water. The City's purchase of the artesian basin in 
Murray and deep wells drilled hundreds of feet below the ground further augmented the City's water 
supply. Future water will be developed through the Bonneville Unit of the Central Utah Project. 
Notwithstanding these other supplies, the Jordan and Salt Lake City Canal, continues today, by virtue 
Sugar House Monument 
erected in 1991 over the 
Jordan <& Salt Lake Canal. 
of the exchange agreements as the corner stone of the City's water supply. The resulting supply of 
high quality Wasatch mountain water remains the most desirable of all the City's water sources. 
Edwin C. Barnes (Bar No. 0217) 
Steven E. Clyde (Bar No. 0686) 
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201 South Main Street, 13th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 322-2516 
Facsimile: (801) 521-6280 
ecb@clydesnow.com 
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Attorneys for Plaintiff Salt Lake City Corporation 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, a 
Utah municipal corporation, AFFIDAVIT OF 
LEROY W. HOOTON, JR. 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : Civil No. 070903735 
BIG DITCH IRRIGATION COMPANY, a : Judge Robin W. Reese 
Utah nonprofit corporation, JAMES 
GARSIDE, J L.C, a Utah Limited Liability : 
Company, RYAN LITKE, and John Does : 
1 through 10, 
Defendants. : 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ) 
LeRoy W. Hooton, Jr., being first duly sworn deposes and states: 
1. My name is LeRoy W. Hooton, Jr., I am over the age of 21 and all matters 
attested to herein are of my own personal knowledge unless otherwise stated. 
{00044773-2} 
2. I was employed by the Salt Lake City Department of Public Utilities 
between 1958 and 2007, serving as Director of that department between 1980 and 
2007. 
3. During my tenure with the City, I was directly and personally involved in 
the administration and maintenance of Salt Lake City's water rights and of the City's 
numerous Exchange Agreements, and in the planning of and budgeting for the facilities 
necessary to meet Salt Lake City's responsibility to provide water to its citizens and 
others connected to the City's water system. 
4. In my capacity as Director of the Department of Public Utilities I made 
periodic reports to the City's mayors. I have reviewed two such reports, dated 
February 16, 1996 and July 13, 1998, which were attached as Exhibits J and K, 
respectively, to Big Ditch's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment Re: Estoppel and Modification dated December 24, 2008. Portions of those 
reports were selectively quoted in paragraphs 31 and 32 of the Big Ditch "Statement of 
Facts." For example, Big Ditch extracts a couple of sentences to suggest it is my 
opinion that the amount of water the City is obligated to provide under to its exchange 
partners has not diminished over the years. That was not, and is not, my opinion. 
5. The quotations taken from my reports were references to the express 
language of the exchange agreements, which has not changed and has not yet been 
otherwise construed by the courts. I was not referring to the City's understanding of the 
extent of its current obligation to deliver irrigation water to exchange partners. With the 
{00044773-2} 
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historic diminution of the amount of land irrigated by the exchange partners and the 
corresponding reduction in the amount of water they have put to beneficial use, I 
believe the City's delivery obligations have been reduced overtime. 
6. In my February 16, 1996 report (a copy of which is attached hereto as 
Exhibit 1 for convenience of the Court), I described the reduction in the amount of land 
under irrigation from the Cahoon Maxfield system to approximately 15 percent of the 
original 1910 amounts, with further reductions since 1992. The statement quoted by 
Big Ditch, "under the City's Exchange Agreements, we were required to deliver as much 
water today as 80 years ago" was my statement that the language of the agreements 
has not been changed in that time. I described there the marked reduction in irrigated 
acreage and the diminished water use by the shareholders of the irrigation companies, 
consistent with the City's understanding that its obligation to deliver irrigation water has 
also decreased over time. The City has consciously maintained the physical capacity to 
deliver to individual exchange partners the full amount of water mentioned in the 
Exchange Agreements in order to avoid a possible claim of default until the City's 
current obligation is adjudicated. As stated, it was and is my belief that the City's 
obligation to deliver irrigation water to its exchange partners has, in fact, decreased with 
the diminished irrigation needs of the companies. I specifically noted at the conclusion 
of Exhibit 1 that the extent of the companies' rights may have to be "adjudicated" 
through "individual lawsuits" to define and settle questions regarding the extent of the 
City's current obligations under the various Exchange Agreements. 
{00044773-2} 
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7. I made the decision to initiate the present lawsuit in part to define and 
adjudicate Salt Lake City's current obligation to Big Ditch Irrigation Company in light of 
the consistent, historic reduction in Big Ditch irrigation water usage over the years. This 
is the very process to which I alluded in Exhibit 1. 
8. The statements made in my July 13, 1998 Weekly Summary Report (a 
copy of which is attach attached as Exhibit 2) are consistent with those in my 
February 16, 1996 memorandum, Exhibit 1. In 1998, the City was involved in a dispute 
with Cahoon Maxfield Irrigation Company, which claimed, among other things, that the 
City was in breach of its exchange agreement with that company. The language quoted 
from my memorandum by Big Ditch refers to the City's effort to avoid a possible claim 
of default by acknowledging the City's present ability to deliver the amount of water for 
which Cahoon Maxfield had originally contracted. The quoted language described the 
City's response to threats made in litigation involving issues which were later settled. 
9. Finally, Big Ditch attaches to its memorandum as Exhibit O a paper 
presented by me at the Intermountain Section of the American Waterworks Association 
annual conference, September 17, 1993. Here again, Big Ditch takes my language out 
of context as if to suggest a meaning I did not intend. The statement made in my paper 
was made in the same context as those in my memoranda to the mayor. That is, that 
the language in the exchange agreements describing the City's obligations has not 
been changed. During my tenure with the City our intention was to maintain the 
physical delivery capacity necessary to meet the terms of the exchange agreements, at 
{00044773-2} 
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least until the courts confirm that the City's delivery obligations under the agreements 
have diminished, so no one could argue that the City was in default under any of those 
agreements. 
10. In its planning and expenditures, including but not limited to its exchange 
of Utah Lake water with the Metropolitan Water District, Salt Lake City has relied upon 
a continuation of the historical diminution in the amount of water called for by Big Ditch 
and the City's other exchange partners. 
11. Further affiant sayeth naught. 
Dated this 23rd day of January 2009. 
4A OHU tttfj^: 
LEROY W. HPOTON, JR. V v - ^ _ J 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of January 2009. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
NOTAftY PUBLIC 
OAWMM. HALES 
40*5 t o y * Kli*ro#Y Cjrcfc 
My Cbflvntetion €xp*r«* 
Jtbruarv 3. 2009 
mrcwvTMt 
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PHILLIP E. LOWRY (6603), 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH (3752), and 
ELIJAH L. MILNE (11171), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, P.C. 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 1248 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone (801)373-6345 
Facsimile (801)377-4991 
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milnee@provolawyers.com 
Attorneys for Big Ditch Irrigation Co. 
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Our File No. 28499-2 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BIG DITCH IRRIGATION COMPANY, et 
al., 
Defendants. 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM 
SUPPORTING BDIC'S MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT RE: 
ESTOPPEL AND MODIFICATION 
Case No. 070903735 
Judge Robin W. Reese 
Big Ditch Irrigation Company here files this supplemental memorandum supporting its 
motion for partial summary judgment now pending before the Court. The sole reason for filing this 
memorandum is to bring to the Court's attention a series of documents recently produced by the City 
in discovery. BDIC here requests that the Court grant it permission to file this memorandum, based 
/ 
on the fact that the documents were only produced by the City in the last few weeks, well after the 
late December filing of BDIC's motion and the City's filing of its cross-motion. 
Facts Surrounding the Document Production 
The parties have agreed to stay discovery in this matter pending the outcome of the pending 
motion, except for one category of documents: internal correspondence and records on water right 
issues maintained by the City. The City provided these documents in a chronological file of about 
20 bankers boxes, and invited the defendants to cull these boxes for anything of interest to them. 
This process began on February 2,2009, and ten days later the defendants concluded the process of 
marking the desired documents. The City then produced copies of the approximately 2000 pages 
of marked documents, with redactions for privilege and confidentiality, on February 23. The 
defendants then scanned and reviewed the documents, and now submit certain of those documents 
to the Court for its review. 
The documents demonstrate the City's state of mind vis-a-vis its exchange agreements. 
Specifically, they show that the City took a legal position that its obligations were diminishing, and 
did not have a reasonable mistaken factual belief that those obligations indeed had diminished (the 
City mentions frequently the fact that the delivery obligations were fixed and could remain so if its 
legal challenges failed). They also demonstrate the City's aggressive policy of forcing its position 
on its exchange partners and other canyon water users. 
The documents are attached, with appropriate highlighting, in this order: 
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1. On December 12, 1997, Leroy Hooton sent a memo to Salt Lake City Mayor 
Corradini in which he stated that the pending dissolution of an exchange partner was hopefully the 
beginning of a trend. 
2. On August 8, 1997, Leroy Hooton sent a memo to Mayor Corradini, wherein he discussed 
the imminent appointment of a new river commissioner. He did not like the possibility of irrigators 
outnumbering the cities on a new committee designed to replace the commissioner, since this might 
mean the irrigators might try to renegotiate the exchange agreements. 
3. In an essay describing the City's water rights and water use history, Leroy Hooton notes that 
certain exchange agreements required specified quantities of free water. 
4. On August 14,1998, Leroy Hooton wrote a memo to Mayor Corradini describing the offer 
by the City to purchase the Cahoon and Maxfield Irrigation Company. He cites the precedents the 
agreement could create, all helpful to the City, especially the precedent that the City's delivery 
obligation has diminished over time because of urbanization. 
5. On January 28,2000, Leroy Hooton wrote Mayor Anderson a memo in which he stated that 
negotiations with Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch had commenced. He admits that exchange 
agreements with the company that provide a fixed amount of water. 
6. On May 1,1998, Leroy Hooton wrote a memo to Mayor Corradini in which he acknowledged 
that the Maxfield Cahoon Exchange Agreement contemplated a fixed exchange amount. 
7. On August 5,1998, Leroy Hooton wrote a memo the Salt Lake City Council explaining that 
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the City in 1987 attempted to buy stock in the Cahoon company as a means of reducing its exchange 
obligations as irrigated lands were being urbanized. If the City reasonably believed that those 
obligations had already diminished, there would be no point in negotiating an agreement to effect 
that result. 
8. On January 19,1996, Leroy Hooton sent a memo to Mayor Corradini in which he stated the 
City's legal position: it would not cede any "water right" to the Silver Fork Pipeline Company to 
settle a lawsuit between the two parties. Mr. Hooton characterized the company representative as 
"dangerous" because he threatened to "reduce the City's hold on water and influence on development 
in the canyon." 
DATED this of March, 2009. 
^PHILLIP E. LOWRY, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Big Ditch Irrigation Co. 
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MAYOR 
OlRCCTon D E P A R T M E N T OT P U B L I C U T I L I T I E S 
W A T C H S U P P L Y A N D W A T E R W O R K S 
W A T E R R E C L A M A T I O N A N O S T O H M W A T C R 
Memorandum 
To: Mayor DeeDee Conradini 
From: LeRoy W. Hooton Jr. [Lfiw\f 
Date" December 12,1997 Vj 
Subject: Weekly Summary 1997 
• The Cahoon Maxfield Irrigation Company (boundary is nearly the same as the 
corporate limits of Murray City), held a stockholders meeting to discuss selling the 
company. The company has a law suit filed against Salt Lake City, claiming the City 
violated the terms of the exchange agreement, is claiming a breach under the terms of 
the agreement and is seeking to reclaim the company's Little Cottonwood Creek water 
rights. The violation stems from their claim that Utah Lake water is not suitable for 
irrigation purposes as required under the exchange agreement and that they illegally 
dissolved the Little Cottonwood Water Company. The litigation is in the discovery 
phase. The City has extensive water quality studies by Utah State University and Dr. 
Jurinak. They have no evidence that the water does not meet irrigation standards. At 
the stockholders meeting many stockholders stated that they wanted the water and 
that they did not have any problem with the quality, disputing the claim of the Board 
of Directors. The Directors also stated the reason that they should sell the company is 
that Murray City and Salt Lake City will take them over, and that they will need a 
quarter million dollars to fight the law suit. It appears that the company has one 
potential buyer, who at this time is unknown. If sold, this will present a complex 
situation, relative to the company's water right, the exchange agreement with Salt 
Lake City and the present lawsuit. Our engineering studies show that only 15 percent 
of the land irrigated under the company's water rights in the 1914 Morse decree are 
still available for irrigation, raising the issue of forfeiture. 
• Meeting with Judy Bell (Sandy City), Dave Ovard (SLCWCD), Nick Sefakis 
(MWDSLC) and LeRoy Hooton to talk about current water issues and the relationship 
between the four entities. Sandy City needs water to the Pepperwood area for 200 
high priced homes. They were going to build a new pipeline and distribution reservoir 
to serve this area; however, because the current MWDSLC master plan is not 
completed, Nick Sefakis has asked them not to construct the facilities until the master 
plan is completed and long-term decisions are made. Sandy City requested that an 
alternative temporary measure be taken to get water to the Pepperwood area by 
pumping water through the SLCWCD trans-valley pipeline (from the west side of the 
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valley to the east side), using MWDSLC water treated at the Jordan Valley Water 
Treatment Plant. Sandy would pay the cost of installing the pumping capacity to 
accomplish this. It would require Salt Lake City giving up, on a temporary basis, 10 
mgd per day treatment capacity in the Jordan Valley Treatment Plant and the Jordan 
Aqueduct. Currently Salt Lake City has this excess capacity, and I agreed to allow a 
study to determine the feasibility and cost of the project. However, I stressed that this 
would be temporary, probably until the year 2002, when the existing conjunctive 
management agreement expires. Also in the course of the discussion, it was noted that 
Sandy City and Salt Lake City are implementing conflicting water use policies, and 
that this could be a problem when funding the MWDSLC facilities under the new 
master plan. Currently Salt Lake City is trying to reduce peak demand in an effort to 
avoid or defer new capacity, while Sandy City's policy is to use water freely and have 
a green city. 
The State Division of Parks and Recreation approved a Mormon Trail (Big Mountain 
to Little Dell) Project from the Non-Motorized Trails Program in the amount of 
$72,450. This will require 50 percent matching funds. This will improve the Mormon 
Trail as part of the Little Dell Recreation Project. We will have to decide if this is a 
City funded match or if the Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake City should 
participate. This will greatly enhance the trail system associated with Little Dell 
Recreation. 
Salt Lake District Ranger Mike Sieg has announced that he is leaving his present 
position to be the assistant director of the inventory and monitoring institute at Fort 
Collins, Colorado. This is a blow to our partnership with the USFS in managing the 
Wasatch Canyon watershed. Mr. Sieg's superior, National Forest supervisor Bemie 
Weingardt has widely different management objectives. Mr, Sieg has recognized the 
special nature of the local canyon watersheds and controlling the expansion of 
recreation and commercial ski resorts. Also, he has administered the forestlands in 
harmony with Salt Lake City. At a time that the City is concerned over the pressures 
on the canyons, this is not good news for us, and may signal more difficult times in 
protecting the city's water supply quality. 
We are finalizing the final agreement with the Brown & Sanford Irrigation Company, 
whereby the Company will turn over all its water rights in Big Cottonwood Creek to 
Salt Lake City for a small amount of free culinary water credit. After one year, the 
Company will dissolve. In modern times thisjs the first irrigation compan^having an 
exchange agreement wi thf f iM J l i § & l 
CC: Brian Hatch 
Roger Black 
QIRCCTOR MAYOR 
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 
WATER SUPPLY AND WATMWORKB 
WATER RECLAMATION AND STORMWATCR 
Memorandum 
To: Mayor DeeDee Corradinii 
From: LeRoy W. Hooton, Jr. { J J Q 4 4 K ^ 
Date: August 8, 1997 \_) 
Subject: Weekly Summary Report 
• The State Engineer is in the process of selecting a River Commissioner to replace Ed 
Higbee who retired July 1,1997 (Mayors weekly summary June 20,1997). In an effort to 
fill the position the State Engineer has proposed a committee consisting of 5 irrigators 
(Company representatives) and 3 cities^ Salt Lake City, Sandv and Murray. ;^J§ 
"" * " ^ ^ Also, the 
irrigators are either in litigation with the city or have an agenda contrary to the cities. 
In the first meeting there was indications that the irrigators were going to use the 
committee as a means of renegotiating their exchange agreements to gain back their 
mountain water. We don't want to offend the State Engineers, but it may be necessary 
to strongly oppose the Committee or file a law suit if the decision process is turned over 
to the irrigators. 
A news add was published in both newspapers on Sunday August 3, regarding 
watershed protection. The same message is available in Spanish at our office. 
One hundred department employees were selected to participate in AWWA's QualServe 
Self-Assessment Survey. The results of the survey should be available to the 
department in approximately one month. After the results have been analyzed, the next 
step in the QualServe program is a peer review which will take place in November and 
provide further information to develop an "Agenda for Improvement". 
There is a small group of Individuals lead by Dan Crow from Dallas Texas, who has a 
dry lot in Mule Hollow and Judith Lamb-Lion (the Vaniers) who own Maxfield Lodge 
that are trying to organize a special improvement district within unincorporated Salt 
Lake County to provide municipal water service (Mayor's weekly summary June 6, 
1997). Crow and the Vaniers are in dispute with Salt Lake City over water rights in Big 
Cottonwood Canyon. Our careful research of the facts, indicate that they do not have 
water rights. However they have joined with a few others in contacting the County 
Commission about forming a special district. They argue that the city charges county 
user 150% of city rates and can only provide surplus water. They have been very vocal. 
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We have talked to Commissioner Horiuchi and plan to meet with the other two 
commissioners to educate them on this issues. Alan Dayton commissioner staff member 
has prepared a memo to the County Commission providing historical background of 
retail water service to Salt Lake County's east side unicorporated area, and concluded 
that this was not a viable proposal. Nevertheless we should expect continued efforts 
from Dan Crow and the Vaniers. 
On August 6,1997, we met with the County Attorney in response to a Notice and 
Order on Superior Soft Water Company. This meeting was an initiative to prevent 
cross connections as a consequence of improperly installed point of use and water 
softening devices in private homes. A lawsuit was filed this spring by a homeowner 
when Superior Soft Water installed a reverse osmosis device in their home in violation 
of Plumbing Code regulations. When this potential for system contamination was 
identified by our department, we asked the Health Department to bring suit against the 
installer as well. A Notice and Order was issued to Superior Soft Water to address 
faulty installation procedures. During this meeting it was determined that the 
company's protocols would be altered and they would provide additional training to 
their installers on cross connections. This would be monitored by a signed stipulation. 
The City County Health Department offered to conduct a pollution prevention 
workshop with this industry to provide industry wide conformance with the plumbing 
code in these plumbing installations. 
The Cross Connection Control Division, in a TQ effort, is reaching out to county-wide 
building inspectors in an attempt to be notified of new backflow preventors installed in 
the city's service area. In a meeting with the Salt Lake County a proposed protocol was 
agreed to that would provide us with inspection reports on all new units. This will be a 
major improvement in the current county process. There was agreement that the 
residential sector has the biggest problems with backflow preventors. Additional 
meetings with plumbing suppliers, and do it yourself suppliers will be held to encourage 
maintaining stock in approved plumbing devices. A flyer with installation 
recommendations will be developed for the homeowner within Salt Lake City and Salt 
Lake County. 
Attached are copies of water and garbage mail stuffers. 
cc: Roger Black 
Brian Hatch 
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Salt Lake City Water Rights 
By LeRoy W. Hooton, Jr. 
Early Water Rights 
Salt Lake City's water rights date back to the first day the Mormon Pioneers arrived in 1847. 
City Creek was diverted as the settlement's water supply, and for the first 35 years was the only 
major source of water. During the early history of the city, some water was used from Red Butte 
and Emigration Creeks; however, in 1862, the United States Army intercepted Red Butte stream 
to provide water to Fort Douglas, and subsequently gained ownership. Emigration Creek only 
produces a small amount of water, and even during the early years, it was highly polluted and 
unsuitable for potable use because cattle grazed in the canyon watershed. Today, Salt Lake City 
has water rights in Emigration Creek, but it is used only for water supply to Liberty Park pond, 
and to meet exchange agreement obligations. In 1892, a tunnel was driven in Emigration Canyon 
that provides water to the city's distribution system. 
Utah Lake Water Rights 
In 1879, the city needed additional water to meet its growth demands. Also, higher diversions 
from City Creek to the Avenues were drawing water away from the newly annexed areas on the 
city's southern border. The waters of Parleys, Mill Creek and the Cottonwoods had already been 
appropriated by individuals and mutual irrigation companies, forcing the city to look to Utah Lake 
and the Jordan River for additional water. Pumping technology had not been developed to a point 
that directly pumping water from Jordan River could be accomplished; therefore, it was 
necessary to go up-stream to the Jordan Narrows to an elevation that would allow flow by gravity 
from the river to the Salt Lake City. Brigham Young supported the canal with a dream of enough 
water to support a population of 100,000. The 28-mile Jordan and Salt Lake City Canal was 
constructed and placed into service in 1882, when the Utah Lake and Jordan River water flowed 
from the Narrows to the confluence of City Creek at Eagle Gate. The city's water rights in Utah 
Lake were confirmed by the 1901 Morse Decree and the 1909 Booth Decree. Salt Lake City has 
1/5 ownership of the Lehi Pumping Plant at the outlet of Utah Lake. 
Exchange Agreements 
Utah Lake water never proved satisfactory for potable use, and the city continued to seek out new 
water rights. The farmers who appropriated the canyon water rights were interested in acquiring 
stored water that would insure a firm water supply to guard against water short years and water 
for irrigation during the late summer growing season. The canyon streams flowed high during the 
spring months, but by late July, August, September and early October diminished in flow and 
there was not enough water to mature their crops. The city, on the other hand, needed higher 
quality water that was suitable for potable use and that was at an elevation that would flow by 
gravity into a pressurized distribution system to its inhabitants. This mutual need led to the 
exchange agreements, whereby the city exchanged its Utah Lake water through the Jordan and 
Salt Lake City Canal to the formers for their canyon waters. The first exchange was with the 
Parleys Water Users in 1888. Subsequently, other exchanges were made with the farmers owning 
Mill Creek, Big Cottonwood and Little Cottonwood water rights. Most of the city's exchange 
agreements were entered into between 1888 and 1936. In 1924, the city acquired rights in the 
East Jordan Canal and extended the canal from the Union area to 6200 South above Highland 
Drive where a pumping plant and pipeline were constructed to pump water to the higher benches 
to exchange water with the higher elevation ditch companies. 
In an average year the surface water rights in the Wasatch Canyons streams yield about 60,000 
acre-feet of water supply that makes up approximately 60 percent of Salt Lake City's current 
water consumption. 
There are 44 different exchange agreements with each agreement different—some requiring the 
cit^^ro^depotablewt^hrough a distribution system at city rates, ^ ^^ers jequir^ ' 
MBMBHBMBBBPB^ Court decisions have confirmed that Salt Lake City 
holds title to the waters under the various exchange agreements, conditional upon meeting the 
terms of the agreements (Green Ditch Water Company v Salt Lake City, and the State of Utah 
and Ellerbeck v Salt Lake City). Administering the agreements is difficult due to the language of 
the agreements and the interpretation taken by both parties. Over the years disputes have arisen 
resulting in a number of law suits. 
Salt Lake City Storage Projects 
Water storage was needed by the city to capture spring snowmelt run-off for release into the 
city's distribution system later in the summer when the stream flows diminished to their normal 
lows. The city built 3,000 acre-foot Mt. Dell dam in Parleys Canyon and two smaller dams at the 
head waters of Big Cottonwood between 1914 and 1917. These provided storage, but they were 
inadequate to meet the city's growing population and water demands. The large storage needed 
would be found with the Provo River Project. 
The Provo River Project 
A Water Advisory Board was formed in 1928 to recommend a water supply development plan 
that would provide the city a firm water supply to support a population of 300,000. The Board 
recommended, among other things, that the city participate in the Provo River Project ("PRP") 
that included the 152,000 acre-foot Deer Creek Reservoir in Provo Canyon, but the city could not 
enter into a long-term repayment contract with the Bureau of Reclamation. To overcome this, in 
1935 the city formed the Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake City ("MWDSLC") to 
participate in the PRP. The water rights associated with the PRP are held by the Provo River 
Water Users Association and consist of surplus flows in the Provo River and transmountain 
diversions from the Weber and Duchesne Rivers. MWDSLC has subscribed to 61.7 percent of 
the PRP, yielding on an annual basis 61,700 acre-feet of water. MWDSLC constructed a 113 
mgd water treatment plant in 1960 to treat both PRP water and the city's Little Cottonwood 
water. The plant is located on Danish Road just west of Wasatch Boulvard. In 1990, Sandy City 
was annexed into MWDSLC, making it a two city district. The Board of Directors is appointed 
by the City Councils of Salt Lake City (5 members) and Sandy City (2 members). 
Artesian Basin 
During the drought of the early 1930s the city, on an emergency basis, acquired water rights in 
the Artesian Basin south of the city, in an area now known as the Mick Riley Golf Course and 
between 900 East and 1300 East, north of Van Winkle Express Way. A pipeline, distribution 
reservoir and pumping plant were constructed to deliver this water into the city's distribution 
system at 2550 South 300 East. Today, this is a key water supply and is essential in providing 
water supply and fire protection to downtown Salt Lake City. 
Ground Water 
Also, during the early 1930s the city acquired ground water rights and began drilling wells to tap 
the Salt Lake valley's ground water aquifers. The city has perfected about 18,000 acre-feet of 
ground water supply. These wells are used for peak demand only during the summer months. 
The city has also acquired water rights in Mt. Olympus spring and two springs in Mill Creek. 
Central Utah Protect 
In order to meet the city's future water supply needs and to deliver water to the Northwest 
Quadrant, the city requested MWDSLC to petition for 20,000 acre-feet of water from the Central 
Utah Project ("CUP") to be delivered through the Jordan Aqueduct at 3800 West and 2100 
South. During the 1980s, the city constructed the 12 million gallon Victory Road Reservoir and 
connecting large supply mains within the Northwest Quadrant to distribute water from the CUP. 
The CUP'S water rigjits are held by the Central Utah Water Conservancy District, and MWDSLC 
has an approved petition for 20,000 acre-feet of water to be delivered beginning in 2005, in 5000 
acre-foot increments over a 4 year period. MWDSLC has ownership of 2/5th of the Jordan 
Valley Water Treatment Plant, Terminal Reservoir and Jordan Aqueduct. 
Little Dell Dam and Lake 
In 1987, the United States Corps of Engineers, MWDSLC and Salt Lake County entered into an 
agreement to build Little Dell Dam and Lake Project ("Little Dell"). Under an interlocal 
agreement, Salt Lake City Public Utilities will operate and maintain the 20,500 acre-foot reservoir 
that was completed in 1992. The annual yield of Little Dell is 7,900 acre-feet of water. Carry-
over storage will provide water during water short years. The water rights are owned in part by 
Salt Lake City and in part by MWDSLC. 
Water Rights and Water Demand 
According to the 1997 Water Master Plan, Salt Lake City and MWDSLC have water rights in 
excess of 130,000 acre-feet of water, enough to meet the city's water supply needs well past 
2025. 
Surplus Water Sales Contracts 
After World War II, there were growth pressures in eastern unincorporated Salt Lake County 
within the city's exchange agreement service area. The city had the water supply and the 
infrastructure to serve the area, and there was no other entity in a position to do so. Under the 
State Constitution, a city can only sell water outside its corporate limits on a surplus basis. 
Supreme Court decisions acknowledged the city's right to sell water under its exchange 
agreements to anyone it wanted (Salt Lake City v Mcfarland. 1954 and Green Ditch v Salt Lake 
City. 1964). The city decided to sell its surplus water outside its corporate limits and now 
provides water to 30,000 connections, serving a population of over 140,000 people in the 
county. Likewise, since 1945 the city has entered into surplus sales contracts with cabin owners, 
ski resorts and the town of Alt a within the canyons. 
Watershed Protection and Water Rights 
Early in the city's history the necessity to protect the quality of its water supply was recognized. 
One of the first ordinances passed by the City Council in 1851 was to protect the quality of the 
water flowing in City Creek. In the latter part of the nineteenth century the City Council 
established the policy of purchasing watershed property to protect water quality. This policy 
continues today, as in 1989 the City Council raised water rates to provide for a "Watershed and 
Water Rights Purchase Fund." Each water bill is assessed a 25 cent surcharge to provide the 
revenue for this fund. Salt Lake City currently owns about 19 percent of the canyon watersheds, 
or 23,600 acres. 
In 1914 and 1934, the United States Congress passed legislation to manage the federal lands in 
conjunction with Salt Lake City to protect the canyon watersheds and Salt Lake City's drinking 
water supply. As a first class city, Salt Lake City has extraterritorial jurisdiction over its 
watersheds outside its corporate limits. Under this granted authority, the city has enacted 
ordinances to protect its watersheds from City Creek on the north to Little Cottonwood on the 
south. In 1988, the City Council adopted the "Salt Lake City Watershed Management Plan," to 
direct the Department of Public Utilities in the management of the canyon watershed areas. 
In 1991, after a 10 year moratorium on new water sales contracts within the canyons, the City 
Council passed the "Canyon Water Sales Ordinance, No.23,M governing new water sales contracts 
in the canyons. New sales contracts are now limited to springs meeting certain criteria. Further, it 
prohibits the enlargement of existing contract quantities. The ordinance also directed the 
Department of Public Utilities to oppose the importation of water, installation of surface water 
treatment and the drilling of wells. 
Growing Pressures to Develop the Wasatch Canyons 
There has been a steady increase in pressure to develop the canyon due to the population growth 
along the Wasatch Front. Dry lots worth hundreds of dollars, if their owners can obtain water, can 
be elevated in worth to hundreds of thousands of dollars. The ski resorts are constrained by their 
water sales contracts with the city, and they are viewed as a hindrance to their desire to expand. 
The economic gain in acquiring a water right in the canyon has a bearing on the current challenge 
to the city's water rights. Those who have water sales agreements with the city for $15 per year 
per cabin, certainly must have some motivation to spend $30,000 to $50,000 in attorney's fees to 
challenge the city. In Little Cottonwood Canyon, a lot with water recently sold for $400,000. 
The trend to is "Park Cityize" the Wasatch Canyons. Only those developable properties owned 
by the federal government and Salt Lake City are safe from development; although ski resorts on 
Forest Permits are in a constant state of expansion. The city will continue to be challenged into 
the future. It will take steady and forceful resolve to continue to protect the city's water rights 
and the quality of its drinking water. 
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Maxfield Irrigation Company, et aL that the City won in the Third Judicial District 
Court but was reversed in the Supreme Court. 
It remains to be seen where this offer will go. Further negotiations may be necessary, 
but we are hopeful that we can successfully conclude this purchase with favorable 
terms. 
2. There are continued discussions with the South Valley Reclamation Plant and the Salt 
Lake City County Health Department to have Salt Lake City run their samples at the 
reclamation plant's laboratory. 
3. Negotiations continue with the Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District, Sandy 
City, Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake City and Salt Lake City to provide 
Sandy City capacity in the Conservancy District's 11400 South trans-valley pipeline. 
Metropolitan Water District would pay up $500,000 to install the necessary pumping 
equipment to provide Sandy City water from the Jordan Valley Water Treatment 
Plant in Buffdale, and Salt Lake City would give up an equal amount of capacity in 
the water treatment plant and Jordan Aqueduct until the year 2005. 
3. Received word from the USFS that they have made a formal request to the Army 
Corp of Engineers in Carson City, to conduct the EIS necessary to remove the Red 
Butte Dam in Red Butte Canyon east of the University of Utah. Their decision was 
based on the fact that no local government would assume ownership of the dam. 
Apparently the Skrull Valley Band of the Goshute Indian Tribe has shown interest in 
the dam and the surrounding watershed. The USFS seems willing to discuss the 
surrounding forest land, but doesn't seem keen on the idea. 
4. Received a letter from UDOT agreeing to close the view area on 1-80 above Mt. Dell 
Reservoir and south of the Mt. Dell Golf Course. We had requested that they install 
suitable sanitation facilities for the public or close the facility down. It was closed on 
July 20. 1998. 
5. Due to a heavy growth of pond weed on the City's Oil Drain - Sewage Canal, we 
agreed to participate with Salt Lake County Flood Control and the Mosquito 
Abatement to apply Magnicide herbicide to open up the channel. (We use this 
herbicide on the East Jordan and Jordan Salt Lake City Canals as a means of 
controlling the weed.) The City when it acquired the right-of-way for the Sewage 
Canal, is obligated to prevent flooding of the adjacent farmland or pay damages. 
Also this is the major outfall for the Reclamation Plant effluent and stormwater run-
off from Rose Park. All parties in the regulatory loop where notified of the 
application. However, we did get a call from EPA regarding the application. There 
appears to be something in EPA's mind regarding reclassification of the canal that 
could affect the Reclamation Plant's NPDES permit limitations. If the standards are 
raised, it will be costly to the City in changing the plant's treatment processes. 
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To: iv* * Ky Anderson 
From: Hooton, Jr. L i U p t ^ 
Date: January 28,2000 \ y 
Subject: Mayor's Weekly Summary 
1. Watershed Property Purchase Negotiations: A joint meeting with Property 
Management and Public Utilities was held on January 21,2000 with Rory C. Mui ( 
Vice President United Park City Mines Company (UPCMC), regarding the City 
purchasing 155.41 acres of watershed property in Big Cottonwood Canyon. The 
property, named Willow Heights, is developable property across the highway from 
Solitude Ski Resort. This property has been identified as the number one priority for 
acquisition in Big Cottonwood Canyon because of its large-scale development 
potential. Mr. Murphy indicated that UPCMC has a number of smaller parcels, 
making their total holdings in the canyon about 190 acres. Salt Lake City has made 
an offer, based on an appraisal without water of $960,000. The watershed property 
would be purchased from the dedicated "Watershed and Water Rights Acquisition 
Fund." (Revenues are from a $0.50 surcharge on all water bills.) 
Mr. Murphy said that WPCMC's Board of Directors rejected Salt Lake City's offer 
price, believing that it is too low. He claimed: 1) That they believe that they can get 
water to the area for development, 2) The sewerline passes through the property for 
easy access and 3) The appraisal did not take into account the commercial 
development of Solitude Ski Resort that raises the value of the surrounding area. (The 
appraisal was make in 1997 before the Solitude commercial development was under 
construction). In terms of compensation, he asked if Salt Lake City would trade 
water rights from the Ontario Tunnel. The answer was no. He also asked for 2 water 
connections on the property. The answer was no. We disputed his claim that water 
could be obtained for the property. WPCMC is not interested in working with the 
Nature Conservancy since their financial position is such that a tax credit would not 
be beneficial. The meeting concluded with Mr. Murphy saying that he would make a 
counter offer in 30 days 
2. MTBE Inquiries: A report was aired on CBS's "60 Minutes" on MTBE, the acronym 
for Methyl tertiary butyl ether. The Department has received some calls regarding the 
telecast, including one from reporter Brent Israelsen, Salt Lake Tribune. The gasoline 
additive, intended to clean up automobile air emissions, is now a problem to the 
nation's drinking water, according to the story line. It was described as T h e biggest 
environmental crisis of the next decade." First found in the ground water supply in 
Santa Monica,'California four years ago, today it affects about 20 percent of the 
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nation's urban wells. It contaminates the groundwater supply through leaking 
gasoline storage tanks. The Oxygenated Fuel Program was implemented by USEPA 
in 1992 in response to requirements of the 1990 Clean Air Act passed by Congress 
and signed by President Bush. The use of oxygenates in gasoline is required only in 
those areas of the United States that have air quality problems. 
Salt Lake City has done some limited testing for MTBE. Four wells located along the 
east bench were tested in 1996 and no MTBE was detected. In 1999, Salt Lake City 
participated in an American Water Works Research Foundation (AWWARF) project, 
entitled "National Assessment of MTBE Occurrence in Drinking Water." Water was 
sampled and tested from Big Cottonwood Creek with no detection of MTBE. 
Oxygenated additives have not been required in gasoline sold in Salt Lake County. 
Therefore, the chances of this contaminate polluting Salt Lake City's wells is 
unlikely. The testing so far confirms this. It is apparent that national testing 
requirements will be promulgated in the near future. With testing and regulations, 
more will be known about this new environmental threat. 
3. Watershed Noxious Weed Ordinance: As part of the *99 Canyon Master Plan, a 
herbicide ordinance is to be prepared to identify water-safe chemicals that can be 
used in the watershed canyons. A panel of experts from the various regulatory 
agencies, Forest Service and private sector has been meeting to gather technical data 
for the ordinance. The panel includes Frank Nambrosky, (City-County Health); Earl 
Jackson, (USU Extension); Ira Brickford and Wayne Grzymkowski, (UDOT); Clark 
Burgess, (Department of Agriculture); Dan Jiron, (Forest Service); Bob Olsen (Bug 
Busters); and Florence Reynolds representing Salt Lake City. The composition of the 
group was intended to capture the best information available on the herbicide issue. 
Besides addressing the type of chemical acceptable for use, the group is also 
recommending the appropriate application method. The group is intending to develop 
GIS mapping of the watershed area where the application method and herbicide 
selection could be indicated. Another meeting is scheduled for March 21, where 
these maps will be discussed further. An MOU for the parties to sign is being 
developed. The purpose of the MOU is to demonstrate expert support for the 
decisions made in the group. 
4. Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake Citv (MWDSLC) Meetine: On January 25. 
2000 the MWDSLC Board of Directors heard a presentation from Rick Giardina & 
Associates, Inc. on potential "impact fees" that may be considered by Salt Lake City 
and Sandy City to finance each entity's share of the MWDSLC Master Plan. Based 
on the legislation, Salt Lake City's share of new water treatment and conveyance 
costs can be allocated to new growth, making the impact fee a viable source of 
revenue to fund in part Salt Lake City's share of the cost. According to Sandy City, 
they are not going to grow much more, and the capacity they need is to replace 
existing capacity (and water supply). Salt Lake City's share of the new capacity is 
estimated to be $106.3 million (excluding debt costs) and based on potential new 
hook-ups could charge up to $4,226 per residential equivalent connection to recover 
the capital costs. It was agreed that the two cities would have to make thr da IMIHI to 
use the impacl fee as a means of financing the new capital facilities 
5 Change Application Before the State Engineer: Fublir Utilities lias tiled a Change 
Application on Water Right a24006 to change the nature of use of 41.9858 cfs or 
11,953.59 acre-feet of water to municipal use based on stock ownership in the East 
Jordan Irrigation Company. This culminates about 5 years of effort to protect Salt 
Lake City's water rights tied to this mutual irrigation company. The City originally 
acquired stock in the East Jordan Irrigation in 1924 as part of a condemnation action 
to gain access to the East Jordan Canal and subsequently acquired additional shares 
over the years. The water right associated with the stock was* in the name of the East 
Jordan Irrigation Company and was subject to adjudication and shrinkage as the 
farmland that the mother water right was tied to disappeared through urbanization. 
Public Utilities worked with the Company and other shareholders to change the 
Company's by-laws to allow a different classification of stock (M-Class) that could be 
in the name of a municipality and thus protected for municipal use. The water right 
was deeded to Salt Lake City, and the Change Application completes the process. 
The public advertisement ended on January 13,2000. If there are no protests by other 
water users in the Utah Lake - Jordan River Drainage by February 2, the process will 
be completed. If there are protests, a hearing will be set by the State Engineer before 
he makes a decision. This is a precedent-setting means of converting stock ownership 
into a deeded water right 
6. Negotiations with the Big Cottonwood 1 anner Ditch Company (HC1): The BCT 
covers the area bounded by 4800 South on the north, Murray City on the west (900 
east) and 1-215 on the south and east. About 50 percent of die area is located within 
the newly incorporated city of Holladay. Salt Lake City entered into an exchange 
agreement with BCT in 1920 and amended the original agreement in 1967. The 
exchange agreement provides Salt Lake City the use of BCT's water rights in Big 
Cottonwood Creek (22 percent of the primary rights) in exchange for: l)Jij|i§ 
reserved by the BCT and 3) an obligation for the City to operate and maintain the 
water distribution system in which it delivers the reserved (free water) to the share 
holders. Over the years, the City's and BCT's relationship has been strained, as there 
have been numerous disagreements in the interpretation of the exchange agreements. 
In 1984, litigation culminated in favor of BCT. In 1988, the BCT approached the 
Public Utilities to negotiate their unused irrigation water that was declining due to 
urbanization. Negotiations for 10 years failed to produce agreement between the 
parties. Last year with the City's successful negotiations with the Brown & Sanford 
Irrigation Company and the Cahoon & Maxfield Irrigation Company, the BCT again 
initiated negotiations. On January 20,2000 after several meetings and exchange of 
written proposals, we again reiterated our negotiating position: 1) Salt Lake City 
would purchase BCT's canyon water rights and water distribution system, 2) Salt 
Lake City would folly incorporate BCT's water system into its own and make the 
necessary up-grades as part of the Public Utilities capital improvements program 
under an agreed upon schedule of improvements, and 3) The BCT's reserved (free) 
water will continue to be delivered to the stockholders under a new agreement. It is 
proposed that payment to BCT can be made through water credits over a period of 
time until the agreed upon purchase price is paid in full. The proposal will be 
presented at the annual stockholders meeting on February 1, 2000. 
7. Public Utilities Advisory Committee (PUAQ Action Items: On January 27,2000 the 
PUAC heard presentations on the growing strength of sewage reaching the City's 
wastewater treatment plant and a recommendation to change the sewer rate structure. 
This was a continuance of the subject that has been before the PUAC over the past 
year. It is also a City Council legislative intent to study the sewer rates to determine if 
there is equity among customer classifications. 
The current rate structure was adopted in 1981 and is based on water used during the 
winter months, when all of the consumption measured by the culinary water meter is 
discharged into the sanitary sewer system. During the winter months, there is no 
outside watering or air conditioning. In 1981, the City's wastewater treatment plant 
was hydraulically over loaded and violating its NPDES permit. The then new rate 
structure was deemed fair and equitable, the more water discharged to the sewer, the 
more the user paid. Also it encouraged and provided incentives to conservation and 
reduce the high flows to the wastewater treatment plant. The rate structure proved 
successful. Along with other measures, the flows were reduced from over 50 million 
gallons per day to 36 million gallons per day. This reduction postponed the need to 
construct another treatment plant, saving millions of dollars in capital expenses. This 
further aided in bringing the treatment plant into permit compliance. With additional 
process improvements the plant is now an award winning treatment facility. 
In the past 5 years there has been a substantial increase in the organic loading of the 
wastewater reaching the treatment plant due to the economic activity within Salt Lake 
City. The organic loading is measured in pounds per day of Biological Chemical 
Demand (BOD). The loading has doubled and if the trend continues, the plant will 
reach its capacity in approximately 2 years. Restructuring the rates, among other 
things, may slow the trend or hopefully reduce the current high loading values. The 
rate structure that is being recommended will include a waste strength component to 
the rate. This will increase the cost of sewer service to food processing businesses and 
restaurants that are now not paying for the extra strength waste they are discharging 
into the sanitary sewer system. In a revenue neutral rate restructuring, residential 
users will see a slight increase in the sewer bills; however, food processing and 
restaurants will see major increases. The PUAC recommended that we move forward 
with refining the rate restructuring and bring it back to them at their March meeting. 
Like the rate structure adopted in 1981, where the rates encouraged water 
conservation, it is believed that a waste strength rate in 2000 will encourage 
conservation that will defer costly new treatment facilities. 
CC: Rocky Fluhart 
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I o: Mayor DeeDee Corradini 
From: LeRoy W. Hooton, Jr LixJf^W 
Date: May 1, 1998 V J 
Subject: Weekly Summary Report 
• -The Jordan Aqueduct along the west: side of the valley is the major water supply 
conveyance pipe for the Northwest Quadrant. Through the MWDSLC petition for 20,000 
acre-feet of water from the Central Utah Project, the district gained 2/7th (28.6%) of the 
capacity in the Jordan Valley Water Treatment Plant and Jordan Aqueduct. This amounts 
to 50-mgd capacity. The Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District conducted a flow 
test on the aqueduct and found that the flow is 26% of design capacity. This reduces the 
City's capacity from 50 mgd to 37 mgd, a substantial decrease that could have an impact 
on the City's long-range water deliveries to the Northwest Quadrant. Some of the 
reduction is attributed to the need to pig (clean) the pipe, but a portion of the reduction is 
related to the Bureau of Reclamation design of the terminal reservoir that reduces the head 
by 50 feet. This design error cannot be made up. We are urging the SLCWCD to clean 
the pipe so that we can determine what flow we can depend on in the futux e 
— KSL-TV did a spot on the City Creek Water Treatment Plant sodium hypochlorite 
chlorination system. This system generates chlorine on-site by using salt, eliminating 
potential risk to the plant operators and the public in transporting, storing and handling 
chlorine gas. 
— Met with representatives of Save; Our Canyons and the Forest Service. The pui pose of 
the meeting was to open a dialogue with the Forest Supervisor Bernie Weingardt. The 
meeting was very productive providing an opportunity for each side to explain their 
position and to understand the other's. I think that it's fair to say that all the parties 
involved recognize that the canyons are on the threshold of enormous change. I think the 
most important aspect of the meeting was that Bernie heard first hand our concerns about 
the canyons and the forest's philosophy regarding 4-season ski resorts. He feels that he 
needs to include alpine slides etc. in the EIS process, but that this does not necessarily 
mean that they will be approved. We agree that the City and Forest Service need to be 
involved as partners in managing the canyons and forge a strong relationship as we go into 
the future. Additional meetings are planned. 
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— Met the water broker (Mr. Jacobs), his attorney and the attorney for the Cahoon & 
Maxfield Irrigation Company ("Company"). We have talked about allowing the transfer 
of 4600 acre-feet of UtahLake water for all the rights of the Company in Little 
^ ^ J J ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ I n turn the City receives about <M)00 acre-
feet of Little Cottonwood water on an average year. Our negotiating position is as 
follows: (I) We have an agreement and a plan to fully honor our commitment, and if the 
Company wants a new agreement to transfer water 30 miles south from the existing 
diversion points, they cannot shift the full burden on Utah Lake water and must take a 
reduction in the amount of water specified in their existing agreement. The City has the 
infrastructure to deliver irrigation water at the existing diversion points, but moving the 
point of diversion to Utah Lake is not possible without a reduction; (2) The Company's 
shareholders have voluntarily subdivided their land over the years and have stopped using 
the irrigation water, and the City has made available irrigation water to the extent of the 
amount required under the exchange agreement, but they have not taken it; (3) The City 
will only exchange wet Utah Lake water for wet Little Cottonwood water, not the paper 
water quantities contained in the 1921 exchange agreement when the area was all 
farmland; and (4) That Utah Lake water is fully satisfactory for irrigation purposes, as 
determined by data, experts and common practice. That their claim that the water is 
unsuitable is not supported by scientific facts. The negotiations did not go well. Jacobs 
says he wants more water, we said that we will not go beyond where we are now. We 
must be careful not to set a precedent that will affect the other City exchanges. 
— The Bureau of Reclamation has filed an application to appropriate 35,500 acre-feet of 
sewage effluent. We plan to protest the application, as we believe that it will interfere 
with Salt Lake City's sewage effluent. We currently have an application before the State 
Engineer for 50,000 acre-feet of water for power generating purposes, and have rights to 
the effluent under State Code Chapter 3c, Conservation and use of Sewage Effluent. 
— The Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake City Board of Directors held their 
monthly meeting and reviewed the Master Plan Cash-flow Analysis. The Master Plan if 
approved calls for $166,484,000 in improvements. Tax rates and water rates were 
discussed to finance the plan, future increases in O&M and cost of Central Utah Project 
water beginning in the 2005. The cash flow scenario included raising the tax rate from the 
present 0.0003 to 0.0005 and water rates from the present $85 per acre-foot to double 
that in the year 2000, and going to $200 per acre-foot by 2003. 
Representative David Jones attended the meeting. 
— EPA and the State DEQ met with the department and the City Attorney's office to 
discuss the Oil Drain and Sewage Canat to Farmington Bay. Roger Culter plans to discuss 
this at the Mayor's Monday staff meeting. 
- The mid-elevation snowpack water content in City Creek is at 400 percent and the 
upper elevation 200 percent. These numbers are high, but at this time not considered a 
threat. Based on run-off projections, the peak run-off should not exceed that of 1983 or 
1984, but does warrant watching, 
\ i'"e were notified that the fluoridation issue would be on the fall ballot. The issue will 
up during the summer to gain public support. It appears that we would have three 
years to equip our facilities at a capital cost of about one million dollars, if passed by the 
County's voters. 
—Water Assist appears to be helping more needy customers since the change in the 
criteria; providing assistance to those who are 150% of the poverty level and those who 
qualify for the County Tax Abatement program. As a result, the dollar amount of 
assistance so far in 1998 has more than doubled over the same time last year. Generally, 
the Water Assist's program fund spends only half the money taken in Last year, 1997, 
ended with $15,489.00 spent compared to $13,945.00 coming in So fat, in 1998, 
$4,587.00 has been spent compared to $3,106.00 coming in. 
CC: Brian Hatch 
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Memorandum 
To: Salt Lake City Council 
From: LeRoy W. Hooton, Jr 
Date: August 5, 1998 
Re: Cahoon & Maxfield Irrigation Company Negotiations to Purchase Assets 
Background: 
« Salt Lake City ("SLC") entered into an exchange agreement with the Cahoon & 
Maxfield Irrigation Company ("Cahoon & Maxfield") on March 28, 1921. 
• Cahoon & Maxfield has decreed water rights in Little Cottonwood Creek amounting 
to about 20 percent of the creek annual flow. 
• SLC, under the terms of the agreement, provides Cahoon & Maxfield specific 
amounts of replacement water during the irrigation season amounting to about 11,400 
acre-feet. 
• Based on the agreement, SLC has committed to serve culinary water to thousands of 
homes and businesses in Salt Lake City and Salt Lake County. 
• Based on recent diversion records, SLC has been delivering 4,700 acre-feet of 
exchange water to Cahoon & Maxfield; 3,000 acre-feet from Utah Lake water rights, 
and 1,700 acre-feet of Little Cottonwood Creek rights. 
• SLC in turn, on a 90 percent probability yield, receives about 5,000 acre-feet of Little 
Cottonwood Creek water for delivery into its municipal distribution system. 
HAYOH 
suit by Cahoon Maxfield (Civil No. 890902134CV) prevented this from happening. 
SLC won in Third Judicial Court, but lost at the Supreme Court. Therefore, SLC 
acquired 70 shares of stock, but they have not been transferred into the SLC's name. 
Currently according to an engineering study, 85 percent of the original land under 
irrigation is no longer being irrigated. 
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• Murray City has 96 shares in the company and Sandy City 50-1/2 shares. 
• Cahoon & Mafield filed a law suit on May 8, 1996 against SLC and Sandy City (Civil 
No. 960901051CV) claiming that SLC had breached the 1921 exchange agreement 
because the water quality of Utah Lake was not suitable for irrigation and that the 
Little Cottonwood Water Company was not dissolved properly by SLC and Sandy 
City and certain officers. The suit has moved forward in the discovery phase 
• On January 5, 1998 John Jacob made an offer to Cahoon & Maxfield to purchase the 
Company's water rights. The offer was for 11,400 acre-feet at $700.00 per acre-foot 
based on the actual amount of water transferred by change application approved by 
the state engineer to Eagle Mountain wells. $1,000 per acre-foot would be paid foi 
Little Cottonwood Creek water to Eagle Mountain's wells. 
• The Cahoon & Maxfield share holders "m a meeting held on December 10, 1997 voted 
authorization for the Board of Directors to explore the sale of the Company's assets 
• Mr. Jacob's, through his attorney Jim Ki irkut, made a formal proposal to SLC on Ji ily 
9,1998. The proposal consisted of an exchange of water, whereby Cahoon & 
Maxfield would convey its Morse Decree water rights in Little Cottonwood Creek to 
SLC and in turn SLC would convey 5,600 acre-feet of water under its primary storage 
rights in Utah Lake to Cahoon & Maxfield. Jacob would also convey 777 acre-feet of 
water (for year-round use) under the Amwest rights to the City in return for payment 
by SLC to Jacob of $621,000. 
s nroposal to exchange 
Jn August 3, 1998, the attorneys representing Cahoon & Maxfield, SLC and Sandy 
City sent a letter to Judge Hanson, requesting the law suit be put on hold pending an 
offer by SLC to purchase Cahoon & Maxfield's assets.. 
Negotiating principles: 
• SLC must protect and preserve its watei rights to meet its citizen's water supply 
needs and meet exchange agreement obligations. SLC provides drinking water to 
approximately 400,000 people in Salt Lake City and Salt Lake County through its 
municipal water distribution system. Enormous public expenditures have been made 
to build dams, conveyance systems, water treatment plants, distribution systems and 
acquire water rights. Nothing should be done to jeopardize SLC's ability to provide 
water to its present and/or future customers. 
• SLC's water rights in Utah Lake are essential in maintaining its water rights through 
exchange agreements with many other mutual irrigation companies, in Little 
Cottonwood, Big Cottonwood, Mill Creek and the Parleys Water Users. Over the 
years, SLC has developed an infrastructure to meet the exchange agreement 
obligations from various sources of supplies, including wells, direct stream diversions 
and canals. SLC has also purchased considerable stock in various mutual irrigation 
companies in which it has exchange agreements to lessen its obligation to deliver 
replacement water. SLCs existing water rights in Utah Lake by virtue of decreed 
rights and shares in the East Jordan Irrigation Company are critical to the continued 
fulfillment of its exchange obligations. SLC cannot meet its exchange obligations by 
transferring large volumes of its Utah Lake rights to others. Physically, the transfer 
disproportionately distorts SLCs ability to operate and deliver the exchange water by 
moving the point of diversion 25 miles away in Utah Lake. Under existing exchange 
agreements, the points of exchange diversions are to farmlands located in Salt Lake 
County to irrigate lands that the original decreed water right were affixed. SLC 
should not allow a change of point of diversion from these original diversion points. 
• The eastern part of Salt Lake County is being rapidly urbanized, replacing the 
farmlands once under irrigation. As the mutual irrigation companies recognize the 
loss of farmlands and the reduction of exchange water, they begin to look for ways to 
preserve their assets either by looking for a revenue stream by leasing the water or 
selling their assets as Cahoon & Maxfield has chosen to do. SLC will be faced in time 
with more and more of these kinds of transactions. Any exchange with Cahoon & 
Maxfield will set a precedent that others will demand; therefore what ever is decided 
here, will later be repeated with other exchange partners. 
Suggested Counter Proposal to Cahoon & Maxfield: 
• A joint offer from SLC, Sandy City and Murray City. SLC will acquire by deed 
Cahoon & Maxfield's water rights in Little Cottonwood Creek and terminate the 
existing 1921 agreement eliminating SLCs obligation to deliver exchange water 
from Utah Lake. Sandy City has 49.5 shares and Murray City 96 shares in Cahoon & 
Maxfield that gives them a water right or right to exchange water through SLCs 
exchange agreement with Cahoon & Maxfield. Under this proposal, Sandy City and 
Murray City will acquire water rights proportional to their stock ownership. 
Furthermore, Murray City is interested in certain portions of the ditch system for 
drainage purposes. 
• SLC will only recognize the amount of exchange water it has delivered to Cahoon & 
Maxfield based on the last 20-year period, or 4,700 acre-feet. SLC offers Cahoon & 
Maxfield, in exchange for the title of their decreed Little Cottonwood water rights 
$700 per acre-foot, or $3,290,000, less SLCs 70/3000Ul(2.3%) share, Sandy City's 
49.5/3000th (1.7%) share, and Murray City's 96/3000th(3.2%) share, or 7.2% 
adjusting the payment to $3,053,120 net cash. In this example, 3,000 shares are used, 
but it should be based on the actual number of shares in good standing which is 
estimated to be around 1,500. Therefore, these percentages and net payment will 
change slightly when SLC receives an actual accounting of shares. 
• Cahoon & Maxfield actually has less risk dealing with SLC and this offer, because 
Jacob's offer to purchase is based on the actual amount of water transferred to the 
Eagle Mountain wells, which will require a change application that could take a year 
to process, and there is a chance that there may be judicial review that could take 
years in court. Furthermore, there will be no reduction imposed on the transfer by 
the State Engineer, if Cahoon & Maxfield accepts SLC's offer. Cahoon & Maxfield 
will receive 100 percent of SLC's offer, whereby if there is a transfer to Utah Lake as 
proposed by Jacob, the volume transferred will be reduced to something less than the 
total applied for in the change application. 
! 
• Murray Cit> will negotiate with Cahoon & Maxfield for the ditch system 
• Murray City will acquire a water right to irrigation water in an amount equal to their 
ownership (96 shares, 3.2% of 4,700 acre-feet ~ 150 acre-feet during the irrigation 
season); also, SLC will enter into an agreement to provide additional irrigation wafer 
to Murray City for a negotiated price. 
• SLC will exchange with Sandy City a proportionate share of the Little Cottonwood 
creek water right based on its stock ownership (1.7% of 5,000 acre-feet = 85 acre-feet 
during the irrigation seasonl). Sandy City will have title to this water 
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To: Mayor Deedee Corradini 
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Date: January 19, 1996 V _ J 
Subject: Weekly Summary Report 
• Salt Lake City has been named in a law suit along with the other Salt Lake County 
canal companies over property located along Utah Lake at Pelican Point; Donald 
Ensign, et al v. Thelma Barnes . et gl. Several years ago the canal companies Board 
of Canal Presidents (which includes Salt Lake City) quit claimed the Pelican Point 
property, as the Canal Presidents no longer needed a pump station at this site, 
to Thelma Barnes, who claimed to be the current heir to the original property owner. 
Apparently Donald Ensign claims to be the heir. The Canal Board of Presidents 
entered a Stipulation and Motion for order of dismissal with prejudice. 
• 1 had a discussion with Bill Lapsley (Silver Fork Pipeline Company) regarding 
settling the Silver Fork law suit out of court. I made it clear that the City would only 
stipulate to contractual issues relative to the uninterruptibility of their water supply 
and rates. The City will not negotiate a "water right," It appears that from his 
comments that he is no longer interested in resolving the issues of concern to his 
stockholders, but rather as he put it, "to destroy the myth that Salt Lake City controls 
all the water in Big Cottonwood Canyon from ridge to ridge." His comments support 
my feeling that he i s S ^ f f i a n d is mot iva ted«df e ip»gCy§ * 6 » f t a a » 
and influence on development in the canyon. 
• Year-end wastewater data (see attached chart) indicate continued increase in sewage 
strength. The annual average influent BOD loading increased to 60,116 lb./day, an 
increase of 25% over the past year. Increased plant treatment capacity costing $5.1 
million over the past 3 years has kept ahead of the increase, improving plant 
performance by 29%, as measured by effluent BOD from 1993 through 1995. Had 
we not anticipated and moved forward with improvements, we would now have 
reached capacity and surely been out of compliance of the City's EPA NPDES permit 
limitations. We are currently conducting a master planning effort to determine future 
loadings and needed treatment facilities. 
• Met with Roger Black regarding the Liberty Park detention basin and 900 South 
stormwater project. We will be moving forward with meeting community councils, 
City Council members and citizens. 
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•We may have to delay the Twin Lake repair contact if the runoff 
projection worsens. We had planned not to store any water behind 
the dam; however, if water supply becomes critical, we may store 
water and postpone the repair work. 
•Use water from the Lower Boundary Springs in Mill Creek. 
• The Utah Olympic Planning Committee has indicated that they may get a variance on 
the cross country ski course to change the maximum elevation from 1800 meters to 
2000 meters. This will allow them to go higher into Dell Fork with the course. They 
would like to take Russ Hone, Canyon Watershed Supervisor to the Calgary site to 
familiarize him with this facility at their expense. Also, they again mentioned the 
area south of 1-80 and were told that we would rather they go to Provo Canyon than to 
consider this untouched area. They agreed and are now focused on the Dell Fork site. 
• Met with John Knudsen, State trails employee who proposed to extend the Mormon 
Trail from the Little Dell recreation project to Big Mountain under a grant. He also 
met with Renee Tanner regarding this matter. We did not object to pursuing his 
proposal. 
• Last July we received the results of a comprehensive sanitary survey of our water 
distribution system and water treatment plants by both the State and County water 
quality divisions. We have completed all the necessary improvements outlined in the 
survey report. It was necessary to request and have granted a number of exemptions 
for overflow and drain pipes from reservoirs and wells that are connected to storm 
drains which were built before the standards and are now difficult or impossible to 
comply with. These exemptions were deemed to be no threat to the public health. On 
January 5,1996 we received a letter which indicated we have a clean slate. This 
means that our water system is fully certified with no deficiencies. 
• Preliminary testing for Giardia and Cryptosporidium in our raw water sources 
indicate the presence of these organisms in all the sources of Big Cottonwood, 
Parleys and City Creek streams. The largest concentrations, as was expected, were in 
the unregulated Provo River with Giardia counts three times higher than the local 
canyon stream. Cryptosporidium was about the same. We have not found any of 
these organisms in the finished drinking water. 
cc: Brian Hatch 
Roger Black 
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Our File No 28,499-2 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY CORP., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BIG DITCH IRRIGATION CO , et al, 
Defendants 
OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
PROPOSED FINAL ORDER AND 
JUDGMENT 
Case No. 070903735 
Judge Robin W. Reese 
Big Ditch Irrigation Co ("Big Ditch") objects to the plaintiffs proposed Final Order and 
Judgment (dated July 22, 2009) for the following reasons: 
1. The plaintiff s proposed Final Order and Judgment is much more all-encompassing and 
far-reaching than that set forth in the Court's July 6, 2009 Memorandum Decision. Indeed, counsel 
for the plaintiff has admitted as much in his July 22,2009 email, which is attached hereto as "Exhibit 
A." In particular, almost all of pages 2 to 5 of the plaintiffs proposed Final Order and Judgment is 
language totally absent from the Court's Memorandum Decision which the plaintiff has apparently 
included in its proposed Final Order and Judgment for some unknown reason and purpose that should 
not be countenanced. Not only is this language superfluous, but it is also totally extraneous from that 
actually set forth and decided in the Court's Memorandum Decision. 
2. Likewise, paragraph 1, on pages 5 and 6, of the plaintiffs proposed Final Order and 
Judgment is much broader than anything set forth in the Court's Memorandum Decision. In 
particular, there does not appear to be anything in the Court's Memorandum Decision stating that 
"Big Ditch conveyed title to its Big Cottonwood Creek water right to Salt Lake City in the 1905 
Agreement." Nor does there appear to be anything in the Memorandum Decision stating that "Salt 
Lake City holds title to that right, as well as the other water rights utilized by Salt Lake City to meet 
its contractual commitments to Big Ditch under the 1905 Agreement." 
3. Paragraph 2, on page 6, of the plaintiffs proposed Final Order and Judgment is also 
much broader than anything set forth in the Court's Memorandum Decision. Not only does this 
paragraph fail to include certain language which is more favorable to Big Ditch than to the plaintiff, 
but it also claims (among other things) that the water at issue was "only" for irrigation, which claim 
(as well as others like it by the plaintiff) the Memorandum Decision does not support. Furthermore, 
rather than ruling that the plaintiff "is presently obligated only to deliver to Big Ditch water for the 
irrigation use by its shareholders on lands served by the Big Ditch system," as this paragraph states, 
the Court's Memorandum Decision states that "the Court . . . does not decide the more specific 
question of the precise amount of water which the City is now obligated to deliver." (Mem. Decision, 
at 1 n.6.) 
4. Paragraph 5, on page 7, of the plaintiffs proposed Final Order and Judgment is also 
broader than anything set forth in the Court's Memorandum Decision. In particular, there does not 
appear to be anything in the Court's Memorandum Decision stating that the plaintiff "holds title 
. . . to the other water rights it utilizes in its discretion to meet its contractual obligations to Big 
Ditch." 
5. Paragraph 6, on page 7, of the plaintiff s proposed Final Order and Judgment is totally 
extraneous from anything set forth in the Court's Memorandum Decision To be specific, there is 
nothing in the Memorandum Decision that addresses, concerns, or supports any part of paragraph 
6 of the plaintiffs proposed Final Order and Judgment. Instead, all of paragraph 6 appears to have 
been included by the plaintiff without reference whatsoever to any portion or part of the Court's 
Memorandum Decision. 
6. Paragraph 7, on page 7, of the plaintiffs proposed Final Order and Judgment also 
appears to be without support from the Court's Memorandum Decision. In particular, nothing in the 
Court's Memorandum Decision states that all of the defendants' counterclaims are dismissed "as a 
matter of law." Instead, this statement seems to be an attempt on the plaintiffs part to prevent 
appellate review of the facts in this case and to instead force any such review to be only of the law 
that may apply. 
Given the fact that the plaintiffs proposed Final Order and Judgment is far more 
encompassing and broader than the Court's actual ruling, as set forth in the Court's Memorandum 
Decision, the Court should refuse to sign and enter such proposed Final Order and Judgment. Instead, 
3 InfB 
the Court should sign and cause to be entered the more concise and accurate proposed Order and 
Judgment which Big Ditch has filed herewith for the Court's review and approval 
DATED this 2 2 day of July, 2009 
:iJAH L. MILNE, for 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Big Ditch Irrigation Co. 
d 
